Opinion
Civil Action No. 2:19-02245-RMG-MGB
01-16-2020
Keith Simpson, Plaintiff, v. South Carolina Department of Corrections; Warden Joseph McFadden, individually and/or in his official capacity as warden of Lieber Correctional Institution; Correctional Officer Dennis, individually and/or in his official capacity as an employee of Lieber Correctional Institution; Correctional Officer Kelly, individually and/or in his official capacity as an employee of Lieber Correctional Institution; Correctional Officer McKie, individually and/or in his official capacity as an employee of Lieber Correctional Institution, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This action has been filed by Plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the South Carolina Tort Claims Act ("SCTCA"), S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10 et seq. (Dkt. No. 2.) Currently before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 50.) Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., this matter has been assigned to the undersigned for all pretrial proceedings. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends the Court grant the Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 50) and dismiss the § 1983 claims brought against Defendants. The undersigned further recommends that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims and remand those claims to state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
This action was severed from Bartlett et al v. South Carolina Department of Corrections et al., 2:17-cv-03031-RMG-MGB, on August 9, 2019. (Dkt. No. 1.)
BACKGROUND
This civil action arises from an alleged inmate-on-inmate attack that occurred at Lieber Correctional Institution ("Lieber"), wherein Plaintiff Keith Simpson was attacked in his room by "several inmates." (Dkt. No. 2 at 12.) Plaintiff, a diabetic, alleges he was assaulted on May 7, 2016, after he returned to his dorm from medical for an insulin shot. (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Correctional Officer Dennis walked by Plaintiff's room "and did not lock his door." (Id.) Shortly thereafter, "several inmates with towels wrapped around their heads entered into his room and began beating him with sticks and stabbing him with shanks; the attack lasted approximately 15 to 20 minutes." (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he stayed in his room "all night even through count and no correctional officer helped him even though there was blood all over the room." (Id.) According to Plaintiff, he was eventually taken to the Medical University of South Carolina after "medical came to his room to give him the insulin and found him all bloody." (Id.) Simpson suffered a nasal bone fracture and laceration from the assault. (Id.)
According to Plaintiff, "Lieber Correctional Institution. . . has a long history of violence among inmates housed in the institution and many times the violence is encouraged and/or condoned by the Defendants as the perpetrators are not punished . . . ." (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed "to keep weapons out of the hands of inmates housed at Ridgeland [sic] Correctional Institution." (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that "Lieber Correctional Institution and other SCDC institutions are severely understaffed due to the failure to hire sufficient officers and due to a large number of turnovers." (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that Lieber allows "inmates from one wing into another wing," thereby permitting "inmates who are suppose[d] to be kept apart to be together, [which] facilitate[es] fights and stabbings." (Id. at 9.) According to Plaintiff, these practices by Lieber violate SCDC's policies and procedures. (Id. at 8-9.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants "acted in a negligent, grossly negligent, reckless, willful, wanton, and with a deliberate indifferent manner in causing injury to the Plaintiffs" by, inter alia, "allowing uncontrolled violence in the correctional institution, . . . failing to provide protection and security for the Plaintiff, [and] . . . in failing to discipline its correctional officers for violations of SCDC policies and procedures." (Id. at 16.) Specific to Plaintiff, the Complaint alleges four causes of action for: (1) injunctive relief pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 15-43-30 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) deliberate indifference against Warden McFadden "and any named Defendant correctional officers" pursuant to § 1983; (3) failure to implement appropriate policies, customs, and practices against Warden McFadden pursuant to § 1983; and (4) violation of the South Carolina Tort Claims Act ("SCTCA") against SCDC, Warden McFadden, "and any named Defendant correctional officers." (Id. at 15-21.)
The Complaint also references claims under § 1983 for violation of the "Fifth Seventh, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution." (Dkt. No. 2 at 1.) Because Plaintiff concedes to the dismissal of these claims, see infra, the undersigned does not consider them further.
On October 7, 2019, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 50). Plaintiff filed a response in opposition on October 21, 2019, stating he "agrees to withdraw" all of his § 1983 claims except for his § 1983 claim against Defendant SCDC for injunctive relief. (Dkt. No. 55 at 9.) Defendants filed a reply brief on October 28, 2019. (Dkt. No. 58.) Defendants' motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment "shall" be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "Facts are 'material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a 'genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." The News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, "'the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor.'" Id. (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)); see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
DISCUSSION
As noted, Plaintiff's response brief states that he withdraws all of his § 1983 claims except for his § 1983 claim against Defendant SCDC for injunctive relief. (Dkt. No. 55 at 9.) Thus, the only claims remaining are Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against Defendant SCDC for injunctive relief and Plaintiff's cause of action for violation of the SCTCA against Defendants SCDC, Warden McFadden, and "any named Defendant correctional officers." (Dkt. No. 2.) Defendants assert, inter alia, that Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against SCDC is barred under the Eleventh Amendment. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 4-6, 22.) Plaintiff responds that SCDC waived sovereign immunity by voluntarily removing this action to federal court, and the Eleventh Amendment only "shields a state entity from suit in federal court for the recovery of monetary damages." (Dkt. No. 55 at 10.) He further asserts that the Court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims because "this Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims." (Id. at 11.)
The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from entertaining an action against a state. See, e.g., Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam) (citations omitted); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1890). Further, Eleventh Amendment immunity "extends to 'arm[s] of the State,' including state agencies and state officers acting in their official capacity," Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted), because "a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office . . . [and] is no different from a suit against the State itself," Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (internal citation omitted). "As a state agency, SCDC is an arm of the State of South Carolina." Abebe v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 0:09-cv-3111-MBS-PJ, 2010 WL 2991595, at *2 (D.S.C. July 2, 2010), adopted in part, 2010 WL 3258595 (D.S.C. Aug. 16, 2010). "As such, the Eleventh Amendment protects SCDC from suit whether money damages or injunctive relief is sought." Id. (citing Alabama, 438 U.S. at 782).
As employees of SCDC, Defendants Dennis, Kelly, and McKie are also entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as to any claims brought against them in their official capacities. See, e.g., Rhoden v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 4:17-cv-2537-HMH-TER, 2017 WL 9288217, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 4, 2017) (finding claims against prison warden in his official capacity should be dismissed because warden is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity), adopted by, 2017 WL 5494126 (D.S.C. Nov. 16, 2017), amended, 2017 WL 6032341 (D.S.C. Dec. 6, 2017); Edwards v. Patell, No. 4:06-cv-0748-HFF-TER, 2007 WL 2428548, at *8 (D.S.C. Aug. 21, 2007) (dismissing claims brought against defendant "employee of SCDC" in his official capacity).
Plaintiff's assertion that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar federal claims against SCDC for injunctive relief is without merit. Plaintiff offers no authority for this assertion, and precedent demonstrates Plaintiff is incorrect. In the landmark Supreme Court decision, Ex parte Young, the Court held that, although prohibited from giving orders directly to a State, federal courts could enjoin state officials in their official capacities. 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908). "The Ex Parte Young exception is directed at 'officers of the state [who] are clothed with some duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws of the state, and who threaten and are about to commence proceedings'" to enforce an unconstitutional act against affected parties. McBurney v. Cuccinelli, II, 616 F.3d 393, 399 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 155-56). "Thus, to correctly plead such a claim, the proper State official must be included as a defendant by name and identified in the body of the complaint with a specific unconstitutional policy, custom, or practice." Smith v. City of Huntington, No. 3:17-cv-03806, 2017 WL 5180456, at *3 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 28, 2017), adopted sub nom. Smith v. City of Huntignton, 2017 WL 5180437 (S.D.W. Va. Nov. 8, 2017); see also Woods v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:18-cv-00834-MGL-KDW, 2019 WL 1995136, at *6 (D.S.C. Apr. 18, 2019) (finding that a "claim for prospective injunctive relief permitted by Ex Parte Young . . . would be brought against state officers or agency employees in their official capacities"), adopted by, 2019 WL 1995511 (D.S.C. May 6, 2019). In other words, as a state agency, SCDC retains its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, regardless of the type of relief sought. For this reason, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against SCDC for injunctive relief be dismissed based on sovereign immunity.
With the dismissal of this § 1983 claim, only Plaintiff's state law claims remain. Here, Plaintiff is correct that because Defendants voluntarily removed this case to federal court, they have waived their immunity from suit in this Court with respect to any claims on which they would otherwise have been subject to suit in state court. Lapides v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 535 U.S. 613, 619 (2002) ("A State's voluntary appearance in federal court waives sovereign immunity for claims where a state has consented to suit in its own courts for such claims); see also Cameron v. Cox, No. 10-1278, 2011 WL 1235308, at * 4 (D.S.C. Jan. 21, 2011), adopted by, 2011 WL 1212177 (D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2011). Through enactment of the SCTCA, South Carolina has generally consented to suit for tort claims filed against it in state court. Briggs v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, No. 13-cv-1348, 2014 WL 1278173 at *21 (Mar. 27, 2014). Therefore, Defendants are subject to suit in this Court for the state law claims asserted against them.
This voluntary removal has not waived Defendants' immunity to any § 1983 claims, however. See Passaro v. Virginia, 935 F.3d 243, 247 (4th Cir. 2019) (rejecting argument that the Commonwealth waived its sovereign immunity to a Title I claim by removing case to federal court); Stewart v. North Carolina, 393 F.3d 484 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that where a state retains its sovereign immunity from suit in state court, it does not lose that immunity by removing the case to federal court).
However, because there are no federal claims remaining, the undersigned recommends the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims. As noted by the Fourth Circuit, "once a district court has dismissed the federal claims in an action, it maintains 'wide discretion' to dismiss the supplemental state law claims over which it properly has supplemental jurisdiction." Yashenko v. Harrah's NC Casino Co., 446 F.3d 541, 553 n. 4 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 353-54 (1988)). A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) if . . . (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C § 1367(c)(3)-(4). When determining whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, a district court must consider "convenience and fairness to the parties, the existence of any underlying issues of federal policy, comity, and considerations of judicial economy." Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350 n.7).
Here, the undersigned is unable to find that the parties would be inconvenienced or unfairly prejudiced by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims, nor does the undersigned find there to be any underlying issues of federal policy involved in Plaintiff's state law claims. The comity factor and considerations of judicial economy weigh in favor of declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. For these reasons, the Court should decline to retain jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law cause of action. See, e,g., Missouri v. Spivey, Case No. 4:13-cv-01326-RMG, 2014 WL 4349151, at *4 (D.S.C. Aug. 29, 2014) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims where summary judgment was granted on the plaintiff's federal claims); Johnson v. Ozmint, No. 9:08-cv-0431-PMD-BM, 2009 WL 252152, at *6 (D.S.C. Feb. 2, 2009) (dismissing federal claims and noting, "With respect to these remaining state law causes of action, when federal claims presented in a case which has been removed to federal court from state court are dismissed, the case should be remanded to state court for resolution of any remaining state law claims . . . ."). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's state law claims be remanded to Dorchester County.
Given that these recommendations are dispositive of the case, the undersigned does not address the parties' remaining arguments.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED. (Dkt. No. 50.) Specifically, the undersigned recommends that summary judgment should be granted as to Plaintiff's federal claims and those claims should be dismissed. The undersigned further recommends the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims and remand those claims to Dorchester County.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED. January 16, 2020
Charleston, South Carolina
/s/_________
MARY GORDON BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).