Opinion
Civil Action Number 03-3372 Section "L" (3).
June 7, 2004
ORDER REASONS
Pending before the Court are two motions: (1) Defendant James Dimon's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and (2) Defendants' Motion for Sanctions. At a May 17, 2004, status conference, the Court raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction and instructed counsel to file supplemental memoranda on the issue. Because it appears that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the above captioned matter, the Court declines to rule on the two pending motions and remands the matter to the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana.
I. Background
Plaintiff Tanya M. Smith worked as a bank teller at Bank One's St. Charles Avenue branch. On September 17, 2003, the Plaintiff was assigned to balance the bank's automatic teller machine. The Plaintiff asserts that while she was performing her task, she withdrew $90,000 in currency to fill the ATM, but $10,000 of that money would not fit in the machine. She claims to have placed the remaining $10,000 on a stack of currency in the bank vault.
A September 18, 2003, audit of the ATM machine was unable to account for $10,000. Later that day, the Plaintiff was interrogated by Bank One's security officers about the missing currency. She maintained that she did not steal the money and did not know how any shortage occurred. Bank One fired the Plaintiff because of the excessive cash shortage in the ATM.
The Plaintiff brought suit on October 30, 2003, against Defendants Bank One, Jamie Dimon. Elizabeth Amdur, Heather Mowers, Tanika Pritchett, Rodger Bergez, and Susanne Reckert in Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. The Plaintiff claims that she was wrongfully terminated by Bank One and defamed by statements made by some of the other Defendants. The Plaintiff claims that she suffered and continues to suffer great emotional distress and mental anguish from the wrongful termination and the theft allegations.
In the Plaintiff's state court petition, she contends that the Defendants harmed her and violated her "civil and constitutional rights . . ." (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 8.) The Plaintiff then alleges five types of harm caused by the Defendants' conduct. Three allegations list state defamation claims. One item asserts that the Plaintiff was wrongfully terminated. Another states, "[v]iolation of petitioner's civil and constitutional rights as guaranteed by the laws of the United States and the State of Louisiana." (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 8.) The Defendants removed the matter to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), invoking the Court's federal question and diversity jurisdiction. At a May 17, 2004, status conference, the Court raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte and instructed counsel to submit supplemental briefing on federal jurisdiction.
II. Law Analysis
A. "Arising Under" Jurisdiction
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). Determination of whether an action "arises under" the laws of the United States is made pursuant to the well-pleaded complaint rule. Jurisdiction exists only if the Plaintiff's statement of her own cause of action demonstrates that claim is based on federal law. Louisville Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
A Plaintiff is deemed master of her case, and she may avoid federal jurisdiction by relying exclusively on state law. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987). Where a Plaintiff properly pleads only a state law cause of action, there generally is no federal jurisdiction. MSOF Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 295 F.3d 485, 490 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, NPC Servs. v. MSOF Corp., 537 U.S. 1046 (2002). "As a general rule, absent diversity jurisdiction, a case will not be removable if the complaint does not affirmatively allege a federal claim." Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6 (2003).
The Defendants assert that the Plaintiff's references to "violations of her civil and constitutional rights" in the state court petition satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule and indicate that this civil action arises under the laws of the United States. The Defendants contend that the Plaintiff's state court petition insinuates that the Plaintiff may pursue an equal rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000). That argument is without merit.
The conclusory mention that a private actor's conduct violates civil and constitutional rights does not satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule. Such a statement documents an effect or injury; it does not state a cause of action. "The court is not bound by the stray labels placed on plaintiff's claims. The existence of federal question jurisdiction cannot be based on facts not alleged in the complaint." Matthews v. Stewart, 207 F. Supp.2d 496, 498 (M.D. La. 2001). An incidental reference to a violation of federal law or the U.S. Constitution does not "convert a state law complaint into a federal cause of action if the federal statute is not a necessary element of the state law claim and no preemption exists." Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 114 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Strong v. Print U.S.A., Ltd., 230 F. Supp.2d 798, 800 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (nothing that the mere mention of Title VII did not convert a state law sexual harassment claim into a federal cause of action).
The well-pleaded complaint rule requires the Court to determine federal jurisdiction from the Plaintiff's allegations in her state court petition. The Plaintiff cites no federal statute in her petition, nor does she allege any facts to support any federal claim. The Plaintiff alleges no state action. She does not intimate that her discharge was in any way related to race. In fact, the Plaintiff never mentions race in her state court petition. There is no federal cause of action pleaded in the Plaintiff's petition, and thus no "arising under" jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The matter was improperly removed on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.
B. Diversity Jurisdiction
Like the Plaintiff, several of the named Defendants are citizens of Louisiana. The Defendants' petition for removal raised fraudulent joinder as an alternative basis for jurisdiction. The Defendant acknowledges that the Plaintiff's non-diverse coworkers are named as individual Defendants in this matter. Nevertheless, the Defendants assert that the focus of the Plaintiff's claim is against Bank One and that the Defendants are sued in the course and scope of their employment.
"Fraudulent joinder can be established in two ways: (1) actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts, or (2) inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the non-diverse party in state court." Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 2003). The Defendants do not allege actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts. Furthermore, the Plaintiff avers that the individually named, nondiverse Defendants defamed her. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's nondiverse coworkers, the alleged tortfeasors, were not fraudulently joined. There presence in the lawsuit defeats the Defendants' assertion of § 1332 diversity jurisdiction.
III. Conclusion
The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Defendant James Dimon's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and Defendants' Motion for Sanctions are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to refiling in state court. IT IS ORDERED that the matter be REMANDED to Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana.