Opinion
No. CIV 01-1418 LFG/DJS
July 11, 2002
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File His First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Damages [Doc. 18]. A response and reply have been filed. This matter may be decided on the briefs; oral argument is not necessary. For the reasons given below, the motion will be denied.
This case was filed in New Mexico state court on November 20, 2001. It was removed to this court by Defendants on December 19, 2001 [Doc. 1]. The original complaint alleged that the defendant insurance companies wrongfully terminated disability payments to Plaintiff David Sipp ("Sipp"). He included in his complaint three causes of action for breach of contract, as well as claims for unfair insurance practices, negligent misrepresentation, and malicious behavior justifying punitive damages. He sought a judgment reinstating his monthly disability benefits, and damages for past benefits wrongfully denied, emotional pain and suffering, and reduced standard of living, plus punitive damage and attorney fees. He now seeks permission of the Court to amend his complaint.
In their Provisional Discovery Plan [Doc. 7], filed in this case on January 28, 2002, the parties agreed that Plaintiff would be allowed until April 11, 2002 to amend his complaint. The Initial Pretrial Report [Doc. 10] contains no deadline for filing amendments to the parties' pleadings; however, the Court finds that the motion to amend is, nevertheless, untimely under the general principles of Rule 15, Fed.R.Civ.P.
That rule provides that a complaint may be amended once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served, and that any later pleadings may be filed only with leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party. The rule goes on to state that "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires."
As the Tenth Circuit notes, "[t]he liberal granting of motions for leave to amend reflects the basic policy that pleadings should enable a claim to be heard on its merits," citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230 (1962); however, the court goes on to add that "[t]his policy is not limitless." Calderon v. Kan. Dep't of Soc. and Rehab. Servs., 181 F.3d 1180, 1186 (10th Cir. 1999).
While leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires," Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), parties seeking the benefit of the rule's liberality have an obligation to exercise due diligence; unseemly delay, in combination with other factors, may warrant denial of a suggested amendment . . . A party's belated attempt to revise its pleadings requires that a court examine the totality of the circumstances and exercise sound discretion in light of the pertinent balance of equitable considerations. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp. v. Garrity Oil Co., 884 F.2d 1510,1517 (1st Cir. 1989). Factors guiding the court in the exercise of its discretion include tardiness; whether the facts sought to be alleged in the proposed amended pleading were known to the pleader all along so that, although he had an opportunity to state the claim, he failed to do so; how much time remains in the discovery period; whether a great deal of discovery has already taken place without reference to the new theory of recovery; and whether the opposing party would be prejudiced by the amendment. Id., at 1517-18; State Distributors, Inc. v. Glenmore Distilleries Co., 738 F.2d 405, 416 (10th Cir. 1984).
"Most important," said the Quaker State court, is whether the moving party proffers a satisfactory explanation for its delay. The Tenth Circuit also cites this factor as important in informing the court's discretion on a motion to amend. See, Woolsey v. Marion Labs., Inc., 934 F.2d 1452, 1462 (10th Cir. 1991); Las Vegas Ice Cold Storage Co. v. Far West Bank, 893 F.2d 1182, 1185 (10th Cir. 1990). Although prejudice to the opposing party may be one ground justifying denial of leave to amend, it is not a necessary factor, and untimeliness alone may be a sufficient basis for denial. Woolsey, at 1462; Las Vegas Ice Cold Storage Co., at 1185.
The Court agrees with Defendants that the motion is untimely, that the information necessary to plead the new causes of action was known to Plaintiff at the time the original complaint was filed, that Plaintiff has offered no explanation for its delay in seeking this amendment, and that allowing this amendment would be prejudicial to Defendants.
Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint goes beyond a mere refinement of his original factual allegations, as he implies in his motion. He is attempting to add three new causes of action: a claim for bad faith in the claims handling process, a claim under the New Mexico Unfair Trade Practices Act, and a claim for repudiation of the contract. His new prayer for relief includes a demand for future benefits based on the repudiation claim, and a demand for treble damages under the Unfair Trade Practices Act.
The facts underlying these claims and demands, while they may have been more fully developed in the course of discovery, were known to Plaintiff at the time the complaint was filed.
He had the opportunity to include these claims in his original complaint but failed to do so, and he gives no justifiable reason for the delay. He failed to seek an amendment within the time the parties agreed in their proposed case management plan.
The discovery deadline expires on July 19, a mere 8 days away. Allowing the extension would inevitably require reopening discovery and essentially starting this case anew, and would significantly delay the final disposition. That would violate the Court's obligations to resolve the case within the time limits contemplated under the District's Expense and Delay Reduction Plan. Allowing the amendment at this late date, especially in the absence of any justification for the tardy request, is not in keeping with the two-pronged goals of the Civil Justice Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 471, et seq., that is, to reduce costs and to expedite the ultimate disposition of a case. Defendants would therefore be prejudiced if the amendment were allowed at this late date. The Court thus exercises its discretion in favor of denying leave to amend.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File His First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Damages [Doc. 18] is denied.