Opinion
Civil Action 1:20-CV-1108
08-27-2021
ANTHONY D. SIMONETTI, Plaintiff v. CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON, Defendant
BRANN, C.J.
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
William I. Arbuckle, U.S. Magistrate Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2020, state inmate Anthony Simonetti (“Plaintiff”) initiated this, as well as several other, pro se civil rights cases related to pending DUI charges in Dauphin County against a law enforcement officer, a prosecutor, and two witnesses. Two of those cases were consolidated under the above-captioned case number. Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. Despite being granted multiple opportunities to file a comprehensive amended complaint, Plaintiff has failed to do so. Furthermore, based on a review of Plaintiff's Complaints in both cases, and various supplemental pleadings, Plaintiff has failed to plead any plausible claim. Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that:
(1) Plaintiff's federal claims against all individuals named in the captions of the Complaint and Supplements be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii);
(2) The Court DECLINE to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims against all individuals named in the Complaint and Supplements;
(3) Defendant Robinson's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 15) be DENIED as MOOT; and
(4) The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to CLOSE this CASE.
II. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 26, 2019, Plaintiff was charged with the following offenses: (1) DUI: Controlled Substance - Impaired Ability - 1st Offense; (2) Driving While BAC .02 or Greater While License Suspended; (3) Disregard Traffic Lane (Single); (4) Give False Information; (5) DUI: Controlled Substance - Schedule 1 - 1st Offense; and (6) DUI: Controlled Substance - Metabolite - 1st Offense. Commonwealth v. Simonetti, No. MJ-12201-CR-0000912-2019 (Magis. Ct. Dauphin Cty.). Plaintiff waived his preliminary hearing, and the case was bound over to the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas. Id.
Ruling on Motions to dismiss, the court generally relies only on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). Therefore I take judicial notice of the state court criminal dockets, and the federal civil dockets associated with this civil case.
The Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas docket lists Jared R. Troutman as the arresting officer, and Christopher J. Robinson as the Assistant District Attorney assigned to Plaintiff's state court criminal case. Commonwealth v. Simonetti, No. CP-22-CR-0004815-2019 (C.C.P. Dauphin Cty). The charges listed on the MDJ docket were changed to the following: (1) DUI: Controlled Substance - Impaired Ability - 4th & Subsequent Offense; (2) DUI: Controlled Substance - Schedule I - 4th & Subsequent Offense; (3) DUI Controlled Substance - Metabolite - 4th and Subsequent Offense; (4) Give False Information; (5) Disregard Traffic Lane (Single); and (6) Driving While BAC .02 or Greater While License Suspended. Id. On June 17, 2021, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to the three DUI counts. Id. All other charges were withdrawn. Id. On July 15, 2021, Plaintiff was sentenced. Nothing on the State court docket suggests that Plaintiff has appealed the conviction.
On June 29, 2020, while Plaintiff's criminal charges were still pending, the Court received three civil complaints filed by Plaintiff. The first Complaint- which initiated this case-names Christopher J. Robinson as a Defendant, and involves claims arising from the Dauphin County criminal charges. (Doc. 1). The second Complaint named the arresting officer (Jared A. Troutman) as a Defendant, and also involved claims arising from the Dauphin County criminal charges. Complaint, Simonetti v. Troutman, No. 1:20-CV-1109 (M.D. Pa.), ECF No. 1 (hereinafter “MDPA Simonetti II”).
For clarity, I will cite to this case, Simonetti v. Robinson, 1:20-CV-1108 (M.D. Pa.), as “MDPA Simonetti I”.
The Third Complaint named the Dauphin County Office of the Public Defender, and Eric Allen Doyle as Defendants and also relates to the state DUI charges. Complaint, Simonetti v. Dauphin Cty Office of the Public Defender, No. 1:20-CV-1095 (M.D. Pa.), ECF No. 1 (hereinafter “MDPA Simonetti III”). On August 31, 2020, this case was dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
Each case was directly assigned to a different Magistrate Judge.
The difficulties of managing three overlapping cases arising out of the same DUI arrest were compounded by Plaintiff's practice of filing a single document “supplementing” his initial Complaints simultaneously to multiple dockets. For that reason, in December 2020, the Court consolidated the two remaining open cases to resolve Plaintiff's claims more efficiently.
For the benefit of the Court and the parties, and because it is relevant to the resolution of this case, I will provide a detailed summary of the procedural history of all three federal civil cases initiated by Plaintiff on June 29, 2020.
A. SIMONETTI V. DAUPHIN COUNTY OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER, 1:20-CV-1095 (M.D. PA.) (“MDPA SIMONETTI III”)
On June 29, 2020, the Court received and lodged Plaintiff's Complaint. MDPA Simonetti III at Doc. 1. Along with his Complaint, Plaintiff filed a Motion requesting leave to proceed in forma pauperis. MDPA Simonetti III at Doc. 2. Plaintiff was incarcerated at the time. Id. (stating that Plaintiff was being held at Dauphin County Prison). An application to proceed in forma pauperis by an incarcerated person needs to include an authorization to debit funds from his or her institutional account as specified by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2), and requires a certification of the prisoner's institutional account balance. Plaintiff's Motion did not include that information. This case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Saporito.
On July 14, 2020, the Court issued a 30-Day Administrative Order directing Plaintiff to complete the correct form to proceed in forma pauperis. MDPA Simonetti III at Doc. 4.
On August 3, 2020, Plaintiff submitted an untitled document that listed three docket numbers at the top: 1:20-CV-1108, 1:20-CV-1109, and 1:20-CV-1095. MDPA Simonetti III at Doc. 5. This document was docketed in two of the three civil cases as a “Proposed Amended Complaint.” Id; MDPA Simonetti II at Doc. 7. In the third case it was docketed as a “Second Supplement.” MDPA Simontetti I at Doc. 7. In this document, Plaintiff appears to assert claims against two new parties not named in any of the other civil cases (Andrew Scott Hodecker and Jacob Nicholas Shindel).
Also on August 3, 2020, Plaintiff filed a corrected Motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis. MDPA Simonetti III at Doc. 6.
On August 6, 2020, Magistrate Judge Saporito issued two orders and Report & Recommendation in this case. First, Magistrate Judge Saporito issued an Order granting Plaintiff's Motions requesting leave to proceed in forma pauperis. MDPA Simonetti III at Doc. 8. Second, he issued an Order construing the “Proposed Amended Complaint” as a Motion to Amend, and denying that Motion. MDPA Simonetti III at Doc. 9. Third, he issued a Report & Recommendation, in which he recommended that Plaintiff's Original Complaint be dismissed. MDPA Simonetti III at Doc. 10.
Objections to Magistrate Judge Saporito's Report were due on August 24, 2020. On August 31, 2020, U.S. District Judge Wilson issued an Order adopting Magistrate Judge Saporito's Report & Recommendation and the case was closed. MDPA Simonetti III at Doc. 11.
On September 3, 2020, the Court received a document addressed to Magistrate Judge Saporito that was docketed as a letter. MDPA Simonetti III at Doc. 12. U.S. District Judge Wilson construed that document as untimely objections to Magistrate Judge Saporito's Report & Recommendation. MDPA Simonetti III at Doc. 13. Those objections were deemed untimely. Id.
B. SIMONETTI V. TROUTMAN, 1:20-CV-1109 (M.D. PA.) (“MDPA SIMONETTI II”)
On June 29, 2020, the Court received and lodged Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendant Troutman. MDPA Simonetti II at Doc. 1. The Complaint is written on a form titled “Complaint for a Civil Case.” Id. Along with that Complaint, Plaintiff filed a Motion requesting leave to proceed in forma pauperis. MDPA Simonetti II at Doc. 2. Plaintiff was incarcerated at the time. Id. (stating that Plaintiff was incarcerated at Dauphin County Prison). An application to proceed in forma pauperis by an incarcerated person needs to include an authorization to debit funds from his or her institutional account as specified by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2), and requires a certification of the prisoner's institutional account balance. Plaintiff's Motion did not include that information. This case was initially assigned to Magistrate Judge Mehalchick.
On July 14, 2020, Plaintiff paid the $5.00 filing fee appropriate in Habeas Petitions. On July 15, 2020, the Court issued a 30-Day Administrative Order directing Plaintiff to complete the correct form to proceed in forma pauperis. MDPA Simonetti II at Doc. 4. It also issued an Order refunding the $5.00 filing fee that was paid in error. MDPA Simonetti II at Doc. 5.
