Opinion
2:23-cv-00768-VBF-PD
02-16-2024
Carlton Mario Sims v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, et al
Present: The Honorable: Patricia Donahue, U.S. Magistrate Judge
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Proceedings: (In Chambers) Order Dismissing First Amended Complaint with Leave to Amend
On August 3, 2023, Plaintiff Carlton Mario Sims (“Plaintiff”), who is confined at California State Prison-Los Angeles County and proceeding pro se, filed a First Amended Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Health Care Department Chief S. Gates (“Gates”). [Dkt. No. 8 at 3.] Plaintiff alleges that he received inadequate medical treatment after contracting COVID-19. [Id. at 4-5.]
The Court has screened the First Amended Complaint and finds it subject to dismissal without prejudice. Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to file a Second Amended Complaint, as set forth below.
Magistrate judges may dismiss a complaint with leave to amend without approval of the district judge. See McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).
A. Standard of Review
The Court is required to screen pro se complaints brought by prisoners and dismiss claims that, among other things, are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)- (b)(1). In determining whether a complaint states a claim, the Court accepts as true the factual allegations and views all inferences in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892-93 (9th Cir. 2011). The Court does not, however, “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) as amended on denial of reh'g, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court construes the first amended complaint liberally. Barrett v. Belleque, 544 F.3d 1060, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
B. Plaintiff's Factual Allegations and Claims Plaintiff sues Defendant Health Care Chief Gates in his individual capacity for “defacto non fact or semblance regarding civil rights under federal law & CDCR medical protocol.” [Dkt. No. 8 at 3.] Plaintiff alleges that he contracted COVID-19 from another inmate and was forcibly housed in Building C5 115 to quarantine at CSP-LAC. [Id. at 4.] He alleges that his living conditions make it difficult for him to stay healthy. [Id.] He alleges that he did not receive adequate follow-up care and treatment such as pain medicine, exercise yard, electrocardiograph, nose swabs, and vaccinations. [Id.] He further alleges that he has not received a chest x-ray and that he still suffers from the effects of COVID-19. [Id.] Plaintiff seeks $20,000 in damages for the pain and suffering he has endured. [Id. at 5.]
C. Discussion
1. Rule 8
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that a complaint contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, at a minimum, a complaint must allege factual allegations to provide “fair notice” of both the particular claim being asserted and “the grounds upon which [the particular claim] rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 & n.3 (2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted). If a complaint does not clearly and concisely set forth factual allegations sufficient to provide defendants with notice of which defendant is being sued, on which theory, and what relief is being sought against them, the complaint fails to comply with Rule 8. See, e.g., McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 1996) (a complaint must make clear “who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with enough detail to guide discovery”); Exmundo v. Kane, 553 Fed.Appx. 742, 743 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming district court dismissal of Section 1983 claims where plaintiff's allegations “were unclear as to the timing and nature of [the defendant's] actions”).
Here, the First Amended Complaint violates Rule 8 because it fails to clearly identify for what conduct he is suing Defendant Gates, and on what legal grounds. There are no specific factual allegations against Gates. Accordingly, because Gates would have difficulty understanding the nature of the claims against him, the First Amended Complaint fails to comply with Rule 8 and must be dismissed with leave to amend.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims
To establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a defendant, while acting under color of state law, caused a deprivation of the plaintiff's federal rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Liability under § 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the meaning of § 1983, ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.'” Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict' constitutional harms.” Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743).
There is no vicarious liability under § 1983. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Hence, a government official - whether subordinate or supervisor - may be held liable under § 1983 only when his or her own actions have caused a constitutional deprivation. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Allegations regarding § 1983 causation “must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). Thus, to state a viable Section 1983 claim against a public official in his individual capacity, a plaintiff must plead that each defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution. See Hines v. Youseff, 914 F.3d 1218, 1228 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he inmates must show that each defendant personally played a role in violating the Constitution. An official is liable under § 1983 only if ‘culpable action, or inaction, is directly attributed to them.' ” (footnotes omitted)).
The First Amended Complaint states that Plaintiff contracted COVID-19 from another inmate and was forcibly housed in Building C5 115 to quarantine. [Dkt. No. 8 at 4.] He further alleges that he did not receive adequate follow-up care and treatment. [Id.] The First Amended Complaint does not provide any factual allegations to put Gates on notice of his acts or omissions that allegedly caused Plaintiff's constitutional injuries. Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating specific conduct by Gates that he contends proximately caused a constitutional violation. Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Thus, as currently pled, the First Amended Complaint does not state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Gates.
3. Cruel and Unusual Punishment in Violation of the Eighth Amendment
To succeed on his Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff must show both objective and subjective deliberate indifference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 846 (1994). To satisfy the objective prong, Plaintiff must show an “objectively intolerable risk of harm.” Id. at 842. The Ninth Circuit has established a four-part test to determine objective deliberate indifference based on exposure to dangerous conditions, as follows:
(i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved-making the consequences of the defendant's conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries.Gordon v. Cty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018).
To show subjective deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must show that Defendants “knew [] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Estate of Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Here, Plaintiff fails to allege that Gates had any knowledge of any risk to Plaintiff's health and safety and failed to adequately respond.
4. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Care
To state a deliberate indifference to medical care claim under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must allege that he suffered from a serious medical need and that officials were deliberately indifferent to it. See Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). A “serious medical need” is one that will cause significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain if not treated. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Deliberate indifference “may appear when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.” Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). A medical care provider, however, is liable for denying a prisoner needed medical care only if the provider “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The conduct must be purposeful and substantial; negligence, inadvertence, or differences in medical judgment or opinion do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-07. Based on this standard, the First Amended Complaint falls short. Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts demonstrating deliberate indifference by Gates.
ORDER
For these reasons, the First Amended Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend.
If Plaintiff intends to pursue this matter, he shall file a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) by February 6, 2024.
Plaintiff is advised that a SAC would entirely replace the First Amended Complaint in this action. Any amended complaint must:
(a) be labeled “Second Amended Complaint;”
(b) be complete in and of itself and not refer in any manner to prior complaints, i.e., it must include all of the claims on which Plaintiff seeks to proceed, Local Rule 15-2;
(c) contain a “short plain” statement of the claim(s) for relief, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a);
(d) make each allegation “simple, concise and direct,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d)(1);
(e) make allegations in numbered paragraphs, “each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(b); and
(f) set forth clearly the sequence of events (including specific relevant dates) which allegedly gives rise to the claim(s) for relief, including what each defendant did and how each specific defendant's conduct injured plaintiff.
If, given the contents of this Order, Plaintiff elects not to proceed in this action, he may expedite matters by signing and returning the attached Notice of Dismissal by February 6, 2024, which will result in the voluntary dismissal of this action without prejudice.
Plaintiff is cautioned that, absent further order of the Court, his failure to timely file a Second Amended Complaint or Notice of Dismissal may result in the dismissal of this action with or without prejudice on the grounds above or for failure to diligently prosecute.
Finally, the Clerk is directed to provide a Central District of California Civil Rights Complaint Form, CV-66, to Plaintiff to facilitate his filing of a Second Amended Complaint if he elects to proceed in that fashion.