Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0638-13T3
03-24-2015
CLAUDETTE SINGLETON, Appellant, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and 5105 NORTH PARK DRIVE OPERATIONS t/a COOPER RIVER CENTER Respondents.
Claudette Singleton, appellant, argued the cause pro se. Arupa Barua, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent Board of Review (John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ms. Barua, on the brief). Respondent 5105 North Park Drive Operations t/a Cooper River Center has not filed a brief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Fisher and Manahan. On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 427,285. Claudette Singleton, appellant, argued the cause pro se. Arupa Barua, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent Board of Review (John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ms. Barua, on the brief). Respondent 5105 North Park Drive Operations t/a Cooper River Center has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
In this appeal, Claudette Singleton argues that the board of review's final decision, which disqualified her from receiving unemployment benefits, was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. Because the board determined, on the basis of findings made by the appeal tribunal after hearing testimony, that it was not reasonable for appellant to voluntarily terminate her employment for the reasons she asserted, we affirm.
As explained in the appeal tribunal decision, appellant was employed by 5101 North Park Drive Operations as a licensed practical nurse from January 2008 to March 2012 when she went out on disability. Her physician released her to return to work on April 24, 2013, but by that time appellant had already resigned. As she testified, appellant resigned because of numerous conflicts with her employer; she claimed entitlement to fifty or sixty cents more per hour than the employer was willing to pay and believed an unreasonable work assignment — of passing medication to sixty patients — was imposed on her. Appellant also complained about the manner in which her paycheck was delivered — a circumstance remedied after a discussion with her employer in 2009. And she testified about verbal altercations with a coworker and the employer's alleged inadequate handling of her request for a transfer. She acknowledged, however, that she was not aware of any threat of termination from her employment at the time she resigned.
The appeal tribunal found, as expressed in a written decision, that the "myriad" reasons given by appellant for her resignation did not represent "good cause attributable to [the] work" as to entitle her to unemployment benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). The appeal tribunal found that the issues raised by appellant existed
as far back as the first month she started working for the company in January 2008[,] [and if] the issues [had] been [] unresolvable the claimant would not have continued to work for the employer. The claimant contends the issues were brought to the employer[']s attention on several occasions but nothing was done to resolve the issues. The contention is rejected. It is the opinion of this Tribunal that although the employer did take steps to resolve the claimant's issues it was not to the claimant's satisfaction and she did not get the result she expected. Ultimately no evidence has been provided to substantiate that the conditions of the work were so severe to cause her to leave available work and join the rank of the unemployed. Additionally, had the claimant returned to work after her disability ended she may have found the changes that she was seeking.The board adopted the appeal tribunal's findings and conclusions.
Appellant argues in a single point that she should not have been disqualified from receiving benefits because she
RESIGNED FROM THE EMPLOYER DUE TO UNRESOLVABLE UNION, EMPLOYER, AND EMPLOYEE CONFLICT ATTRIBUTABLE TO WORK. THE CONFLICT INCLUDES AN UNRESOLVABLE WAGE ISSUE.We find insufficient merit in this argument to warrant further discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(A), (E). We add only the following brief comments.
At oral argument, appellant expressed a desire to present evidence outside the record. We did not permit this but advised appellant that we would withhold our decision on this appeal pending her filing of a motion to supplement no later than February 17, 2015. In addition, although permitted to orally argue for thirty minutes, appellant argued she required additional time, claiming she understood Rule 2:11-1(b)(3) permitted thirty minutes "per argument" and she had seven arguments to make. We rejected this and terminated appellant's argument after thirty minutes, but we also suggested that she could move for that relief as well. Appellant's motion on these points has been received; her arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion. We add only that Rule 2:11-1(b)(3) allows each party "a maximum of . . . 30 minutes in the Appellate Division, but the court may terminate the argument at any time it deems the issues adequately argued." Appellant was provided the maximum thirty minutes. Her contention that a party is permitted thirty minutes per argument is incongruous with a plain reading of the Rule; moreover, appellant's brief contains only one point and, therefore, does not even provide a basis for the erroneous standard she now urges. The motion is denied in all respects.
It has long been recognized that in scrutinizing an employee's reason for resigning, "the test is one of ordinary common sense and prudence" and "[m]ere dissatisfaction with working conditions which are not shown to be abnormal or do not affect health, does not constitute good cause for leaving work voluntarily." Domenico v. Board of Review, 192 N.J. Super. 284, 288 (App. Div. 1983). The resignation "must be compelled by real, substantial and reasonable circumstances not imaginary, trifling and whimsical ones." Ibid.
This legal principle poses a fact-sensitive question which the appeal tribunal resolved after hearing appellant present her testimony and her reasons for resigning. Because there is factual support for the appeal tribunal's findings, which the board adopted, and because the dispute fell well within the agency's expertise, the applicable standard of appellate review counsels against our intervention. Brady v. Board of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997).
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION