Smith v. Bright

Full title: Teran Smith, Appellant, v. Gail B. Bright, Tommy Bright, Donald Valencia…

Court: Florida Court of Appeals, First District

Date published: Oct 11, 2023

No. 1D22-1678 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2023)

Opinion

1D22-1678

10-11-2023

Teran Smith, Appellant, v. Gail B. Bright, Tommy Bright, Donald Valencia, James D. Smith, Heirs of Andrew Smith Estate, Martin C. Hornberger, Donna A. Hornberger, Robert Alan Hastings, Sr., Dana Ann Hastings, Robert Alan Hastings, II and Aaron Hastings, Appellees.

Kerry Adkison of Kerry Adkison, P.A., Chipley, for Appellant. T.A. Borowski, Jr. and Darryl Steve Traylor, Jr. of Borowski and Traylor, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellee James D. Smith.

LONG, J.

Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Gadsden County. David Michael Frank, Judge.

Kerry Adkison of Kerry Adkison, P.A., Chipley, for Appellant.

T.A. Borowski, Jr. and Darryl Steve Traylor, Jr. of Borowski and Traylor, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellee James D. Smith.

LONG, J.

Teran Smith appeals the trial court's entry of a final judgment after non-binding arbitration. Section 44.103(5), Florida Statues, provides in pertinent part that "[a]n arbitration decision shall be final if a request for a trial de novo is not filed within the time provided by the rules promulgated by the [s]upreme [c]ourt." The relevant rule requires a party to file a motion for trial within twenty days after service of the arbitration award and findings. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.820(h).

Smith did not file a motion for trial within the twenty-day period, and so the trial court entered a final judgment in accordance with the arbitration decision. As set out in rule 1.820(h), the trial court was required to enter "such orders and judgments as may be required to carry out the terms of the decision as provided in section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes." The language is straightforward. If no motion for trial is filed within the twentyday period, the trial court must enforce the decision of the arbitrator.

AFFIRMED.

WINOKUR, J., concurs; BILBREY, J., concurs with opinion.

BILBREY, J., concurring.

I fully concur with the opinion. I write only to mention that time limits in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, including rule 1.820, are not absolute. Time can be enlarged by the trial court, including "after the expiration of the specified period . . . when failure to act was the result of excusable neglect." Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.090(b)(1)(B). "The determination of whether the failure to abide by a specified time limit constitutes excusable neglect is in essence an equitable one which should take into account all the relevant circumstances, including prejudice to the other party, the reason for the delay, the duration of the delay, and whether the movant acted in good faith." Boudot v. Boudot, 925 So.2d 409, 416 (Fla. 5^th DCA 2006); see also Nicholson-Kenny Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Steinberg, 932 So.2d 321, 326 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (remanding for a trial de novo where one party's "attorneys' words, actions, and conduct led [the opposing party's] attorney to believe that they assented to its request for a trial de novo" and disapproving "the use of 'gotcha' litigation tactics"). These considerations are absent here, so we are correct to affirm.