Opinion
J-S69002-19 No. 1491 EDA 2019 No. 1904 EDA 2019
01-24-2020
GRAZYNA SKLODOWSKA-GREZAK Appellant v. WIESLAW GREZAK Appellee
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Decree Entered March 28, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Domestic Relations at No(s): 5575 CV 2016, 751 DR 2005 Appeal from the Decree Entered June 10, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Civil Division at No(s): 5575 CV 2016, 751 DR 2005 BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J. MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
Grazyna Sklodowska-Grezak ("Wife") and Wieslaw Grezak ("Husband") have been enmeshed in divorce proceedings off and on since 2005. Wife now appeals pro se at Superior Court Docket Number 1491 EDA 2019 from entry of the divorce decree on March 28, 2019, following denial of exceptions to the Master's Report and Recommendation equitably distributing marital property, and at Superior Court Docket Number 1904 EDA 2019, from the June 10, 2019 order denying Wife's Petition for Supersedeas. We affirm.
The appeal is timely. The divorce decree was entered on the docket on March 28, 2019. Wife filed her notice of appeal on Monday, April 29, 2019. Because the thirtieth day fell on Saturday, April 27, 2019, the appeal is timely. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (notice of appeal shall be filed within thirty days of entry of order appealed); 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908 (when last day of appeal period falls on Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday, that day is omitted from computation of appeal period).
We granted Wife's request to consolidate the appeals on July 23, 2019. Order, 7/23/19.
On August 30, 2005, Wife filed a complaint in divorce, which she subsequently discontinued. In an opinion denying in part and granting in part the parties' exceptions to the Master's Report in this case, the trial court explained the procedural history of this case, as follows:
On August 3, 2016, [Wife] filed [a second] action in divorce against [Husband]. The parties were married on July 24, 1982, in Poland and there were two children born of the marriage, both of whom are now adults. On July 24, 2018, a hearing was held before Divorce Master Daniel M. Corveleyn, Esquire ("Master"). The Master filed his Report and Recommendations on August 27, 2018. Husband filed Exceptions to the Divorce Master's Report on September 13, 2018 and Wife filed Exceptions to the Divorce Master's Report on September 17, 2018. Oral argument was held
in this matter on November 1, 2018. We are now prepared to address the exceptions filed by the parties.Trial Court Opinion, 3/28/19, at 1, 3-4.
* * *
Husband is 59 years old and Wife is 56 years old. Husband is self-employed as the owner and operator of Grezak Construction Company, a business registered with the state of New Jersey, Division of Consumer Affairs, as of May 1, 2006; and registered as a home improvement contractor in Pennsylvania. Wife is presently unemployed because of her alleged poor medical condition[]. At the Master's hearing, Wife claimed to suffer from cardiac issues, and muscle spasms, however she admitted that she has not seen a specialist for these issues and she has not filed a physician's verification for the claimed problems. Before she came to the USA, Wife claimed to have run a lucrative business in Poland making suits for Russian people. In the United States, she operated a cleaning business known as "Magic Wand."
There was no indication of contribution by either party to the education, training or increased earning power of the other party. The source of income of each party was noted; and each party claimed to contribute to the preservation of the mar[it]al home by either payment of taxes and/or remedial work. The parties lived a frugal life and the economic circumstances of each party at the time the division of property is minimal.
The trial court continued the procedural history in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, as follows:
On March 28, 2019, we entered an Opinion and Order denying [Wife's] Exceptions to the Master's Report and granting in part and denying in part [Husband's] Exceptions to the Master's Report. On April 26, 2019, [Wife] filed a "Motion to Open Final March 28, 2019 Decree in Divorce for Reconsideration and Modification in Part of March 28, 2019 Order/Petition for Special Reliefs (sic)/Petition for Modification of Marital Debts and Post Divorce Alimonies for [Wife]/Petition for Constructive Trust" (sic) which we denied in an Order dated May 3, 2019.
* * *
On April 29, 2019, [Wife] filed a Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania and on May 3, 2019, we directed [Wife] to file her 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. On May 15, 2019, [Husband] filed a "Petition for Appointment of a Realtor to List Marital Properties for Sale, for [Husband] to Obtain his Property left at the Marital Residence and for Contempt" ("Petition")[.] Thereafter, on May 21, 2019, [Wife] filed a Petition for Supersedeas and on May 22, 2019, [Wife] filed a "Motion to Dismiss/Strike [Husband's] Petition for Appointment of a Realtor to List Marital Properties for Sale, for [Husband] to Obtain his Property left at the Marital Residence and for Contempt" ("Motion") (sic)[.] This [c]ourt scheduled a hearing on the Petition and Motion for June 3, 2019.Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 6/6/19, at unnumbered 1-2.
On May 24, 2019, [Wife] filed a "Concise Statements (sic) of the Errors Complained of on Appeal Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)" ("Statement"). We file this Statement Pursuant to 1925(a) in response to [Wife's] Statement. In her Statement, [Wife] sets forth a confusing statement of her concept of this case. Similarly, [Wife] set forth a confusing, wordy statement in her Exceptions to the Master's Report and Recommendations.
We first address Husband's request that we quash this appeal due to Wife's noncompliant brief with our rules of appellate procedure. Husband's Brief at 12-14; see Pa.R.A.P. 2101 ("Briefs . . . shall conform in all material respects with the requirements of these rules . . . and, if the defects are in the brief . . . of the [Wife] and are substantial, the appeal . . . may be quashed or dismissed.").
We note, as well, that this Court entered a per curiam order on December 3, 2019, precluding our Prothonotary from accepting any further filings in this matter. Order, 12/3/19.
Although this Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, "pro se status confers no special benefit upon the [Wife]. To the contrary, any person choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume that his lack of expertise and legal training will be his undoing." In re Ullman , 995 A.2d 1207, 1211-1212 (Pa. Super. 2010). Accordingly, pro se litigants must comply with the procedural rules set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Court. Commonwealth v. Tchirkow , 160 A.3d 798, 804 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
In the instant matter, the brief filed by Wife fails to conform to the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Pa.R.A.P. 2114-2119 (addressing specific requirements of appellate briefs). Most egregious is Wife's failure to provide a statement of questions involved. Our appellate rules provide, in part:
The statement of the questions involved must state concisely the issues to be resolved, expressed in the terms and circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail. . . . No question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby. Each question shall be followed by an answer stating simply whether the court or government unit agreed, disagreed, did not answer, or did not address the question.Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a). Instead, Wife includes verbatim statements from paragraphs one through five of her Rule 1925(b) statement filed on May 24, 2019, and a completely new issue labeled as number six, which was not included in the Rule 1925(b) statement, and therefore, is waived. In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2017) ("[I]t is well-settled that issues not included in an appellant's statement of questions involved and concise statement of errors complained of on appeal are waived); Wife's Brief at unnumbered iii-iv. Moreover, the statements that are presented on these two pages numbered one through five are unconnected by syntax and are nearly indecipherable. Significantly, none of the identified paragraphs presents a claim related to the order appealed in Superior Court Docket 1904 EDA 2019. Because there is no issue before us related to the appeal in 1904 EDA 2019, the June 10, 2019 order is affirmed.
Wife's reply brief appears to be an attempt to present the same allegations of her original brief, with the added claim, for the first time, of an issue relating to the denial of supersedeas on June 10, 2019, the order appealed at Superior Court docket 1904 EDA 2019. Wife's Reply Brief at 10-14. "[A]n appellant is prohibited from raising new issues in a reply brief. Moreover, a reply brief cannot be a vehicle to argue issues raised but inadequately developed in appellant's original brief." Commonwealth v. Fahy , 737 A.2d 214, 219 n.8 (Pa. 1999); see also Bishops , Inc. v. Penn Nat. Ins., 984 A.2d 982 (Pa. Super. 2009) (issue raised in reply brief inadequate where it was not raised in statement of questions involved and the appellant made only passing reference to issue in its brief as cross-appellee).
"This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant." Coulter v. Ramsden , 94 A.3d 1080, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2014). "When issues are not properly raised and developed in briefs, when the briefs are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for review, a court will not consider the merits thereof." Commonwealth v. Sanford , 445 A.2d 149, 150 (Pa. Super. 1982); see also Commonwealth v. Rompilla , 983 A.2d 1207, 1210 (Pa. 2009) ("Appellant's failure to adequately develop his arguments or support his bald assertions with sufficient citation to legal authority impedes meaningful judicial review of his claims"); Stimmler v. Chestnut Hill Hosp., 981 A.2d 145, 153 n.9 (Pa. 2009) (argument portion of brief must contain "sufficient citation to the record and legal authority, together with analysis, to guide this Court in its review of the issue.").
Thus, because the defects in Wife's briefs are so substantial that they impair our ability to conduct a meaningful review, we could dismiss the appeal at 1491 EDA 2019, as well. In consideration of Wife's challenges as a non-native English speaker and in light of the trial court's valiant effort to sift through Wife's allegations, however, we will not quash the appeal.
The verbatim "issues" Wife suggests, as excised from her Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, are as follows:
CONCISE STATEMENTS OF ERRORS COMPLAINED OF ON APPEAL
PURSUANT TO Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)/QUESTIONS PRESENTED TO
ARGUMENTS
1. Whether the Trial Court erred (when did not consider) any evidence that [Husband] attempted to misled [Wife] in imposition on her his unfair marital settlement, and from February 24, 2017 [Husband] possesses and acts in a willful manner culminating in agreements with authorities ...and ... law firm not assigned to this action, to leave [Wife] in nothing, as [Husband'] long term plan to retaliate against [Wife] for his 2005 incarnation resulted from his contempt of PFA involving extortion of $20,000.00 from [Wife], and whether the The Trial Court erred when refused to grant... [Wife'] February 24, 2017 ... and related Petitions.
2. Whether the Trial Court committed an error of law or abuse of discretion during the March 23, 2018 hearing and thereafter by precluding review of [Wife'] pending Motions, Petitions ... related to her economic claims, inter alia, [Wife's] imposition of discovery on [Husband] and alimony pendente lite ... when [Wife] was not
entitled to have requested continuance ... with English-Polish interpreter ... to have compressive testimony of [Wife] and cross-testimony of [Husband] as this perpetuated a highly prejudicial environment for ... [Wife] and more significantly circumvented her rights to protection of the equitable distribution under the Divorce Code.Wife's Brief at unnumbered iii-iv.
3. Whether the Trial Court committed an error of law or abuse of discretion by precluding [Wife] from proper procedural requirements for an adjudication of her economic claims finding no intimidation of ... [Wife] during the equitable distribution before the Divorce Master on July 24, 2018 equitable distribution hearing, and whether an economic justice was provided for her... when can be no doubts that ... [Wife] was ... precluded from her rights to ...present her documents on her economic claims to equitable distribution, precluded to proceed on her exceptions on November 1, 2019, and whether the Trial Court should to review them supported by the new evidence requested in her April 26, 2019 Motion to Open final March 28, 2019 Decree of Divorce for Reconsideration and Modification in part of March 28, 2019 Order/Petition for Special Reliefs/Petition for Special Reliefs/Petition for Modification of Marital Debts and Post-Divorce Alimonies for [Wife]/Petition for Constructive and April 29, 2019 Motion to Supplement the aforementioned Motion/Petition.
4. Whether [Husband's] intrinsic fraud and other misrepresentations were responsible for March 28, 2019 Order, and it is invalid in part, and the Trial Court should review [Wife'] economic claims fully incorporated by the April 26, 2019 ... and April 29, 2019 ... aforementioned Applications ... herein by reference.
5. Whether it was a proper exercise of discretion for the Trial Court not to assign the marital house in Pennsylvania to [Wife's] name ... when she acquired equity in Pennsylvania house and additionally invested $150,000.00 in funds and labor to save it from dissipation.
6. Whether [Husband] terminated his rights in Pennsylvania and Poland houses, caused delays, and there is no doubts that the Trial Court abused its discretion or committed an error of law, when ordered the exclusive authority on enforcement of the sale of Pennsylvania and Poland houses.
In determining equitable distribution, the trial court considered the following factors:
(1) The length of the marriage.
(2) Any prior marriage of either party.
(3) The age, health, station, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties.
(4) The contribution by one party to the education, training or increased earning power of the other party.
(5) The opportunity of each party for future acquisitions of capital assets and income.
(6) The sources of income of both parties, including, but not limited to, medical, retirement, insurance or other benefits.
(7) The contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation or appreciation of the marital property, including the contribution of a party as homemaker.
(8) The value of the property set apart to each party.
(9) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage.
(10) The economic circumstances of each party at the time the division of property is to become effective.
(10.1) The Federal, State and local tax ramifications associated with each asset to be divided, distributed or assigned, which ramifications need not be immediate and certain.
(10.2) The expense of sale, transfer or liquidation associated with a particular asset, which expense need not be immediate and certain.
(11) Whether the party will be serving as the custodian of any dependent minor children.Trial Court Opinion, 3/28/19, at 2-3 (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a)).
In reviewing awards of equitable distribution, we are guided by the following:
A trial court has broad discretion when fashioning an award of equitable distribution. Our standard of review when assessing the propriety of an order effectuating the equitable distribution of marital property is whether the trial court abused its discretion by a misapplication of the law or failure to follow proper legal procedure. We do not lightly find an abuse of discretion, which requires a showing of clear and convincing evidence. This Court will not find an "abuse of discretion" unless the law has been overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised" was "manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence in the certified record. In determining the propriety of an equitable distribution award, courts must consider the distribution scheme as a whole. We measure the circumstances of the case against the objective of effectuating economic justice between the parties and achieving a just determination of their property rights.Carney v. Carney , 167 A.3d 127, 131 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting Morgante v. Morgante , 119 A.3d 382, 386-387 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
"An abuse of discretion is not found lightly, but only upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence." Yuhas v. Yuhas , 79 A.3d 700, 704 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc). Moreover, it is within the province of the trial court to weigh the evidence and decide credibility, and this Court will not reverse those determinations as long as they are supported by the evidence. Sternlicht v. Sternlicht , 822 A.2d 732, 742 (Pa. Super. 2003). We are also aware that "a master's report and recommendation, although only advisory, is to be given the fullest consideration, particularly on the question of credibility of witnesses, because the master has the opportunity to observe and assess the behavior and demeanor of the parties." Childress v. Bogosian , 12 A.3d 448, 455-456 (Pa. Super. 2011).
We note that the trial court, which has entertained over 2,000 pages of documents in this case, expressed its familiarity "with the procedural history of this case," and acknowledged Wife's "dilatory" conduct. Trial Court Opinion, 3/28/19, at 6. Nevertheless, the trial court also opined that Wife, proceeding pro se, "zealously [was] representing herself." Id. The court opined that while Wife "sincerely believed that she was prosecuting the case in her best interest," "file[d] multiple motions and petitions," and "was committed to her cause," the court remained concerned that Wife intended to "delay the sale of the marital residence and the property in Poland." Id. Our review of the entire record and the parties' briefs compels our support for the trial court's resolution of the aspects of Wife's claims that are decipherable, and we rely on the March 28, 2019, and June 6, 2019 opinions of the trial court in affirming this case.
The parties are directed to attach those opinions in the event of further proceedings in this matter.
Decrees entered March 28, 2019, and June 10, 2019, affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 1/24/20
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