Opinion
Civil Action 8:22-cv-01245-PX
10-28-2022
DALONTE SMITH, Plaintiff, v. NEW LIFE CHURCH, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PAULA XINIS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Pending before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. ECF No. 9. The motion is fully briefed, and no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6. For the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED as to the federal claim. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claim and remands the claim in lieu of dismissal.
The Court construes the facts in the Complaint as true and in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997).
On April 27, 2022, Plaintiff Dalonte Smith filed suit against Defendants in the Circuit Court for Charles County, Maryland, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., and common law intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). ECF No. 2. The Complaint avers that on April 29, 2019, employees of Defendant New Life Church (the “Church”)-Dawn Leukhardt, Michelle Hotler, Gracie Labarbera, and Logan Chambers-taunted, harassed, and fought with Smith, his mother, and his younger siblings during church services. Id. at 1. Smith now suffers from panic attacks, depression, insomnia, headaches, tremors, and anxiety as a result. Id. at 1-2. The Complaint further avers that the Church did not allow Smith to volunteer at the parish and would not hire him, even though the Church “afforded all other members of the congregation” similar opportunities. Id. at 1. Smith contends baldly that the Church denied him these opportunities due to his disability, although the Complaint does not describe at all the nature of his disability. Id.
On May 24, 2020, Defendants removed the case to this Court, noting this Court's federal question jurisdiction over the ADA claim, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over the common law IIED claim, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. Defendants now urge the Court to dismiss both claims or alternatively grant summary judgment in their favor. Because Smith failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the motion, construed as one for dismissal, is granted as to the ADA claim. As to the IIED claim, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and remands the matter to the Charles County Circuit Court.
II. Standard of Review
A motion styled as a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment implicates the Court's discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d). Pursuant to Rule 12(d), if “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court” in connection with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). The Court has “complete discretion to determine whether or not to accept the submission of any material beyond the pleadings that is offered in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and rely on it, thereby converting the motion, or to reject it or simply not consider it.” Wells-Bey v. Kopp, No. ELH-12-2319, 2013 WL 1700927, at *5 (D. Md. Apr. 16, 2013) (internal citation omitted). In deciding whether to consider extra-pleading material, courts focus on whether the material would “facilitate the Court's decision.” Price v. Murdy, No. GLR-17-736, 2018 WL 1583551, at *4 (D. Md. Mar. 30, 2018). Because the Complaint itself includes sufficient information for the Court to decide this motion, the Court declines to consider the supplemental materials attached to Defendants' motion and construes the motion as one for dismissal.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006). The Court accepts “the well-pled allegations of the complaint as true,” and construes all facts and reasonable inferences most favorably to the plaintiff. Ibarra, 120 F.3d at 474. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint's factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Court must be able to deduce “more than the mere possibility of misconduct”; the facts of the complaint, accepted as true, must demonstrate that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Ruffin v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 126 F.Supp.3d 521, 526 (D. Md. 2015) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679), aff'd in relevant part, 659 Fed.Appx. 744 (4th Cir. 2016).
Because Smith proceeds pro se, the Court must read his pleadings charitably and let all potentially viable claims proceed on the merits. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). But “even a pro se complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege a ‘plausible claim for relief.'” Forquer v. Schlee, No. RDB-12-969, 2012 WL 6087491, at *3 (D. Md. Dec. 4, 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). A complaint must “permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct based upon its judicial experience and common sense.” Coleman v. Md. Ct. App., 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679) (internal quotes and alterations omitted).
III. Analysis
Defendants argue that the ADA claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. ECF No. 9 at 3. The exhaustion requirements in the ADA “are identical to those applicable to claims under Title VII” of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Snead v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George's Cnty., 815 F.Supp.2d 889, 894 (D. Md. 2011) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a)). Before a plaintiff may pursue an ADA claim in federal court, he must file a formal charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). See Sydnor v. Fairfax Cnty., 681 F.3d 591, 593 (4th Cir. 2012). The charge must be filed within 180 days of the date of the alleged discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
Smith failed to follow these required steps before filing this action. Indeed, Smith candidly admits in his response to Defendants' motion that he never filed any charge with the EEOC. ECF No. 11 at 2. Thus, the ADA claim must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Smith also cannot salvage the claim by filing a formal charge with the EEOC now. Broadly reading the Complaint, the alleged misconduct took place in April of 2019. More than three years have passed, placing the matter well beyond the 180-day window for filing an administrative charge. See ECF No. 2. Accordingly, the Court must dismiss the ADA claim with prejudice.
Defendants also argue that the Complaint fails to make plausible an IIED claim. ECF No. 9 at 5. The Court retains supplemental jurisdiction over this common law claim. But where, as here, the Court “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” the Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). In so declining, the Court retains discretion to either dismiss the claim or remand the case to state court. See Hinson v. Norwest Fin. S.C., Inc., 239 F.3d 611, 616 (4th Cir. 2001) (“We conclude that a district court has discretion to remand to state court a removed case involving pendent claims upon a proper determination that retaining jurisdiction over the case would be inappropriate.”) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The power to remand in such circumstances is “inherent in the statutory authorization to decline supplemental jurisdiction.” Id. at 617. Whether to dismiss or remand turns on “principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Id. (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 484 U.S. at 357) (internal quotation marks omitted).
With these principles in mind, the Court concludes that remand is proper. Dismissal as opposed to remand would require Smith to refile his IIED claim in state court-an inefficient and arguably unfair outcome because the statute of limitations has since run on the claim. Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101 (providing a three-year statute of limitations for civil actions). Moreover, “remand is appropriate pursuant to the principle of comity where only state law claims remain because ‘[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided.'” Montgomery v. Freedom Mortg. Corp., No. GLS-21-02643, 2022 WL 3139638, at *8 (D. Md. Aug. 5, 2022) (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)). The Court, therefore, will exercise its inherent authority to remand Smith's IIED claim to state court. Hinson, 239 F.3d at 617.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss as to the ADA claim with prejudice. ECF No. 9. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the IIED claim and remands the case to the Circuit Court for Charles County, Maryland in lieu of dismissal. The Court also denies as moot Smith's “Motion to Recognize Personal Representative and Set Trial Date.” ECF No. 13. A separate Order follows.