Kormos v. Cleveland Retail Credit Men's Co., 131 Ohio St. 471, 3 N.E.2d 427. And such statute is to be strictly construed. Smiley v. Arrow Spring Bed Co., 138 Ohio St. 81, 33 N.E.2d 3, 133 A.L.R., 960; Bickel v. American Can Co., 154 Ohio St. 380, 96 N.E.2d 4. We have held that Section 4511.21, Revised Code, has no application under ordinary circumstances to intersection cases.

The assured clear distance statute imposes upon the operator of a motor vehicle an obligation to be able to stop his or her vehicle within the distance that discernible objects may be seen so as to avoid a collision. Smiley v. Arrow Spring Bed Co. (1941), 138 Ohio St. 81, 88-89. However, a motorist does not violate the assured clear distance statute where the "assured clear distance ahead is, without his fault, suddenly cut down or lessened" by an obstruction which enters his path of travel and "renders him unable, in the exercise of ordinary care, to avoid colliding" with the obstruction.

" (Emphasis added.) In the case of Smiley v. Arrow Spring Bed Co. (1941), 138 Ohio St. 81, 133 A. L. R. 960, the Supreme Court held: "1.

This statute constitutes a specific requirement of law, a violation of which is negligence per se. Gumley v. Cowman, 129 Ohio St. 36, 193 N.E. 627; Kormos v. Cleveland Retail Credit Men's Co., 131 Ohio St. 471, 3 N.E.2d 427. The Supreme Court of Ohio has construed this statute strictly. Smiley v. Arrow Spring Bed Co., 138 Ohio St. 81, 33 N.E.2d 3, 133 A.L.R. 960. In Toledo Terminal Rd. Co. v. Hughes, 115 Ohio St. 562, the driver of an automobile was held to be contributorily negligent as a matter of law, where an automatic signal was not working, and the driver drove his automobile into a train standing on the track over a crossing during a dense fog.

Upon the trial of the action, at the close of plaintiff's evidence in chief, the court on motion directed a verdict for the defendant and rendered judgment accordingly. Such action was apparently predicated on the court's view that as a matter of law defendant was chargeable with no more than negligence under the holding of this court in Universal Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bassett, 130 Ohio St. 567, 200 N.E. 843, 119 A.L.R., 646, and that plaintiff's decedent was chargeable with the violation of the assured-clear-distance-ahead statute (Section 4511.21, Revised Code), hence his conduct amounted to contributory negligence as a matter of law, and there could be no recovery under the holding in Smiley v. Arrow Spring Bed Co., 138 Ohio St. 81, 33 N.E.2d 3, and other like cases. There was an appeal to the Court of Appeals on questions of law, and that court affirmed the judgment below without written opinion.

What defendant says must be supported by some substantial evidence. The decisions of this court have established that the operator of a motor vehicle violates this statute if he drives at such speed that he collides with a reasonably discernible object (1) which is located ahead of him in his lane of travel and which object is (a) static or stationary ( Skinner v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co., 127 Ohio St. 69, 186 N.E. 722; Watt v. Jefferson Trucking Co., 130 Ohio St. 99, 196 N.E. 887; Kormos v. Cleveland Retail Credit Men's Co., 131 Ohio St. 471, 3 N.E.2d 427; Smiley v. Arrow Spring Bed Co., 138 Ohio St. 81, 33 N.E.2d 3, 133 A.L.R., 960), or (b) moving ahead of him in the same direction ( Gumley, Admr., v. Cowman, 129 Ohio St. 36, 193 N.E. 627; Higbee Co. v. Lindemann, 131 Ohio St. 479, 3 N.E.2d 426; Bickel v. American Can Co., 154 Ohio St. 380, 96 N.E.2d 4), or (2) which appears in his path at a sufficient distance ahead of him to give him time, in the exercise of ordinary care, to bring his automobile to a stop and avoid a collision ( Klever v. Reid Brothers Express, Inc., 151 Ohio St. 467, 86 N.E.2d 608; Erdman v. Mestrovich, 155 Ohio St. 85, 97 N.E.2d 674; Sherer v. Smith, a Minor, 155 Ohio St. 567, 99 N.E.2d 763). It is the burden of the defendant, who asserts contributory negligence and invokes the aid of Section 6307-21, General Code, to present some evidence upon each element necessary to constitute a violation in order to make a prima facie case of violation.

Thus, drivers must travel at a speed that enables them to stop by the point at which their vision is ended by a condition that obstructs their view. Woods, supra , at 387, 171 N.E.2d 496, quoting Smiley v. Arrow Spring Bed Co. , 138 Ohio St. 81, 89, 33 N.E.2d 3, 7 (1941) (holding that a driver "may * * * assume nothing that is not assured to him by the range of his vision.") See also Ohio Jury Instructions, CV Section 411.19 (Rev. Dec. 6, 2014). {¶36} If a condition completely obstructs a driver's view of the roadway ahead, then a driver would have to stop in order to maintain an ACDA of his vehicle.

The evidence indicated that the decedent had made no attempt to stop his car; there were no skid marks. In Smiley v. Arrow Spring Bed Co., 138 Ohio St. 81, it was held, in the second paragraph of the syllabus: "To comply with the assured-clear-distance-ahead provision of Section 12603, General Code, the driver of a motor vehicle must not operate it at a greater speed than will permit him to bring it to a stop within the distance between his motor vehicle and a discernible object obstructing his path or line of travel, unless such assured clear distance ahead is, without his fault, suddenly cut down or lessened by the entrance within such assured clear distance ahead and into his path or line of travel, of some obstruction which renders him unable, in the exercise of ordinary care, to avoid colliding therewith."

The facts involved in the Hangen case were in dispute, and, in any event, entirely dissimilar to those here presented. In Smiley v. Arrow Spring Bed Co., 138 Ohio St. 81, 33 N.E.2d 3, 133 A. L. R., 960, however, Judge Hart, in the opinion, stated at page 88: "In this connection, by way of extenuation or exoneration, it has been suggested in certain cases that the driver of an automobile in operating his car has a right to assume, until he has notice to the contrary, that others on the highway will obey the law.

The great majority of cases in Ohio decided in relation to the assured clear distance rule are cases in which the Ohio courts have held that the driver of a vehicle was barred from recovery by his contributory negligence because of violation of the assured clear distance statute. E.g., Woods v. Brown's Bakery, 171 Ohio St. 383, 171 N.E.2d 496 (1960); Whitaker v. Baumgardner, 167 Ohio St. 167, 146 N.E.2d 729 (1957); Bickel v. American Can Co., 154 Ohio St. 380, 96 N.E.2d 4 (1950); Smiley v. Arrow Spring Bed Co., 138 Ohio St. 81, 33 N.E.2d 3, 133 A.L.R. 960 (1941). See also Carufel v. Chesapeake Ohio Ry., 286 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1961); Buster v. Baltimore Ohio R.R., 252 F.2d 173 (6th Cir. 1958); Berke v. Baltimore Ohio R.R., 232 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1956).