Opinion
No. 05-10-00936-CR
Opinion Filed July 26, 2011. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the 382nd Judicial District Court, Rockwall County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 2-10-248.
Before Justices O'NEILL, FRANCIS, and MYERS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Desi Antonio Smalley pleaded guilty to attempted kidnapping with no agreement about punishment. The trial court accepted appellant's plea and assessed punishment at ten years' confinement. In a single point of error, appellant contends his guilty plea was involuntary. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment. On March 4, 2010, appellant entered an elementary school cafeteria and told a first grade girl that she was supposed to leave with him. The girl refused and told a teacher that she did not know appellant. School staff directed appellant to leave the school. Appellant left and was apprehended shortly thereafter. The grand jury indicted appellant for attempted kidnapping. Appellant pleaded guilty to the offense. When he pleaded guilty, he was given written plea admonishments notifying him of the consequences of his plea. Appellant signed the written admonishments and a judicial confession stating he committed the offense as alleged in the indictment. At the plea hearing, appellant testified that he had carefully gone over the admonishments and judicial confession with his attorney and that he understood everything that he had signed. Appellant testified he was pleading guilty because he was guilty and for no other reason. After appellant testified he committed the offense, the trial court asked him about a presentence investigation which showed he told the probation department that he did not commit the offense. Appellant then gave a somewhat conflicting and confusing response regarding whether he was admitting committing the offense. Appellant testified the probation department asked if he spoke to "some little girl" and he told the probation officer no. He claimed that was a true response, but also admitted lying to the probation officer when he denied committing the offense. Appellant specifically admitted entering school property and directing a child to leave the school with him. Then he stated that he did not remember how he asked the child to leave and that he did not know the child named in the indictment. However, he again stated he did what he was charged with in the indictment. Finally, appellant verified once again he was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily. In his appeal, appellant asserts his guilty plea was not voluntary. He relies on his alleged refusal to admit to the specific factual details of the offense. We determine the voluntariness of a guilty plea from the totality of the circumstances viewed in light of the entire record. Ducker v. State, 45 S.W.3d 791, 796 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.). Article 26.13(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires that prior to accepting a guilty plea, the trial court must admonish the defendant of the consequences of his plea. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a) (West Supp. 2010). When the record indicates that the trial court properly admonished the defendant, a prima facie showing exists that the defendant entered a knowing and voluntary plea. See Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (per curiam). A defendant may still raise the claim that his plea was not voluntary; however, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate he did not fully understand the consequences of his plea such that he suffered harm. Id. Appellant does not dispute he was properly admonished in accordance with article 26.13(a). He nevertheless contends the record shows his plea was involuntary because he never specifically admitted asking the particular child to leave the school with him. Appellant however did sign the judicial confession and testified he committed the offense as alleged in the indictment. While his testimony may have been somewhat equivocal when discussing the details, he ultimately testified he did do what he was charged with doing. Thus, we cannot agree with appellant's contention that he claimed innocence at the plea hearing. Moreover, even when a defendant claims he is innocent, various considerations may motivate him to plead guilty. See Mallett v. State, 65 S.W.3d 59, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Thus, such claims of innocence do not necessarily render a plea involuntary. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). We conclude appellant has not met his burden of showing his plea was involuntary. We resolve the sole issue against appellant and affirm the trial court's judgment.