Opinion
12731-19L
11-09-2022
RODNEY SMITH, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
ORDER AND DECISION
Joseph W. Nega, Judge.
This case is presently calendared for an in-person trial at the session of the Court scheduled to commence on Monday, November 28, 2022, in Detroit, Michigan. On September 29, 2022, respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (respondent's motion). By Order issued October 6, 2022, the Court directed petitioner to file a response to respondent's motion on or before November 2, 2022. To date, petitioner has not filed a response to respondent's motion. The Court could grant respondent's motion on that ground alone. See Rule 121(d). Nevertheless, the Court has considered respondent's motion on its merits and concludes that respondent is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code, Title 26 U.S.C., in effect at all relevant times, all regulation references are to the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 26 (Treas. Reg.), in effect at all relevant times, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
I. Background
On or around August 29, 2016, petitioner submitted to respondent a document styled as a "Form 1040-NTB, Claim form for non-'trade or business' withholdings" for tax year 2014 (purported 2014 return). The purported 2014 return claimed an amount of $6,787.14 in "unauthorized withholdings" and attached several "corrected" versions of third-party income reporting forms issued to him by payors, which changed the taxable amounts to $0. The first page of the purported 2014 return included a lengthy field, entitled "Purpose of form," which provided various frivolous arguments as to why taxpayers are permitted to "report zero (0) 'trade or business' income and to claim back unauthorized withholding thereon." On April 5, 2018, an employee of respondent, Jonna Love, prepared and submitted for approval a Form 8278, Assessment and Abatement of Miscellaneous Civil Penalties, asserting a $5,000.00 penalty under section 6702(a) against petitioner for the submission of the purported 2014 return. On April 9, 2018, Adam Fisher, who was Ms. Love's immediate supervisor, signed the Form 8278 in the field for "approver signature." May 14, 2018, respondent issued to petitioner a CP15 Notice of Penalty Charge, informing him of the assessed section 6702(a) penalty.
This form is not an authentic Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, and appears to have been created by petitioner himself or downloaded by him from a tax protester website.
On or around October 19, 2017, petitioner submitted to respondent a second document styled as a "Form 1040-NTB, Claim form for non-'trade or business' withholdings" for tax year 2016 (purported 2016 return). The purported 2016 return claimed an amount of $1,843.06 in "unauthorized withholdings" and again attached several "corrected" versions of third-party income reporting forms issued to him by payors, which changed the taxable amounts to $0. The purported 2016 return also included the same frivolous arguments that petitioner included in the purported 2014 return. On March 21, 2018, Ms. Love prepared and submitted for approval a Form 8278, asserting a $5,000.00 penalty under section 6702(a) against petitioner for the submission of the purported 2016 return. Also on March 21, 2018, Mr. Fisher, as Ms. Love's immediate supervisor, signed the Form 8278 in the field for "manager." On April 23, 2018, respondent issued to petitioner a CP15 Notice of Penalty Charge, informing him of the assessed section 6702(a) penalty.
On October 2, 2018, respondent issued to petitioner a Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6230 (NFTL), corresponding to the two $5,000.00 penalties for tax years 2014 and 2016. Petitioner submitted a Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due Process or Equivalent Hearing, which was signed by petitioner on signed November 5, 2018, and was received by respondent on November 28, 2018. On the Form 12153, petitioner checked a box requesting lien withdrawal. In an attachment to the Form 12153 that provided the reason for his CDP request, petitioner stated that he was "in [the] process of collecting documentation" and that an explanation with "detailed, documented, supported reasons with evidence [would] soon be forthcoming" which would demonstrate "errors along with unfair treatment by the IRS."
On March 29, 2019, SO Alicia Howard sent to petitioner a letter acknowledging receipt by Appeals of the CDP request and scheduling a conference for May 8, 2019. In the letter, SO Howard stated that, in order for her to consider a collection alternative, petitioner should submit a completed Form 433-A, Collection Information Statement for Wage Earners and Self-Employed Individuals and Forms 1040 for tax years 2012 through 2017. On May 8, 2019, SO Howard sent to petitioner a letter stating (1) that she had called him for the scheduled conference with no answer or voicemail and (2) that she had not received any of the requested information for consideration of a collection alternative. In the letter, SO Howard requested that petitioner submit any information for consideration within 14 days of the date of the letter. Petitioner did not respond to SO Howard within 14 days of May 8, 2019.
In the letter, SO Howard describes the conference as having been scheduled for May 5, 2019.
On June 6, 2019, SO Howard issued to petitioner a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Actions Under Sections 6320 or 6330 (notice of determination), sustaining the NFTL. On July 10, 2019, petitioner filed a Petition with this Court. On October 30, 2019, respondent filed a Motion to Remand, seeking to remand the case to Appeals for further consideration. In the Motion to Remand, respondent represented that respondent's letters to petitioner had incorrectly directed petitioner to forward his correspondence to respondent's Philadelphia office, rather than the correct Holtsville, NY office. On November 12, 2019, petitioner filed a Response to Motion to Remand, representing that he did not object to the granting of the motion, and by Order issued November 14, 2019, the Court granted respondent's Motion to Remand.
On December 30, 2019, petitioner sent a package addressed to the Holtsville Appeals office, requesting that the hearing be conducted by correspondence and providing an extensive explanation of why he believed the lien should be withdrawn. The December 30 submission included numerous copies of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests made by petitioner and purported copies of other taxpayers' federal income tax returns. On February 3, 2020, SO Howard sent petitioner a letter stating that she had made several attempts to contact him via telephone, with no answer or voicemail message, and scheduling a conference for February 12, 2020. On February 11, 2020, petitioner sent to SO Howard a fax, confirming his request for the hearing to be conducted by correspondence and stating that he was away from home and thus did not have a telephone but that he did receive mail forwarding. On February 20, 2020, SO Howard sent to petitioner a letter stating that she had received his request for conference by mail. In the letter, SO Howard stated that the balance at issue was due to a penalty assessed against petitioner under section 6702(a). The letter also stated that "[i]t has not been made clear what you are looking for or how you plan to resolve the liability" and requested a response from petitioner by March 5, 2020.
On February 24, 2020, petitioner sent to SO Howard a fax, advising that he had sent his detailed explanation on December 30, 2019 to the Holtsville Appeals office. Petitioner attached to the fax a copy of a United States Postal Service (USPS) certified mail receipt and a printout from the USPS website's tracking page for the receipt's certified mailing number, which indicated that the corresponding item had been received in Holtsville, NY on January 2, 2020. In the fax, petitioner also requested that SO Howard confirm whether she had the package, as it "would take some effort on my part to reprint and re-organize all the documents and evidence that I sent." On February 27, 2020, SO Howard sent to petitioner a letter advising that she had received his February 24, 2020 fax; SO Howard advised that she had not received the December 30, 2019 mailing and that he would need to resubmit it for review no later than March 9, 2020. Petitioner did not respond to SO Howard by the March 9, 2020 deadline.
On July 20, 2020, SO Howard issued a Supplemental Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Actions Under Sections 6320 or 6330 (supplemental notice of determination). In the supplemental notice of determination, SO Howard described her correspondence with petitioner during the remand proceeding and stated that, as of March 12, 2020, she had not received the December 30, 2019 package from petitioner and thus had closed the case.
II. Discussion
A. Summary Judgment Standard
The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite litigation and avoid costly, time-consuming, and unnecessary trials. Fla. Peach Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C 678, 681 (1998). The Court may grant summary judgment when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. Rule 121(b); Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), aff'd, 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994). In deciding whether to grant summary judgment, we construe factual materials and draw inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sundstrand Corp., 98 T.C. at 520. However, the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his pleadings but, rather, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial. Rule 121(d); see Sundstrand Corp., 98 T.C. at 520.
B. Standard of Review
Section 6330(d)(1) grants this Court jurisdiction to review the SO's determination in connection with a CDP hearing. Section 6330(c)(2) prescribes the matters that a taxpayer may raise at a CDP hearing, including spousal defenses, challenges to the appropriateness of the collection action, and collection alternatives. The existence or amount of the underlying tax liability may be contested at a CDP hearing only if the taxpayer did not receive a notice of deficiency or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute the tax liability. See § 6330(c)(2)(B); Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 609 (2000); Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 180- 81 (2000).
If the validity of the underlying tax liability is properly at issue, the Court will review the taxpayer's liability de novo. See Sego, 114 T.C. at 609-10. Where the validity of the underlying tax liability is not properly at issue, the Court will review the SO's administrative determination for abuse of discretion. Id. at 610. Abuse of discretion exists when a determination is arbitrary, capricious, or without sound basis in fact or law. Murphy v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 301, 320 (2005), aff'd, 469 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2006).
C. Underlying Liability
As noted above, a taxpayer may challenge the existence or amount of his underlying tax liability in a CDP proceeding only "if the person did not receive any statutory notice of deficiency for such tax liability or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability." § 6330(c)(2)(B). The phrase "underlying tax liability" includes the tax due, any additions to tax or penalties, and statutory interest. See Katz v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 329, 339 (2000); see also Callahan v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 44, 49 (2008) (concluding that the "underling tax liability" includes a taxpayer's liability for section 6702 penalties).
As a threshold matter, we conclude that petitioner is not precluded from challenging his underlying liability by section 6330(c)(2)(B). Section 6703(b) provides that the deficiency procedures do not apply to the assessment of frivolous return penalties under section 6702. Consequently, petitioner did not receive a notice of deficiency for the liabilities at issue here. In addition, the record demonstrates that petitioner has not had a prior opportunity for a conference with Appeals to dispute the liabilities. See Callahan, 130 T.C. at 50 (citing Lewis v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 48 (2007)).
This Court considers a challenge to underlying liability in a CDP case only if the taxpayer properly raised a challenge in the CDP proceeding. See Giamelli v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 107, 115 (2007); Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(f)(2), Q&A-F3. The taxpayer does not properly raise an issue, including the underlying liability, during the CDP hearing if he "fails to present to Appeals any evidence with respect to that issue after being given a reasonable opportunity to present such evidence." Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(f)(2), Q&A-F3. We have previously observed that "de novo review of frivolous return penalties is not automatic" and that a taxpayer "must make a meaningful challenge to the penalty itself" in order to preserve an underlying liability challenge for review. Pohl v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-291, at *8.
Accordingly, a taxpayer must plausibly contend that his return either (1) contained sufficient "information on which the substantial correctness of the self-assessment" could be judged, § 6702(a)(1)(A), or (2) was not "based on a position which the Secretary has identified as frivolous." Pohl, T.C. Memo. 2013-291, at *8; § 6702(a)(2)(B).
Respondent asserts that petitioner did not properly raise the issue of his underlying liability in the CDP proceeding. In respondent's motion, respondent seeks to invoke section 6330(g), which permits the Secretary to treat any portion of a CDP request "as if it were never submitted," "if the Secretary determines that such portion meets the requirement of clause (i) or (ii) of section 6702(b)(2)(A)." § 6330(g); see Buczek v. Commissioner, 143 T.C. 301, 307 (2014); Thornberry v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 356, 372-73 (2011). Respondent concedes that no disregard letter was issued to petitioner. In addition, neither the notice of determination nor supplemental notice of determination invoked section 6330(g) as a basis for sustaining the collection action. We thus are unable to conclude that respondent made a determination with respect to disregarding the underlying liability portion of petitioner's CDP request. See § 6330(g) (applying only "if the Secretary determines" a CDP request is frivolous) (emphasis added); see also Ryskamp v. Commissioner; 797 F.3d 1142, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Belair Woods, LLC v. Commissioner, 154 T.C. 1, 15 (2020) (observing that the term "determination" "denotes a communication with a high degree of concreteness and formality"). When reviewing an agency determination, we must judge its validity "solely by the grounds invoked by the agency." Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947); see Antioco v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-35, at *24-*25 (applying Chenery in CDP context). We thus do not review respondent's post hoc invocation of section 6330(g).
We now turn to whether petitioner properly raised an underlying liability challenge. At the outset, petitioner cannot plausibly contend that his 2014 and 2016 purported returns contained sufficient information on which the substantial correctness of his self-assessment could be judged. To the contrary, as so-called zero returns, reporting no taxable income and attempting to "correct" various third-party reporting, each return "contained information that on its face indicate[d] that the self-assessment [was] substantially incorrect." Walker v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2022-63, at *9 (quoting § 6702(a)(1(B)); see Grunsted v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 455, 460 (2011) ("This Court and others have repeatedly characterized returns reflecting zero income and zero tax as frivolous.").
This leaves the question of whether petitioner plausibly contended that his return position had not been identified by the Secretary as frivolous. We conclude that petitioner failed to do so. In his February 24, 2020 fax to SO Howard, petitioner characterized his December 30, 2019 submission as showing that his returns were "not based upon a position prescribed by the Secretary." However, in the December 30 submission, petitioner failed to make any plausible argument as to why his returns were not based upon a position identified by the Secretary as frivolous. In the submission, for instance, petitioner argued that his returns were not frivolous because "many other filers. . . made the same claims for the same reasons, but. . . received no allegations of 'frivolous' and received refunds." Such an argument is meritless. See, e.g., Mid-Continent Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 571 F.2d 1371, 1376 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[I]t is well established that a taxpayer has no right to insist upon the same erroneous treatment afforded a similarly situated taxpayer in the past."), aff'g, 67 T.C. 37 (1976); Davis v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1014, 1022 (1976). In any event, petitioner's "equal treatment" argument goes to the merits of his tax position, not to the narrower procedural question of whether his return was based upon a position identified by the Secretary. Cf. Walker, T.C. Memo. 2022-63, at *6 (identifying taxpayer's "procedural argument" about Secretary's identification as sufficient to preserve underlying liability challenge).
Petitioner's most procedural-seeming argument in the submission was that his returns positions were not frivolous because Notice 2007-30 and Notice 2010-33, which are the Secretary's identifications of frivolous positions, see § 6702(c), "have to do with some action or claim of a 'taxpayer.'" In petitioner's view, because he received "zero (0) 'trade or business' payments, there are no taxes" and thus petitioner "cannot be a taxpayer" to whom Notice 2007-30 and Notice 2010-33 are applicable. Petitioner's argument is wholly frivolous. See, e.g., Martin v. Commissioner, 756 F.2d 38, 40 (6th Cir. 1985), aff'g, T.C. Memo. 1983-473. In any event, again, petitioner's argument goes to the merits of his tax position, not to the procedural question of whether his return was based upon a position identified by the Secretary. Cf. Walker, T.C. Memo. 2022-63, at *6.
Petitioner's contentions were insufficiently plausible to preserve his underlying challenge. Having provided a representative sample of the arguments in petitioner's December 30 submission, we need not further address the remaining arguments "with somber reasoning and copious citation of precedent." Crain v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d 1417, 1417 (5th Cir. 1984). Petitioner offered no plausible contentions during the CDP proceeding as to why his 2014 and 2016 return positions had not been identified by the Secretary as frivolous. We thus conclude that petitioner failed to preserve an underlying liability challenge for review in this Court.
D. Abuse of Discretion
In deciding whether SO Howard abused her discretion in sustaining the proposed collection action, we consider whether she: (1) properly verified that the requirements of applicable law or administrative procedure had been met; (2) considered any relevant issues petitioner raised; and (3) considered "whether any proposed collection action balances the need for the efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern of * * * [petitioner] that any collection action be no more intrusive than necessary." § 6330. For the reasons stated below, we conclude that SO Howard did not abuse her discretion in sustaining the collection actions against petitioner.
1. Consideration of the December 30th Submission
SO Howard closed the supplemental CDP case on March 12, 2020, 14 days after informing petitioner that she would do so if he failed to timely re-send the December 30, 2019 package by March 9, 2020. Cf. Shanley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-17, 2009 WL 195929, at *5 (sustaining an SO's decision to close case after taxpayer failed to respond within 14-day deadline). SO Howard's decision to close the case after petitioner failed to timely respond was therefore reasonable. See Scholz v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2015-2, at *8 ("When an SO gives a taxpayer an adequate period of time in which to respond, it is not an abuse of discretion for the SO to move ahead after encountering radio silence from the taxpayer."); see also Pough v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 344, 351 (2010). However, petitioner has emphasized in a prior filing in this case that Appeals already possessed the December 30 submission, as evidenced by its later presence in the administrative record, and thus SO prematurely closed the case without reviewing it.
To the extent that SO Howard may have procedurally erred in closing the case without reviewing the December 30 submission, we find such error to be harmless. In the December 30 submission, petitioner presented a jumble of familiar, frivolous arguments as to why he is not subject to federal income tax and as to why his arguments were not frivolous. As apparent support, petitioner included in the submission (1) FOIA requests he made to the IRS and (2) various purported copies of other taxpayers' federal income tax returns and refund checks.
We are satisfied that consideration of the frivolous and meritless arguments and irrelevant documents in the December 30 submission could not have affected SO Howard's determination to sustain the collection action. See Ruhaak v. Commissioner, 157 T.C. 103, 118 (2021); Perkins v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 58, 70- 71 (2007) (concluding that any error by Appeals was harmless given that the taxpayer raised only "frivolous and groundless" arguments); see also Romano-Murphy v. Commissioner, 152 T.C. 278, 310 (2019) (describing harmless error rule as applicable if an agency's mistake was not prejudicial and would "not affect the outcome"). Accordingly, remand of this case back to Appeals-the remedy sought by petitioner at various points in this case-would be futile, as nothing in petitioner's December 30 submission would justify a determination not to sustain the collection action. See Lunsford v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 183, 189 (2001) (finding it neither "necessary [n]or productive" to remand when the only arguments presented by the taxpayers were based on previously rejected legal propositions); see also N.L.R.B v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 767 n.6 (1969) (describing remand as "an idle and useless formality" where there was no "uncertainty as to the outcome of a proceeding" before the agency). Accordingly, we reject petitioner's argument that we must remand this case for any further consideration.
