Opinion
No. 154, 2002
Submitted: November 19, 2002
Decided: December 26, 2002
Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for Kent County, Cr.ID. No. 0103019016
Affirmed.
Unpublished opinion is below.
DERRICK SMALLWOOD, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. No. 154, 2002 In the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. Submitted: November 19, 2002 Decided: December 26, 2002
Before WALSH, HOLLAND and STEELE, Justice.
ORDER
This 26th day of December 2002, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties, it appears to the Court as follows:
(1) A Superior Court jury convicted appellant, Derrick Smallwood, of Resisting Arrest, 11 Del. C. § 1257, two counts of Attempted Murder, 11 Del. C. § 531, and two counts of Possession of a Firearm during the Commission of a Felony, 11 Del. C. § 1447A. In this appeal, Smallwood asserts two grounds of error: (i) that the police took his post-arrest statement in violation of his Miranda rights; and (ii) the trial judge abused his discretion when he denied Smallwood's Motion for a New Trial based on alleged juror misconduct. We conclude that the trial judge did not err in its various rulings and that the conviction should be affirmed.
(2) With respect to Smallwood's Miranda claim, we conclude that the trial judge correctly denied Smallwood's motion to suppress his statements to the police. At the time of the statement, Smallwood was hospitalized at the Christiana Medical Center after being shot in the chest and foot the previous evening. A Dover Police Department Officer testified that he was previously acquainted with Smallwood's brother and that the Police Department assigned him to guard Smallwood at the hospital. The officer then testified that while he was in the hallway guarding Smallwood's room, Smallwood motioned for him to enter the hospital room. The officer then testified that Smallwood made an incriminating statement that he would probably receive a life sentence or the death penalty for shooting a police officer.
(3) Miranda warnings are required when police interrogate a suspect in a custodial setting. We conclude that Smallwood, not the officer, initiated conversation about the alleged crimes and that the officer did not interrogate or engage in the "functional equivalent" of interrogation with Smallwood. We further conclude that because no interrogation occurred, the police were not required to Mirandize Smallwood. In addition, because Miranda warnings were not required, we need not conduct an analysis of whether Smallwood knowingly waived his Miranda rights. Accordingly, the trial judge properly denied Smallwood's motion to suppress his statements to the police.
DeJesus v. State, 655 A.2d 1180, 1190 (Del. 1995).
Interrogation under Miranda need not amount to actual question and may instead be the "functional equivalent" of questioning. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
(4) We find no merit to the claim that the trial judge abused his discretion when he denied Smallwood's Motion for a New Trial based on alleged juror misconduct. Smallwood claims that a juror's failure to answer in the affirmative to the voir dire question of whether a family member had been charged with crimes of violence entitles him to a new trial because a possibility existed that the juror was biased.
(5) Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution guarantee a defendant in a criminal proceeding the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. To establish reversible error in cases involving inadvertent nondisclosure, a defendant must demonstrate that "a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire," and that "a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause."
Banther v. State, 783 A.2d 1287, 1289 (Del. 2001); Flonnory v. State, 778 A.2d 1044, 1051-52 (2001); see Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 471-72 (1965); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
Banther v. State, 783 at 1290-91 (quoting McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 446 U.S. 556 (1984) (plurality opinion)).
The impartial administration of justice is severely compromised when the juror's nondisclosure of material information during voir dire is deliberate. However, we have favorably cited the proposition that a juror's inaccurate response to a voir dire question based on a factual inaccuracy rather than dishonesty did not warrant a new trial. The United States Supreme Court has held that an honest yet mistaken answer to a voir dire question rarely amounts to a federal constitutional violation.
Banther, 783 A.2d at 1291 (citing Fitzgerald v. Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 362-63 (4th Cir. 1998) (juror's interpretation of voir dire question did not indicate dishonesty but rather factual inaccuracy); United States v. Edmond, 43 F.3d 472, 473-74 (9th Cir. 1994) (simple forgetfulness of juror did not indicate lack of impartiality); Amirault v. Fair, 968 F.2d 1404, 1405-06 (1st Cir. 1992) (juror's genuine blocking of incident from memory did not indicate dishonest response)).
Greenwood, 446 U.S. at 555-56.
We have also stated that the record must support a conclusion that the juror's incorrect answer to the voir dire question was simply inadvertently inaccurate and not purposefully untrue.
Banther, 783 A.2d at 1291-92.
(6) Although the juror incorrectly answer a material voir dire question, a correct response would not have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.
She would not be disqualified from jury service simply because she has relatives with a criminal record. The trial judge conducted an in camera evidentiary hearing to question the juror in detail about her failure to respond accurately to the voir dire question. The trial judge clearly met the requirement that the record reflect the juror's reason for inaccuracy. The trial judge concluded, and the record adequately supports his conclusion, that the juror was confused by the question and that the juror did not intentionally conceal information from the Court or the parties. The trial judge also concluded that the juror believed she honestly answered the question, had no special desire to get on the jury, and had no bias or prejudice for or against the State or the defendant. Accordingly, the trial judge properly denied the Smallwood's Motion for a New Trial.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED.