Opinion
Case No. 4D03-2293.
Opinion filed March 3, 2004.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County, Karen Miller, Judge, L.T. Case No. 03-4376 CAAA.
Robyn S. Hankins of Robyn S. Hankins, P.L., West Palm Beach, for appellant.
James S. Telepman of Cohen, Norris, Scherer, Weinberger Wolmer, North Palm Beach, for appellee.
Jennifer Smith appeals an order of the trial court dismissing her complaint with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action against City Mazda under Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA"). Because a proper cause of action for a violation of FDUTPA was pled within the four corners of Smith's complaint, we reverse.
The essential facts are framed by the allegations in the complaint, which must be accepted as true for purposes of the motion to dismiss. See Sovran Bank, N.A. v. Parsons, 547 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). Smith was employed by City Mazda and its predecessor company for thirteen years. Smith attempted to purchase a used car from City Mazda at a discount, but was told that the discount would only apply to the purchase of a new vehicle. Smith then purchased a used Mazda from one of City Mazda's competitors. Thereafter, Smith was summarily terminated by City Mazda because she purchased a vehicle from another dealership.
Smith alleged that City Mazda violated FDUTPA by violating section 448.03, Florida Statutes, which prohibits an employer from discharging an employee for trading or dealing with any particular merchant, or for not trading or dealing with any particular merchant. Smith sought injunctive relief and other legal and equitable damages. City Mazda filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Smith's complaint "in essence, asserts a claim for damages for wrongful termination, under the guise of a claimed violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act." Ultimately, the trial court granted City Mazda's motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
The Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), sections 501.201-.213, Florida Statutes (2002), provides a civil cause of action for "[u]nfair methods of competition, unconscionable acts or practices, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." § 501.204(1), Fla. Stat. A violation of FDUTPA may be based upon "[a]ny law, statute, rule, regulation, or ordinance which proscribes unfair methods of competition, or unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable acts or practices." § 501.203(3)(c), Fla. Stat. Smith alleges that City Mazda violated section 448.03, which proscribes an unfair method of competition or an unfair or unconscionable act or practice. Section 448.03 provides in part that
Any person or persons, firm, joint stock company, association or corporation . . . having persons in their service as employees, who shall discharge any employee or threaten to discharge any employee in their service for trading or dealing, or for not trading or dealing as a customer or patron with any particular merchant . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree. . . .
City Mazda contends that Smith's allegations do not state a cause of action because FDUTPA was never intended to govern the relationship between an employer and an employee. We believe that, in this regard, City Mazda reads the complaint and FDUTPA too narrowly. Smith alleged that City Mazda terminated her employment because she purchased a vehicle from someone other than City Mazda. Thus, City Mazda's actions affected Smith not only as an employee, but also as a consumer, restricting her right to freely deal with any merchant she so chose. We agree with Smith's contention that "[t]here is nothing in the statute that exempts illegal, unfair and deceptive trade practices aimed at employees from the reach of FDUTPA." Cf. Niles Audio Corp. v. OEM Sys. Co., 174 F. Supp.2d 1315, 1319-20 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (holding that even a competitor of the FDUTPA violator may sue for damages). City Mazda's alleged conduct, a practice condemned by Florida law, could be construed to constitute "[u]nfair methods of competition, unconscionable acts or practices, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." § 501.204(1), Fla. Stat.
Smith's complaint was straightforward and set forth a cause of action under FDUTPA. Accordingly, we find that the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss. We reverse and remand with directions that the trial court reinstate Smith's complaint.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
STONE and WARNER, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL DISPOSITION OF ANY TIMELY FILED MOTION FOR REHEARING.