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Smith v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company

United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina
Feb 11, 2003
Case No. 1:02CV00063 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 11, 2003)

Opinion

Case No. 1:02CV00063

February 11, 2003


MEMORANDUM OPINION


This case is before this Court on the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. [Doc. #12]. For the reasons set forth below, the Defendant's motion is GRANTED.

I.

The facts, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff are as follows: Kevin Smith has been employed at R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company ("RJRT") since November 19, 1996. Mr. Smith was originally hired in an entry level position, but was promoted three times within three years. Ultimately, he was promoted to plater operator. As plater operator, Mr. Smith was responsible for operating machinery that manufactures the copper plating on the printing cylinders used in the packaging and labeling printing process.

On October 26, 2001, Mr. Smith was in charge of running tank 1 and tank 2, which are used to plate the cylinders. There are three steps in the preparation of a cylinder: stripping, cutting, and plating. As usual, Mr. Smith was responsible for plating the cylinders. At 3:24 pm, Mr. Smith took a cylinder out of tank 2, and proceeded to wash and filter tank 2. Tank 1 was in use with another cylinder in it. Mr. Smith went to the break room around 3:30 pm, where Mr. Stimpson informed him that there was a hot cylinder. A hot cylinder is an industry term for a priority cylinder. Mr. Smith informed Mr. Stimpson that tank 2 was being filtered and tank 1 was in use.

At 3:45 pm, Kim Joyce, the Manager of Cylinder Services, called to check on the status of the cylinder. Mr. Smith informed her that the cylinder would be placed in the tank at 4:10 pm. Joyce called for a meeting between Mr. Stimpson, Mr. Smith, and herself. In the meeting they discussed the status of the cylinder and the delay. Mr. Smith stated to Mr. Stimpson that he knew how to do his job. The cylinder was not finished until 5:45 pm, causing a delay in production. As a result, Joyce referred the matter to Human Resources for investigation and determination whether any action should be taken against Mr. Smith.

On October 31, 2000, Mr. Smith complained to Human Resources Supervisor Lynn Crews that Joyce had harassed him. Mr. Smith told Crews that Joyce had publicly blamed him for the recent demotion of DeWayne Byrd, a department supervisor. Byrd had made a derogatory statement to one of Mr. Smith's co-workers, Matthew Tatum. Byrd told Tatum that people who wear their hair in braids like Mr. Tatum's should be out on the street and not working for the company. Mr. Smith, who also wore his hair in braids, encouraged Tatum to report Byrd's derogatory comment. As a result of Tatum's complaint, RJRT demoted Mr. Byrd from a supervisory position to an operations position.

Mr. Smith stated that another employee, Tony Cunningham, told him that Joyce had said Mr. Smith was a trouble maker. In response to Mr. Smith's complaint, Crews conducted an investigation into Joyce's behavior. Crews found that Joyce had simply announced that Mr. Byrd had been demoted, and had in no way implied that Mr. Smith was connected to his demotion. In addition, Crews found that Mr. Cunningham had just said hello to Mr. Smith and asked him, "Are you staying out of trouble?" Cunningham stated that it was a greeting and did not refer to Byrd's demotion. As a result of the investigation, Ms. Crews found that Joyce had not acted inappropriately with respect to Smith and no corrective action was taken.

On November 3, 2000, Steve Karr, the Director of Human Resources, was contacted by Mark Powell, Mr. Smith's senior supervisor, about Smith's agitated and hostile behavior on that morning. Mr. Karr recommended that Smith be referred to the Medical Department because the behavior could be the result of an unattended health or personal problem. According to company policy, in such a situation an employee is referred to the Medical Department. When Karr contacted the Medical Department, Nurse Holmes informed him that the Medical Department already needed to see Mr. Smith because his name had come up for reevaluation in the Industrial Vehicle Operation Certification due to his pre-existing problems with high blood pressure.

Mr. Smith was contacted by the Medical Department, but went to lunch before going to the department. When he returned to the parking lot of the packing department, Mr. Powell approached his car and asked him to leave the grounds and go straight to the Medical Department. After Mr. Smith attempted to enter the packing department building, Powell became belligerent and beat on Mr. Smith's car windows. Mr. Smith left the packing department and reported to the Medical Department. Upon examination, Dr. Bonfili, the company's Medical Director, observed that Mr. Smith had elevated blood pressure and was acting agitated. Dr. Bonfili asked Smith to submit to a drug test. Mr. Smith consented, and the results were negative. Dr. Bonfili's notes from his examination of Mr. Smith indicate that the company was considering giving Smith a final notice for poor job performance. In the same examination, Dr. Bonfili decided to take Smith out of work because of his elevated blood pressure combined with his history of elevated blood pressure. Mr. Smith remained on leave until December 1, 2000.

As a result of the investigation into events surrounding the production delay of October 26, 2000, RJRT found that Mr. Smith had deliberately delayed the production of the hot cylinder. Mr. Karr, in conducting the investigation, interviewed all of the key employees and members of management involved in the events. Mr. Karr relied on Mr. Stimpson's Statement that he had told Mr. Smith that the hot cylinder was ready to plate at 2:00 pm, but Smith did not begin work on the cylinder until 4:10 pm because he filtered both of the tanks after being informed of the hot cylinder.

Although the plater operator must filter both tanks each day, the tanks can be filtered at anytime during the day.

In addition, Mr. Karr relied on the signed statements of Mr. Abee and Mr. Tickle, two long time RJRT employees, who said that after receiving a telephone call from Mr. Jones, the Cylinder Planner, regarding the status of the cylinder, Mr. Smith had said, "I do not give a goddamn what those people upstairs want. I will get the cylinder when I feel like it." Abee and Tickle reported that, after making the statement, Mr. Smith had drained both of the tanks for the cylinder. This practice shuts down the platting process for urgent cylinders and, as a result, production was shut down. Based on the outcome of the investigation, it was determined that Mr. Smith should be given a final warning.

RJRT does not implement disciplinary action while an employee is on inactive status. After Mr. Smith returned, he was given the opportunity to respond to the investigation. On December 6, 2000, Mr. Smith was issued a final warning. The final warning prevented Mr. Smith from receiving a pay raise or seeking a promotion for a one year period.

II.

RJRT has moved for summary judgment on Mr. Smith's claims of racial discrimination and retaliation. Mr. Smith abandoned his claim of racial discrimination in his response to summary judgment. As a result, summary judgment will be entered in favor of RJRT on that claim. Mr. Smith is still pursuing his retaliation claim.

Mr. Smith alleges retaliatory employment action in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

Summary judgment is only proper when, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986);Cox v. County of Prince William, 249 F.3d 295, 299 (4th Cir. 2001). Summary judgment requires a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence, not a weighing of the evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). An issue is genuine if a reasonable jury, based on the evidence, could find in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Cox 249 F.3d at 299. The materiality of a fact depends on whether the existence of the fact could cause a jury to reach different outcomes. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Cox, 249 F.3d at 299;Solers, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 146 F. Supp.2d 785, 791 (E.D.Va. 2001). The party opposing the motion may not rest upon its pleadings but must instead provide evidence or point to evidence already in the record that would be sufficient to support a jury verdict in its favor.Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. This evidence must be properly authenticated pursuant to Rule 56(e). Orsi v. Kirkwood, 999 F.2d 86, 92 (4th Cir. 1993).

III.

Mr. Smith contends that, as a result of complaining about Ms. Joyce's harassment, he was forced to take a drug test and issued a final warning. Smith alleges that Joyce harassed him because he had encouraged a fellow employee to report a racially derogatory comment by a supervisor who, as a result, was demoted.

Mr. Smith has neither offered nor pointed to evidence of conduct or statements directly reflecting that either the drug test or the final warning was the result of his having complained about harassment. He does not then, at this stage, have sufficient direct evidence to support a jury finding that he suffered an adverse employment action as the result of a retaliatory motive. He must proceed under the McDonnell Douglas pretext method. See Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1142 (4th Cir. 1995);Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1985).

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, if Mr. Smith can establish his prima facie case, then the burden shifts to RJRT to state a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802; Beall v. Abbott Labs., 130 F.3d 614, 619 (4th Cir. 1997). If RJRT can articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, the burden shifts back to Mr. Smith to produce evidence sufficient to support a reasonable inference that RJRT's stated reason was a pretext for retaliation. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; Beall, 130 F.3d at 619.

In order to make out a prima facie case for retaliation in violation of Title VII, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he was engaged in a protected activity; (2) the defendant took adverse employment action against him; and (3) there was a sufficient causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Beall, 130 F.3d at 619.

A.

In regard to the drug test, RJRT does not dispute that Mr. Smith can establish the first prong of the prima facie case. However, RJRT does dispute that it took adverse employment action against Mr. Smith when Dr. Bonfili requested that he take the drug test.

For an action to be considered an "adverse employment action" under Title VII, the action must have an adverse effect on the terms, conditions, or benefits of employment. Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am., 126 F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1116 (1998). Adverse effects on the terms, conditions or benefits of employment include a decrease in wages, discharge, demotion, loss of job title, or a loss of job responsibility. Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 865-66 (4th Cir. 2001).

