Opinion
C. A. 6:22-cv-02207-RMG-KFM
10-21-2022
Khammesherma Smith, Plaintiff, v. Ofc Dalton, Ofc. Pugh, Ofc. Sweat III, Ofc. Robinson, Ofc. Anderson, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald, United States Magistrate Judge
The plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on July 12, 2022 (doc. 1). On September 26, 2022, the undersigned issued an order informing the plaintiff that his complaint was subject to dismissal as drafted and providing him with time to file an amended complaint to correct the deficiencies noted in the order (doc. 23). The plaintiff was informed that if he failed to file an amended complaint or cure the deficiencies outlined in the order, the undersigned would recommend that his claims be dismissed (id. at 8-9). The plaintiff has failed to file an amended complaint within the time provided; accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the instant matter be dismissed.
ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff, a prisoner in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) and located at Kershaw Correctional Institution (“Kershaw”), brings this action seeking damages from the defendants for events that occurred while he was a pretrial detainee in the Sumter County Detention Center (“the Detention Center”) (doc. 1). As an initial matter, the court takes judicial notice of the plaintiff's convictions for 3 counts of second degree burglary in the Sumter County General Sessions Court. See South Carolina Department of Corrections Incarcerated Inmate Search, https://public.doc.state.sc.us/scdc-public/ (enter the plaintiff's first and last name) (last visited October 20, 2022). The plaintiff also has a pending charge for unlawful carry of a pistol and a conviction for public disorderly conduct for which he was sentenced to time served. See Sumter County Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Sumter/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (enter the plaintiff's name and 2019A4320100519, 2021A4310200323) (last visited October 20, 2022).
Phillips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record.”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘[t]he most frequent use of judicial notice . . . is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
The plaintiff alleges violations of his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights (doc. 1 at 5). He contends that all of the defendants attacked him and punished him while on shifts between November 2019 and August 2020 (id. at 5, 6-7). He further alleges that he was medically ignored and harassed and falsely imprisoned (id. at 6-7). The plaintiff alleges injuries to his face, leg, and neck, and psychological trauma (id. at 7). For relief, the plaintiff seeks criminal charges against the defendants and money damages (id.).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, the plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if the plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening the plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983, seeking damages from the defendants. However, the plaintiff's complaint is subject to summary dismissal. As an initial matter, the plaintiff's request that criminal charges be brought against the defendants is subject to summary dismissal because private citizens lack a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or non-prosecution of another. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). Additionally, to the extent the plaintiff's complaint can be construed as challenging his pending criminal charge in the Sumter County General Sessions Court, such claim is subject to dismissal in this matter because the plaintiff seeks relief with respect to his pending charge in another case. See Smith v. Police Officer Name Unknown One, et al, C/A No. 3:22-cv-02920-HMH-KFM (D.S.C.). The remainder of the pleading deficiencies in the plaintiff's claims are addressed in more detail below.
Heck v. Humphrey
To the extent the plaintiff's complaint can be construed as asserting that he was unlawfully imprisoned in the Detention Center based upon any of his other prior convictions, his claims are barred by Heck. In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that in order to recover damages for imprisonment in violation of the Constitution, the imprisonment must first be successfully challenged. The Court stated:
We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, . . . a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted); see also Edwards v. Balisock, 520 U.S. 641 (1997) (the preclusive rule of Heck extended to § 1983 claims challenging procedural deficiencies which necessarily imply the invalidity of the judgment). This is known as the “favorable termination” requirement. See Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262, 263 (4th Cir. 2008). As noted, judicially-noticed, publicly-available online inmate records from SCDC and records for the Sumter County General Sessions Court indicate that the plaintiff has four prior charges for which he was convicted. See South Carolina Department of Corrections Incarcerated Inmate Search (enter the plaintiff's first and last name) (last visited October 20, 2022); Sumter County Public Index (enter the plaintiff's name and 2019A4320100519) (last visited October 20, 2022). The plaintiff's convictions do not indicate a favorable termination. As such, the plaintiff's false imprisonment claims relating to his Sumter County convictions are barred by Heck at this time, because he has not received a favorable termination.
No Personal Allegations
Aside from the Heck bar, the plaintiff's complaint is also subject to summary dismissal because he has not made any personal allegations of wrongdoing against the defendants (doc. 1). Indeed, the defendants do not appear in the plaintiff's complaint beyond the caption and being named as defendants (see doc. 1). Although the plaintiff's allegations must be liberally construed, the plaintiff must provide more than general and conclusory statements to allege a plausible claim for relief. Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74-75 (4th Cir. 1994); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (noting that liability under § 1983 “requires personal involvement”). Indeed, the plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that the defendants were personally involved in the purported deprivations. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the constitution.”); Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding that an official must be personally involved in the alleged deprivation before liability may be imposed). As such, the plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
Excessive Force Claim
It appears that the plaintiff may allege excessive force by the defendants when he was “attacked” and “punished” (see doc. 1 at 6-7). The Eighth Amendment expressly prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. In order to state a plausible Eighth Amendment excessive force claim, a plaintiff must allege that the “prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind (subjective component) and [that] the deprivation suffered or injury inflicted on the inmate was sufficiently serious (objective component).” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996)). Thus, courts must analyze both subjective and objective components. “[T]he ‘core judicial inquiry' regarding the subjective component of an excessive force claim is ‘whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.'” Parkerv. Stevenson, 625 F. App'x. 196, 198 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Iko, 535 F.3d at 238, 239). The Fourth Circuit has identified the following four factors to consider when determining whether a prison official's actions were carried out “maliciously and sadistically” to cause harm:
(1) the need for the application of force; (2) the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of any reasonably perceived threat that the application of force was intended to quell; and (4) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.Id. (quoting Iko, 535 F.3d at 239); see also Whitley Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986). To establish the objective component, a plaintiff must allege “the alleged wrongdoing is objectively ‘harmful enough' to establish a constitutional violation” in the context of “‘contemporary standards of decency.'” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1,8 (1992) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991)). When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, there always exists a constitutional violation regardless of how significant a plaintiff's injury may be. Id. at 9; see also Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010). Here, even liberally construed, the plaintiff's excessive force claim fails to state a claim for relief. The plaintiff alleges that he was “attacked” and “punished” (see doc. 1 at 6-7). However, it is unclear which defendants were involved in the alleged excessive force “attack” and “punishment” or even when the incidents occurred. As recognized by the Supreme Court, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Further, the plausibility standard requires more than “‘an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.'” Griffith v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., C/A No. 2:12-cv-00239-DCN, 2012 WL 2048200, at *1 (D.S.C. June 6, 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). As such, even liberally construed, the plaintiff's allegations regarding excessive force “stop[] short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that it is not enough to plead facts that are “merely consistent” with a defendant's liability). In light of the foregoing, the plaintiff's excessive force claim is subject to summary dismissal.
Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs Claim
Liberally construed, the plaintiff also alleges that the defendants “medically ignored” him (doc. 1 at 6-7). Not “every claim by a prisoner [alleging] that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the [Constitution].” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). The government is required to provide medical care for incarcerated individuals. Id. at 103. However, to establish deliberate indifference, the treatment “must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851-52 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
In order to state a claim, a plaintiff must show a serious medical need as well as that the defendant “knowingly disregarded that need and the substantial risk it posed.” DePaola v. Clarke, 884 F.3d 481, 486 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 218-20 (4th Cir. 2016); Heyer v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 209-11 (4th Cir. 2017)). A “serious medical need” is a condition “diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Heyer, 849 F.3d at 210 (citation omitted). “Deliberate indifference may be demonstrated by either actual intent or reckless disregard. A defendant acts recklessly by disregarding a substantial risk of danger that is either known to the defendant or which would be apparent to a reasonable person in the defendant's position.” Miltier, 896 F.2d at 851-52 (citation omitted). “It is only such indifference that can offend ‘evolving standards of decency' in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Mere negligence or malpractice does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. Moreover, disagreements between an inmate and a physician over the inmate's proper medical care do not state a Section 1983 claim unless exceptional circumstances are alleged. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir.1985).
Here, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs. First, his vague and conclusory allegations that he was medically ignored do not plausibly allege personal involvement by the defendants. See Vinnedge, 550 F.2d at 928. Additionally, the plaintiff's vague reference to injuries to his face, leg, and neck, and his psychological injuries fail to allege a serious medical condition that required treatment. As such, the plaintiff's medical indifference claim is subject to summary dismissal.
Rule 41
In addition to the foregoing, the plaintiff's complaint is also subject to dismissal pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is well established that a court has the authority to dismiss a case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to prosecute and/or failure to comply with orders of the court. Ballard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93, 95 (4th Cir.1989). “The authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered an ‘inherent power,' governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962) (emphasis added). In addition to its inherent authority, this court may also sua sponte dismiss a case for lack of prosecution under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). Id. at 630. In considering whether to dismiss an action pursuant to Rule 41(b), the court is required to consider four factors:
(1) the degree of personal responsibility on the part of the plaintiff;
(2) the amount of prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay;
(3) the history of the plaintiff in proceeding in a dilatory manner; and,
(4) the existence of less drastic sanctions other than dismissal.Davis v. Williams, 588 F.2d 69, 70 (4th Cir.1978).
Here, the factors weigh in favor of dismissal. With respect to factors (1) and (3), the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, so he is responsible for his failure to respond to court orders, failure to keep his address updated with the court, and failure to respond to the court's September 26, 2022, order. The plaintiff has been warned on several occasions that failure to keep his address updated with the Court or to comply with orders of this court may result in dismissal of this action pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (docs. 11 at 2; 15 at 2-3; 19 at 2; 23 at 8-9). Per the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) Incarcerated Inmate Search, the plaintiff may have been transferred from Kershaw a month ago. See South Carolina Department of Corrections Incarcerated Inmate Search, https://public.doc.state.sc.us/scdc-public/ (enter the plaintiff's first and last name) (last visited October 20, 2022). However, even though the instant matter is similar to the circumstances in Gibbs v. S.C. Dep't of Corrs., the instant matter is distinguishable from Gibbs because the plaintiff was warned on at least three occasions that he was responsible for keeping his address updated with the court and has had ample opportunity in the last month to update his address with the court. See Gibbs v. S.C. Dep't of Corrs., C/A No. 20-7510, 2022 WL 1467707 (4th Cir. 2022) (unpublished) (finding that the Rule 41 factors favored the plaintiff where he was “not personally responsible for his transfer to a different prison” that caused him not to receive the court's order and he had not been warned regarding keeping his address updated). Accordingly, as the plaintiff has failed to comply with this court's September 26, 2022, order, the instant action is also subject to dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) for failure to comply with orders of the court.
RECOMMENDATION
By order issued September 26, 2022, the undersigned provided the plaintiff an opportunity to correct the defects identified in his complaint and further warned the plaintiff that if he failed to timely file an amended complaint or failed to cure the identified deficiencies, the undersigned would recommend to the district court that the action be dismissed with prejudice and without leave for further amendment (doc. 23). The plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint within the time provided. Accordingly, in addition to the reasons discussed herein, this action should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action with prejudice (except for the claims barred by Heck, which should be dismissed without prejudice), without further leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, C/A No. 20-1620 (4th Cir. Aug. 17, 2022) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”). It is further recommended that this action be designated as a “strike” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the following page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Room 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).