Opinion
No. CV 03 0195938
March 15, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION — MOTION TO STRIKE
Presently before the court is the defendants' motion to strike counts two and four of the plaintiff's complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the motion to strike is granted as to both count two and count four.
FACTS
On July 2, 2003, the plaintiff, Andrew Skorvanek, filed a four-count complaint against the defendants, Saul Guayllasca and Hector Camacho. The plaintiff seeks damages for injuries he allegedly sustained when the motor vehicle he was driving was struck by a vehicle operated by Guayllasca and owned by Camacho. Count one is brought against Guayllasca and alleges negligence. Count two is brought against Guayllasca and alleges statutory recklessness pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295. Counts three and four are brought against Camacho and allege that Camacho is vicariously liable pursuant to General Statutes § 52-183 for Guayllasca's negligence and statutory recklessness respectively.
"In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property."
On December 1, 2003, the defendants filed a motion to strike counts two and four of the plaintiff's complaint and the corresponding prayers for relief. In compliance with Practice Book § 10-42, the defendants have filed a memorandum of law in support of their motion to strike. On December 23, 2003, the plaintiff timely filed a memorandum of law in opposition. In his memorandum of law plaintiff conceded that the case of Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 836 A.2d 394 (2003), decided by the Supreme Court of December 17, 2003 required that defendants' motion to strike be granted as to the fourth count.
The plaintiff is correct in conceding that the fourth count of his complaint must be stricken under Matthiessen, id., which held that General Statutes "§ 52-183 does not abrogate the common-law principle that punitive damages may not be assessed against parties whom the law holds vicariously liable for the acts of others." The defendants' motion to strike count four is therefore granted.
DISCUSSION
The role of the trial court in ruling on a motion to strike is "to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997). "It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendants motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gazo v. Stamford, 255 Conn. 245, 260, 765 A.2d 505 (2001). "The court must construe the facts in the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). "[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bhinder v. Sun Co., 263 Conn. 358, 366, 819 A.2d 822 (2003).
Count two of plaintiff's complaint incorporates paragraphs one through ten from count one. Those paragraphs include no allegations of negligence. Paragraph 11 of the second count alleges: "At the time of the collision, the roadway was straight, the weather was clear and dry and there were no obstructions to Defendant's vision." Paragraph 12 of the second count alleges: "At the time of the collision, the Defendant had an elevated blood alcohol content as defined by General Statutes § 14-227a." Paragraph 13 alleges that, the plaintiff's injuries and damages were caused by the recklessness of "Defendant Lyons" (sic) in one or more of twelve different respects including violations of General Statutes §§ 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, and 14-227a. The allegations of paragraph 13 also include allegations of recklessness based on violations of statutes not enumerated in § 14-295 (§ 14-240 and § 14-81) as well as recklessness not based on statutory violations.
Plaintiff's allegations of common-law and statutory negligence against defendant Guayllasca are set forth in paragraph 11 of the first count.
The second count is directed against defendant, Saul Guayllasca. Presumably the references to the Defendant" in paragraphs 11 and 12 refer to Guayllasca.
Paragraph 13 of the second count contains subparagraphs a. to j. and two subparagraphs labeled k.
The defendants move to strike count two of the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that it fails to allege facts sufficient to support a claim of statutory recklessness pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295. In opposition, the plaintiff argues that count two states facts sufficient to support a claim of recklessness.
The law on the question of pleading recklessness under these circumstances was well stated by Judge D'Andrea in Bell v. Harrow, No. CV980167961S (Nov. 29, 2001) 2001 Ct. Sup. 15776. "The appellate courts have not indicated what facts a plaintiff must plead in order to establish a cause of action pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295, and there is a split of authority in the Superior Court on this issue. The first line of Superior Court cases requires a plaintiff to plead specific facts to support a claim of recklessness at common law in addition to alleging a violation of one of the enumerated statutes in § 14-295. See, e.g., Pitka v. Ullrich, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at New London, Docket No. 530000 (November 16, 1994, Austin, J.) ( 13 Conn. L. Rptr. 32) (simple allegation that defendant deliberately or recklessly violated certain motor vehicle statutes is insufficient to support claim under § 14-295); Lezotte v. Hanover Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury at Waterbury, Docket No. 112067 (January 6, 1993, Sylvester, J.) ( 8 Conn. L. Rptr. 199, 200) (same); Gaudet v. Ziobran, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex at Middletown, Docket No. 061126 (June 10, 1992, Austin, J.) ( 6 Conn. L. Rptr. 862, CT.Sup p. 15780) (same).
The second line of cases holds that a plaintiff must only allege that the defendant violated one or more of the motor vehicle statutes enumerated in § 14-295 and that this violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries. See, e.g., Nelson-Hlebogiaxmis v. Lee, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 167571 (May 17, 1999, Hiller, J.); Price v. Paccar Leasing Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of New London at New London, Docket No. 538888 (February 19, 1997, Booth, J.); St. George v. Connecticut Car Rental Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford/New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 554923 (February 27, 1996, Spada, J.)."
Reviewing the allegations of count two of plaintiff's complaint, the court is satisfied that the plaintiff has made sufficiently particular allegations of recklessness to withstand a motion to strike. However, those allegations are directed against "the Defendant Lyons" who is not a party to this case. The second count contains no allegations of recklessness against either of the defendants named in this case. Accordingly, the court finds that count two fails to state a cause of action against either defendant and the motion to strike that count must be granted.
Based on the foregoing discussion, the defendants' motion to strike is granted as to count two and as to count four.
David R. Tobin, Judge