In this case, Smith was asked to take a drug test when he was sent to the company's medical department. Smith consented to the test, which came back negative. Smith did not suffer any adverse changes in his employment status, his pay did not decrease, and his responsibilities did not change. Smith has not presented any evidence to show that the drug test negatively impacted his employment. As a result, Smith is unable to make a prima facie case of retaliation as it relates to the drug test.

The Fourth Circuit has not specifically held that a drug test in and of itself is considered an adverse employment action.

B.

Mr. Smith, in regard to the final warning, can establish a prima facie case of retaliation. First, neither party disputes that Mr. Smith was engaged in a protected activity. Second, Mr. Smith suffered an adverse employment action when he was given a final warning, because the final warning resulted in Mr. Smith not receiving his scheduled wage increase for one year and his not being eligible for promotion opportunities in the same year. See Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 865-66.

Third, Mr. Smith can show that there is a temporal proximity between his complaint and the final warning. It is true that Mr. Smith does not produce any direct evidence of causation, but he has shown that his complaint about Ms. Joyce on October 31, 2001 was followed by his final warning on December 6, 2001. While distant temporal proximity can weaken or even rebut the causation element, Joiner v. Walmart Stores, Inc. 114 F. Supp.2d 400, 410 (W.D.N.C. 2000), close temporal proximity can provide a sufficient inference of causation to satisfy the third prong of the prima facie case. Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir. 1994);Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 454 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting that a causal connection had been found to exist when four months had passed between the protected activity and the adverse employment activity). In this case, the time period of little over one month, including Mr. Smith's leave, is enough to satisfy the causation element of the prima facie case. Therefore, Mr. Smith can establish a prima facie case of retaliation.

Although Mr. Smith has established a prima facie case, RJRT contends that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for giving Mr. Smith his final warning. RJRT states that it gave Mr. Smith a final warning because the company's investigation revealed that he deliberately delayed the production process. Mr. Karr, the Director of Human Resources, conducted the investigation. Mr. Karr relied on statements by Mr. Smith's supervisor that Mr. Smith had been informed that the hot cylinder was ready at 2:00 pm, but he proceeded to filter both tanks. In addition, Mr. Karr relied on the signed statements of Mr. Abee and Mr. Tickle, regarding Mr. Smith's statements to the effect that "I do not give a goddamn what those people upstairs want. I will get the cylinder when I feel like it."

Mr. Smith denies the findings of the investigation. Mr. Smith states that before he learned of the "hot cylinder" he removed another cylinder from tank 2 and began to wash and filter it. At the same time there was another cylinder in tank 1. Mr. Smith states that he informed his supervisor of the situation. However, the issue is not whether Mr. Smith committed the actions, but is whether RJRT honestly believed that he committed the misconduct. Tinsley v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 155 F.3d 435, 444 (4th Cir. 1998).

Therefore, Mr. Smith must show that RJRT's nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext. Mr. Smith's evidence consists of his speculation as to the motives behind his final warning, the temporal proximity of the final warning, and his account of the events. When an employer gives a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for an adverse employment action, the test is not whether the reason was correct, the test is only if it was truly the reason for the adverse action. Dejarnette v. Corning, Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 299 (4th Cir. 1998).

Speculation may not be considered evidence for summary judgment. Evans v. Technologies Applications Service Co., 80 F.3d 954, 960 (4th Cir. 1996). Therefore, Mr. Smith's speculation regarding the motives behind his final warning, including speculation as to the motives of Mr. Abee and Mr. Tickle cannot be considered.

Mr. Smith does not present any evidence that RJRT's reason was not the true reason for the adverse action. Mr. Smith's evidence, including his account of the events, disputes the correctness of the outcome of the investigation, but it does not undermine RJRT's showing that Mr. Karr believed that Mr. Smith deliberately delayed the production process based on statements by witnesses. For example, Mr. Smith offers no evidence that the witnesses did not in fact make those statements or, if they did, that Mr. Karr was, at the time, aware of facts that would discredit them. Mr. Smith's only remaining evidence is the temporal proximity, which alone is insufficient to demonstrate pretext. Therefore, summary judgment for RJRT is appropriate.

IV.

For the reasons stated above, the Defendant's motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED.


Summaries of

Smith v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company

United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina
Feb 11, 2003
Case No. 1:02CV00063 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 11, 2003)
Case details for

Smith v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company

Case Details

Full title:KEVIN SMITH, Plaintiff, v. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY — PACKAGING…

Court:United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina

Date published: Feb 11, 2003

Citations

Case No. 1:02CV00063 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 11, 2003)

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