Opinion
No. C99-2128
June 11, 2001
ORDER
This matter comes before the court pursuant to Defendants' November 9, 2000 motion for summary judgment (docket number 30). The parties have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge. Oral argument was held on April 30, 2001. For the reasons set forth below, the motion for summary judgment is granted.
I. Factual Background
Plaintiff Candis Smith ("Smith") worked as an administrative secretary for the Memorial Foundation of Allen Hospital. On December 22, 1998, an adoption agency notified her that she should be prepared to leave in approximately ten days to adopt a Romanian girl. She left for Romania on January 4, 1999. On January 14, 1999, approximately one week after she returned from her trip, her employment was terminated. Several weeks later, she was re-hired as a float secretary.
Smith filed this suit against Allen Health Systems, Inc. ("Allen Health Systems"); Allen Memorial Hospital Corp. ("Allen Hospital"); the Memorial Foundation of Allen Hospital ("the Foundation"); Richard Seidler ("Seidler"), President and CEO of Allen Health Systems and Allen Memorial Hospital; Kenneth Leibold ("Leibold"), the Manager of Human Resources at Allen Hospital; and Robert Justis ("Justis"), the Manager of Corporate Relations Development at Allen Hospital and Executive Director of the Foundation (collectively "Allen Health"). Count I of her complaint alleges violations of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.; Count II alleges breach of contract; Count III alleges violations of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; and Count IV alleges violation of Iowa Code Chapter 216.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
A motion for summary judgment may be granted only if, after examining all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court finds that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kegel v. Runnels, 793 F.2d 924, 926 (8th Cir. 1986). Once the movant has properly supported its motion, the nonmovant "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). "To preclude the entry of summary judgment, the nonmovant must show that, on an element essential to [its] case and on which [it] will bear the burden of proof at trial, there are genuine issues of material fact." Noll v. Petrovsky, 828 F.2d 461, 462 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)). Although "direct proof is not required to create a jury question, . . . to avoid summary judgment, `the facts and circumstances relied upon must attain the dignity of substantial evidence and must not be such as merely to create a suspicion.'" Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985) (quoting Impro Prod., Inc. v. Herrick, 715 F.2d 1267, 1272 (8th Cir. 1983)). In applying these standards, the court must give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Krause v. Perryman, 827 F.2d 346, 350 (8th Cir. 1987).
In the context of employment discrimination cases, summary judgment should be used sparingly. Hardin v. Hussman, 45 F.3d 262, 264 (8th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). "`Because discrimination cases often depend on inferences rather than on direct evidence, summary judgment should not be granted unless the evidence could not support any reasonable inference for the nonmovant.'" Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 385 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1340 (8th Cir. 1994)). In applying these standards, the court must give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Krause, 827 F.2d at 350.
III. Family Medical Leave Act A. Retaliatory Discharge Under the FMLA
While the Eighth Circuit has not formally adopted the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), burden-shifting framework for retaliatory discharge claims arising under the FMLA, courts generally have applied the McDonnell Douglas framework. See e.g., Brungart v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 798 (11th Cir. 2000);King v. Preferred Technical Group, 166 F.3d 887, 891-92 (7th Cir. 1999). Therefore, to establish a prima facie case under the FMLA, Smith must establish: (1) she engaged in activity protected by the FMLA; (2) her employer took adverse employment action against her; and (3) there is a causal connection between her protected activity and the employer's adverse employment action. Id. at 892.
Once a plaintiff establishes the prima facie case, the employer must then rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case with evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for taking the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03. "The employer's explanation of its action must be `clear and reasonably specific,' but the employer does not have to prove to the court that it was motivated by the proffered reason." White v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 985 F.2d 434, 436 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)) (internal citations omitted). If the employer can rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case, the plaintiff must show "sufficient admissible evidence from which a rational factfinder could find that the [employer]'s proffered nondiscriminatory reason was either untrue or not the real reason, and that intentional discrimination was the real reason." Lang v. Star Herald, 107 F.3d 1308, 1311 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying McDonnell Douglas framework to sex discrimination under Title VII).
B. Smith's Prima Facie Case
First, the defendants do not dispute that Smith was engaged in activity protected by the FMLA. Second, the defendants argue that they did not take adverse employment action against her because she was re-hired as a float secretary and has not been damaged. Smith worked as administrative secretary and was terminated from this position. Even though Smith was re-hired as a float secretary, Smith alleges that she lost overtime pay and at least nine hours of earned time, as well loss of prestige in being demoted and emotional harm resulting therefrom. Smith's termination from her administrative secretary position and the emotional harm resulting from that termination is a sufficient adverse employment action to establish the second element of her prima facie case.
Third, Allen Health argues there is no causal connection between her protected activity and the employer's adverse action. Contrary to Allen Health's arguments, Smith does not have to allege that the defendants made any discriminatory remarks regarding her taking FMLA leave; she is entitled to rely on indirect or circumstantial evidence. See Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 825 (8th Cir. 2000). Smith argues that because she was terminated while on FMLA leave, she has established this element of her prima facie case. Courts generally require the existence of "more than a temporal connection between protected activity and an adverse employment action . . . to show a genuine factual issue on retaliation . . . ." Buettner v. Arch Coal Sales Co., 216 F.3d 707, 716 (8th Cir. 2000). The Eighth Circuit has declined to specifically determine "whether temporal proximity alone would be sufficient to create an inference of a causal connection . . . ." Id.; Stuart v. General Motors Corp., 217 F.3d 621, 635 (8th Cir. 2000). Smith left for Romania on January 4, 1999 and her employment was terminated on January 14, 1999. For the purposes of this summary judgment motion, Smith has established enough of a causal connection to meet the third prong of the prima facie case based on the timing of her termination.
C. The Defendant's Reason for Terminating Smith
Having established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendants to present evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for discharging Smith. "The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (citation and footnotes omitted). The defendant alleges that Smith was terminated because she failed to send out receipts and thank you cards to over 400 donors who made contributions totaling $350,000 between November 4, 1998 and December 31, 1998.
D. Evidence of Pretext
Because the defendants have presented a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the discharge, the presumption of discrimination disappears and Smith must show "sufficient admissible evidence from which a rational factfinder could find that the [employer]'s proffered nondiscriminatory reason was either untrue or not the real reason, and that intentional discrimination was the real reason." Lang, 107 F.3d at 1311. In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000), the Supreme Court addressed the quantum of evidence necessary to create a jury question at this stage of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. It held that "a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated." Id. at 148. This statement in Reeves made clear that additional, independent evidence of discriminatory animus is not always required to support an inference of discrimination, and that evidence supporting the plaintiff's prima facie case and exposing as pretextual the employer's reason for an adverse employment action should be considered, along with any other evidence that may exist, in determining whether an inference of discrimination has been raised.
The Reeves case involved an age discrimination claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and arose in the context of a judgment as a matter of law following a trial on the merits. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 138-39. The Court applied the McDonnell Douglas framework to the plaintiff's age discrimination claim. Id. at 140. Furthermore, the Court made it clear that its McDonnell Douglas analysis under the Reeves case also applies to motions for summary judgment. See id. at 150.
Fisher v. Pharmacia Upjohn, 225 F.3d 915, 922 (8th Cir. 2000).
Smith has been unable to present any evidence from which a factfinder could conclude that the defendant's reason for terminating Smith was pretextual. First, Smith argues that she alone suffered a penalty when other employees shared responsibility for failure to send out the receipts and thank you notes. Smith, however, was the only person charged with the administrative task of sending out receipts and thank you notes on a timely basis.
Second, Smith argues that a discriminatory intent can be inferred by Allen Health's attempt to "cover up" after her termination. The minutes of the January 19, 1999 Board of Directors meeting mention Smith's attendance at computer training and states: "It was announced that Candy Smith requested a maternal leave for adoption of a foreign born child. The leave was granted." The minutes, however, did not state that Smith had been terminated on January 14. Smith also points to a lack of counseling notes in her personnel file after Robert Justis counseled her on her receipting sometime in the Fall of 1998. While it may be unusual that the Board's minutes do not reflect Smith's termination, the lack of a record of her termination in the minutes does not indicate an intent to cover up her termination as a pretext for taking FMLA leave. Similarly, a lack of counseling notes in Smith's personnel file does not indicate that Allen Health's reason for terminating Smith was a pretext for illegal discrimination.
Third, Smith points to her December 31, 1998 evaluation in which Justis gave her a positive evaluation. Allen Health argues Smith was given a favorable evaluation because Justis had not learned that Smith had failed to sent out 400 receipts and thank you notes dating back to November 4, 1998. At the time Justis wrote the evaluation, he knew that Smith was about to begin her FMLA leave on January 1, 1999. If Allen Health planned on firing her for taking FMLA leave and intended to use her failure to send out receipts and thank you letters as a pretext for her termination, it would have been strange to give her a positive evaluation on December 31, 1998.
