Opinion
Civil Action No. 16-cv-06423 (JBS-AMD)
03-16-2017
CLARENCE SINGLETARY, Plaintiff, v. CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL, Defendant.
APPEARANCES Clarence Singletary, Plaintiff Pro Se 919 Collings Avenue, Unit B Collingswood, NJ 08107
OPINION
APPEARANCES Clarence Singletary, Plaintiff Pro Se
919 Collings Avenue, Unit B
Collingswood, NJ 08107 SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
1. Plaintiff Clarence Singletary seeks to bring a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden County Jail ("CCJ") and certain unidentified correctional officers of CCJ ("the Officers") for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Complaint, Docket Entry 1. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that the Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice in part and dismissed without prejudice in part.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires courts to review complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. Courts must sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
3. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will: (1) dismiss the Complaint with prejudice as to claims made against CCJ; and (2) dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
CLAIMS AGAINST CCJ
4. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. In order to set forth a prima facie case under § 1983, a plaintiff must show: "(1) a person deprived him of a federal right; and (2) the person who deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law." Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)).
Section 1983 provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
5. Generally, for purposes of actions under § 1983, "[t]he term 'persons' includes local and state officers acting under color of state law." Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991)). To say that a person was "acting under color of state law" means that the defendant in a § 1983 action "exercised power [that the defendant] possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer [was] clothed with the authority of state law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (citation omitted). Generally, then, "a public employee acts under color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law." Id. at 50.
"Person" is not strictly limited to individuals who are state and local government employees, however. For example, municipalities and other local government units, such as counties, also are considered "persons" for purposes of § 1983. See Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
6. Because the Complaint has not sufficiently alleged that a "person" deprived Plaintiff of a federal right, the Complaint does not meet the standards necessary to set forth a prima facie case under § 1983. In the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from CCJ for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The CCJ, however, is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983; therefore, the claims against it must be dismissed with prejudice. See Crawford v. McMillian, 660 F. App'x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2016) ("[T]he prison is not an entity subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.") (citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973)); Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538-39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is not a "person" under § 1983). Given that the claims against the CCJ must be dismissed with prejudice, the claims may not proceed and Plaintiff may not name the CCJ as a defendant.
7. Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint to name a person or persons who were personally involved in the alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement, however. To that end, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.
CLAIMS OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT
IN RELATION TO ALLEGED PRISON OVERCROWDING
8. Second, for the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim of allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement in relation to purported overcrowding, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
9. The present Complaint does not allege sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that a constitutional violation has occurred in order to survive this Court's review under § 1915. Even accepting the statements in Plaintiff's Complaint as true for screening purposes only, there is not enough factual support for the Court to infer a constitutional violation has occurred.
10. To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim, the Complaint must allege "sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). "[A] pleading that offers 'labels or conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally construed, "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
"The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)." Samuels v. Health Dep't, No. 16-1289, 2017 WL 26884, slip op. at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2017) (citing Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App'x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012)); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App'x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States, 287 F. App'x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
11. With respect to the alleged facts giving rise to Plaintiff's claims, the Complaint states: "I was put in to a two man room with 4 people and I slept on the floor near the toilet." Complaint § III(C).
12. Plaintiff does not identify the date(s) or time(s) of these alleged events. Id. § III(B) (blank).
13. Plaintiff contends that he suffered a "bad back" from these events. Id. § IV.
14. With respect to requested relief, Plaintiff seeks $4,000 for "mental anguish[,] depression[,] foot fung[u]s from the shower[,] [and] bad back from sleeping on the floor." Id. § V.
15. Even construing the Complaint as seeking to bring a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged prison overcrowding, any such purported claims must be dismissed because the Complaint does not set forth sufficient factual support for the Court to infer that a constitutional violation has occurred.
16. The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348-50 (1981) (holding double-celling by itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill, 488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) ("[M]ere double-bunking does not constitute punishment, because there is no 'one man, one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.'" (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542 (1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis requires courts to consider whether the totality of the conditions "cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned to them."). Some relevant factors are the length of the confinement(s), whether plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or convicted prisoner, any specific individuals who were involved in creating or failing to remedy the conditions of confinement, any other relevant facts regarding the conditions of confinement, etc.
17. Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint to particularly identify adverse conditions that were caused by specific state actors, that caused Plaintiff to endure genuine privations and hardship over an extended period of time, and that were excessive in relation to their purposes. To that end, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.
The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to service. --------
18. Plaintiff is further advised that any amended complaint must plead specific facts regarding the conditions of confinement. In the event Plaintiff files an amended complaint, Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that a constitutional violation has occurred in order to survive this Court's review under § 1915.
19. Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id. The amended complaint may not adopt or repeat claims that have been dismissed with prejudice by the Court.
20. Therefore, given that the Complaint does not set forth sufficient factual support for the Court to infer that a constitutional violation has occurred in relation to purported overcrowding, it must be dismissed without prejudice as to claims made against the Officers because the Complaint does "[not] allege[] any personal involvement by [the Officers] in any constitutional violation - a fatal flaw [in] a § 1983 suit." Baker v. Flagg, 439 F. App'x 82, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). "'Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.' Thus, [plaintiff] failed to state a claim against [the individual defendants]." Bob v. Kuo, 387 F. App'x 134, 136 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). In other words, Plaintiff's Complaint does not allege any personal involvement by the Officers in the purported overcrowding.
CLAIMS OF DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE MEDICAL CARE
21. Finally, the Court will dismiss without prejudice the Plaintiff's allegations of denial of the right to adequate medical care.
22. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to pretrial detainees' claims of inadequate medical care. Bocchino v. City of Atlantic City, 179 F. Supp.3d 387, 403 (D.N.J. 2016).
