Opinion
868 EDA 2023 J-S31017-23
01-16-2024
POONAM SINGHAL Appellant v. MARTIN BERG AND WALTER DAVIS
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered February 6, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No: 200601327
BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM
STABILE, J.
Appellant, Poonam Singhal, appeals in this landlord-tenant action from an order denying her post-trial motions following a non-jury decision denying her action for unpaid rent against Appellees Martin Berg and Walter Davis. The trial court properly found against Appellant and denied her post-trial motions, because the evidence demonstrated that Appellant failed to obtain a valid rental license and therefore, was not permitted to collect rent from Appellees. Accordingly, we affirm.
Appellant commenced this action via complaint in July 2020 and subsequently filed three amended complaints. The third amended complaint alleged that Appellant owns a property at 1417 West Erie Avenue in Philadelphia ("the property"), and that on May 14, 2019, Appellees entered a written agreement to lease the property. The third amended complaint alleged that Appellees failed to pay rent from December 2019 to June 2020, thus subjecting them to liability in the amount of $51,149.48 for unpaid rent plus lates fees and maintenance costs. Appellees filed an answer to the third amended complaint with new matter and a counterclaim.
None of the issues in this appeal relate to Appellees' counterclaim, so we do not discuss it further.
On February 6, 2023, the case proceeded to a non-jury trial. Appellees asserted during trial that (1) the rental property was residential, (2) Appellant failed to obtain a certificate of rental suitability for this property, and therefore (3) Appellant was not entitled to collect rent or seek damages for unpaid rent. At the conclusion of trial, the court entered a decision in favor of Appellees on Appellant's claim and in favor of Appellant on Appellees' counterclaim. Appellant filed post-trial motions, which the court denied, and a timely appeal to this Court. Without ordering Appellant to file a statement of matters complained of on appeal, the trial court filed an opinion which stated that the decision against Appellant should stand because her rental license was suspended during the time period in which Appellees failed to pay rent, thus precluding Appellant from obtaining rent under relevant provisions of the Philadelphia Code ("the Code").
Appellant raises the following issues in this appeal:
1. Should the court find the lease between the owner and for-profit management company, where they did not reside, as a commercial lease?
2. Is a commercial lessee responsible for maintenance issues for their residential lessees?
3. Whether a commercial lessee is entitled to get the security refunded if they did not pay rent for 4 months, did not pay for utilities, did not return the property broom clean or free of human inhabitants brought by them and after agreeing to forgo the security deposit in lieu of duty to remove trash and their tenants left behind, without returning their security deposits?Appellant's Brief at 11-12.
Appellant's pro se brief boils down to the argument that she had a commercial lease with Appellees instead of a residential lease, and therefore the property was not subject to the Code provisions that the trial court cited in support of its decision. We disagree. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code, it is irrelevant whether the lease was "commercial" or "residential". The Code provides that owners of "rooming houses" cannot collect rent unless they obtain a Certificate of Rental Suitability. The evidence demonstrates that the property is a rooming house, but Appellant failed to obtain a Certificate of Rental Suitability for the property. Consequently, the trial court properly determined that Appellant had no right to collect rent from Appellees.
In appeals from non-jury decisions, this Court's scope and standard of review is well-settled:
Our appellate role in cases arising from non-jury trial verdicts is to determine whether the findings of the trial court are supported by competent evidence and whether the trial court committed error in any application of the law. The findings of fact of the trial judge must be given the same weight and effect on appeal as the verdict of a jury. We consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict winner. We will reverse the trial court only if its findings of fact are not supported by competent evidence in the record or if its findings are premised on an error of law. However, where the issue concerns a question of law, our scope of review is plenary.
The trial court's conclusions of law on appeal originating from a non-jury trial are not binding on an appellate court because it is the appellate court's duty to determine if the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts of the case.Bank of New York Mellon v. Bach, 159 A.3d 16, 19 (Pa. Super. 2017).
Viewed in the light most favorable to Appellees, the verdict winners, the evidence demonstrates that the trial court's decision was correct. The evidence shows that on May 1, 2019, Appellees entered into a written agreement with Appellant to lease the property. Appellant testified, "The building is eleven bedrooms and one kitchen. The building is not eleven apartments." N.T., 2/6/23, at 41. The lease agreement provided that the building space was to be used as a group home. This language, the trial court stated, "indicates that the property was to be used as one unit." Trial. Ct. Op., 3/24/23, at 3.
Appellees intended to use the property to run an alcohol treatment center for homeless persons. N.T., 2/6/23, at 83 (testimony of Appellee Berg). Due to the condition of the property and the repairs necessary to make it habitable, Appellees were unable to obtain approval from the Pennsylvania Alliance of Recovery Residences to use it as a treatment center. Appellees contacted the Licenses and Inspections Department ("L & I"), which cited Appellant for multiple code violations relating to the property at the time of the rental to Appellees, including failure to have a fire certification, failure to have a license to run the property as a rooming house, open junction electrical boxes, open and leaking plumbing, hanging outlets with open wires, open switches, no fire or smoke detectors, and leaking ceilings. Id. at 24-26, 85-86; exhibit P-10. The main electrical wire leading from the breaker box into the house was fried or burnt. N.T., 2/6/23, at 40.