In her supplement to her statement of material facts, Smith cites the deposition testimony of Sue Groves, the employee who replaced Smith as administrative secretary. Smith argues that Allen Health's treatment of Groves indicates a discriminatory animus because Groves did not know that sending out receipts and thank you notes on a daily basis were a requirement in her job description. Groves testified that she generally sent receipts and thank you notes out within a week of receiving a donation, and that, at the most, two weeks was the longest that it took for her to send them out. Groves testimony does not indicate she was treated differently than Smith. Smith was terminated for failing to send out 400 receipts and thank you notes for donations totaling $350,000. Groves testimony that she sent out receipts and thank you notes within a week, and at the most within two weeks, does not indicate a discriminatory animus on the part of Allen Health. Smith was terminated for failing to send out receipts and thank you notes over a two-month period.
Deposition of Sue Groves, p. 25.
Finally, Smith alleges that Allen Health's failure to follow the policies for progressive discipline outlined in its Standard Operating Procedure ("SOP") raises an inference of discrimination. "An employer's failure to follow its own policies may support an inference of pretext."Floyd v. Missouri Department of Social Services, 188 F.3d 932, 937 (8th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). To create an inference of pretext, however, a plaintiff must establish that the failure to follow the policy affected her differently from other employees. See id. The SOP specifically gave Allen Health the right to discipline an employee without progressing through the disciplinary steps. Smith has not provided any evidence that other employees were treated differently under the progressive discipline policy; therefore, Allen Health's failure to use progressive discipline is insufficient to support an inference of pretext.
In sum, Smith has not alleged sufficient facts from which a reasonable factfinder could determine that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason offered by Allen Health was a pretext for intentional discrimination. Therefore, Allen Health is entitled to summary judgment on Smith's claim of retaliatory discharge under the FMLA.
IV. Breach of Contract
Count II of Smith's complaint seeks damages based on breach of an employment contract. Smith argues she had an employment contract based on two Allen documents: the Associate Handbook and a Standard Operating Procedure for Corrective Discipline ("SOP"). Generally, employment relationships in Iowa are presumed to be at-will. Jones v. Lake Park Care Center, Inc., 569 N.W.2d 369, 374 (Iowa 1997). One exception to this general rule is "when an implied contract of employment is created by a handbook or employee policy manual guaranteeing that discharge will occur only under certain circumstances." Id. at 375.
In order for an employee handbook to create an implied contract, "(1) the handbook [must be] sufficiently definite in its terms to create an offer; (2) [must be] communicated to and accepted by the employee so as to create an acceptance; and (3) the employee [must] provide consideration." Id. In determining whether the language in a handbook is sufficiently definite to create a contract, courts consider: "(1) Is the handbook in general and the progressive disciplinary procedures in particular mere guidelines or a statement of policy, or are they directives? (2) Is the language of the disciplinary procedures detailed and definite or general and vague? and (3) Does the employer have the power to alter the procedures at will or are they invariable?" Anderson v. Douglas Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 277, 286-87 (Iowa 1995) (citations omitted).
If an employer includes "an appropriately drafted disclaimer" that makes clear the statements in the handbook will not be regarded as binding on both the employee and management, the employer can avoid liability. Id. at 375-76. To determine whether a disclaimer is effective, courts consider two factors: "(1) whether the disclaimer is clear in its terms; and (2) whether the coverage of the disclaimer is unambiguous." Phipps v. IASD Health Services Corp., 558 N.W.2d 198, 204 (Iowa 1997).
Smith argues the Associate's Handbook and the SOP are sufficient to create an implied contract. Both documents, however, contain language which preclude finding an implied contract. First, the Associate Handbook contains a disclaimer. On page eight, under the "Employment Policies and Procedure for Employment" section, it states:
"The language used in this handbook is not intended to create, nor is it to be construed to constitute an employment contract between Allen and any associate." Second, the SOP clearly allows Allen Health to deviate from its progressive discipline policy. It provides the following progressive discipline steps: (1) first level written warning; (2) second level written warning; (3) one day suspension without pay; and (4) discharge. After the SOP outlines the progressive discipline steps, it states: "The hospital reserves the right to discharge an associate immediately, without progressing through the first three disciplinary steps."
The disclaimer in the handbook and the language in the SOP are sufficient to preclude liability. The disclaimer clearly states the handbook does not create an employment contract. The SOP identifies levels of discipline and clearly allows Allen Health to deviate from those procedures without giving the employee any type of notice. Therefore, no genuine issues of material fact exist on Smith's breach of contract claim and the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this issue.
V. Title VII and Iowa Code Chapter 216
Smith argues she was discriminated against on the basis of religion in violation of Title VII and Iowa Code Chapter 216. Generally, cases brought under Iowa Code Chapter 216 are analyzed similarly to cases brought under Title VII. See Brine v. University of Iowa, 90 F.3d 271, 274 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Smith v. ADM Food Corp., 456 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Iowa 1990)). Therefore, the court will utilize the Title VII framework to evaluate both Smith's state and federal law claims.
The basis for Smith's religious discrimination claim is her involvement with the Servant Unique Family Ministries and her alleged protest of Allen Health's hiring practices toward minorities. Smith's religious discrimination claim is analyzed under the same three-step burden-shifting framework used to analyze her FMLA retaliatory discharge claim. First, Smith must establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination. She must show: (1) she was engaged in activity protected under Title VII; (2) the defendants took adverse employment action against her; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. LaCroix v. Sears, Roebuck, Co., 240 F.3d 688, 691 (8th Cir. 2001). Once a plaintiff establishes the prima facie case, the employer must then rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case with evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for taking the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03. If the employer can rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case, the plaintiff must show "sufficient admissible evidence from which a rational factfinder could find that the [employer]'s proffered nondiscriminatory reason was either untrue or not the real reason, and that intentional discrimination was the real reason." Lang, 107 F.3d at 1311.
First, Allen Health does not dispute that Smith was engaged in activity protected by Title VII when she discussed Allen Health's hiring practices regarding Bosnians with Ken Leibold, the human resources manager. Second, Allen Health argues that Smith cannot establish that she was subjected to an adverse employment action based on this conversation. The conversation between Smith and Leibold occurred sometime in the Fall of 1998. Smith was terminated on January 14, 1999. According to the deposition testimony of Robert Justis and Rick Seidler, after Seidler and Justis learned that the receipts and thank you notes had not been sent, they made the decision to terminate Smith and then conferred with Leibold. Smith has not set forth any evidence that Justis or Seidler knew of Smith's conversation with Leibold regarding Bosnian applicants at the time they made the decision to terminate her.
Plaintiff's Appendix Exhibit 5, pp. 28-29.
Plaintiff's Appendix Exhibit 11, pp. 15-17.
Third, Smith has been unable to show any causal connection between her termination and her conversation with Leibold. Smith relies on the timing of her termination; however, the conversation with Leibold occurred sometime in the Fall of 1998 and she was terminated following the discovery of the unmailed receipts on January 14, 1999. Generally, more than a temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse employment action is required to infer a causal connection. Buettner, 216 F.3d at 716. There is no evidence in the record that would indicate that her termination was somehow linked to her conversation with Leibold, and the time lapse of at least several months is insufficient to create a causal connection between her conversation with Leibold and her termination.
Assuming, arguendo, that Smith could establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, Allen Health has articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating Smith: failure to send out over 400 receipts and thank you cards totaling $350,000 worth of donations. Smith then must present evidence from which a factfinder could conclude Allen Health's reason was either untrue or not the real reason for her termination. See Lang, 107 F.3d at 1311. Smith's brief relies solely on the timing of her termination to establish pretext. Justis and Seidler made the decision to terminate Smith and discussed the decision with Leibold. There is no evidence in the record which suggests Justis and Seidler were ever aware of her conversation with Leibold regarding hiring Bosnian applicants. The lack of awareness on the part of Justis and Seidler, in addition to the several month time lapse, is not sufficient evidence from which a factfinder could infer Allen Health's decision was a pretext for discrimination. At oral argument, Smith quoted the minutes of the Board's January 19, 1999 meeting in which it referred to Smith's leave for the purposes of adopting a "foreign born child." It takes effort to infer evidence of a discriminatory animus toward hiring minorities from this mere statement in the minutes. Therefore, even if Smith could establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge under Title VII, she cannot present evidence from which a rational factfinder could conclude Allen Health's reasons for terminating her were a pretext for discrimination.
Upon the foregoing,
IT IS ORDERED
That the defendants' November 9, 2000, motion for summary judgment (docket number 30) is granted; this matter is dismissed. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment for the defendants.