Opinion
C. A. No. 07C-10-109 (CHT).
Submitted: June 29, 2009.
Decided: December 11, 2009.
Roger D. Landon, Esquire of MURPHY LANDON, Wilmington, DE, Attorney for the Plaintiff.
David C. Malatesta, Jr., Esquire of KENT MCBRIDE, P.C., Wilmington, DE, Attorney for the Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR ADDITUR
Presently before the Court is the Plaintiff's motion for a new trial or in the alternative, additur, brought pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 59. That which follows is the Court's resolution of the issues so presented.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On October 11, 2007, the Plaintiff, Amanda L. Sinrod, initiated the instant litigation against the Defendant, James R. Murphy. It is based upon a collision between their two motor vehicles that took place on U. S. Route 13 in New Castle, Delaware and seeks compensation for injuries received by Ms. Sinrod that she suffered as a result therefrom. Trial of the underlying issues of negligence and the extent to which Ms. Sinrod was injured began before the Court and a jury on February 2, 2009. It ended seven days later, on February 24, 2009, when the jury rendered a verdict in favor of Ms. Sinrod and awarded her $87,500 in compensatory damages. However, because the jury found Ms. Sinrod was fifty percent (50%) comparatively negligent, the Court ultimately reduced her award to $43,750.
Ms. Sinrod subsequently filed the instant motion on March 3, 2009, seeking a new trial or in the alternative, additur. She alleged that the jury verdict was against the greater weight of the evidence presented. That evidence may be summarized as set forth below.
That same day, Ms. Sinrod also filed a motion for an award of costs associated with prosecuting the trial pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 5101.
It is uncontested that on February 19, 2007, Ms. Sinrod left the home of relatives in Middletown, Delaware to return to her residence in New Jersey. That night she was traveling north on U. S. Route 13, near Van Buren Avenue in New Castle County, Delaware. Ms. Sinrod, who was operating her jeep, was struck from behind by the tractor-tailor driven by Mr. Murphy proceeding in the same direction.
The accident was investigated by Trooper Stevens of the Delaware State Police who inspected the scene and interviewed the drivers of both vehicles along with at least two witnesses. Based upon that investigation, Trooper Stevens determined that the collision occurred because Mr. Murphy was following too closely behind Ms. Sinrod. As a result, Mr. Murphy was issued a citation for violating 21 Del. C. § 4123(b).
The Defendant did not contest the issuance of the citation. However, the record is unclear as to whether the Defendant plead guilty to the charge.
It is also undisputed that the force of the collision so damaged the Sinrod vehicle that she was not able to exit her vehicle. It is also not disputed that Ms. Sinrod remained so restricted for at least forty-five minutes following the collision before being extracted by emergency service personnel. Once freed, she was airlifted to Christiana Hospital where she was admitted and treated for the injuries she received.
Uncontroverted medical records revealed that she was treated for a partially torn rotator cuff, cervical strain/sprain, a herniated lumbar disc and a concussion accompanied by a swelling of the brain. Those records further reflected that general surgery to reduce that swelling along with cosmetic surgery to address the outward effects of the general surgery was performed during the course of her hospitalization. Lastly, there is an absence of any dispute that from the time of her injuries until the date trial began, Ms. Sinrod incurred a total of $24,985 in uncompensated expenses and missed three weeks of work.
The initial dispute at trial centered on why the tractor-trailer could not stop in time to avoid colliding with the Sinrod vehicle which had stopped because of congested traffic ahead of it. Both sides presented evidence in support of their respective positions. The jury apparently believed that what actually took place was somewhere in between when it determined that both were equally culpable.
Ms. Sinrod claimed that Mr. Murphy was following too closely and could not bring his vehicle to a stop when her lane of travel was halted. She indicated that she had been traveling in the lane where the collision took place for about ten seconds before the traffic ahead of her stopped. She estimates that the contact with the Murphy tractor-trailer occurred approximately two seconds later and that there was nothing that she could do to avoid the same.