In addition, as Appellant acknowledged, there was no heat for much of the property. Id. at 54-55.
Because of these code violations, Appellant was unable to secure a valid Certificate of Rental Suitability. Instead, on August 20, 2019, over three months after the Lease was executed, Appellant was only able to obtain a "Limited Certificate of Rental Suitability" which provided, "This Certificate is NOT VALID for any units identified herein as having uncorrected violations or which are affected by uncorrected violation. The rental of any of the rental units identified in the violations below or of any rental units affected by the common area violations below is prohibited by law." Exhibit P-10. The violations noted on the Limited Certificate of Rental Suitability included failure to have annual test records and certifications of all fire alarm systems and failure to obtain a Housing Inspection License from L & I. Id. Appellant never obtained an unqualified rental license during the entire period of unpaid rent (December 2019 through June 2020). Trial Ct. Op. at 4 ("[Appellant] was unable to produce . . . a valid rental license for the lease period in question").
The Code provides "[t]he owner of any dwelling unit, multiple family dwelling, rooming house, dormitory, hotel, one-family dwelling, two-family dwelling, or rooming unit let for occupancy must obtain a rental license." Phila. Code § 9-3902(1)(a). The Code further provides that "[t]he owner of any property for which a rental license is required shall, at the inception of each tenancy, provide the tenant a Certificate of Rental Suitability that was issued by the Department no more than sixty days prior to the inception of the tenancy." Phila. Code § 9-3903(1)(a).
The Code defines "rooming house" as "[a] building containing rooming units arranged or occupied for lodging, with or without meals, and not occupied as a one-family dwelling or a two-family dwelling." Phila. Code § 9-3901(5)(n). The Code defines "rooming unit" as "[a]ny room or group of rooms which together form a single habitable unit occupied or intended to be occupied by an individual or family for sleeping or living, but not for cooking purposes." Phila. Code § 9-3901(5)(o).
Section 9-3901(4)(e) of the Code provides that "[a]ny owner who fails to obtain a rental license as required by Section 9-3902, or comply with Section 9-3903 regarding a Certificate of Rental Suitability, or whose rental license has been suspended, shall be denied the right to recover possession of the premises or to collect rent during or for the period of noncompliance or during or for the period of license suspension." This Court has construed Section 9-3901(4)(e) to preclude property owners who fail to comply with § 9-902 or § 9-3903 from obtaining either unpaid rent or possession of the leasehold premises. Frempong v. Richardson, 209 A.3d 1001, 1010 (Pa. Super. 2019).
The evidence demonstrates that the property had eleven "rooming units," that is, eleven "room[s] or group of rooms which together form a single habitable unit occupied or intended to be occupied by an individual or family for sleeping or living, but not for cooking purposes." Phila. Code § 9-3901(5)(o). The same evidence demonstrates that the property is a rooming house under the Code, i.e., "[a] building containing rooming units arranged or occupied for lodging, with or without meals, and not occupied as a one-family dwelling or a two-family dwelling." Phila. Code § 9-3901(5)(n).
Since the property was a rooming house, Appellant was required to obtain a Certificate of Rental Suitability in order to rent the property to other persons. The evidence shows that Appellant was only able to procure a Limited Certificate of Rental Suitability that prohibited rental of rooming units affected by the violations listed in the Limited Certificate. In effect, the Limited Certificate prohibited rental of all rooming units, because the violations listed on the Limited Certificate-failure to have annual test records and certifications of all fire alarm systems and failure to obtain a Housing Inspection License from L & I-affected the entire property. Since Appellant lacked certification to rent any rooming unit in the property, the trial court properly found that Section 9-3901(4)(e) of the Code defeated Appellant's action against Appellees for unpaid rent.
Appellant contends that the Code provisions do not apply to her because the lease was a commercial lease instead of a residential lease. The question whether the lease was "commercial" or "residential" is irrelevant under the Code. What is relevant is that the Code prohibits lessors of rooming houses, such as Appellant, from obtaining rent when they fail to procure a Certificate of Rental Suitability. Here, as discussed above, the Limited Certificate that Appellant obtained did not authorize her to rent any of the rooming units in the property. As a result, her action against Appellees ran aground under the Code.
Since we affirm the trial court on this basis, we need not discuss the other grounds posited by Appellees for affirming the trial court's decision, including the alleged deficiencies in Appellant's brief, Appellant's alleged failure to provide a City of Philadelphia Partners For Good Housing Handbook to Appellees, and Appellant's alleged breach of the implied warranty of habitability.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.