Summary
finding that a "stipulation" in the complaint that the plaintiff would not seek or accept over $75,000.00 was insufficient to block removal since the plaintiff could amend her complaint at any time and delete that language, and since the separate affidavit tendered by the plaintiff's lawyer was not signed by the plaintiff herself
Summary of this case from McGlynn v. HustonOpinion
Case No. 05-cv-0112-MJR.
March 24, 2005
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
In the Circuit Court of Madison County, Illinois, Mary Smith filed a putative class action against Pfizer, Inc., manufacturer of a prescription pain relief medication "Bextra." Pfizer timely removed the case on February 18, 2005, invoking this Court's subject matter jurisdiction under the federal diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Ten days later, Judge Herndon recused, and the case randomly was reassigned to the undersigned District Judge.
Before the Court is Plaintiff Smith's fully-briefed remand motion. For the reasons described below, the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction and grants the motion.
Smith's state court complaint, based on an Illinois consumer fraud statute, alleges that Pfizer negligently marketed Bextra, despite the fact Pfizer knew of dangerous side effects and symptoms of the drug.
Of significance is what Smith's complaint does not seek. She does not sue for any personal injury she or others may have sustained as a result of ingesting Bextra. Nor does she pray for injunctive relief. Rather, she seeks compensatory damages to cover the costs of medical monitoring and testing which would facilitate early detection of any injuries.
Specifically, the complaint asks for damages "sufficient to cover the costs of periodic medical examinations which are reasonably necessary to detect and enable early treatment of injuries and/or diseases caused by Bextra" (Doc. 2, p. 6). As explained further below, this aspect of the complaint plays a key role in determining the amount in controversy.
28 U.S.C. § 1332 confers original jurisdiction over suits between citizens of different states if (a) complete diversity exists between the parties, and (b) the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, excluding interest and costs. The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of demonstrating that all jurisdictional requirements have been satisfied. Chase v. Shop `N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 110 F.3d 424, 427 (7th Cir. 1997).
Here, complete diversity exists between the parties. The question is whether Pfizer has shown that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, excluding interest and costs.
For a defendant to successfully remove a class action based on diversity, at least one of the named plaintiffs must have a claim that surpasses the $75,000 jurisdictional bar. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, 123 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1153 (1998); Garbie v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 211 F.3d 407, 409 (7th Cir. 2000). If one named plaintiff meets the jurisdictional minimum, the other named plaintiffs and class members can "piggyback" on that plaintiff's claim, via supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Brand Name, 123 F.3d at 607.
Pfizer's removal notice alleges: "it is Pfizer's good faith belief" that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 (Doc. 1, p. 2). Plainly, that allegation does not meet Pfizer's burden of proof as to the amount in controversy. See, e.g., Chase, 110 F.3d at 427 (removing defendant must support allegations of diversity jurisdiction with "competent proof"); America's Best Inns, Inc. v. Best Inns of Abilene, L.P., 980 F.2d 1072, 1074 (7th Cir. 1992) (allegations based upon information and belief are insufficient to support diversity jurisdiction).
Pfizer does offer proof to support its contention that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. With the removal notice, Pfizer submitted the declaration of Dennis R. Connolly, who has experience in tort-related medical monitoring programs. Connolly suggests that the medical monitoring requested by Smith in this case actually will be much more extensive than Smith anticipates and, despite the fact the class is defined to include only consumers who purchased Bextra in Illinois, the consumers to be tested — and the doctors doing the testing — would be located "throughout the country" (Doc. 1, Exh. C, p. 2).
Furthermore, Connolly predicts that the monitoring will require the establishment of a claims-handling facility. According to Connolly, the cost of "siting" that facility will include expenditures to rent space, store records, manage operations, install hardware and communication lines, purchase furnishings, staff the operations center, train the staffers, and compile and analyze the results of all medical monitoring ( Id., p. 3). Relying on the Connolly declaration, Pfizer maintains that the cost to set up this facility and provide medical monitoring for "hundreds of thousands" of class members easily exceeds $75,000, justifying the exercise of jurisdiction in this case.
The Court disagrees. This Circuit does recognize that, in determining the amount in controversy, the Court may consider the cost to defendant of enforcing the requested relief, as well as the value to plaintiff of obtaining that relief. McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 595 F.2d 389, 395 (7th Cir. 1989) (adopting "either viewpoint" rule under which the Court may consider the "pecuniary result to either party which the judgment would directly produce").
But it is far from clear that the either viewpoint rule applies in a case, such as this, in which the plaintiff requests no injunctive relief and instead seeks only compensatory damages. For instance, in Uhl v. Thoroughbred Technology and Telecommunications, Inc., 309 F.3d 978, 983-84 (7th Cir. 2002), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit sharply distinguished cases in which only money damages were sought (such as Smith's case against Pfizer) from cases in which injunctive relief was sought.
The Court emphasized:
In a case that seeks only money damages, the amount the defendant will lose is more or less the same. But in a case like this one, for injunctive relief, there may be an asymmetry. The question has thus arisen whether it is proper in determining amount in controversy to look in the alternative to the cost the defendant will incur in complying with the injunction the plaintiff seeks. In this circuit, the answer to the latter question has been yes: it is established that the jurisdictional amount should be assessed looking at either the benefit to the plaintiff or the cost to the defendant of the requested relief — the so-called "either viewpoint" rule. See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, 123 F.3d 599, 609 (7th Cir. 1997); McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 595 F.2d 389, 391-95 (7th Cir. 1979). Those cases specifically establish that the cost to a defendant of complying with an injunction sought by the plaintiff may properly be considered in determining the amount in controversyUhl indicates that the either viewpoint assessment should be used only in cases in which the complaint includes a request for injunctive relief. See also Gould v. Artisoft, Inc., 1 F.3d 544, 548 n. 4 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying either viewpoint rule to case in which the pecuniary harm to the defendant from the injunctive relief requested by the plaintiff exceeded the amount in controversy). The instant case contains no such request.
See also this Court's 10-20-2003 Order in Flynn, et al. v. General Motors Corp., et al., Case No. 03-cv-0486-MJR, Doc. 34, p. 4 ("Defendants cite no cases extending the `either viewpoint' rule to complaints seeking only monetary relief.").
Additionally, even if the either viewpoint rule does apply (if the Court accepts Pfizer's argument that Smith's prayer for compensatory damages is really a request for injunctive relief in disguise), the Court is not persuaded that the entire cost envisioned by Pfizer is chargeable to the single named plaintiff (Smith) from whose standpoint the Court evaluates the amount in controversy. As the Seventh Circuit explained in Brand Name, 123 F.3d at 609-10 :
Whatever the form of relief sought, each plaintiff's claim must be held separate from each other plaintiff's claim from both the plaintiff's and the defendant's standpoint. The defendant in such a case is deemed to face multiple claims for injunctive relief, each of which must be separately evaluated.Accord Del Vecchio v. Conseco, Inc., 230 F.3d 974, 977-78 (7th Cir. 2000) (Even under the either viewpoint rule, each plaintiff's claim for relief must be separately evaluated. "That means, for Del Vecchio, that the amount in controversy from the defendants' point of view is the amount they risk paying him, not the amount they might have to pay the entire class.").
Nor does this case fit into the narrow exceptions to the anti-aggregation rule recognized in Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) and its progeny — the "common fund exception" which covers situations in which there is a single res at issue (like an estate), and the recovery is a "unitary whole." See Del Vecchio, 230 F.3d at 977-78.
The Court does find appeal in Pfizer's argument as to the effect of Smith's purported disclaimer of damages, but that does not support this Court's exercise of diversity jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs' counsel mistakenly believes that remand is warranted based solely on the allegations of the complaint and an accompanying affidavit of counsel. The complaint states:
Plaintiff stipulates that she will not seek and will neither demand nor accept on behalf of any Class Member any recovery in excess of $75,000 exclusive of interest and costs.
Doc. 2, p. 2.
Simultaneously filed in state court with the complaint is an affidavit of Plaintiffs' counsel that "the total damages sought by the Plaintiff in this cause of action exceeds Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000), but is less than Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000) per Plaintiff or class member [sic]."
This "stipulation" in Smith's complaint does not prevent removal. Allegations that a plaintiff seeks no more than $75,000 or will not accept damages over $75,000 do not, standing alone, preclude removal. Such allegations properly are considered by the Court (and have been considered by this Court in prior cases) but are not determinative of the amount in controversy.
In American Bankers Life Assur. Co. of Florida v. Evans, 319 F.3d 907, 908 (7th Cir. 2000), the Seventh Circuit (a) affirmed the determination by Judge William D. Stiehl of this Court that subject matter jurisdiction did not lie and (b) found insufficient an allegation which stated that the damages were "in no event to exceed $75,000."
The district court properly ignored this detail — it was neither a limit on recovery, see 735 ILCS 5/2-604; BEM I, L.L.C. v. Anthropologie, Inc., 301 F.3d 548, 552 (7th Cir. 2002) . . . nor a demand for $75,000, see De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1408 (5th Cir. 1995) — and looked instead to the claim's actual value, see In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, 248 F.3d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 2001),American Bankers, 319 F.3d at 908 (emphasis added).
So, the language of the complaint, by itself, does not defeat removal here. Next, the Court examines to the affidavit filed with Plaintiffs' state court complaint in compliance with ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT RULE 222 ("Any civil action seeking money damages shall have attached to the initial pleading the party's affidavit that the total of money damages sought does or does not exceed $50,000.").
The law of this Circuit clearly holds: "Litigants who want to prevent removal must file a binding stipulation or affidavit with their complaints." Chase, 110 F.3d at 430, citing In re Shell Oil Co., 970 F.2d 355, 356 (7th Cir. 1992). See also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Jurisdiction 3d § 3725 at 87 (a plaintiff's waiver of over $75,000 "must be truly binding on the plaintiff in state court before it will prevent removal"). The question is whether attorney Armstrong's Rule 222 affidavit (filed with Smith's state court complaint) is binding as to Smith's damages.
No Seventh Circuit case located by the undersigned Judge or cited by counsel squarely delineates what constitutes a legally binding stipulation/affidavit under Shell Oil. A number of federal district courts have held that, to prevent removal, a pre-removal affidavit or stipulation must be signed by the plaintiff, not just plaintiff's counsel. See, e.g., Asbury-Castro v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 729, 733 (N.D. W.Va. 2005) ("to be operative, a disclaimer must be `a formal, truly binding, pre-removal stipulation signed by counsel and his client explicitly limiting recovery'"); Virden v. Altria Group, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 2d 832, 847 (N.D. W.Va. 2004) ("Therefore, absent a binding stipulation signed by Virden that he will neither seek nor accept damages in excess of $75,000, the Court must independently assess whether the defendants have proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Virden's complaint seeks damages in excess of $75,000."); McCoy v. Erie Ins. Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 481, 485-86 (S.D. W.Va. 2001) ("The better rule requires a formal, truly binding, pre-removal stipulation signed by counsel and his client explicitly limiting recovery.").
Other courts have interpreted an attorney's stipulation as binding on the plaintiff (even when not signed by the plaintiff), if the plaintiff confirmed in writing the attorney's authority to bind the plaintiff. See Dozier v. Kentucky Finance Co., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 716, 719 (S.D. Miss. 2003) (complaint demand for less than $75,000 "coupled with the stipulation of plaintiff's counsel," whose authority to stipulate on behalf of plaintiff has been confirmed by plaintiff himself, established that amount in controversy did not exceed $75,000). See also Dora v. Citifinancial, Inc., 2003 WL 22243996, *4 (N.D. Miss. 2003) (removal thwarted where plaintiffs affirmed that they were legally bound by stipulation which stated "Neither the individual Plaintiffs nor their lawyers will accept an amount that exceeds the federal jurisdictional minimum . . .; Neither the individual Plaintiffs nor their lawyers will amend the complaint after one year to plead an amount in controversy in excess of the $74,900, per Plaintiff, nor will they authorize anyone on their behalf or their future heirs and assigns, to make such an amendment").
In the case at bar, the Court already has found the "stipulation" in the complaint that Plaintiff Smith will not seek or accept over $75,000 insufficient to block removal. (For one thing, Plaintiff could amend her complaint at any time and delete that language.) The separate affidavit tendered by lawyer Armstrong was not signed by Smith. Nor did Smith, in any pre-removal document, affirm that stipulation as binding her. The Court is not convinced that the affidavit is "binding" under Shell Oil, so as to effectively block removal. Thus, the undersigned Judge must look "instead to the claim's actual value." American Bankers, 319 F.3d at 908.
Smith seeks compensatory damages to cover the cost of periodic doctor visits — and presumably tests — to detect any injury or disease caused by ingesting Bextra (Doc. 2, p. 6). She seeks no injunctive relief or punitive damages. She does not ask for a comprehensive system of court-supervised medical monitoring.
Although the estimate of the amount in controversy contained in the complaint is not dispositive of the amount in controversy, the Court may consider it. Indeed, accepted wisdom provides "when deciding whether a claim meets the minimum amount in controversy, the plaintiff's evaluation of the stakes must be respected." Barbers, 132 F.3d at 1205. The Court cannot conceive how (and Pfizer has not demonstrated that) Smith's claim surpasses the $75,000 jurisdictional bar.
Nor does the Court find persuasive Pfizer's argument that subject matter jurisdiction lies here under the recently-enacted amendments to the federal jurisdictional statutes known as the "Class Action Fairness Act of 2005." Pub.L. 109-2, Feb. 18, 2005, 119 Stat. 14. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) now confers original subject matter jurisdiction on federal district courts over "any civil action in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs," and is a class action in which any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a state different from any defendant. The statute explicitly permits aggregation of claims in class actions to reach the $5,000,000 hurdle. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6) ("In any class action, the claims of the individual class members shall be aggregated to determine whether the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs."). Pfizer argues that the aggregated claims in the instant case easily exceed $5,000,000 (Doc. 11, p. 9).
The Court, however, concludes that the amendments in question do not apply, because this case was not "commenced on or after the date of enactment" (February 18, 2005). Plaintiff commenced this case by filing her complaint in Illinois state court on December 28, 2004.
The Court rejects Pfizer's argument that "commenced" means the date the case reached federal court ( i.e., the date a case was removed) rather than the date the complaint was filed. Both a plain reading of the statute and the legislative history of the bill indicate that the jurisdictional amendments were never intended to apply retroactively. See P.L. 102-9 ("The amendments made by this Act . . . shall apply to any civil action commenced on or after the date of enactment of this Act."); 151 Cong. Rec. H741 (Feb. 17, 2005(remarks of Rep. Udall) ("Unlike earlier versions, S. 5 would not have a retroactive effect, so it would not affect pending cases."). See also 151 Cong. Rec. H753 (Feb. 17, 2005) (remarks of Rep. Goodlatte); 151 Cong. Rec. S1080 (Feb. 8, 2005) (remarks of Sen. Dodd); 151 Cong. Rec. S1087 (Feb. 8, 2005) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
Pfizer has not met its burden of establishing that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. Jurisdiction does not lie under the federal diversity statute. Because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it GRANTS Smith's February 24, 2005 motion (Doc. 4) and REMANDS this case to the Circuit Court of Madison County, Illinois.
Smith did not request an award of costs and expenses of removal in her remand motion or supporting brief, and the Court DECLINES to award such costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
IT IS SO ORDERED.