Mr. Murphy presented a version that was substantially at odds with that proffered by Ms. Sinrod. He contended that Ms. Sinrod suddenly switched from the adjacent lane of travel into the lane that in which he was traveling. He did not see her until she engaged in that maneuver. When she did, Ms. Sinrod left an insufficient distance between the two vehicles so as to permit him to avoid the collision that ensued.
The extent to which Ms. Sinrod was injured was as hotly contested as the liability of the parties. In addition to the suffering that she suffered immediately following the accident, Ms. Sinrod presented evidence that she continues to suffer from, and will likely do so for the remainder of her life, Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome ("PTSD") generally and headaches in particular as well as the fear of being confined. She also claimed that because she continued to experience the effects of injuries suffered on February 19, 2007, she would continue to incur medically related expenses for the remainder of her life totaling between $372,000 and $474,000. This figure included a little over $400 per month or approximately $5,000 per year for medicines alone as well as the cost of future surgical and related procedures that she would need, at least according to her experts. There was no claim for lost wages.
Mr. Murphy did not contest the legitimacy of the past medical expenses claimed by Ms. Sinrod or that she suffered injury on the date of the accident. He did however, present or point to evidence that the swelling of her brain and related problems had been resolved three weeks later. And, Ms. Sinrod did not substantiate the need for future medical treatments from the records produced or the so-called expert testimony presented. Lastly, Mr. Murphy pointed out that Ms. Sinrod had not been treated by any healthcare providers for almost two years prior to the trial and that there was evidence that she had suffered injury to some of the afflicted areas in the past.
The Parties' Contentions
The Plaintiff
Ms. Sinrod contends that the jury's finding that she and Mr. Murphy were equally at fault was against the greater weight of the evidence. The witnesses and the investigation by Trooper Stevens, she argues, establishes that she changed lanes safely leaving enough space to allow Mr. Murphy to avoid colliding with her vehicle when her vehicle stopped for the traffic in front of her. The jury's evaluation of the nature and extent of the damages suffered was similarly misplaced given the evidence presented as to the multiple injuries inflicted and the physical, emotional and financial losses which resulted and/or are projected. In particular, Ms. Sinrod notes the fact that she was trapped in her car for almost an hour and had to be airlifted by helicopter to the hospital for emergency treatment for her injuries. She also directs the Court's attention to the severity of those injuries as well as their continuing impact upon her life, present and anticipated in the future.
Moreover, the projected future losses of at least $372,000 do not compensate for pain and suffering.
The Defendant
Mr. Murphy, as might be expected, argues that there is no basis to disturb the decision of the jury. He contends that the Court should honor the jury's finding. According to him, the jury's apportionment of liability and assessment of damages should not shock the conscience of the Court. Stated differently, when the Court considers the record established at trial, the jury's findings are consistent with the weight of the evidence.
More specifically, Mr. Murphy contends that the evidence as to liability was conflicting and supported the finding by the jury that both parties were equally negligent. As to the injuries suffered, Mr. Murphy notes that Ms. Sinrod had a preexisting shoulder injury and the injury to her head had been resolved within three weeks of the accident. He goes on to direct the Court's attention to the lack of any medical treatment for two years prior to trial and that the need for future medical treatment and/or medicines was at best speculative. The jury's view of the compensation due Ms. Sinrod in light of the extent of her culpability and the losses incurred, was appropriate.
DISCUSSION
In considering a motion for a new trial, the trial court begins with the presumption that the jury's verdict is correct. This presumption reflects the significant deference given to the jury in its role as fact-finder. A jury's verdict will only be set aside if it is found to be "against the great weight of the evidence." To be specific, the trial court cannot grant a new trial unless a review of all of the evidence reveals that "the evidence preponderates so heavily against the jury verdict that a reasonable jury could not have reached the result." Additur is appropriate when the award "is so grossly out of proportion to the injuries suffered as to shock the Court's conscience and sense of justice." With respect to additur, the Court will not reduce a jury award unless it is "so grossly excessive as to shock the Court's conscience and sense of justice;" and stated differently, the Court will not disturb the jury's verdict "unless the injustice of allowing the verdict to stand is clear."
Patterson v. Coffin, 854 A.2d 1158, 2004 WL 1656514, at *2 (Del. 2004).
Caldwell v. White, 2005 WL 1950902, at *3 (Del. Super., May 25, 2005).
Storey v. Camper, 401 A.2d 458, 465 (Del. 1979).
Id.
Hall v. Dorsey, 1998 WL 960774 (Del. Super., Nov. 5, 1998) (quoting Mills v. Telenczak, 345 A.2d 424, 426 (Del. 1975)).
Riegel v. Dastard, 272 A.2d 715, 717-718 (Del. 1970), (citing Bennett v. Barber, 79 A.2d 363 (Del. 1951)).
In viewing all the evidence in this case this Court cannot find the jury's verdict is against the great weight of the evidence on the issue of liability. The evidence supports the finding that both parties were equally negligent given the evidence presented. It is reasonable to conclude that Ms. Sinrod changed lanes suddenly and was forced to stop for traffic shortly thereafter. It is just as reasonable for the jury to find that Mr. Murphy did not see her vehicle until it was too late, but did not allow enough space between his vehicle and the one in front of him whenever it entered his lane given the traffic conditions existing at that stretch of Route 13. In sum, both were responsible as the jury determined.
It is with the jury's finding as to the compensation to be awarded prior to apportionment that causes a problem for at least three reasons.
First, Ms. Sinrod's vehicle was struck with such force by a much larger vehicle and was so damaged as a result that she was trapped inside it suffering from multiple injuries. It took an additional forty-five minutes after the collision until emergency service personnel could free her. During that period of time, she was fearful that an explosion and/or fire would take place and she would die. In addition, because of the initial severity of her injuries, Ms. Sinrod was airlifted by helicopter for treatment to a nearby hospital. Those injuries included, as noted above, substantial trauma to her neck and back, a concussion along with swelling of the brain required surgery and hospitalization for several days after the accident.
Second, the record reflects that Ms. Sinrod lost at least three weeks from work and incurred $24,985 in expenses that were not paid from other sources as of the date the instant trial began. Those expenses, she claimed she would continue to incur into the future. In addition, her testimony that from the date of the accident, she suffered from PTSD, headaches as well as the fear of being unable to get out of confined places. Moreover, she underwent cosmetic surgery to reduce the swelling in her brain, stands unrebutted. Also absent is any substantive response to the testimony from her experts as to the long term impact of those injuries.
Third, while the jury was free to accept or reject some or all of the expert testimony as to the future costs associated with the medical treatment Ms. Sinrod claimed would be necessary for the rest of her life, the amount of the verdict appears to bear no relationship to any of the damage evidence put before the jury. Even if one were to include the fact that Ms. Sinrod had not received professional treatment for her injuries for at least two years before the trial began, does not seem to recognize the initial severity and the extent of those injuries. Nor does it take into account the treatment rendered immediately in response or for the next 52.7 years.
Dr. Bandera and Dr. O'Brien at trial opined that the plaintiff suffered from injuries that would require permanent care for the rest of her life expectancy which statistically is 52.7 years.
In light of all the factors referenced above, it is readily apparent, at least to the Court, that the jury's award of $87,500 reduced by Ms. Sinrod's negligence to $43,750 preponderates so heavily against the evidence that a reasonable jury could not have reached such a result. Indeed, it is so disproportionate to the injuries Ms. Sinrod suffered as to shock the conscience of the Court as well as its sense of justice. The jury's verdict as to the compensatory damages to be assessed can not as a result, be allowed to stand.
It is the Court's decision that Ms. Sinrod is, as a result, entitled to a new trial as to the issue of damages unless Mr. Murphy agrees to accept additur in the amount $150,000, for a total award of $237,500. Ms. Sinrod would as a result, receive $118,750 once that amount is reduced by her negligence. That figure takes into account the severity of the collision and injuries initially sustained as well as ultimately suffered, the extent of the treatments in response up to the date trial began and that which might be needed in the future. It also reflects the amount of the otherwise uncompensated expenses incurred by Ms. Sinrod up to that same point in time and any such medical services likely to be incurred in the future.