To prove a conspiracy between private parties and the state under § 1983, the plaintiff must show a joint participation, agreement, or “meeting of the minds” to violate constitutional rights. See Six v. Henry, 42 F.3d 582, 585 (10th Cir.1994). There must be sufficient evidence of a conspiracy to prevent the jury from “engag[ing] in sheer speculation and conjecture.”

We have explained that "intra-government dissemination [of a defamatory statement], by itself, falls short of the Supreme Court's notion of publication." Asbill v. Hous. Auth. of Choctaw Nation of Okla., 726 F.2d 1499, 1503 (10th Cir. 1984); see also Six v. Henry, 42 F.3d 582, 586 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that "even if . . . [the defendant] had made a negative statement to other . . . government office personnel as to any plaintiff," no publication occurred); Lollis v. City of Eufaula, 249 F. Appx. 20, 25 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) ("There is no evidence that the Defendants caused the . . . statements or the reprimand to be published outside the Police Department or City Council, as is required to establish his claim."). Ms. Reams's statements were made at a closed-door, executive session of the WyDOT Commission.

Mr. Rinehart cites to a handful of cases to support his position. See Jantzen v. Hawkins, 188 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1999); Six v. Henry, 42 F.3d 582 (10th Cir. 1994); Busey v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of the County of Shawnee, Kan., 277 F.Supp.2d 1095 (D.Kan. 2003); Sims v. Bd. of Pub. Util. of Kan. City, Civ. A. No. 89-2328-0, 1991 WL 49792 (D.Kan. Mar.28, 1991) (unpublished opinion). His reliance is entirely misplaced.

Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976); see also Six v. Henry, 42 F.3d 582, 585 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding no publication where there was no “public pronouncement” of stigmatizing information). But “intra-government dissemination, by itself, falls short of the Supreme Court's notion of publication.

Moreover, Trejo fails to present evidence, or even argue, that these accusations were published by some form of "public pronouncement." See Six v. Henry, 42 F.3d 582, 585 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding that because the statements at issue were not made in any public pronouncement, statements made to other governmental office personnel fell short of publication). The undisputed facts show that Trejo has not asserted a protected liberty interest.

Over the years, the Tenth Circuit has applied the intra-government dissemination principle a number of times in mostly unpublished opinions. See Ellison v. Roosevelt County, 700 F. App'x 823, 832 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished); Sky Harbor Air Serv., Inc. v. Reams, 491 F. App'x 875, 886-87 (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublished); Lollis v. City of Eufaula, 249 F. App'x 20, 25 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished); McCarty v. City of Bartlesville, 8 F. App'x 867, 874 (10th Cir. 2001) (unpublished); Custodio v. Parker, 65 F.3d 178 at *4 (10th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision); Six v. Henry, 42 F.3d 582, 586 (10th Cir. 1994); Harris v. Blake, 798 F.2d 419, 422 n.2 (10th Cir. 1986). The Tenth Circuit has recently recognized, however, that it has not "precisely defined the scope of intra-government disseminations."

There must be sufficient evidence of a conspiracy to prevent a factfinder from "engag[ing] in sheer speculation and conjecture." Six v. Henry , 42 F.3d 582, 585 (10th Cir. 1994). Thus, a plaintiff fails to state a claim for conspiracy absent specific facts showing a "meeting of the minds" among the alleged co-conspirators.

See, e.g., Hudson Dep. 36:8-12; Def. Hooten's Mot. Ex. 9 (Doc. No. 42-9); Lambert Dep. 11:3-12:6, 13:17-16:10, 19:4-15 (Doc. No. 42-5). Defendant Hooten also has presented evidence that "at least as many" employees who had participated in Caudill's campaign "were retained as were discharged" during the relevant time period. Six v. Henry, 42 F.3d 582, 584-85 (10th Cir. 1994); see Def. Hooten's Mot. Undisputed Facts at pp. 13-14, ¶¶ 43-50; Pl.'s Resp. to Def. Hooten's Facts at pp. 9-10, ¶¶ 43-50. In short, "[t]o withstand summary judgment . . . , an employee must produce evidence linking the employer's action to the employee's speech."

However, in the remaining cases, the Tenth Circuit applied the "intra-government dissemination" label to dissemination that occurred between separate government agencies—one the plaintiff's employer, the other not—engaged in different functions. SeeMcCarty, 8 Fed.Appx. at 874 ; Six v. Henry, 42 F.3d 582, 586 (10th Cir.1994). As applied in those cases, "intra government" is less a term of art and more literally construed to cover communication between public agencies regardless of their specific relationship to plaintiff's former employer.

"Tenth Circuit caselaw on stigma-plus claims generally arises out of employment-law cases." Bell v. Bd. of Educ., No. CIV 06-1137 JB/ACT, 2008 WL 4104118, at *17 (D.N.M. May 6, 2008)(Browning, J.)(citing Six v. Henry, 42 F.3d 582, 585 (10th Cir. 1994); Corbitt v. Andersen, 778 F.2d 1471, 1474-75 (10th Cir. 1985)). To satisfy a liberty-interest claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: