Smart v. Kirby

8 Citing cases

  1. Jones v. United States

    1:23-cv-01929 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 2024)

    are properly asserted in Section 2255 motions in the sentencing court rather than through Section 2241 habeas corpus petitions. See, e.g., Smart v. Kirby, 436 Fed.Appx. 64, 66 (3d Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (noting that ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be brought through Section 2255 motion); Application of Galante, 437 F.2d 1164, 1165 (3d Cir. 1971) (same); Day v. Samuels, 263 Fed.Appx. 246, 248 (3d Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (concluding that sufficiency of evidence claim should have been asserted in Section 2255 motion rather than Section 2241 habeas corpus petition).

  2. Sanchez v. Warden FCI Fairton

    Civ. 20-12041 (NLH) (D.N.J. May. 11, 2022)

    Petitioner “thus lacks standing to challenge the sequence in which he was required to serve his sentences.” Smart v. Kirby, 436 Fed.Appx. 64, 66 (3d Cir. 2011). In Jones v. Warden McKean FCI, a Third Circuit panel concluded the petitioner had Article III standing to raise the primarycustody question under § 2241 because the defendant did “not wish to challenge the explicit exercise of intersovereign comity, but rather intends to raise an issue about the results flowing therefrom.”

  3. Smalls v. Quay

    Civil Action 3:21-1352 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2022)

    Application ofGalante, 437 F.2d 1164, 1165B66 (3d Cir. 1971) see alsoSavage v. Zickefoose, 446 Fed. App'x. 524, 525-26 (3d Cir. 2011) (“To the extent that [the petitioner] alleged that the sentencing court should have provided for concurrent federal and state sentences under U.S.S.G. §§5G1.3(b) and 5G1.3(c), the District Court properly dismissed his claims for lack of jurisdiction.... We agree with the District Court that [the petitioner's] situation is not the rare one rendering §2255 inadequate or ineffective.”); Smart v. Kirby, 436 Fed. App'x. 64, 65-66 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that the petitioner could not pursue his claim that his federal sentencing court violated U.S.S.G. §5G1.3 in a §2241 habeas petition and finding that §2255's savings clause did not apply). “The remedy afforded under §2241 is not an additional, alternative, or supplemental remedy to that prescribed under §2255.”

  4. Mathis v. Baltazar

    CIVIL NO. 1:18-CV-395 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2018)

    See Savage, 446 F. App'x at 525-26 ("To the extent that [the petitioner] alleged that the sentencing court should have provided for concurrent federal and state sentences under U.S.S.G. §§ 5G1.3(b) and 5G1.3(c), the District Court properly dismissed his claims for lack of jurisdiction. . . . We agree with the District Court that [the petitioner's] situation is not the rare one rendering § 2255 inadequate or ineffective."); Smart v. Kirby, 436 F. App'x 64, 65-66 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that the petitioner could not pursue his claim that his federal sentencing court violated U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 in a § 2241 habeas petition, and finding that § 2255's savings clause did not apply). III. Conclusion

  5. Carter v. Lane

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:17-CV-672 (M.D. Pa. Jun. 13, 2017)

    See Savage v. Zickefoose, 446 F. App'x 524, 525-26 (3d Cir. 2011) ("To the extent that [the petitioner] alleged that the sentencing court should have provided for concurrent federal and state sentences under U.S.S.G. §§ 5G1.3(b) and 5G1.3(c), the District Court properly dismissed his claims for lack of jurisdiction. . . . We agree with the District Court that [the petitioner's] situation is not the rare one rendering § 2255 inadequate or ineffective."); Smart v. Kirby, 436 F. App'x 64, 65-66 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that the petitioner could not pursue his claim that his federal sentencing court violated U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 in a § 2241 habeas petition, and finding that § 2255's savings clause did not apply). The court acknowledges that nonprecedential decisions are not binding upon federal district courts.

  6. United States v. Gay

    Criminal No. 14-154 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 2016)

    First, in support of his argument that he is in primary state custody, Defendant cites to cases that are outside this Court's jurisdiction, (Docket No. 113 at 5-8), and he fails to establish the invalidity of, or even address, the authority upon which the Court relied in finding that criminal defendants do not have standing to raise the issue of which sovereign maintains primary jurisdiction over them while in custody, (see Docket No. 98 at 6). Because Defendant has not demonstrated that he has standing pursuant to the well-settled law of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — namely, Bowman v. Wilson, 672 F.2d 1145 (3d Cir. 1982), and Smart v. Kirby, 436 Fed. App'x 64, 66 (3d Cir. 2011) — he simply cannot prevail on the merits here. In any event, Defendant's instant challenges concern the Court's alternative rulings that if Defendant had established standing, which he had not, he also failed to proffer any evidence supporting his claim that he is in primary state custody.

  7. United States v. Gay

    Criminal No. 14-154 (W.D. Pa. Jul. 28, 2016)

    Bowman, 672 F.2d 1145, 1153-54 ("Those who assert jurisdiction, not those in their custody, are the beneficiaries of the rule allocating priority of prosecution to the sovereignty which first takes custody of a person."). Rather, any disputes as to sovereignty must be resolved by the entities asserting same—in this case, the United States Marshal Service and the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole. Smart v. Kirby, 436 Fed. App'x 64, 66 (3d Cir. 2011) ("We have explained that '[t]he exercise of jurisdiction over a prisoner who has violated the law of more than one sovereignty and the priority of prosecution of the prisoner is solely a question of comity between the sovereignties which is not subject to attack by the prisoner.'") (quoting Bowman, 672 F.2d 1145, 1154).

  8. Pitts v. Spaulding

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-CV-0644 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2015)   Cited 5 times

    Finally, to the extent that Petitioner is arguing that the federal sentencing court erred in imposing his federal sentence, specifically that it intended to grant a downward departure pursuant to section 5G1.3(c) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines as, he claims, is evidenced by the statements it made during its oral pronouncement of sentence, but failed to do so, see (Doc. 1, pp. 1, 4-6); (Doc. 7, pp. 3-4), such a claim is beyond the purview of this Court. See Smart v. Kirby, 436 F. App'x 64, 65-66 (3d Cir. 2011); Vasquez-Alcazar, Civil Action No. 3-09-CV-2233, at p. 6 n.1. "Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute[.