However, "divergence in panel or circuit views of a statute, criminal or otherwise, is inherent—and common—in our [judicial] system [and] does not establish vagueness." United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 143 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc); see also United States v. Morrison, 686 F.3d 94, 104 (2d Cir. 2012) ("[I]t is manifest that conflicts between courts over the interpretation of a criminal statute do not in and of themselves render that statute unconstitutionally vague."); Small v. Bud-K Worldwide, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 2d 438, 448 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (Bianco, J.) (collecting cases), aff'd sub nom. Small v. Rice, 546 F. App'x 41 (2d Cir. 2013). Judicial disagreements demonstrate that applying anti-fraud provisions to concrete insider trading cases can "be difficult," but "[t]hat alone cannot render 'shapeless' a federal criminal prohibition, for even clear rules 'produce close cases.'"