SeeChamberlain v. Giampapa, M.D., 210 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding no collision between New Jersey statute and Rule 8 where the statute required an affidavit 60 days after the answer to complaint is filed); Sledge v. United States, 723 F. Supp. 2d 87, 100 (D.D.C. 2010); Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp., 90 F.3d 1523, 1541 (10th Cir. 1996)) (finding no conflict with Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 because the state rule is more narrowly tailored); Hill v. Morrison, 870 F. Supp. 978, 982 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (finding no direct conflict between Rule 11 and previous version of Mo Rev. Stat. § 538.225); Holbrook v. Woodham, No. , 2007 WL 2071618, at *4 (W.D. Pa. July 13, 2007) (finding no conflict between Pennsylvania statute and Rule 26 because statute did not require expert reports nor accelerate the requirements of Rule 26). But see, e.g., Larca v. United States, 302 F.R.D. 148, 159 (N.D. Ohio 2014) (finding Ohio's affidavit rule for medical malpractice cases directly conflicts with the pleading requirements in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 where the statute requires the affidavit to be filed along with the complaint and the Ohio Supreme Court has said the rule goes to the sufficiency of the complaint).

Courts in this Circuit considering requests for jurisdictional discovery related to exceptions to the FTCA have not relied on Rule 56(d). See, e.g. , Loughlin , 393 F.3d at 166–68 ; Ignatiev v. United States , 238 F.3d 464, 466–67 (D.C.Cir.2001) ; Donahue v. United States , 870 F.Supp.2d 97, 114–15 (D.D.C.2012) ; Sledge v. United States , 723 F.Supp.2d 87, 92–98 (D.D.C.2010). The Court will follow the path of other courts in this Circuit, and will treat Plaintiff's argument under Rule 56(d) as a request for jurisdictional discovery.

This Court found previously that “[t]he great weight of the case law suggests that if a decision regarding the protection, safety, and classification of prisoners is discretionary (i.e., there are no mandatory directives) then such a decision is grounded in public policy and the discretionary function applies.” Sledge v. United States, 723 F.Supp.2d 87, 96 (D.D.C.2010); see, e.g., Ashford v. United States, 463 Fed.Appx. 387, 394–95 (5th Cir.2012) (“Maintaining order and security in prison is the type of policy-based decision that the discretionary function exception shields.”); Montez v. United States, 359 F.3d 392, 398–99 (6th Cir.2004) (concluding that plaintiff failed to allege sufficient factual support to “rebut the Gaubert presumption that the decisions by prison officials regarding his safety were based upon BOP policy”); Santana–Rosa v. United States, 335 F.3d 39, 44–45 (1st Cir.2003) (“The management of large numbers of potentially dangerous individuals within a penal facility inevitably requires not only the exercise of discretion but decision-making within the context of various difficult policy choices.

'” (cleaned up) (quoting Sledge v. United States, 723 F.Supp.2d 87, 91 (D.D.C. 2010))); see also United States ex rel. Settlemire v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 913, 920-21 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“expressing] no opinion on [the] merits” because dismissal was proper under Rule 12(b)(1) such that the court need not address the 12(b)(6) challenge). As discussed above, Mr. Masek's complaint is patently insubstantial such that

See Sledge v. United States, 723 F.Supp.2d 87, 100 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding that a prisoner's claims shall “survive because they include claims for simple negligence . . .”).

. If the Court ‘“determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it can proceed no further.'” Sledge v. United States, 723 F.Supp.2d 87, 91 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Simpkins v. District of Columbia Gov't, 108 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1997)); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction

Because the Court ultimately concludes that absolute immunity and the Younger abstention doctrine preclude the Court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court need not reach the defendants' other arguments based on either Rule 12(b)(1), see Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999) (“It is hardly novel for a federal court to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits.”), or Rule 12(b)(6), see Sledge v. United States, 723 F.Supp.2d 87, 91 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Once a court ‘determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it can proceed no further.'” (quoting Simpkins v. D.C. Gov't, 108 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1997)));

, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Because the Court's ruling on dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is ultimately dispositive, see infra Section III, the Court need not conduct a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis, see Sledge v. United States, 723 F.Supp.2d 87, 91 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Once a court ‘determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it can proceed no further.'” (quoting Simpkins v. D.C. Gov't, 108 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1997)); see also Green v. Stuyvesant, 505 F.Supp.2d 176, 177 n.2 (D.D.C. 2007) (Walton, J.) (“[D]ue to the resolution of the defendants' Rule 12(b)(1) request, the Court does not need to address [ ] alternative grounds for dismissal at this time.”)

, or Rule 12(b)(6), see Sledge v. United States, 723 F.Supp.2d 87, 91 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Once a court ‘determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it can proceed no further.'” (quoting Simpkins v. D.C. Gov't, 108 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1997)); see also Green v. Stuyvesant, 505 F.Supp.2d 176, 177 n.2 (D.D.C. 2007) (Walton, J.)

And before considering that, the Court must assure itself of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Sledge v. United States, 723 F.Supp.2d 87, 95 n.8 (D.D.C. 2010). Thus, for efficiency's sake, the Court will first address jurisdictional issues with Cole's claims against the Federal Defendants, and for any remaining claims over which the Court has jurisdiction, it will proceed to consider whether she has stated a claim.