Authority over the “internal management” of the court is not the equivalent of authority over any judicial decision that affects case flow. Cf. Brutley v. Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 20, 23 (Ky.1998) (“The Chief Judge, being this Court's delegate, has considerable discretion in administrative decisions, however no other District Judge has the authority to ‘bind the hands' of another District Judge by issuing any order which limits the discretionary ruling of another judge.”); Sims v. Ryan, 125 N.M. 357, 961 P.2d 782, 784 (1998) (Where a local ordinance gave the “Presiding Judge” authority to establish judicial polices, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that “[a]lthough judicial policymaking authority allows a Presiding Judge to set schedules, make rules of court, assign duties, and generally administratively run the court, the Presiding Judge may not strip a duly elected judge of the inherent powers associated with the position, including the power to sentence.”); State ex rel. Skinner v. Dostert, 166 W.Va. 743, 278 S.E.2d 624, 634–35 (1981) (Concluding that the circuit court's “general supervisory control” over a magistrate court allowed the circuit court to “exercise the administrative powers necessary to ‘secure the convenient and expeditious transaction of ... business[,]’ ” but did not “confer upon the circuit court the power to interfere with the judicial function of the magistrate or to control judicial discretion in any particular case before the magistrate.”).

Authority over the "internal management" of the court is not the equivalent of authority over any judicial decision that affects case flow. Cf. Brutley v. Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 20, 23 (Ky. 1998) ("The Chief Judge, being this Court's delegate, has considerable discretion in administrative decisions, however no other District Judge has the authority to 'bind the hands' of another District Judge by issuing any order which limits the discretionary ruling of another judge."); Sims v. Ryan, 961 P.2d 782, 784 (N.M. 1998) (Where a local ordinance gave the "Presiding Judge" authority to establish judicial polices, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that "[a]lthough judicial policymaking authority allows a Presiding Judge to set schedules, make rules of court, assign duties, and generally administratively run the court, the Presiding Judge may not strip a duly elected judge of the inherent powers associated with the position, including the power to sentence."); State ex. rel. Skinner v. Dostert, 278 S.E.2d 624, 634-35 (W. Va. 1981) (Concluding that the circuit court's "general supervisory control" over a magistrate court allowed the circuit court to "exercise the administrative powers necessary to 'secure the convenient and expeditious transaction of . . . business[,]'" but did not "confer upon the circuit court the power to interfere with the judicial function of the magistrate or to control judicial discretion in any particular case before the magistrate.").

Authority over the "internal management" of the court is not the equivalent of authority over any judicial decision that affects case flow. Cf. Brutley v. Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 20, 23 (Ky. 1998) ("The Chief Judge, being this Court's delegate, has considerable discretion in administrative decisions, however no other District Judge has the authority to 'bind the hands' of another District Judge by issuing any order which limits the discretionary ruling of another judge."); Sims v. Ryan, 961 P.2d 782, 784 (N.M. 1998) (Where a local ordinance gave the "Presiding Judge" authority to establish judicial polices, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that "[a]lthough judicial policymaking authority allows a Presiding Judge to set schedules, make rules of court, assign duties, and generally administratively run the court, the Presiding Judge may not strip a duly elected judge of the inherent powers associated with the position, including the power to sentence."); State ex. rel. Skinner v. Dostert, 278 S.E.2d 624, 634-35 (W. Va. 1981) (Concluding that the circuit court's "general supervisory control" over a magistrate court allowed the circuit court to "exercise the administrative powers necessary to 'secure the convenient and expeditious transaction of . . . business[,]'" but did not "confer upon the circuit court the power to interfere with the judicial function of the magistrate or to control judicial discretion in any particular case before the magistrate.").

State v. Riordan, 2009-NMSC-022, ¶ 6, 146 N.M. 281, 209 P.3d 773. {34} Defendant relies on Sims v. Ryan, 1998-NMSC-019, ¶ 9, 125 N.M. 357, 961 P.2d 782, for the proposition that "[g]enerally, an unusual or exigent circumstance must exist for a different judge to impose a sentence[,]" and that he is entitled to either resentencing by the trial judge or a record regarding the basis for the trial judge's recusal because neither the trial nor sentencing judge made findings about unusual or exigent circumstances. However, Sims involved the original judge's sentencing of a defendant after the defendant pleaded guilty to DWI, followed by the municipal court's presiding judge voiding the original judge's sentence because the original judge did not adhere to the presiding judge's unwritten policy for DWI offenses.

Additionally, the authorities Defendant does cite in support of his position are inapplicable because they all relate to the standard of review when a court sits as an appellate court in review of proceedings from a court of record. See State v. Candelaria, 2008–NMCA–120, ¶¶ 10, 12, 144 N.M. 797, 192 P.3d 792 (reviewing proceedings of record from the metropolitan court in the district court); see also Sims v. Ryan, 1998–NMSC–019, ¶ 4, 125 N.M. 357, 961 P.2d 782 (reviewing the discretionary act of the district court); Rest. Mgmt. Co. v. Kidde–Fenwal, Inc., 1999–NMCA–101, ¶¶ 1, 8, 127 N.M. 708, 986 P.2d 504 (reviewing a district court's decision). In this case, however, the district court is not being asked to review a matter of record.

Additionally, the authorities Defendant does cite in support of his position are inapplicable because they all relate to the standard of review when a court sits as an appellate court in review of proceedings from a court of record. See State v. Candelaria, 2008-NMCA-120, ¶¶ 10, 12, 144 N.M. 797, 192 P.3d 792 (reviewing proceedings of record from the metropolitan court in the district court); see also Sims v. Ryan, 1998-NMSC-019, ¶ 4, 125 N.M. 357, 961 P.2d 782 (reviewing the discretionary act of the district court); Rest. Mgmt. Co. v. Kidde-Fenwal, Inc., 1999-NMCA-101, ¶¶ 1, 8, 127 N.M. 708, 986 P.2d 504 (reviewing a district court's decision). In this case, however, the district court is not being asked to review a matter of record.

N.M. Const. art. VI, § 13 ("The district courts, or any judge thereof, shall have power to issue writs . . . provided, that no such writs shall issue directed to judges or courts of equal or superior jurisdiction."); Sims v. Ryan, 1998-NMSC-019, ¶ 6, 125 N.M. 357, 961 P.2d 782 (stating that a presiding judge "may not infringe on [another] judge's inherent power"). It is axiomatic that a party may not do indirectly that which the law does not permit directly.

However, because each judge has inherent power to control his or her own courtroom, then it follows that when judges of the same judicial district hold coordinate positions, one judge cannot infringe on another judge's power to control his or her own courtroom. See Sims v. Ryan, 1998-NMSC-019, ¶ 6, 125 N.M. 357, 961 P.2d 782 (stating a presiding judge may not infringe on another district judge's inherent power). Cf. Miller v. City of Albuquerque, 88 N.M. 324, 327-28, 540 P.2d 254, 257-58, (Ct.App. 1975) (stating that although a judge of concurrent jurisdiction may enter subsequent interlocutory orders in a case in which another judge had entered orders, one judge's actions cannot infringe upon the power of the second judge to act).