23. "[T]he Fourteenth Amendment in this context incorporates the protections of the Eighth Amendment" (Holder v. Merline, No. 05-1024, 2005 WL 1522130, at *3 (D.N.J. June 27, 2005) (citing Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1067 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 985 (1992)), and most cases have stated that, at a minimum, the Eighth Amendment's "deliberate indifference" standard will suffice. In other words, "substantive due process rights are violated only when 'the behavior of the governmental officer is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the conscience.'" Callaway v. New Jersey State Police Troop A, No. 12-5477, 2015 WL 1202533, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar, 17, 2015) (citing Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-47, n.8 (1998)). See also Jacobs v. Cumberland County Dep't of Corr., No. 09-0133, 2010 WL 5141717, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 2010) ("When executive action is at issue, a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process may be shown by conduct that 'shocks the conscience'") (citing A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne County Juvenile Detention Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 579 (3d Cir.2004)).
24. Applying this principle in the context of a claim for violation of the right to adequate medical care, a pretrial detainee must allege the following two elements to set forth a cognizable cause of action: (1) a serious medical need; and (2) behavior on the part of prison officials that constitutes deliberate indifference to that need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).
25. To satisfy the first prong of the Estelle inquiry, an inmate must demonstrate that his medical needs are serious. The Third Circuit has defined a serious medical need as: (1) "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment"; (2) "one that is so obvious that a lay person would recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention"; or (3) one for which "the denial of treatment would result in the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" or "a life-long handicap or permanent loss." Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 272-73 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted). When evaluating this first element under Estelle, courts consider such factors as "the severity of the medical problems, the potential for harm if the medical care is denied or delayed and whether any such harm actually resulted from the lack of medical attention." Maldonado v. Terhune, 28 F. Supp.2d 284, 289 (D.N.J. 1998).
26. The second element of the Estelle test is subjective and "requires an inmate to show that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical need." Holder, 2005 WL 1522130, at *4 (citing Natale, 318 F.3d at 582) (finding deliberate indifference requires proof that the official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety). Conduct that constitutes negligence does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference; rather, deliberate indifference is a "reckless disregard of a known risk of harm." Holder, 2005 WL 1522130, at *4 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994)). "Furthermore, a prisoner's subjective dissatisfaction with his medical care does not in itself indicate deliberate indifference." Holder, 2005 WL 152213, at *4 (citing Andrews v. Camden County, 95 F. Supp.2d 217, 228 (D.N.J. 2000)). Courts have found deliberate indifference "in situations where there was 'objective evidence that [a] plaintiff had serious need for medical care,' and prison officials ignored that evidence[,] Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 815 n.14 (3d Cir. 2000)[,] [and] in situations where 'necessary medical treatment is delayed for non-medical reasons.' Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987)." Natale, 318 F.3d at 582.
27. Here, Plaintiff's contention is that "the officers would not let me go to medical two [sic] get my diabetic medicin[e]s[.]" Complaint § III(C). This bare allegation is insufficient, without more, to establish a Fourteenth Amendment inadequate medical care claim.
28. First, the Complaint sets forth no facts establishing the Estelle test's "serious condition" element. The Complaint is silent with respect to facts relevant to establishing this point, such as: the nature of Plaintiff's diabetic condition; the type(s) of medication purportedly denied to him; the length of the alleged delay in administering medication to Plaintiff for his condition; and the severity of the reactions, if any, that he suffered from deprivation of or delay in receiving medication on his claimed dosing schedule. (The foregoing examples are merely illustrative but not exhaustive or exclusive.) In short, Plaintiff has not alleged that he has ever actually been diagnosed with a diabetic condition, that his purported diabetic condition is so obvious that a lay person would recognize the necessity for medication, or that the Officers' delay or denial of medication resulted in the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or a permanent loss to Plaintiff. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not satisfied Estelle's first element for a claim of denial of medical care under the Fourteenth Amendment.
29. Second, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting deliberate indifference by the Officers to satisfy the subjective prong under Estelle.
30. For example, Plaintiff sets forth no allegations as to whether the officers deliberately delayed or purposely prevented him from receiving medical treatment without justification (such as good-faith effort by the Officers to maintain or restore order) or with the intent to punish Plaintiff. The severity of Plaintiff's alleged medical condition, the potential for harm to Plaintiff from such condition if medical care was denied or delayed, and whether any such harm actually resulted from the alleged lack of medical care are also unclear from Plaintiff's allegations. The Complaint is silent as well with respect to whether the Officers knew that Plaintiff claimed to be diabetic or whether his need for medication was obvious. See, e.g., Mattern v. City of Sea Isle, 131 F. Supp.3d 305, 316 (D.N.J. 2015) (citing Nicini, 212 F.3d at 815 n.14) ("[T]he Third Circuit has found deliberate indifference in situations where there was 'objective evidence that [a] plaintiff had serious need for medical care,' and prison officials ignored that evidence"). Furthermore, the Complaint does not set forth any contentions that describe how individual officers were personally involved and deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.
31. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action for inadequate medical care while incarcerated at CCJ. His claims of denial of the right to adequate medical care will be dismissed without prejudice, with leave to amend the Complaint within 30 days of the date of this order to meet the pleading deficiencies noted above, if Plaintiff elects to pursue this claim.
CONCLUSION
32. For the reasons stated above, the Complaint: (a) is dismissed with prejudice as to claims against CCJ; (b) is dismissed without prejudice as to claims of allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement; and (c) is dismissed without prejudice as to claims of denial of the right to adequate medical care.
33. An appropriate order follows.
March 16 , 2017
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge