Opinion
17492.
SUBMITTED JUNE 11, 1951.
DECIDED JULY 10, 1951.
Equitable petition. Before Judge Nichols. Floyd Superior Court. April 21, 1951.
Elizabeth Brown and Maddox Maddox, for plaintiffs.
Hicks Culbert, for defendants.
1. Courts are reluctant to interfere with the management of a church. When church property is devoted to a specific doctrine, the courts may prevent it from being diverted from such use. Code, § 22-408. In the present case a diversion from a specific doctrine is not alleged, nor is it alleged that the church property is being used for purposes contrary to the provisions in the deed to the original trustees.
2. The constitution and laws of the church organization are not pleaded or made a part of the petition; nor are facts alleged sufficient to enable a court of equity to determine which of the contending factions may have within its group the properly elected and qualified trustees as successors in trust of the church property. Jurisdiction to determine who are the duly constituted trustees of the church organization rests with the ecclesiastical forum of the organization, and not with a court of equity. Knowles v. White, 199 Ga. 772 ( 35 S.E.2d 451); Stewart v. Jarriel, 206 Ga. 855 ( 59 S.E.2d 368). The court properly sustained the general demurrer of the defendants.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
No. 17492. SUBMITTED JUNE 11, 1951 — DECIDED JULY 10, 1951.
The plaintiffs brought a petition in behalf of themselves and the members of a named church (which will be referred to herein as the Church). The petition alleged in substance: Certain named individuals of the plaintiffs are trustees of the Church by virtue of their election at a regular church conference of the members of the Church held on August 9, 1950. The Church is an existing voluntary association of persons for the purpose of divine worship in harmony with the constitution, creed, and discipline of a named denomination. The defendants were at one time officers and members of the Church, but they now profess to be officers and members of a church with the same denominational name, except that it is asserted to be "Independent." (This church organization will be referred to as the Independent Church). The Church owns described property, conveyed to its trustees on June 1, 1905. The deed to the trustees recites: "Said Trustees shall hold said property for the use and benefit of said church and for the purposes that may from time to time to be designated by said church. Their successors to be appointed by the Conference of said Church." The Church is a subordinate part of the named denomination, which has established tribunals to decide all questions of faith, discipline, rule, or ecclesiastical government, and the Church is bound by the decisions of this tribunal, which is a named district conference. This district conference convenes once a year. The defendants voted to withdraw from the district conference in December, 1949, and the withdrawal was duly accepted by the conference. The constitution and laws of the named denomination do not authorize or permit any person or body of persons to carry over the church property into another organization. (No copy of the constitution or laws of the denomination was set out in the petition or attached as an exhibit thereto.) The defendants are interfering with the plaintiffs and those whom they represent in their efforts to worship in the church building, and are preventing the plaintiffs from so worshipping. In 1949 the membership of the Church numbered 147. Twenty-five members, including the plaintiffs, are still members of the Church. The property of the Church was acquired by it for specific purposes and trusts, and its use by the Independent Church would be a diversion of trust funds.
The prayers were: for process; that the defendants be restrained from using the church building; that a decree be entered requiring the defendants to surrender the church property to the plaintiffs, the legal trustees; and for other relief.
The general demurrer of the defendants was sustained, and the exception is to that judgment.