Opinion
LLICV165008059S
10-27-2016
Susan Skipp et al. v. Mary Brigham et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (#102)
Hon. John D. Moore, J.
I
BACKGROUND
The defendants, Mary Brigham and Mary Brigham Law, LLC (collectively, Attorney Brigham or the defendants), moved, on May 27, 2016, to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint. (#102.) The defendants filed a memorandum of law with exhibits as part of #102. The defendants made several arguments in their motion to dismiss. The defendants claimed, among other things, that, given Attorney Brigham's status as guardian ad litem, the plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrine of absolute, quasi-judicial immunity, that the lead plaintiff, Susan Skipp (Ms. Skipp), lacks standing to bring this suit on behalf of her two minor children and that the plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrine of prior pending action.
The defendants' other arguments, that the plaintiff Ms. Skipp may not bring a legal malpractice claim against them because there was never an attorney-client relationship between them, that the complaint fails to state claims upon which relief may be granted and that some of the plaintiffs' claims are time-barred need to be raised in a motion to strike or a motion for summary judgment.
The plaintiffs filed an objection to the motion to dismiss on June 13, 2016. (#105.) In their objection, the plaintiffs argued that (1) absolute quasi-judicial immunity does not protect the defendants from allegations of fraud or financial misfeasance, from allegations arising from a time period after which Attorney Brigham ceased to serve as guardian ad litem, namely post-dissolution, or from allegations arising from claims that Attorney Brigham acted outside of her authority as guardian ad litem; (2) Ms. Skipp is entitled to bring an action on behalf of her minor children; and (3) the doctrine of prior pending action does not apply. The plaintiffs filed an amended objection (#112.10) on July 8, 2016, in which they provided further detail as to the objections set forth above and mounted attacks on exhibits submitted in support of the motion to dismiss. The court heard argument on this motion on July 11, 2016. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint in all respects but one.
This objection also contained a motion for prejudgment remedy, which cannot be considered until after the court decides the instant motion to dismiss, which claims lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Harrison, 264 Conn. 829, 839, n.6, 826 A.2d 1102 (2003).
II
STANDARD OF REVIEW
" The grounds which may be asserted in [a motion to dismiss]" include " lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter . . ." Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 195 Conn. 682, 687, 490 A.2d 509 (1985), citing Practice Book § 143, which is now § 10-30(a). " [A] motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). " A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 310 Conn. 616, 626, 79 A.3d 60 (2013). " A court deciding a motion to dismiss must determine not the merits of the claim or even its legal sufficiency, but rather, whether the claim is one that the court has jurisdiction to hear and decide." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hinde v. Specialized Education of Connecticut, Inc., 147 Conn.App. 730, 740-41, 84 A.3d 895 (2014).
It is well established that, " in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, supra, 310 Conn. at 626. " When a trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 651, 974 A.2d 669 (2009). Moreover, in regard to self-represented litigants, the court " should be solicitous . . . and construe their pleadings liberally in light of the limited legal knowledge they possess." (Internal quotations marks omitted.) Markley v. Dep't of Pub. Util. Control, 301 Conn. 56, 74, 23 A.3d 668 (2011). The liberal construction of the pleadings of self-represented parties, however, is not without limitation: the motion to dismiss does not admit all facts, but, rather, " all facts which are well pleaded . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added.) Ferreira v. Pringle, 255 Conn. 330, 346, 766 A.2d 400 (2001).
" Trial courts addressing motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 10-31(a)(1) may encounter different situations, depending on the status of the record in the case . . . [L]ack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts . . .
" [I]f the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts established by affidavits submitted in support of the motion to dismiss; . . . other types of undisputed evidence; . . . and/or public records of which judicial notice may be taken; . . . the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint . . . If affidavits and/or other evidence submitted in support of a defendant's motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with counteraffidavits . . . or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action without further proceedings." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, supra, 292 Conn. 650-52.
As set forth below, in deciding this motion, the court has considered the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint, as well as various filings and decisions in Ms. Skipp's underlying divorce matter, both pre- and postjudgment, and matters related thereto.
The burden of proof as to subject matter jurisdiction is on the plaintiffs. " [T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction whenever and however raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430, n.12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003).
Once the question of subject matter jurisdiction has been raised, it " must be answered before the court may decide the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kelly v. Albertsen, 114 Conn.App. 600, 605, 970 A.2d 787 (2009). In fact, once raised, the court must consider and decide the issue of subject matter jurisdiction before proceeding any further. Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Harrison, 264 Conn. 829, 839 n.6, 826 A.2d 1102 (2003); Figueroa v. C& S Ball Bearing, 237 Conn. 1, 4, 675 A.2d 845 (1996).
III
REVIEW OF THE COMPLAINT
The court must begin, therefore, by reviewing the well-pleaded allegations that the plaintiffs have directed against Attorney Brigham to see whether these allegations, either alone or considered within the context of the undisputed facts before the court, trigger the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Even read with the liberal construction accorded to a self-represented party, the court finds the complaint to be disordered, inchoate, unfocused and confusing. It is entitled " Complaint of Malfeance [sic], Malpractice, Neglect, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Intentional Infliction of Injury, Endeavoring to Obstruct Justice, Child Endangerment, Willful Fraud, Conspiring to Defraud, Perjury, Failure of Duty, Vexatious Litigation, Slander and Defamation, Honest Good and Services Fraud and Violation of State & Federal ADAAA Disability Laws." Although comprising 152 numbered paragraphs, as well as several unnumbered ones, the complaint makes no attempt to place any of the various purported causes of action cited in the caption under separate counts. Further, while the complaint names only Attorney Brigham and her law firm as defendants, it contains allegations of seriously improper conduct directed against many other parties. Additionally, the complaint appears to allege harm suffered by people other than the plaintiffs. Moreover, the complaint incorporates (1) legal arguments and legal citations that presage and attempt to respond to the arguments of the instant motion, (2) hearsay evidence, much of it concerning matters well outside of the scope of a claim against an attorney, (3) conclusions, purportedly legal and otherwise, (4) bald assertions unsupported by factual allegations, (5) allegations of criminal conduct, and (6) demands that appear to be discovery requests (please see paragraphs 100-12 and 115, in which the plaintiff Ms. Skipp requests the defendant to " clearly explain" or " clearly state" certain positions asserted or actions undertaken by the defendant).
Along with appearing to attempt to vindicate the rights of other, unnamed claimants, the complaint includes accusations against the following non-parties: the " state of Connecticut Courts and its officers, " " the State of Connecticut and its legislature, " six private attorneys, five judges, " two members of CSSD" and three outside contractors. Obviously, allegations against parties not properly named and served are not before the court and do not trigger the court's subject matter jurisdiction; neither are they relevant to a motion to dismiss brought by Attorney Brigham for allegations brought against her.
The complaint does not comply with the requirements of § 10-1 of the Connecticut Practice Book, which mandates that pleadings, including complaints, " contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies, but not of the evidence by which they are to be proved, " and that " such statement . . . be divided into paragraphs numbered consecutively, each containing as nearly as may be a separate allegation." Practice Book, § 10-1. Whenever a pleading, like this complaint, " fails to define clearly the issues in dispute, the court will put upon it such reasonable construction as will give effect to the pleadings in conformity with the general theory which it was intended to follow, and do substantial justice between the parties." (Citation omitted.) Preleski v. Farganiasz, 97 Conn. 345, 348, 116 A. 593 (1922). The court, therefore, reading the complaint liberally, and attempting to give effect to the general theories set forth therein, discerns four categories of well-pleaded allegations of claimed harm to the plaintiffs by Attorney Brigham.
The first category is that, while serving as guardian ad litem, Attorney Brigham harmed the plaintiffs in a variety of ways. The second category is a claim that Attorney Brigham served as guardian ad litem beyond the time of her appointment, which, according to the plaintiffs' allegation, ended at dissolution, on March 28, 2011. The third category is that Attorney Brigham exceeded her authority as guardian ad litem. The fourth category is that Attorney Brigham committed acts of fraud or financial misfeasance in her billing practices and in actions she undertook to attempt to get paid for her work as the guardian ad litem. The court will now detail the allegations that fall into each of these categories.
Category One
The plaintiffs aver that Attorney Brigham, acting as the guardian ad litem for the two minor children during Ms. Skipp's divorce action improperly discharged her duties in this capacity. These allegations include claims that Attorney Brigham, while serving as guardian, (1) acted negligently; (2) failed to investigate claims; (3) made false statements while (a) testifying, (b) making parenting plan recommendations, and (c) making representations to the court; and (4) discriminated against the plaintiffs concerning their disabilities both in her parenting recommendations as guardian ad litem and in coercing the plaintiffs to partake of services offered by various professionals " who were prejudiced and had an interest in 'business development.'" Complaint, paragraph 151.
Category Two
The plaintiffs allege that Attorney Brigham served as guardian ad litem for the lead plaintiff's two minor children beyond the period for which she was appointed, namely, after the date of the dissolution, which was March 28, 2011.
Category Three
The plaintiffs allege that Attorney Brigham acted outside the scope of her authority as guardian ad litem and that Attorney Brigham served as a guardian ad litem before she qualified as one under state law.
Category Four
The plaintiffs claim that Attorney Brigham committed financial misfeasance, fraud and perjury by overbilling, billing for work she did not perform, billing for unauthorized work and pursuing payment to be paid for such work in Ms. Skipp's divorce matter. Additionally, the plaintiffs allege that, after Attorney Brigham was relieved of her duties as guardian ad litem, she improperly attempted to collect her fees by misrepresenting (1) the applicability of the status of the stay in Ms. Skipp's federal bankruptcy action to the state court, and (2) the categorization of guardian ad litem fees under state law to the federal court. The court will review each of the four categories of claims alleged against Attorney Brigham seriatim to ascertain whether the doctrine of absolute, quasi-judicial immunity applies to strip the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
The court will discuss in greater detail, infra, the claims made against parties not sued in this case.
IV
DISCUSSION
A
Absolute, Quasi-Judicial Immunity as to Allegations against Attorney Brigham
Under Connecticut law, appointments of a guardian ad litem take place pursuant to the authority of General Statutes § 46b-54. Our Supreme Court has held that " attorneys appointed by the court pursuant to § 46b-54 are entitled to absolute, quasi-judicial immunity for actions taken during, or activities necessary to, the performance of functions that are integral to the judicial process." Carrubba v. Moskowitz, 274 Conn. 533, 537, 877 A.2d 773 (2005). Courts, in fact, have, in general, " accorded guardians ad litem absolute immunity . . . by directing a functional inquiry to the specific facts of the case." Id., 544. What this means is that " guardians ad litem would be absolutely immune in exercising functions such as testifying in court, prosecuting custody or neglect petitions, and making reports and recommendations to the court in which the guardian acts as an actual functionary or arm of the court, not only in status or denomination but in reality." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Conversely, " absolute immunity would not be available . . . when persons who would normally be accorded immunity perform acts which are clearly outside the scope of their jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
The policy reasons for granting guardians ad litem absolute, quasi-judicial immunity when they are acting as such are manifest. First, guardians ad litem perform functions " sufficiently comparable to those of officials who have traditionally been afforded absolute immunity at common law . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 542. In fact, the duty of a guardian ad litem to secure the best interests of a minor, one of the chief duties set forth in § 46b-54, " places the guardian squarely within the judicial process to accomplish that goal . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 547. Second, the " likelihood of harassment or intimidation by personal liability [is] sufficiently great to interfere with the official's performance of his or her duties . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 543. When acting as guardians ad litem in a divorce proceeding, both before and after judgment, guardians ad litem face the " threat of litigation from a disgruntled parent, unhappy with" a guardian's recommendations or testimony. Id. Such threats " would be likely not only to interfere with the independent decision making required by this position, but may very well deter qualified individuals from accepting the appointment in the first instance." Id. As our Supreme Court has noted, " [w]ithout immunity, guardians ad litem would act like litigation lightning rods. Lawsuits would, in the words of Learned Hand, 'dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.'" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 547-48. Third, appropriate procedural safeguards exist to adequately protect against improper conduct by guardians ad litem. Id., 543. All guardians ad litem are subject to removal by the supervising judge. Id. Attorneys who serve as guardians are, additionally, subject to discipline for violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Id.; see also Shaughnessey v. Statewide Grievance Committee, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-09-4045136-S (Oct. 14, 2009, Sheldon, J.) [48 Conn.L.Rptr. 649, ] (" a guardian ad litem's absolute quasi-judicial immunity from legal liability in connection with her guardianship work does not include immunity from professional discipline for ethical violation committed in the course of that work, precisely because exposure to such discipline is one of the central reasons why the 'strong medicine' of immunity was held to be justified in the first place" [emphasis omitted]).
The court is aware that the plaintiff claims that the grievances that she filed against Attorney Brigham have not been successful. That argument, however, misses the boat. The thrust of the court's point is that clients may avail themselves of the grievance process, not that filing a grievance is a guarantee that an attorney will be disciplined.
Our Appellate Court has held, in Perugini v. Giuliano, 148 Conn.App. 861, 873, 89 A.3d 358, 366 (2014), that " the doctrine of absolute immunity concerns a court's subject matter jurisdiction . . ." (affirming dismissal of case brought against defendant for actions she undertook as attorney for plaintiff's former wife in divorce action). A number of Connecticut trial courts, including two involving guardians ad litem, have concluded that the issue of absolute judicial immunity can properly be raised in a motion to dismiss. Whitnum v. Emons, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV-15-5014842-S, (April 5, 2016, Lee, J.); Damato v. Thomas, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-09-5030385-S (June 2, 2010, Peck, J.) (50 Conn.L.Rptr. 112, ); Janicki v. Subbloie, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-01-0277848-S (April 3, 2002, Skolnick, J.) (31 Conn.L.Rptr. 626, ) (guardian ad litem); Coburn v. Henderson, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-09-5011906-S, (May 19, 2009, Pittman, J.); Day v. Smith, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-07-4027999-S, (February 11, 2008, Bellis, J.); Anastasio v. Shaughnessy, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-08-5017263-S (September 30, 2009, Bellis, J.) (48 Conn.L.Rptr. 572, ) (guardian ad litem). Therefore, the court concludes that the defendant may raise the issue of absolute, quasi-judicial immunity via a motion to dismiss because this issue implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction.
1
Category One Claims
Category One contains allegations leveled against Attorney Brigham for her actions while serving as the guardian ad litem. As mentioned above, the movant claims that she was cloaked with absolute quasi-judicial immunity while acting as guardian ad litem. The plaintiffs dispute that claim. For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that all of the allegations found in Category One, arising as they do from Attorney Brigham's service as guardian ad litem, are insulated from suit as the result of the doctrine of absolute quasi-judicial immunity. Therefore, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear these claims and the court grants the motion to dismiss as to the Category One claims.
Pursuant to the guidance of Carrubba, supra, 274 Conn. at 543-44, the court must undertake a functional analysis of the allegations of Category One to see whether they aver activities that Attorney Brigham undertook to discharge her duties as guardian ad litem. As mentioned supra, such activities include " functions such as testifying in court, prosecuting custody or neglect petitions, and making reports and recommendations to the court in which the guardian acts as an actual functionary or arm of the court, not only in status or denomination but in reality." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 544. Although the court, as discussed above, is somewhat hamstrung by the manner in which the plaintiffs set forth their allegations, the complaint alleges various harm arising from Attorney Brigham's actions as guardian ad litem. Ms. Skipp alleges that Attorney Brigham designed a parenting plan that was destined to fail and was poorly drafted, violated federal law, served as guardian ad litem without proper training, refused to submit to audits, acted without legal consent, committed fraud on the court, filed and prosecuted motions, colluded with others to whom she referred the parties or their children, made improper recommendations to the court, negligently handled her duties, testified improperly and falsely, issued opinions about the plaintiff that Attorney Brigham was not qualified to make, made libelous and slanderous statements, harassed the plaintiff, discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of a claimed mental disability, acted as guardian without standing, worked as a guardian without a retainer, impeded two DCF investigations, acted as a " tool for the court to make a finding" (Complaint, paragraph 140), willfully violated certain Rules of Professional Conduct, intentionally inflicted emotional distress, willfully committed child abuse and neglect, and engaged in vexatious litigation.
As pleaded, the court finds that all of these allegations, insofar as they all allegedly occurred while Attorney Brigham served as guardian ad litem, are claims arising from the activities Attorney Brigham undertook as guardian ad litem. As a result, for all of these allegations, Attorney Brigham is cloaked with absolute, quasi-judicial immunity. Therefore, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the allegations of Category One, and the court grants the motion to dismiss these allegations.
The court will discuss infra the period of time in which Attorney Brigham served as the guardian ad litem in Ms. Skipp's divorce case.
Given the manner in which the complaint has been pleaded, the court anticipates that the parties to this lawsuit may not understand the application of the court's ruling to the allegations of the complaint. Therefore, the court will spell it out as follows. Based upon the court's holding in this section, the court orders the plaintiffs to remove from the complaint the following allegations: the allegations of paragraph 1, except those that pertain to alleged billing issues; all of paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 7; the first and third sentences of paragraph 8; all of paragraphs 9 and 11; paragraph 18, insofar as it pertains to the defendant; the last sentence of paragraph 22; all of paragraphs 36, 37, 38, 39, 42 and 43; all of the allegations of paragraph 44 except for those relating to billing; all of paragraphs 46, 47 and 48; paragraph 50, insofar as it pertains to the defendant; all of paragraph 52; the second sentence of paragraph 53; all of paragraphs 54 and 55; the first sentence of paragraph 56; all of paragraphs 64, 66 and 73; the last three sentences of paragraph 74; all of paragraphs 75, 76, 91, 98, 99, 116, 121, 130, 131, 132, 133, 135, 136, 137, 138 and 139; the second and third sentences of the body of paragraph 140; all of paragraph 140b and c (on the same page under the body of 140); all of the second paragraph 140b (found on the page after the body of 140); all of paragraph 140d, 140e and 140f; all of paragraph 141, including sub-parts; all of paragraphs 143, 144, 145, 146, 148, 149, 150, 151 (the first) and paragraph 151 (the second) and paragraph 152, except for the billing allegations.
2
Category Two and Three Claims
The Category Two and Three claims comprise allegations that Attorney Brigham harmed the plaintiffs by continuing to act as guardian ad litem in the plaintiff's dissolution proceeding after the date on which her appointment was terminated, namely, March 28, 2011, the date of judgment, and by performing activities outside of the authority granted to her in her appointment and before she was qualified to be a guardian ad litem.
In other words, the Category Two and Three allegations attempt to carve out an exception to the general applicability of the doctrine of absolute, quasi-judicial immunity for guardians ad litem such as the defendant by alleging that Attorney Brigham lacked authority to serve as guardian ad litem after the dissolution judgment and that Attorney Brigham acted outside of her authority and before she was qualified to serve as a guardian ad litem. As mentioned above, the court may consider not only the well-pleaded allegations that fall in these categories, but also " other types of undisputed evidence . . . and/or public records of which judicial notice may be taken . . ." Conboy v. State, supra, 292 Conn. 651-52. The allegations of the instant case sprang from the plaintiff's dissolution case, and the court may take judicial notice not only of court files in the plaintiff's divorce proceeding; State v. Bunkley, 202 Conn. 629, 648, 522 A.2d 795 (1987); but also of judicial decisions in that case. C. Tait & E. Prescott, Connecticut Evidence (5th Ed. 2014) § 2.17.1, p. 125.
Based upon the court's review of Ms. Skipp's divorce file, and for the reasons set forth below, the court finds that the undisputed facts prove that (1) Attorney Brigham served as guardian ad litem of Ms. Skipp's two minor children from September 9, 2010 through October 16, 2012, the date on which Attorney Brigham was discharged by the court, (2) Attorney Brigham acted at all times during that period within the scope of her authority as guardian ad litem, (3) the training requirements for guardians ad litem were not effective when Attorney Brigham was appointed as such, and (4) the billing restrictions on guardians ad litem did not go into effect until after Attorney Brigham was relieved of her duties. Because these findings abnegate Ms. Skipp's Category Two and Three allegations of lack of authority, which allegations were intended to serve as an exception to the general application of absolute, quasi-judicial immunity while Attorney Brigham served as guardian ad litem, the court also grants the defendants' motion to dismiss these claims.
As mentioned above, the Category Two claims allege that Attorney Brigham acted without authority as a guardian ad litem because she continued in that capacity beyond the date of dissolution, March 28, 2011. This allegation is controverted by the undisputed evidence from the plaintiff Ms. Skipp's underlying dissolution case, Tittle v. Skipp-Tittle, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. FA-10-4022292-S. As set forth below, undisputed evidence from the plaintiff's divorce file reflects that Attorney Brigham continued, with the court's authorization, to serve as guardian ad litem beyond March 28, 2011, and, in fact, until she was discharged by order of the court on October 16, 2012.
The plaintiff's divorce file reveals the following. A motion to appoint a guardian ad litem (#109) was filed in the divorce action on September 3, 2010. Attorney Brigham was appointed as guardian ad litem on September 9, 2010. (##111, 112.) The judgment dissolving the plaintiff's marriage entered on March 28, 2011. (#152.)
On September 13, 2011, the court, Resha, J., issued a memorandum of decision on pending motions. (#210.) In that memorandum, Judge Resha held that Attorney Brigham served as guardian ad litem " during the parties' divorce proceedings and subsequent thereto." Trial Transcript, p. 10, September 13, 2011. Other orders in this decision evidence that Attorney Brigham's tenure as guardian ad litem continued beyond the date of this decision, September 13, 2011. These orders include requirements that Attorney Brigham, as guardian, was to meet with the children and Dr. Horowitz regarding changes to the parenting agreement; id., 15-16; and that each party " is to immediately notify the other and the guardian of any change in the health of the children while in their care." Id., p. 16.
Judge Resha issued a further memorandum of decision on pending motions on December 28, 2011. (#241.) This decision further reinforced the fact that the parties continued to employ the defendant as guardian ad litem with the court's authorization. In the Facts section of this decision, the court noted that " [t]he parties are unable to communicate on almost any level. They use the services of the Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) for inordinate amounts of time on almost every issue involving the children . . . The GAL presented the only viable plan for the holiday season . . ."
On March 14, 2012, Judge Resha issued a memorandum of decision (#268.75) as to the defendant's motion for appointment of an attorney for the minor children. In this memorandum, Judge Resha finds that " Attorney Brigham was so appointed [as Guardian Ad Litem] on September 9, 2010, and she has continued to act in that capacity during these extensive postjudgment hearings." Tittle v. Skipp-Tittle, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. FA-10-4022292-S, (March 14, 2012, Resha, J.).
On October 16, 2012, the court, Munro, J. issued another memorandum of decision in regard to the plaintiff's motion to modify custody and related orders. (#379.) This decision recognized that " the children's interests were protected by a guardian ad litem." Tittle v. Skipp-Tittle, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. FA-10-4022292-S, (October 16, 2012, Munro, J.). This decision also evidenced that Attorney Brigham was still " focused throughout these proceedings on her primary duties: to investigate and promote what is best for her wards, the two children of the parties." Id. Further, this decision found that Attorney Brigham's " rate and fees charged are fair and reasonable, " that she was " owed substantial amounts of money by both of the parties, " and that she " has invested an enormous amount of time and attention to the needs of her wards, and she has done so competently." Id. Paragraph 13 of the court's orders in this memorandum of decision terminated Attorney Brigham as guardian ad litem by employing the following language: " The Guardian ad litem is relieved of her duties, but shall be re-appointed, if she is so willing, if a motion to modify these custody orders is filed." Id.
Judge Munro's decision was affirmed by the Appellate Court after Ms. Skipp appealed it, and both the Connecticut and United States Supreme Courts declined to grant certification. Tittle v. Skipp-Tittle, 150 Conn.App. 64, 66, 89 A.3d 1039 (2014), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 228, 193 L.Ed.2d 132, rehearing denied, 136 S.Ct. 609, 193 L.Ed.2d 490 (2015). Ms. Skipp chose to appeal Judge Munro's decision on three bases: (1) that Judge Munro lacked subject matter jurisdiction, (2) that Judge Munro abused her discretion in modifying custody, and (3) that the Appellate Court should exercise supervisory authority over the administration of justice to evaluate the role of court-appointed guardians ad litem. Id. Ms. Skipp did not appeal those portions of Judge Munro's decision relieving the guardian ad litem of her duties as of the date of the decision, establishing the competence of Attorney Brigham's service as guardian ad litem or finding the rates and fees charged by Attorney Brigham to be fair and reasonable. Having failed to raise these issues on appeal, Ms. Skipp abandoned their consideration by the Appellate Court. Grimm v. Grimm, 276 Conn. 377, 393, 886 A.2d 391 (2005) (" [c]laims that are inadequately briefed generally are considered abandoned"), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1148, 126 S.Ct. 2296, 164 L.Ed.2d 815 (2006).
In any event, the Appellate Court held that its review of the record and Ms. Skipp's appellate arguments " convinces us that all of the defendant's claims are without merit." It is an established fact, therefore, that Attorney Brigham's service as guardian ad litem in the underlying case ran from September 9, 2010 through October 16, 2012.
It concerns the court that Ms. Skipp has continued to allege in this case, multiple times over, that Attorney Brigham's appointment was terminated at the time of the dissolution judgment when Ms. Skipp is well aware that it was Judge Munro's October 16, 2012 ruling that terminated the guardian's appointment. Ms. Skipp needs to bear in mind, as the Appellate Court has already informed her, that " [a]lthough Connecticut courts construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of self-represented parties, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tittle v. Skipp-Tittle, 161 Conn.App. 542, 547 n.2, 128 A.3d 590 (2015). One such relevant rule is Practice Book § 4-2(b), which states that the " signing of any pleading . . . shall constitute a certificate that the signer has read the document, [and] that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it . . ." Continuing to propound allegations in contravention of established facts would violate § 4-2(b) of the Practice Book.
The same is true of the Category Three allegations that Attorney Brigham acted ultra vires. Filings ##111 and 112 from Ms. Skipp's divorce proceeding prove the nature and extent of Attorney Brigham's retention as guardian ad litem. Paragraph 1 of #111, an agreement signed by Ms. Skipp, posits that, " Attorney Mary Brigham shall be appointed as Guardian Ad Litem for the parties' minor children. The plaintiff shall advance the initial retainer for Attorney Brigham. Each party shall immediately contact Attorney Brigham to schedule an appointment to address the issues of custody and the establishment of a parenting plan." Tittle v. Skipp-Tittle, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. FA-10-4022292-S (September 9, 2010). Order #112 provides further detail. It reveals that the court appointed Attorney Brigham for both minor children and instructed her to file an appearance upon receipt of #112, examine the parties' financial condition and file a motion seeking an order of fees from either or both parties at an early date. The court file reflects that Attorney Brigham sought and received an order of fees from both parties. Both the dissolution settlement agreement, #151, in paragraph 5.4, and order #155, which are dated March 28 and 29, 2011, respectively, evidence that the court ordered Ms. Skipp to pay fees and costs to Attorney Brigham.
Order #112 also posits Attorney Brigham's duties as guardian ad litem to include: " 1. An investigation of the facts necessary to get a clear picture of the child's circumstances; 2. A determination of the child's best interest to be summarized in writing by a report to the court; 3. Interview the parties including the child(ren); 4. Frequent communication with the child and the court; 5. Visit the child as often as necessary to verify that court orders are being followed; 6. Make recommendations to the court if you believe an Atty. For Minor is necessary; 7. Review court files, DCF files, police records and mental health records; 8. Confer with teachers, coaches, and other school authorities; 9. Confer with family relations counselors; 10. Confer with professionals; 11. The making of recommendations to the court through testimony; 12. Report any incidents of child abuse; 13. Attend all hearings; 14. Participate in formulation of the child's permanent plan; 15. Remain engaged in the case until discharged by the court; 16. Encourage settlement of disputes; 17. Review and inquire of work records for each party; and 18. Request that the court order additional functions/duties you believe necessary to complete the function of the guardian."
The scope of Attorney Brigham's duties was, at once, both extremely broad and extremely deep. The breadth and depth of Attorney Brigham's duties as guardian ad litem reinforce the court's holdings in this decision that the Category One allegations pertain to functions that Attorney Brigham performed as guardian ad litem and that that Attorney Brigham needed to serve as guardian until discharged by the court. The scope of Attorney Brigham's duties additionally contravene Ms. Skipp's Category Two claims and provide undisputed factual proof that Ms. Skipp's more general Category Three allegations that Attorney Brigham acted in an ultra vires manner are groundless. This is especially true when read in the light of Judge Munro's findings in her October 16, 2012 memorandum of decision, #379, e.g., that (1) Attorney Brigham was " focused throughout these proceedings on her primary duties: to investigate and promote what is best for her wards, the two children of the parties, " (2) Attorney Brigham's " rate and fees charged are fair and reasonable, " (3) Attorney Brigham was " owed substantial amounts of money by both of the parties, " and (4) Attorney Brigham " has invested an enormous amount of time and attention to the needs of her wards, and she has done so competently." As discussed above, these findings are the law of the case in Ms. Skipp's underlying divorce proceeding.
The Category Three allegations pertaining to Attorney Brigham's training and to billing at rates above the statutory rate are baseless, for several reasons. As the documents referred to above display, the court approved Attorney Brigham's appointment as guardian ad litem in this case on September 10, 2010. Tittle v. Skipp-Tittle, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. FA-10-4022292-S, ##111, 112 (September 9, 2010).
The training requirements for guardians ad litem were not imposed until much later, on January 1, 2012; Practice Book § 25-62; and only applied to newly appointed guardians ad litem. Nicole A. Carnemolla, Note, " Raising the Bar for Child Advocates in Connecticut's Family Court, " 33 Quinnipiac L.Rev. 411, 427 (2015) (" As of January 1, 2012, Sections 25-62 and 25-62A of the Connecticut Practice Book limited new appointments of AMCs and GALs in family court to individuals who had completed the State of Connecticut Family Matters Comprehensive AMC/GAL training program"); AMC/GAL Training Course, available at http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/news/AMC_GAL_Training_Poster.pdf (last visited October 27, 2016) (" P.B. § § 25-62 and 25-62A, effective January 1, 2012, limit new appointments as guardians ad litem and attorneys for minor children to persons who have completed this training, regardless of experience"). The record is clear that Attorney Brigham was appointed as guardian ad litem on September 10, 2010, long before January 1, 2012, making the training inapplicable to her service as guardian ad litem in Ms. Skipp's dissolution action. Furthermore, the billing restrictions imposed on Connecticut guardians ad litem arise from a statute, Public Acts 2014, No. 14-3, as amended by Public Acts 2014, No. 14-207, now found as General Statutes § 46b-12, which did not go into effect until after Attorney Brigham was relieved of her duties.
In sum, the above-mentioned findings from the divorce proceeding and the effective date of the guardian ad litem training and billing requirements abnegate and disprove Ms. Skipp's Category Two and Three allegations that Attorney Brigham, while serving as guardian ad litem, lacked authority, lacked the proper training, improperly billed Ms. Skipp and billed above the statutory rate. The court, therefore, disagrees with Ms. Skipp's contention that these Category Two and Three allegations carved out an exception to the general application of absolute, quasi-judicial immunity that Attorney Brigham enjoyed while serving as guardian ad litem. As a result, the court grants the defendant's motion to dismiss the Category Two and Three claims.
3
Category Four Claims
As mentioned above, the plaintiffs' Category Four claims allege that Attorney Brigham committed financial misfeasance, fraud and perjury by overbilling, by billing for work she did not perform, by billing for work not authorized by her appointment as guardian ad litem and by seeking to be paid for such work in state court, before and during Ms. Skipp's bankruptcy, and in federal bankruptcy court. The Category Four claims essentially aver that Attorney Brigham was not functioning as a guardian ad litem when engaging in such activities. The court will separate the Category Four claims into two batches to help analyze whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over those claims.
The first batch of claims arises from billings incurred before Attorney Brigham was relieved of her duties, on October 16, 2012. The court has already found, in section 2 above, that the undisputed facts and clear guidance of the law indicate that the court, upon her appointment, instructed Attorney Brigham to seek an order pertaining to the payment of her fees as guardian ad litem, that Ms. Skipp was ordered to pay Attorney Brigham for her services as guardian ad litem, that Attorney Brigham served in this capacity until October 16, 2012, that Judge Munro found that Attorney Brigham's fees and rates, incurred until the date on which she was relieved of her duties, were fair and reasonable, that this finding is the law of the underlying divorce case, and that there were no statutory or other restrictions on guardian ad litem billing until the effective date of the 2014 public acts, long after Attorney Brigham ceased to serve as the guardian ad litem. Therefore, the undisputed facts clearly demonstrate that so much of Attorney Brigham's guardian ad litem billings that were incurred before October 16, 2012 were part and parcel of her service as guardian ad litem. One trial court has stated, in dicta, that claims of unfair billing practice for fees and costs incurred while one served as an attorney for a minor child are " sufficiently within the defendant's role as counsel [for a minor child] that absolute immunity still applies." Coburn v. Henderson, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-09-5011906, 2009 WL 1578482 (May 19, 2009, Pittman, J.). This court finds the same to be true for the billing claims for costs and fees incurred while one is a guardian ad litem. Moreover, in the context of a guardian ad litem's appointment, this conclusion makes sense. As noted above, in Ms. Skipp's underlying case, the court (1) instructed Attorney Brigham to seek an order setting forth the manner in which the parties were going to pay Attorney Brigham for her service as guardian ad litem, (2) granted such an order, and (3) issued orders requiring Ms. Skipp to pay Attorney Brigham. The payment for services that Attorney Brigham rendered as guardian ad litem was inextricably intertwined with the performance of those services. Moreover, providing absolute immunity to a guardian ad litem for billing within the court proceeding in which she has been appointed supports the policy reason for providing absolute immunity to guardians ad litem, namely, to insure the guardian's objectivity by buffering the guardian ad litem from the " threat of litigation from a disgruntled parent, unhappy with" the guardian's recommendations or testimony, Carrubba, supra, 543, and to diminish the possibility of " harassment and intimidation." Id. Therefore, the undisputed facts support the conclusion that, while billing in the divorce case for guardian ad litem services authorized by the court before and immediately after the termination of her appointment, Attorney Brigham was functioning as a guardian ad litem and should be cloaked with absolute, quasi-judicial immunity for these allegations. Therefore, the court grants the motion to dismiss these claims.
In an abundance of caution, and because of the manner in which the complaint has been pleaded, the court will make it clear that it orders the plaintiffs to remove the following dismissed Category Two and Three allegations, and the dismissed " first batch" of Category Four allegations from the complaint: all of the allegations of paragraph 2; all of the remaining allegations of paragraph 8; all of the remaining allegations of paragraph 44, except for those pertaining to child support; all of the remaining allegations of paragraph 53; all of the allegations of paragraphs 65, 70, 72; the first sentence of paragraph 74; all of the allegations of paragraphs 93, 113, 120, 124, 125, 126, 127, 130, 131, 132 and 137; paragraph 140a (first page) and 140c (second page); and paragraph 147.
The second batch of Category Four claims arise later, after Attorney Brigham was relieved of her duties, and stem from claims for payment made by Attorney Brigham in Ms. Skipp's bankruptcy proceedings and in further proceedings in Ms. Skipp's divorce case. These claims allege that, in regard to the issue of whether Attorney Brigham's fees are dischargeable in Ms. Skipp's bankruptcy proceedings, Attorney Brigham was not forthright (1) with the state court about federal bankruptcy stay issues, and (2) with the federal bankruptcy court as to whether the fees owed by Ms. Skipp could be appropriately classified as child support. One trial court previously considered the applicability of the functional test set forth above in a case in which a parent sued a guardian ad litem solely for billing malfeasance, including placing a lis pendens on trust property not owned by the parent, and not for allegedly improper service as a guardian ad litem. Anastasio v. Shaughnessy, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-08-5017263-S (September 30, 2009, Bellis, J.) (48 Conn.L.Rptr. 572, ).
In Anastasio, under the unique facts set forth in that case, Judge Bellis opined that, while " seeking remuneration for one's services is probably an activity that guardians ad litem frequently undertake, obtaining counsel fees does not necessarily further the main objective of a guardian ad litem, which is protecting the best interest of the child." Id., 575, . The same is true in this case. The second batch of Category 4 allegations appear to involve claims that Attorney Brigham improperly tried to collect fees in bankruptcy court and in state court long after the termination of her appointment in state court. These allegations arise in the context of Attorney Brigham's claims that her fees are not dischargeable in Ms. Skipp's bankruptcy. Ms. Skipp's claims in this regard include allegations that Attorney Brigham was disingenuous with the two courts. As alleged, this second batch of Category 4 claims is sufficiently removed from straightforward allegations of attempting to collect fees in the underlying divorce proceeding so as not to be cloaked with absolute, quasi-judicial immunity. As mentioned above, absolute immunity is not available " when persons who would normally be accorded immunity perform acts which are clearly outside the scope of their jurisdiction." Carrubba, supra, at 544. Therefore, because this second batch of Category Four claims implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction, the court denies the motion to dismiss as to these claims. After reviewing the remaining legal issues in the case, the court will provide clear guidance to Ms. Skipp as to how to next proceed.
As mentioned elsewhere in this memorandum, the allegations of the existing complaint are not pleaded as required in the Practice Book. The court contemplates, as explained both supra and infra, that, if the plaintiff wishes to proceed, she must replead the existing allegations in a manner to comport with our pleading practices. Even if that were to occur as the court contemplates, the court's decision on this issue does not constitute a ruling on the veracity or the sufficiency of such future allegations or as to whether or not there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to these allegations, but merely that the existing allegations are, at this time, marginally sufficient to implicate the court's subject matter jurisdiction. The court also notes that the litigation regarding whether the fees are dischargeable in bankruptcy is still unfolding. In Skipp v. Brigham, United States District Court, 557 B.R. 271 (D.Conn. 2016), a federal trial judge, acting as the appellate court for a decision by the federal bankruptcy court, remanded the case to the bankruptcy court " for independent consideration of whether Ms. Skipp's debt to Ms. Brigham is non-dischargeable as a domestic support obligation under 11 U.S.C. § § 523(a), 101 (14A)." Id. The latter issue will apparently be decided as a question of fact in the bankruptcy court. Id.
B
Ms. Skipp's Standing to Bring Action as Next Friend of Her Minor Children
Ms. Skipp alleges that she has standing to bring this action as the next friend of her two minor children. For the reasons stated below, the court finds that Ms. Skipp lacks standing to bring this action as the next friend of her children and dismisses those portions of the complaint.
Citing relevant Connecticut case law, the defendants argue that Ms. Skipp lacks standing to bring this action as the next friend of her minor children because of the custody dispute alluded to in the complaint. The defendants further contend that, if a party lacks standing, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. To consider this contention, the court must first review the allegations of the complaint pertaining to Ms. Skipp's relationship to the minor children and then consider Ms. Skipp's response to the defendant's contentions.
Ms. Skipp listed three plaintiffs in this lawsuit: herself individually and, " by next friend and Parent, Susan Skipp" two minors identified as' " G.A.T., 15, minor female" and " W.G.T., 13, minor male." Complaint caption. Ms. Skipp signed the complaint on behalf of all three plaintiffs. Although the complaint does not expressly allege that Ms. Skipp is the mother of the two minor children, the summons lists her as both " next friend" and " parent" to both G.A.T. and W.G.T., and the court, in reviewing the complaint liberally, infers this fact to be necessarily alleged. Moreover, the defendant's memorandum concedes that the two minor plaintiffs are " her [Ms. Skipp's] children." Defendant's memorandum of law in support of motion to dismiss, p. 9. The only clear allegation that Ms. Skipp has the right to bring this lawsuit on behalf of her two children is not well-pleaded, as it constitutes a legal conclusion based upon federal law. It reads as follows: " Generally, a parent who is a party to the lawsuit and who has the same interests as the child is a proper representative under Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(c)." Complaint, paragraph 10. In her objection to the motion to dismiss, Ms. Skipp argues that " [c]hildren's parents hold the best interest of their children and are able to sue for their damages as next friend. It appears no one else is advocating for the minors and it is the duty of the court to ensure the protection of the plaintiff minors' rights." Plaintiff's objection to motion to dismiss and motion for prejudgment remedy, p. 1. In her amended objection, Ms. Skipp claims, without citing authority, that she is " able to serve as Next friend" because she has not lost her parental rights. Plaintiff's amended motion to objection and to strike desponents' [sic] exhibits, p. 5.
Under some circumstances, Ms. Skipp could qualify as the next friend of the minor children. As our Supreme Court has pointed out, " [u]nder normal circumstances, parents of a minor child satisfy both prongs of this test [establishing next friend status] because they are presumed to act in the best interests of the minor child." Carrubba v. Moskowitz, supra, 274 Conn. at 552. Carrubba, however, firmly stands for the proposition that this presumption is rebutted during a custody battle. Id. As Carrubba points out, " in a custody dispute, parents lack the necessary professional and emotional judgment to further the best interests of their children. Neither parent could be relied on to communicate to the court the children's interests where those interests differed from his or her own . . . A parent's judgment is or may be clouded with emotion and prejudice due to the estrangement of husband and wife." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Certain allegations of the complaint demonstrate convincingly that the claims against the defendant arise from an ongoing custody dispute, one that Ms. Skipp has lost. For example, Ms. Skipp alleges that the defendant is not cloaked with immunity " for matters of 'family court custody.'" Complaint, paragraph 28. Further, the complaint alleges a " state-required breakup of a natural family." Complaint, paragraph 60. Finally, the plaintiff challenges the defendant " to clearly explain how the children received support from this guardian given the outcome is one year of forced isolation of the children from the mother; not a phone call, card, hug nor kiss." Complaint, paragraph 105. Because the allegations of this case arise from a custody dispute, Ms. Skipp lacks standing to bring this lawsuit on behalf of her children.
Two other factors reinforce the conclusion that Ms. Skipp does not have standing to bring this case as the next friend of her minor children. The first is that, in this case, in what the court has termed the Category One, Two, Three and the first batch of the Category Four claims, Ms. Skipp has sued Attorney Brigham in her capacity as a guardian ad litem for Ms. Skipp's children. The Carrubba court pointed out, under very similar circumstances, that " [t]he defendant was responsible for undertaking actions that represented the best interest of the minor . . . and it was precisely those actions to which [the plaintiff] had objected [by bringing the lawsuit]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Our Supreme Court further explained that, under the circumstances that pertained in Carrubba (and that pertain here), if parents could " penetrate the shield of immunity merely by bringing suit in the child's name, that tactic would undermine the public policy goals supporting the immunity . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The second reason is that the billing allegations could not be brought on behalf of the minor children. The allegations arising from allegedly improper billing practices affect only the obligor, Ms. Skipp, and not her minor children. There are no allegations that the defendant billed the minor children or that the minor children were ordered by the court to pay Attorney Brigham's fees; the only allegations in the complaint pertaining to billing aver that that defendant billed " the plaintiff" in the singular, e.g., Ms. Skipp. See, e.g., Complaint, paragraph 80E and F.
Under markedly similar circumstances to those in this case, Carrubba found that, " because the plaintiff's interests are adverse to the minor child, he lacks standing to bring a claim . . . on the child's behalf as next friend." Id., 552-53. For the same reasons, and based upon the holding of Carrubba, the court finds that Ms. Skipp lacks standing to bring this lawsuit as the next friend of her minor children. Because Ms. Skipp's lack of standing implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction; id., 550; the court grants the defendants' motion to dismiss the minor plaintiffs from this lawsuit.
C
Prior Pending Action Doctrine
The defendant contends that the allegations claiming violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and of intentional infliction of emotional distress should be dismissed under the doctrine of prior pending action. However, the court has already dismissed these allegations under its rulings supra . Therefore, there is no need, for purposes of this decision, to review the application of the law pertaining to the doctrine of prior pending action to these claims.
D
Amending the Complaint
The court has clearly stated which allegations of the complaint it has dismissed as a result of the court granting portions of Attorney Brigham's motion to dismiss. However, as mentioned above, the complaint is replete with other and unrelated irrelevant, immaterial and impertinent allegations. Additionally, the complaint raises claims on behalf of persons who are not before the court, makes allegations against persons who are not sued, contains legal argument, evidence and bald conclusions and does not comport with Connecticut Practice Book pleading requirements. In a venerable case, our Supreme Court encountered similar pleadings. It noted in that case that the " pleadings following the complaint in this action do not contain plain and concise statements of the facts on which the pleaders relied. They are prolix and in places obscure and uncertain, and they are encumbered by unnecessary repetition and the recitation of evidential matter." Preleski v. Farganiasz, 97 Conn. 345, 347-48, 116 A. 593 (1922).
Under Practice Book § 10-1, each " pleading shall contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies, but not of the evidence by which they are to be proved . . . If any such pleading does not fully disclose the ground of claim . . . the judicial authority may order a fuller and more particular statement; and, if in the opinion of the judicial authority the pleadings do not sufficiently define the issues in dispute, it may direct the parties to prepare other issues." The court, therefore, has inherent power to order a party to replead to comport with Practice Book requirements. See Traylor v. State, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV-13-5014624-S, (July 9, 2014, Moukawsher, J.) (" trial courts have discretion to shape an appropriate order concerning the pleadings under Practice Book § 10-1 . . . as a form of relief in response to pending motions, and under their inherent authority to control the proceedings"); Fusari v. Middletown Area Transit, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-11-5035400-S, (April 18, 2011, Berger, J.) (" dismiss[ing] . . . action sua sponte pursuant to its inherent authority" for failure to comply with Practice Book § § 4-2(b) and 10-1).
In addition to the paragraphs that must be removed from the complaint as set forth above in this memorandum of decision, the court orders the following paragraphs, or parts thereof, to be redacted from the complaint for failing to comply with one or more of the Practice Book pleading requirements set forth above or for inserting inappropriate matter into the complaint. The court orders the plaintiff to redact paragraph 6, which seems to assert an irrelevant criminal allegation; paragraphs 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, which constitute legal arguments; paragraphs 16, 18, 20 and 21, which are claims against the judicial branch, not against the defendants; paragraphs 17 and 19, which constitute legal arguments; the remaining allegations of paragraph 22, which has nothing to do with the defendants; paragraphs 23-32, inclusive, which constitute legal arguments; paragraphs 34, 35 and 40, which are not directed at the defendants; paragraphs 41 and 51, which constitute legal arguments; paragraphs 58-63, as well as paragraphs 86, 87 and 97, which are not directed at the defendants; paragraphs 100-12, which are argumentative discovery requests; paragraph 114, which is not directed to the defendants; paragraph 118 and the transcript portion of paragraph 120, which constitute evidence; paragraph 122, which is not directed to the defendants; paragraph 123, which constitutes a legal argument; and paragraph 134, which is irrelevant, immaterial and evidentiary.
What remains for Ms. Skipp are those portions of the following paragraphs that pertain to the post-termination billing practices of Attorney Brigham involving claims in both state and bankruptcy court that guardian ad litem fees constitute child support and are therefore not dischargeable in Ms. Skipp's bankruptcy: paragraphs 44, 56, 67, 77-84, inclusive; paragraphs 88-90, inclusive, paragraphs 92-96, inclusive, paragraphs 115, 117 and 128-129, inclusive; the body of paragraph 140, except for the second and third sentences and the second paragraph 140a. At the present time, these paragraphs are not presented in an orderly or logical manner. Therefore, the court orders the plaintiff, Ms. Skipp, to draft an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this memorandum of decision. This amended complaint shall not include any of the factual material contained in the paragraphs that the court has, above, ordered to be removed from the complaint. This amended complaint may use allegations taken from the paragraphs referred to in this opinion that the court has not ordered to be redacted. The amended complaint may also include background material necessary to attempt to plead legally cognizable causes of action, such as that contained in existing paragraphs 68, 69 and 71. The amended complaint must comport with the Practice Book requirements set forth above; it must be a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies. If it asserts more than one theory of recovery, it must divide the amended complaint into causes of action, each set forth in a separate count. The amended complaint must avoid irrelevant, immaterial and impertinent allegations, claims made on behalf of persons who are not before the court, allegations against persons who are not defendants, legal arguments, evidence and bald conclusions. Failure to file the amended complaint according to the parameters set forth above and within the time period set forth above may result in the court issuing appropriate sanctions issued after conducting a hearing thereupon.
SO ORDERED.