Opinion
Case No. 15-cv-00427-BAS(WVG)
04-13-2016
SHARON SMITH, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. CITYFRONT TERRACE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, ET AL., Defendants. AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIM
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FIFTH AND SEVENTH CAUSES OF ACTION AND REMANDING CASE TO STATE COURT FOR DECISION ON REMAINING CAUSES OF ACTION
(ECF No. 28)
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Epsten Grinnell & Howell removed this case from state to federal court after Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint, adding the second cause of action alleging a violation of the Federal Fair Debt Collections Practices Act. (ECF No. 1.) On March 7, 2016, after a Joint Motion by the parties, this Court dismissed Epsten Grinnell & Howell as a Defendant and dismissed the second cause of action for a violation of the Federal Debt Collections Practices Act. (ECF No. 41.)
Defendant Cityfront Terrace Homeowners Association ("HOA") moves to dismiss the remaining causes of action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 28.) The Court finds this motion suitable for determination on the papers submitted and without oral argument. See Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). This Court GRANTS the Motion to the extent it requests dismissal of the fifth cause of action for a violation of the Federal Fair Housing Act and the seventh cause of action for a violation of the California Fair Housing Act. Because the fifth cause of action is the only remaining federal cause of action, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state causes of action and REMANDS the case back to the state court for decision on the remaining state court causes of action.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs live in a condo at 500 West Harbor #816. (ECF No. 22, Third Amended Complaint ("TAC") ¶6.) Presumably, the HOA is the homeowners association at this condominium complex. Apparently, the HOA attempted to collect what they alleged were overdue assessments from the Smiths and, when the Smiths failed to pay the assessments, instituted foreclosure proceedings and barred Plaintiffs from using the common areas of the condominium complex.
These facts are largely derived from the pleadings filed in support of and in opposition to the Motions to Dismiss along with earlier iterations of the Complaint, since much is omitted from the TAC. --------
Plaintiffs allege that Mrs. Smith suffers "from an advanced arthritic condition," and that the HOA was aware of this condition. (TAC ¶107.) According to Plaintiffs, "[t]he HOA intentionally singled Plaintiffs out for deactivation of their key cards because the HOA knew of Mrs. Smith's handicap" and were using h er handicap to coerce her to pay the HOA assessments. (TAC ¶110.) "By deactivating her key cards, the HOA refused to allow Mrs. Smith use of the elevator that directly accesses her unit. Instead, the HOA forced her to engage in additional physical exertion and take more than one elevator to simply go from the garage to her unit." (TAC ¶113.) On June 25, 2014, when apparently confronted with their discrimination, "the HOA admitted its discrimination by allowing Mrs. Smith full elevator access." (TAC ¶114.)
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2001). The court must accept all factual allegations pleaded in the complaint as true and must construe them and draw all reasonable inferences from them in favor of the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, rather, it must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has "facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombley, 550 U.S. at 556). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
"[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (alteration in original). A court need not accept "legal conclusions" as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Despite the deference the court must pay to the plaintiff's allegations, it is not proper for the court to assume that "the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged or that defendants have violated the...laws in ways that have not been alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
Courts may not usually consider material outside the complaint when ruling on a motion to dismiss. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990). However, documents specifically identified in the complaint whose authenticity is not questioned by parties may also be considered. Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1080 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995) (superseded by statute on other grounds). Moreover, the court may consider the full text of those documents even when the complaint quotes only selected portions. Id. It may also consider material properly subject to judicial notice without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994).
As a general rule, a court freely grants leave to amend a complaint which has been dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). However, leave to amend may be denied when "the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency." Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986).
IV. ANALYSIS
Under the Federal Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), it is unlawful to discriminate against any person "in the provision of services or facilities in connection" with a dwelling because of a handicap. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). Contrary to the arguments of the HOA, the statute is not limited to those who are in the process of renting or buying a dwelling. See, e.g., DuBois v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 453 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006).
A plaintiff can allege a violation of the FHA in one of three ways: by alleging disparate treatment, disparate impact or failure to make accommodations. Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 304-05 (9th Cir. 1997). In order to allege a disparate treatment claim the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case that she is a member of a protected class and that others similarly situated to the plaintiff were treated differently. Id.; see also Hayden Lake Recreational Water & Sewer Dist. v. Haydenview Cottage, LLC, 835 F. Supp. 2d 965, 978 (D. Idaho 2011) ("[T]o prevail on a disparate treatment claim, the Plaintiff must demonstrate that the challenged regulation or policy singles out a protected group (in this case, the disabled) and applies different rules to them because of their protected trait.") (citing Community House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 490 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 2007)). The burden then shifts to the Defendant to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the disparate treatment. Gamble, 104 F.3d at 305.
For a disparate impact case, a plaintiff must allege that there were practices in place that, although outwardly neutral, had a "significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on persons of a particular type produced by Defendant's facially neutral acts or practices. Gamble, 104 F.3d at 305. Thus, Plaintiff must allege that somehow the HOA practices had a significantly adverse or disproportionate effect on the physically disabled.
Finally, to allege a "reasonable accommodation" case, the Plaintiff must allege that the HOA "refuses to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, where such accommodations may be necessary to afford physically disabled equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." Gamble, 104 F.3d at 306. Thus, in order to allege a failure to "reasonably accommodate" her, Plaintiff must allege that she gave the HOA notice and an opportunity to accommodate her. Taylor v. Harbour Pointe Homeowners Ass'n, 690 F.3d 44, 49 (2nd Cir. 2012). Plaintiffs must further allege that "'but for the accommodation, they will likely be deprived of the opportunity to enjoy the housing of their choice.'" S. Cal. Housing Rights Ctr. v. Los Feliz Towers Homeowners Ass'n, 426 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (quoting U.S. v. California Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 107 F.3d 1374, 1380-81 (9th Cir. 1997)).
In this case, Plaintiffs attempt to allege "disparate treatment" and a failure to reasonably accommodate. (TAC ¶¶109-110, 114.) However, Plaintiffs fail to "plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombley, 550 U.S. at 570. First, although the Plaintiffs allege that Mrs. Smith suffered from an "advanced arthritic condition," they fail to allege that this condition impacted her mobility such that the requirement that she take two elevators made it difficult for her to enter her condominium. Second, Plaintiffs repeatedly allege a formulaic recitation of the elements of the cause of action, disapproved by Twombley. (See TAC ¶106) ("The HOA has engaged in discriminatory housing practices[.]"); (TAC ¶110) ("Plaintiffs were discriminated against by the HOA because of Mrs. Smith's handicap."); (TAC ¶111) ("The HOA engaged in a discriminatory housing act by discriminating against Mrs. Smith in the terms, conditions or privileges in the provision of services or facilities in connection with the Property because of a handicap of Mrs. Smith.")
To the extent Plaintiffs allege facts supporting their claim for relief, they claim the HOA deactivated Plaintiffs' access keys which prohibited their access to the condominium common areas purportedly because they failed to pay their overdue homeowners association fees and that this denied Mrs. Smith "use of the elevator that directly accessed her unit. Instead [she was] forced to engage in additional physical exertion and take more than one elevator to simply go from the garage to her unit and vice versa." (TAC ¶113.) These allegations are insufficient to establish either disparate treatment or disparate impact claims. Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege that Mrs. Smith was a member of a protected class, that others similarly situated to the Plaintiffs were treated differently or that the policy suspending access to the common areas for nonpayment of homeowners fees singles out a protected group and applied different rules to them because of their protected trait. See Haydenview Cottage, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 978. Nor do Plaintiffs allege that the HOA had practices or policies that, although outwardly neutral, had a significantly adverse impact on the disabled. Gamble, 104 F.3d at 305.
With respect to the reasonable accommodation claim, Plaintiffs do not allege that they informed the HOA of the difficulty Mrs. Smith was having and the HOA refused to make reasonable accommodation for her disability. In fact, to the contrary, the Complaint alleges, that when confronted with the problem Mrs. Smith was having, the HOA allowed Mrs. Smith full elevator access. (TAC ¶114.)
Since this Court dismisses the fifth cause of action for a violation of the Federal Fair Housing Act, so too must the seventh cause of action under the California Fair Housing Act fail. See Los Feliz Towers Homeowners Ass'n, 426 F. Supp. 2d at 1068 ("An analysis under the [California Fair Housing Act] mirrors the analysis under the federal Fair Housing Act.") (citing Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114, 1131 n.8 (9th Cir. 2001)).
V. CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS IN PART Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 28). The Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs' fifth and seventh causes of action. The Court declines to take supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state causes of action and REMANDS the case to the State Court for resolution of the remaining claims. See Ramirez v. Bank of America Corp., No. CV 09-7788 DDP (SSx), 2009 WL 5184480, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2009) ("After dismissal of all federal claims, a court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and remand the case sua sponte if there exists no independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction.") (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(c), 1447(c)).
IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: April 13, 2016
/s/ _________
Hon. Cynthia Bashant
United States District Judge