2. Verification
Section 6751(b)(1) provides a general rule that a penalty may not be assessed "unless the initial determination of such assessment is personally approved (in writing) by the immediate supervisor of the individual making such determination." The assessment of a section 6702(a) penalty is subject to the requirements of section 6751(b). Kestin v. Commissioner, 153 T.C. 14, 22 (2019). Respondent has produced two Forms 8278, corresponding to the two $5,000.00 section 6702(a) penalties assessed against petitioner. The Form 8278 for the penalty imposed for tax year 2014 was prepared by Ms. Love on April 5, 2018, and signed by Mr. Fisher, her immediate supervisor, on April 9, 2018. On May 14, 2018, respondent issued to petitioner a CP15 Notice of Penalty Charge, informing him of the assessed section 6702(a) penalty. The Form 8278 for the penalty imposed for tax year 2016 was also prepared by Ms. Love and was signed by Mr. Fisher on March 21, 2018. On April 23, 2018, respondent issued to petitioner a CP15 Notice of Penalty Charge, informing him of the assessed section 6702(a) penalty. We thus conclude that, for both section 6702(a) penalties, Ms. Love's initial determination of assessment was approved in writing by her immediate supervisor, prior to formal written communication of the assessment to petitioner, in compliance with section 6751(b)(1).
In his December 30, 2019 submission, petitioner pointed to the fact that both Forms 8278 referenced "ARG 44" in the remarks field. Petitioner speculated that this is a reference to Notice 2010-33's Argument 44, which identifies as frivolous the position that "[a] taxpayer's income is not taxable if the taxpayer assigns or attributes the income to a religious organization (a 'corporation sole' or ministerial trust) claimed to be tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3), or similar arguments described as frivolous in Rev. Rul. 2004-27, 2004-1 C.B. 625." Construed liberally, petitioner thus appears to have argued that supervisory approval was improper because he did not in fact base his return positions on Argument 44. Any such argument by petitioner is meritless. As we have previously observed, section 6751(b) "is captioned 'Approval of Assessment', not 'Explanation of Assessment,'" Pickens Decorative Stone, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2022-22, at *7, and requires no more than "a supervisor's signature on a civil penalty approval form." Clarkson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2022-92, at *12. We thus reject any argument seeking to graft onto section 6751(b)(1) "a subtextual requirement" that a penalty approval form provide a substantive explanation for the penalty assessment. Belair Woods, LLC, 154 T.C. at 17 (quoting Raifman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-101, at *61).
We conclude that SO Howard did not abuse her discretion in sustaining the collection action, based on her verification that the assessments complied with the requirements of applicable law and administrative procedure.
3. Balancing & Other Issues Raised
We also conclude that SO Howard appropriately conducted a balancing analysis in sustaining the proposed collection actions. Given that petitioner did not propose a collection alternative nor provide any financial information, SO Howard was well within her discretion to proceed with the proposed collection action. See, e.g., Davison v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2019-26, at *18 ("It is not an abuse of discretion for an Appeals officer to sustain a collection action and not consider collection alternatives when the taxpayer has proposed none."), aff'd, 805 Fed.Appx. 259 (5th Cir. 2020). Petitioner raised no other relevant issues for SO Howard to consider. See, e.g., Burnett v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-204, at *9 ("The term 'relevant' does not include frivolous or groundless issues.").
III. Conclusion
We will grant respondent's motion and sustain the challenged collection action. We will deny as moot the remaining pending motions in this case: (1) respondent's Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Proposed Facts and Evidence Should Not be Accepted as Established Pursuant to Rule 91(f), filed October 13, 2022; (2) respondent's Motion to Proceed Remotely, filed October 26, 2022; and (3) petitioner's Motion to Change Place of Trial to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, filed October 27, 2022. We will also discharge as moot the Court's pending Order to Show Cause, issued October 24, 2022. This Court has considered all the other arguments of the parties and, to the extent not discussed above, finds those arguments to be irrelevant, moot, or without merit.
Upon due consideration and for cause, it is
ORDERED that respondent's Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Proposed Facts and Evidence Should Not be Accepted as Established Pursuant to Rule 91(f), filed October 13, 2022, is denied as moot. It is further
ORDERED respondent's Motion to Proceed Remotely, filed October 26, 2022, is denied as moot. It is further
ORDERED that petitioner's Motion to Change Place of Trial to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, filed October 27, 2022, is denied as moot. It is further
ORDERED that the Court's Order to Show Cause, issued October 24, 2022, is hereby discharged as moot. It is further
ORDERED that respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed September 29, 2022, is granted. It is further
ORDERED AND DECIDED that the Supplemental Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Actions Under Sections 6320 or 6330, dated July 20, 2020, upon which this case is based, is sustained, and respondent may proceed with the collection actions as determined in the Notice of Determination for tax years 2014 and 2016.