Opinion
23 Civ. 701 (KPF)
03-10-2023
DWAYNE SINGLETON, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK CITY DISTRICT ATTORNEY ALVIN BRAGG; NEW YORK CITY; NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPT (MIDTOWN NORTH PRECINCT); POLICE OFFICER JOHN DOE and JOHN DOE POLICE OFFICER, Defendants.
ORDER OF SERVICE
KATHERINE POLK FAILLA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Dwayne Singleton (“Plaintiff”), who is currently incarcerated at the West Facility on Rikers Island, brings this pro se action asserting that the defendants have violated his federal constitutional rights, and he seeks damages. He sues: (i) New York County District Attorney Alvin Bragg; (ii) the City of New York; (iii) the New York City Department of Correction (“DOC”); (iv) the New York City Police Department's (“NYPD”) Midtown North Precinct; and (v) two unidentified “John Doe” police officers assigned to the NYPD's Midtown North Precinct. The Court construes Plaintiff's complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as claims under state law.
Plaintiff filed his complaint while he was held in the Vernon C. Bain Center, in the Bronx, New York.
By order dated March 9, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons discussed below, the Court dismisses all of Plaintiff's claims against the DOC and the NYPD's Midtown North Precinct, and dismisses Plaintiff's claims under Section 1983 against District Attorney Bragg. The Court also directs the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York to provide to Plaintiff and the Court the identities and badge numbers of the unidentified “John Doe” police-officer defendants, and directs service on the City of New York.
Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee, even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner's IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” afforded to pro se litigants, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits - to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Id. But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 679.
DISCUSSION
A. The Court Dismisses the Claims Against DOC and the NYPD's Midtown North Precinct
The Court must dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims against the DOC and the NYPD's Midtown North Precinct because subdivisions of the City of New York, such as the DOC and the NYPD's Midtown North Precinct, are not entities that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F.Supp.2d 385, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”).
The Court notes that, in addition to naming the DOC and the NYPD's Midtown North Precinct as defendants, Plaintiff has named the City of New York as a defendant. Thus, there is no need to add the City of New York as a defendant. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims against the DOC and the NYPD's Midtown North Precinct for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, without prejudice to Plaintiff's claims against the City of New York. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
B. The Court Dismisses the Federal Claims Against District Attorney Bragg
To the extent that Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against District Attorney Bragg, arising from his decision to criminally prosecute Plaintiff, or his actual prosecution of Plaintiff, the Court dismisses such claims under the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity. Under this doctrine, prosecutors are absolutely immune from civil suits for damages for acts committed within the scope of their official duties where the challenged activities are not investigative in nature but, rather, are “‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.'” Giraldo v. Kessler, 694 F.3d 161, 165 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)); see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993) (absolute immunity is analyzed under a “functional approach” that “looks to the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In addition, under this doctrine, prosecutors are absolutely immune from suit for acts that may be administrative obligations, but are “directly connected with the conduct of a trial.” Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 344 (2009); see also Ogunkoya v. Monaghan, 913 F.3d 64, 70-72 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that prosecutors' direction as to where a criminal defendant would be arraigned was in preparation for a court proceeding in which the prosecutors were acting as advocates, and they were therefore shielded by absolute immunity (citing, inter alia, Van de Kamp)). This doctrine has been held to protect a prosecutor from suit for his or her decision to advocate, and for his or her actual advocacy, with respect to a criminal defendant's access to a diversion program from prosecution. See Dantzig v. Cnty. of Westchester, No. 19 Civ. 8811 (NSR), 2021 WL 1030655, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2021); Sims v. Monaghan, No. 13 Civ. 6496 (FPG), 2015 WL 9307350, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2015).
Here, Plaintiff's claims against District Attorney Bragg are based on actions within the scope of Bragg's official duties and are associated with Bragg's decision to criminally prosecute Plaintiff, and with his actual criminal prosecution of Plaintiff, which appear to include Bragg's decision to advocate, and his actual advocacy, for the denial of Plaintiff's access to a diversion program from prosecution.
Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that Bragg has “lied [about Plaintiff] and denied [him] the right to be released to a program called cases which accepted” him. (ECF 2, at 7.) Plaintiff also alleges that because Bragg has “maliciously produced false charges [against him, he has been] denied [his] freedom.” (Id.)
Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims under Section 1983 against Bragg because such claims seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief, see § 1915(e)(2)(b)(iii), and, consequently, are frivolous, see § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i); Collazo v. Pagano, 656 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that a claim against prosecutor dismissed under the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity is frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
C. The Court Orders Corporation Counsel to Produce Information Regarding Unidentified “John Doe” Officer Defendants
Under Valentin v. Dinkins, a pro se litigant is entitled to assistance from the Court in identifying an unidentified defendant. 121 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1997). In the complaint, Plaintiff supplies sufficient information to permit the NYPD to identify the unidentified “John Doe” police-officer defendants. They are those members of the NYPD who, on or about March 20, 2022, were assigned to the NYPD's Midtown North Precinct, and who arrested Plaintiff on or about that date in the vicinity of the intersection of 54th Street and 12th Avenue, in New York, New York. It is therefore ordered that the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, who is the attorney for and agent of the NYPD, ascertain the identity and badge number of each of the unidentified “John Doe” police-officer defendants whom Plaintiff seeks to sue here, and the address where each of those defendants may be served. The Corporation Counsel must provide this information to Plaintiff and the Court within 60 days of the date of this order.
Within 30 days of receiving this information, Plaintiff must file an amended complaint naming the newly identified defendants. The amended complaint will replace, not supplement, the original complaint. An amended complaint form that Plaintiff should complete is attached to this order. Once Plaintiff has filed an amended complaint, the Court will screen the amended complaint and, if necessary, issue an order directing service on the newly identified defendants.
D. Service on the City of New York
Because Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed IFP, he is entitled to rely on the Court and the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service. Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d. 119, 123 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process . . . in [IFP] cases.”); Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(3) (the court must order the Marshals Service to serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed IFP).
Although Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally requires that a summons be served within 90 days of the date the complaint is filed, Plaintiff is proceeding IFP and could not have served a summons and the complaint until the Court reviewed the complaint and ordered that a summons be issued. The Court therefore extends the time to serve until 90 days after the date that a summons is issued.
To allow Plaintiff to effect service on the City of New York through the U.S. Marshals Service, the Clerk of Court is instructed to fill out a U.S. Marshals Service Process Receipt and Return form (“USM-285 form”) for the City of New York. The Clerk of Court is further instructed to issue a summons for the City of New York, and deliver to the Marshals Service all the paperwork necessary for the Marshals Service to effect service upon the City of New York.
If the complaint is not served on the City of New York within 90 days after the date the summons is issued, Plaintiff should request an extension of time for service. See Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that it is the plaintiff's responsibility to request an extension of time for service).
Plaintiff must notify the Court in writing if his address changes, and the Court may dismiss the action if Plaintiff fails to do so.
E. New York Legal Assistance Group
Plaintiff may consult the legal clinic opened in this judicial district to assist people who are parties in civil cases, but who do not have lawyers. The clinic is operated by a private organization called the New York Legal Assistance Group (“NYLAG”); it is not part of, or operated by, the court (and, among other things, therefore, it cannot accept filings on behalf of the court, which must still be filed by a pro se party in the court's Pro Se Intake Unit).
To receive limited-scope assistance from the clinic, Plaintiff may mail a signed retainer and intake form to the NYLAG Pro Se Clinic at 40 Foley Square, LL22, New York, New York 10007. Once the paperwork is received, the clinic will coordinate contact with the litigant. Once received, it may take up to two weeks for the clinic to contact the litigant. Copies of the clinic's flyer, retainer, and intake form are attached to this order.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons detailed above, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims against the DOC and the NYPD's Midtown North Precinct for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, and dismisses Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against District Attorney Bragg for seeking monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief and as frivolous.
The Court directs the Clerk of Court to:
(i) Mail an information package to Plaintiff's address of record;
(ii) Issue a summons for the City of New York; complete a USM-285 form with the address for the City of New York; and deliver all documents necessary to effect service on the City of New York to the U.S. Marshals Service; and
(iii) Mail a copy of this order and the complaint to the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, at 100 Church Street, New York, New York 10007.
An amended complaint form is attached to this order. A flyer, retainer, and intake form from NYLAG are also attached to this order.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.