Opinion
Case No. A1-01-112
March 4, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING, IN PART, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the Court are the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Based on the following discussion, the Court denies the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and grants, in part, the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
From July 1996 through May 2002, the plaintiff, Lee Smart ["Smart"] was employed as a Bureau of Indian Affairs [BIA] police officer assigned to patrol duties in Fort Yates, North Dakota. During the period in question Woodrow Starr ["Starr"] served as the Police Chief in Fort Yates and was Smart's supervisor.
On December 14, 1999, Smart accepted a temporary position as the supervisory officer of the Community Oriented Policing Services ["COPS"] program, which was funded by a grant from the Department of Justice. Smart allegedly received an increase in compensation of approximately a $1.00 an hour when she began her duties as a supervisory officer.
On or about January 20, 2000, Smart told Chief Starr that she was pregnant. On January 20, 2000, Chief Starr wrote Smart a memorandum wherein he advised Smart of his decision to place her on "light duty status" and directed her to "immediately begin office duties" and "turn in your issued duty weapon and your vehicle keys." Smart responded in another memorandum in which she stated that she had not asked for "light duty status" and that she was able to continue her duties as a police officer "until it is medically confirmed that [she] will be unable to" do so. Some time later that day, Smart and Chief Starr discussed her new status and the conversation became heated. Chief Starr sent Smart home for the day; declined to take Smart off "light duty status"; and did not return her duty weapon or vehicle.
On January 21, 2000, Smart wrote a memorandum to Brent La Roque, the Aberdeen Area District Commander regarding the actions of Chief Starr. On January 21, 2000, Chief Starr wrote a memorandum to Carl Ducheneaux, the Tribal Personnel Officer, recommending that Smart's temporary assignment as a COPS supervisory officer be cancelled and she return to her previous position. Chief Starr stated that Smart's attitude and behavior were belligerent and uncooperative. Smart's appointment as a COPS supervisory officer was cancelled as of January 24, 2000.
On February 18, 2000, Smart filed a formal complaint of discrimination. In a letter dated, August 15, 2000, the EEOC accepted Smart's claim and began an investigation. On February 16, 2001, the Report of Investigation was completed. The final agency decision of the Department of Interior concluded that "Smart was discriminated against on the basis of sex when she was placed in a light-duty status and her weapon and vehicle were removed on January 20, 2000, due to her pregnancy." Smart filed a civil complaint with this Court on November 2, 2001.
II. LEGAL DISCUSSION A. SCOPE OF THE EEOC CLAIM
The Defendant, Gale Norton as Secretary of the Interior, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and has contended that Smart did not exhaust her administrative remedies prior to bringing this action in federal court.
Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment based on sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Discrimination based on sex includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). "However, Title VII establishes an administrative procedure which a complaining employee must follow before filing a lawsuit in federal court." Williams v. Little Rock Municipal Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 222 (8th Cir. 1994).
exhaustion of administrative remedies is central to Title VII's statutory scheme because it provides the EEOC the first opportunity to investigate discriminatory practices and enables it to** perform its roles of obtaining voluntary compliance and promoting conciliatory efforts. To exhaust administrative remedies an individual must: (1) timely file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC setting forth the facts and nature of the charge and (2) receive notice of the right to sue.
"A plaintiff will be deemed to have exhausted administrative remedies as to allegations contained in a judicial complaint that are like or reasonably related to the substance of charges timely brought before the EEOC." Id.; see Faibisch v. University of Minnesota, 304 F.3d 797, 803 (8th Cir. 2002).
In determining whether an alleged discriminatory act falls within the scope of a discrimination claim, the administrative complaint must be construed liberally in order not to frustrate the remedial purpose of [Title VII] and the plaintiff may seek relief for any discrimination that grows out of or is like or reasonably related to the substance of the allegations in the administrative charge. Accordingly, the sweep of any subsequent judicial complaint may be as broad as the scope of the EEOC investigation which could reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination. Allegations outside the scope of the EEOC charge, however, circumscribe the EEOC's investigatory and conciliatory role, and for that reason are not allowed. Kells v. Sinclair Buick-GMC Truck, Inc., 210 F.3d 827, 836 (8th Cir. 2000).
In her initial "Complaint of Discrimination" dated February 18, 2000, Starr alleged that she was discriminated against based on her sex. (Docket No. 28, Exhibit 8). In the blank asking for a description of the "basis of discrimination" she wrote:
"gender mentioned in working environment. working conditions involving pregnancy."
She also described her allegations of discrimination by writing:
I was discriminated against on Sept 20 1999 when the Chief of Police made a statement referring to my gender in my working environment, "difficult being a woman working in a man's field. On January 20 2000, my duty weapon and assigned police unit were taken due to my pregnancy, causing disagreement with the Chief's decision, therefore, resulting in removal from my acting capacity as Tribal Supervisory Officer.
Finally, Smart listed the remedies she believed would resolve her complaint by writing:
to be treated equally as a police officer, acting supervisory position returned along w/ duty weapon and police unit. Already presented to the Chief. Also obtained Dr's statement ref physical/health conditions.
On August 15, 2000, Smart received a letter from the United States Department of the Interior which stated her complaint had been reviewed and the following claims of discrimination were accepted for investigation:
Because of your sex (female) you were arbitrarily placed in a light-duty status and your duty weapon and assigned patrol vehicle were taken away from you on January 20, 2000, due to your pregnancy. When you raised your objection to this action, your supervisor recommended your removal as Acting Tribal Supervisory Officer. You were removed from your capacity as Acting Tribal Supervisory Officer, on January 25, 2000.
(Docket No. 28, Exhibit 9).
The defendant contends that Smart has now raised numerous claims outside the scope of her initial EEOC complaint. It is difficult to discern the number, nature, and type of claims that Smart has asserted in her Amended Complaint because it is replete with employment discrimination "buzzwords," including: sexual harassment, disparate treatment, hostile work environment, crude and sexually suggestive comments, and constructive discharge.
The Court agrees that many of the claims asserted by Smart are not "like or reasonably related to the substance of charges" alleged in Smart's original EEOC complaint. The EEOC complaint does not allege that sexually suggestive remarks were made regarding Smart, nor does it allege a hostile work environment. (Docket No. 28, Exhibit 8). The allegations made in the EEOC complaint all appear to stem from the treatment Smart received at work because of her pregnancy. The August 15, 2000, letter Smart received from the Department of the Interior which summarizes her claims of discrimination also focused on the employment-related decisions made by Chief Starr "due to [Smart's] pregnancy." A review of the "Report of Investigation" further reveals that the EEOC focused on the discriminatory actions taken allegedly based on Smart's pregnancy condition. (Docket No. 23).
The Court concludes that Smart has exhausted her administrative remedies as to her claims alleging disparate treatment based on her pregnancy and, accordingly, those claims are properly before this Court. However, the Court concludes that the other claims eluded to in Smart's complaint, such as sexual harassment, sexually suggestive comments, hostile work environment and constructive discharge, are neither like nor reasonably related to her initial EEOC complaint and accordingly, Smart has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to such claims. Thus, to the extent that Smart's complaint alleges claims for sexual harassment, hostile work environment, and constructive discharge, such claims are not properly before this Court and must be dismissed for failure to exhaust the appropriate administrative remedies.
B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND AWARD OF DAMAGES
Smart has filed a motion for summary judgment and has contended that no genuine issues of material fact exist. In addition, Smart requests an award of economic damages in the amount of $6,944.00 plus interest; non-economic damages for humiliation and emotional suffering in the amount of $80,000.00; and costs and attorney fees in the amount of $150.00 and $10,000.00, respectively.
The Court will grant a motion for summary judgment if there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986) (explaining that the Court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor). If the movant can show that there is no issue as to any material fact, then the non-movant must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. A mere trace of evidence supporting the non-movant's position is insufficient — the facts must generate evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
A review of the record in this case reveals that there are issues of material fact which remain unresolved. Although Smart has set forth a prima facie case of disparate treatment, see Bergstrom-Ek v. Best Oil Co., 153 F.3d 851, 857-58 (8th Cir. 1998), the defendant has alleged facts that could show that there are genuine issues for trial and that the treatment was not disparate. For example, the defendant has alleged that both male and female employees who were on "light duty" had their weapons and vehicles taken. Smart disputes this evidence and contends the male employees were not involuntarily put on light duty status or had their weapons or vehicles taken away. Nevertheless, there clearly are disputed issues of fact to be resolved by the fact finder at trial.
The facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant/defendant and the defendant has alleged facts which could show that the treatment at issue was not disparate. Thus, the Court concludes that summary judgment is not warranted at this stage because there are genuine issues of material fact that need to be resolved at trial.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that Smart has exhausted her administrative remedies as to her claims alleging disparate treatment based on her pregnancy and she will be allowed to continue with such a claim. However, to the extent that Smart's complaint alleges claims of sexual harassment, hostile work environment, and constructive discharge, these claims are not properly before the Court and must be DISMISSED. Accordingly, the defendant's summary judgment motion (Docket No. 27) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
In addition, the Court finds that there are issues of material fact which remain unresolved and, accordingly, Smart's motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 22) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.