On July 30, 2020, Plaintiff filed a document that was docketed as a “Supplement” to his Complaint. MDPA Simonetti II at Doc. 6. Plaintiff listed two case numbers at the top: 1:20-CV-1109 and 1:20-CV-1108. Id. This document was docketed to both of those civil cases. Id.; see also MDPA Simonetti I at Doc. 5.
On August 3, 2020, Plaintiff submitted an untitled document that listed three docket numbers at the top: 1:20-CV-1108, 1:20-CV-1109, and 1:20-CV-1095. MDPA Simonetti II at Doc. 7. This document was docketed in two of the three cases (including this one) as a “Proposed Amended Complaint.” Id.; see also MDPA Simonetti III at Doc. 5. In the third case it was docketed as a “Second Supplement.” MDPA Simonetti I at Doc. 7. In this document, Plaintiff asserts claims against two new parties not named in any of the other civil cases (Andrew Scott Hodecker and Jacob Nicholas Shindel).
Also on August 3, 2020, Plaintiff filed a corrected Motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis. MDPA Simonetti II at Doc. 8.
On November 24, 2020, this case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Arbuckle.
On December 1, 2020, the Court issued an Order consolidating MDPA Simonetti I and MDPA Simonetti II. MDPA Simonetti II at Doc. 10; MDPA Simonetti I at Doc. 18. In that Order, Plaintiff was instructed to file a comprehensive Amended Complaint in which he should bring any civil claims he intended to bring in MDPA Simonetti I or MDPA Simonetti II. Id. Plaintiff was also advised that if he did not file an Amended Complaint on or before December 30, 2020, the Court would proceed on the Original Complaints and Supplements filed in MDPA Simonetti I. Id.
On January 15, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Motion requesting the appointment of counsel. MDPA Simonetti II at Doc. 11. This Motion listed the case numbers for both MDPA Simonetti I and MDPA Simonetti II. The Motion was docketed in both cases. In MDPA Simonetti II, the Court issued an Order, explaining that all requests related to any claim against Defendant Troutman should be filed to the docket in MDPA Simonetti I.
C. SIMONETTI V. ROBINSON, 1:20-CV-1108 (M.D. PA.) (“MDPA SIMONETTI I”)
On June 29, 2020, the Court received Plaintiff's Complaint. Christopher Robinson is the only Defendant named in that Complaint. MDPA Simonetti I at Doc. 1. On July 6, 2020, the Complaint was docketed. Id. The Complaint is written on a pre-printed form titled “Complaint for a Civil Case.” Id. Along with that Complaint, Plaintiff filed a Motion requesting leave to proceed in forma pauperis. MDPA Simonetti I at Doc. 2. Plaintiff was incarcerated at the time. Id. (stating that Plaintiff was incarcerated at Dauphin County Prison). An application to proceed in forma pauperis by an incarcerated person needs to include an authorization to debit funds from his or her institutional account as specified by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2), and requires a certification of the prisoner's institutional account balance. Plaintiff's Motion did not include that information. This case was directly assigned to Magistrate Judge Arbuckle.
On July 14, 2020, the Court issued a 30-Day Administrative Order directing Plaintiff to complete the correct form to proceed in forma pauperis. MDPA Simonetti I at Doc. 4.
On July 30, 2020, Plaintiff filed a document that was docketed as a “Supplement” to his Complaint. MDPA Simonetti I at Doc. 5. Plaintiff listed two case numbers at the top: 1:20-CV-1109 and 1:20-CV-1108. Id. This document was docketed to both of those civil cases. Id.; see also MDPA Simonetti II at Doc. 6.
On August 3, 2020, Plaintiff submitted an untitled document that listed three docket numbers at the top: 1:20-CV-1108, 1:20-CV-1109, and 1:20-CV-1095. MDPA Simonetti I at Doc. 7. This document was docketed as a “Second Supplement” in this case. Id. It was docketed as a “Proposed Amended Complaint” in the other two cases. See MDPA Simonetti II at Doc. 7; MDPA Simonetti III at Doc. 5. In this document, Plaintiff asserts claims against two new parties not named in any of the other civil cases (Andrew Scott Hodecker and Jacob Nicholas Shindel).
Also on August 3, 2020, Plaintiff filed a corrected Motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis. MDPA Simonetti I at Doc. 6.
On August 5, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis. MDPA Simonetti I at Doc. 9. On the same day, the Court screened Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). MDPA Simonetti I at Doc. 10. In its screening order, the Court concluded that, as pleaded, Plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim against Defendant Robinson in his Original Complaint, or in any of the supplements. Id. Plaintiff was given curative instructions, and was advised that if he chose not to file an amended complaint on or before September 4, 2020 his claims may be dismissed. Id.
At this point, the Court had not directed the Clerk of Court to serve Plaintiff's Complaint. However, it appears that Plaintiff may have attempted to do so himself. On August 7, 2020, counsel entered an appearance on behalf of Defendant Robinson. MDPA Simonetti I at Docs. 11, 12. Defendant Robinson also filed a waiver of service of summons. MDPA Simonetti I at Doc. 13.
On October 1, 2020, Defendant Robinson filed a Motion to Dismiss. MDPA Simonetti I at Doc. 15. Along with his Motion, Defendant Robinson filed a Brief in Support. MDPA Simonetti I at Doc. 16. Plaintiff did not file a Brief in Opposition. On October 22, 2020, Defendant Robinson filed a Reply. MDPA Simonetti I at Doc. 17.
On December 1, 2020, the Court issued an Order consolidating MDPA Simonetti I and MDPA Simonetti II. MDPA Simonetti I at Doc. 18. In that Order, Plaintiff was instructed to file an Amended Complaint in which he should bring any civil claims he intended to bring in MDPA Simonetti I and MDPA Simonetti II. Id. Plaintiff was also advised that if he did not file an Amended Complaint on or before December 30, 2020, the Court would proceed on the Original Complaints and Supplements filed in MDPA Simonetti I. Id.
On January 15, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Motion requesting the appointment of counsel. MDPA Simonetti I at Doc. 20. This Motion listed the case numbers for both MDPA Simonetti I and MDPA Simonetti II. In his Motion, Plaintiff also reported that he did not receive the Court's Order directing him to file an Amended Complaint until after the response deadline had passed. On January 22, 2021, the Court denied Plaintiff's request for counsel. MDPA Simonetti I at Doc. 21. In the same Order, the Court granted Plaintiff until March 22, 2021 to file his comprehensive amended complaint. Id. To date, Plaintiff has not filed his comprehensive amended complaint alleging all claims against Defendant Troutman and Defendant Robinson. It is also not clear what case, if any, Plaintiff intended to add the new Defendants to.
III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SCREENING COMPLAINTS IN CASES WHERE A PLAINTIFF IS PROCEEDING IN FORMA PAUPERIS
This Court has a statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of pro se complaints brought by litigants given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Specifically, the Court is obliged to review the complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which provides, in pertinent part:
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that -
(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or
(B) the action or appeal--
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
In performing this mandatory screening function, the Court applies the same standard that is used to evaluate motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has observed the evolving standards governing pleading practice in the federal courts, stating that “pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009). “[A] complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief.” Id. at 211. It also “has to ‘show' such an entitlement with its facts.” Id.
To test the sufficiency of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must conduct the following three-step inquiry:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 1950. Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Id.Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and ‘“however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a pro se complaint must recite factual allegations that are enough to raise the Plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT ROBINSON
As discussed in Section II. C. of this Report, Plaintiff filed a Complaint asserting claims against Defendant Robinson-the Assistant District Attorney assigned to his state court criminal case. This Complaint is written on a pre-printed civil complaint form. Under the section “Statement of Claim” Plaintiff wrote:
Entitled to Damages: Plaintiff has been wrongfully imprisoned over a false affidavit which Robinson signed off on. Plaintiff was raped on 17 April 2020 by another inmate. Plaintiff has been unable to post bail b/c Def refuses to agree to reduced bail. Plaintiff's relationship with fiance is broken because fiance believes false narrative of Def. 26 Aug. 2019 Def. signs off on affidavit 23 Sept. 2019 Def. refuses to support bail reduction. Also 28 Dec. 2019 and 2 June 2020 Def. continues to bully Plaintiff into pleading guilty to charges Plaintiff knows he didn't commit.
MDPA Simonetti I at Doc. 1, p. 4. As relief, Plaintiff requests:
Relief: Defendant to be charged and a jury trial to dispose of civil case. Plaintiff to agree or not [illegible word] bail reduction so
Plaintiff can adequately mount a credible def before trial if can takes it to trial. Dismissal of criminal charges: CP-22-CR-0004815-2019 because they are founded on lies, hearsay, a house built on sand not rocks, solid foundation. Relief: a jury trial over this matter.
MDPA Simonetti I at Doc. 1, p. 5.
In a document docketed as a “Supplement” on July 30, 2020, Plaintiff alleges:
The defendants (Troutman and Robinson) conspired together to violate the due process and other civil rights of Plaintiff (Mr. Anthony Simonetti) and to charge him with a crime he didn't commit (he wasn't a driver, he was a passenger) and which Defendant Robinson & Troutman should have recognized he did not commit.
MDPA Simonetti I at Doc. 5. Unlike in his Complaint, in the July 30, 2020 Supplement, Plaintiff requests compensatory damages, and costs.
In a document docketed as a “Second Supplement” on August 3, 2020, Plaintiff mentions Defendant Robinson once by name in the heading, but does not assert any factual allegation against him in the body of the document. MDPA Simonetti I at Doc. 7.
Plaintiff appears to be asserting two federal claims against Defendant Robinson. First, he alleges a due process claim arising out of Defendant Robinson's refusal to reduce bail. Second he alleges a malicious prosecution claim arising out of Defendant Robinson's decision to charge Plaintiff with a crime.
1. Plaintiff's Due Process Claim (Refusal to Agree to Reduced Bail)
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state shall not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” A due process claim requires a two-part analysis. First, the court must determine whether the interest asserted by the plaintiff is within the scope of protection of life, liberty, or property found in the Due Process Clause. Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2000). Second, if the interest is one that is protected by the Due Process Clause, “the question then becomes what process is due to protect it.” Id.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff generally alleges that Defendant Robinson denied him due process of law. To the extent Plaintiff is alleging that some period of pretrial detention implicates a liberty interest, this type of claim is not properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See e.g. Malloy v. District Attorney of Montgomery Cty, 461 F.Supp.3d 168, 171 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (explaining that challenges to the fact or duration of confinement are not properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
Furthermore, assuming arguendo that such a claim could be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that claim may be barred by prosecutorial immunity.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's due process claim against Defendant Robinson should be dismissed.
2. Plaintiff's Malicious Prosecution Claim (Charging Plaintiff With a Crime)
Plaintiff's claim that Defendant Robinson violated Plaintiff's rights by charging Plaintiff with a crime appears to be a malicious prosecution claim. It is well-settled that:
“[t]o prove malicious prosecution ... a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in plaintiff's favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.” Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003); Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009); Piazza v. Lakkis, 2012 WL 2007112, *7 (M.D. Pa. June 5, 2012); Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 379-80 (3d Cir. 2016). “[A] claim for malicious prosecution ‘permits damages for confinement imposed pursuant to legal process.' ” Piazza, 2012 WL 2007112, *8 (citations omitted). Further, “a claim for malicious prosecution seeks to remedy ‘the deprivation of liberty accompanying prosecution, not prosecution itself.' ” Id. (citations omitted).Wiggins v. McAndrew, No. 3:17-cv-1410, 2018 WL 3727389 at *7 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2018).
As pleaded, Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible malicious prosecution claim. The State court docket shows that Plaintiff has pleaded guilty to some of the charges arising out of that prosecution. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims of malicious prosecution against Defendant Robinson should be dismissed because the criminal proceeding at issue did not end in Plaintiff's favor.
B. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT TROUTMAN
As discussed in Section II. B. of this Report, Plaintiff filed a Complaint asserting claims against Defendant Troutman-the officer who arrested Plaintiff in in August 2019. That Complaint was written on a pre-printed civil complaint form.
Under the section “Statement of Claim” Plaintiff wrote:
Troutman knowingly, willingly, voluntarily, crafted a Libel/Slanderous fake affidavit of probable cause (CP-22-CR-0004815-2019. (1) Time of alleged incident not correct. (2) Location of minor ACC not correct. (3) Truck of Andrew Scott Hodecker slammed into Shindel's vehicle. (4) I was the passenger not driver. (5) Deprivation of Rights. Told I couldn't urinate. (6) Touched inappropriately-genitals. (7) discrimination because I'm LGBT (Bisexual). (8) Falsification of my signature. (9). Witness intimidation. (10) Bribery. (11) Coersion. (12) Abuse of Power. (13) Giving false info under pain of perjury. (14) Requesting excessive bail. (15). Stealing property.
MDPA Simonetti II at Doc. 1, p. 4. As relief, Plaintiff requested:
Relief, Awarded just compensation for sexual harassment/abuse. Awarded just compensation for inapp. touching. Awarded just compensation for sexual discrimination, deprivation of rights, homophobic slurs, threats, witness intimidation, bribery, forging a signature, coercion, abuse of power, writing and swearing an oath of affirmation that he knew was false. I also request a jury trial for this action.
MDPA Simonetti II at Doc. 1, p. 5.
In a document docketed as a “Supplement” on July 30, 2020, Plaintiff alleges:
On or about 0800 AM Monday 26 August 2019 the Plaintiff was arrested by Trooper Troutman and charged with DUI without probable cause, reasonable suspicion, and without a warrant.
The defendants (Troutman and Robinson) conspired together to violate the due process and other civil rights of Plaintiff (Mr. Anthony Simonetti) and to charge him with a crime he didn't commit (he wasn't a driver, he was a passenger) and which Defendant Robinson & Troutman should have recognized he did not commit.
The investigation conducted by Troutman and his actions taken therein were taken in bad faith or, in the alternative, negligently, and the Plaintiff was damaged and continues to be damaged ....
MDPA Simonetti I at Doc. 5.
In a document docketed as a “Proposed Amended Complaint” on August 3, 2020, Plaintiff alleges:
This is a federal question. I am seeking monetary damages for false imprisonment. The Defendants slander and libel during an investigation, slander and libel post investigation, via fake affidavit, led to my incarceration and continues to illegally detain me with this being a federal question, therefore this honorable and just court has subject matter jurisdiction of the case under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
MDPA Simonetti I at Doc. 7, p. 1. As far as his specific allegations against Defendant Troutman in that document, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Troutman:
(1) bribed and/or threatened Jacob Shindel to say that Plaintiff was driving on August 26, 2019 when the vehicle was pulled over;
(2) claims that Plaintiff admitted to switching seats, when Plaintiff only said that once;
(3) claims Plaintiff failed roadside sobriety tests, when Plaintiff passed the tests;
(4) claims Plaintiff had glossy and red eyes, when Plaintiff only rubbed his eyes due to a pollen allergy;
(5) stated that Plaintiff said he smoked on August 26, when Plaintiff actually told Defendant Troutman that he smoked “just now”;
(6) lied about reading Plaintiff implied consent laws/form;
(7) forced Plaintiff to give a blood draw.
MDPA Simonetti I at Doc. 7. Plaintiff alleges these are all slander and libel claims. Id.
Liberally construed, Plaintiff appears to allege four federal claims against Defendant Troutman in his original papers and supplements: (1) false arrest; (2) false imprisonment; (3) violation of due process (refusing to agree to reduced bail); and (4) malicious prosecution (charging Plaintiff with a crime).
These three federal claims are asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Shuman v. Penn Manor School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). “It is well settled that § 1983 does not confer any substantive rights, but merely ‘provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Williams v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 870 F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cty., 757 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2014)). To establish a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must establish a deprivation of a federally protected right and that this deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005).
1. Plaintiff's False Arrest & False Imprisonment Claims
Plaintiff alleges in the July 20, 2020 “Supplement” that Defendant Troutman arrested him without a warrant, reasonable suspicion, or probable cause. In the August 3, 2020 “Second Supplement”/“Proposed Amended Complaint” Plaintiff alleges that he was falsely imprisoned.
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV . To assert a false arrest claim a plaintiff must allege that he or she was arrested without probable cause. Dillard v. Cornick, No. 1:18-CV-70, 2018 WL 4679952, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2018); citing Andrews v. Scuilli, 853 F.3d 690, 697 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal citation omitted). “[P]robable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.” Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995).
Like a claim for false arrest, a claim for false imprisonment under § 1983 is based in the Fourth Amendment and the guarantee against unreasonable seizures. Garcia v. County of Bucks, 155 F.Supp.2d 259, 265 (E.D. Pa. 2001). “[W]here the police lack probable cause to make an arrest, the arrestee has a claim under § 1983 for false imprisonment based on a detention pursuant to that arrest.” Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995). Therefore, where a claim for false arrest is sustained, a claim for false imprisonment may also be sustained.
However, reviewing Plaintiff's papers (complaints, supplements, and the proposed amended complaint) together, Plaintiff has failed to plead a plausible false arrest claim. Although Plaintiff alleges he was arrested “without probable cause, ” this allegation is a legal conclusion. The underlying facts, taken as true, do not support this conclusion.
Plaintiff alleges that, at 8:00 a.m. on October 26, 2019 there was a traffic accident between two cars. MDPA Simonetti I at Doc. 5, p. 1. Plaintiff alleges that, at the scene of the accident Andrew Scott Hodecker told Defendant Troutman that Jacob Shindel's vehicle caused the two-car accident. MDPA Simonetti I at Doc. 7, p. 2. Plaintiff also alleges that Jacob Shindel told Defendant Troutman that Plaintiff was driving Shindel's vehicle at the time of the accident. Id. Although Plaintiff contends both of these statements are lies, he does not allege that Defendant Troutman was aware of that at the time. In fact, Plaintiff suggests that at the scene of the accident, or shortly thereafter, he admitted that he was driving. See MDPA Simonetti I at Doc. 7, p. 2 (“Defendant Troutman claims I admitted to switching seats with Shindel. Plaintiff only said that once while in the cop car b/c Troutman was attempting to get Shindel to pull out in front of him to pull him over for a DUI. . . . O repeatedly denied driving when interrogated during investigation, and on the way to DCP, Dauphin County Prison, because I never drove.”).
Plaintiff also alleges that he had glossy and red eyes (Plaintiff attributes to allergies), and admitted that he “hit his friend's vape pen” and “smoked” at the scene of the accident (but does not specify what substance he smoked). Id. at p. 3. To the extent Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Troutman was required to rely on Plaintiff's assertion that he had “allergies, ” and that this assertion somehow vitiates probable cause based on the appearance of Plaintiff's eyes, he is mistaken. See Olson v. Ako, 724 Fed.Appx. 160, 167 (3d Cir. 2018) (finding that an officer was not required to rule out a suspect's innocent explanation for suspicious facts) (citing District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S.CT. 577 (2018)).
Plaintiff also suggests that Officer Troutman may have performed or attempted to perform a field sobriety test (although Plaintiff disputes his cooperation and Defendant Troutman's conclusion that Plaintiff failed the test). Id.
Based on the facts alleged by Plaintiff, Defendant Troutman had sufficient knowledge at the time of the arrest to reasonably suspect Plaintiff was driving under the influence. Therefore, Plaintiff's false arrest claim against Defendant Troutman should be dismissed. Plaintiff's false imprisonment claim fails for the same reasons.
2. Plaintiff's Due Process Claim (Failure to Agree to Reduced Bail)
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state shall not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” A due process claim requires a two-part analysis. First, the court must determine whether the interest asserted by the plaintiff is within the scope of protection of life, liberty, or property found in the Due Process Clause. Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2000). Second, if the interest is one that is protected by the Due Process Clause, “the question then becomes what process is due to protect it.” Id.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff generally alleges that Defendant Troutman denied him due process of law. To the extent Plaintiff is alleging that some period of pretrial detention implicates a liberty interest, this type of claim is not properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See e.g. Malloy v. District Attorney of Montgomery Cty, 461 F.Supp.3d 168, 171 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (explaining that challenges to the fact or duration of confinement are not properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Accordingly, Plaintiff's due process claim against Defendant Troutman should be dismissed.
3. Plaintiff's Malicious Prosecution Claim (Charging Plaintiff with a Crime)
Plaintiff's claim that Defendant Troutman violated Plaintiff's rights by charging Plaintiff with a crime appears to be a malicious prosecution claim. It is well-settled that:
“[t]o prove malicious prosecution ... a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in plaintiff's favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.” Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003); Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009); Piazza v. Lakkis, 2012 WL 2007112, *7 (M.D. Pa. June 5, 2012); Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 379-80 (3d Cir. 2016). “[A] claim for malicious prosecution ‘permits damages for confinement imposed pursuant to legal process.' ” Piazza, 2012 WL 2007112, *8 (citations omitted). Further, “a claim for malicious prosecution seeks to remedy ‘the deprivation of liberty accompanying prosecution, not prosecution itself.' ” Id. (citations omitted).Wiggins v. McAndrew, No. 3:17-cv-1410, 2018 WL 3727389 at *7 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2018).
As pleaded, Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible malicious prosecution claim. The State court docket shows that Plaintiff has pleaded guilty to some of the charges arising out of that prosecution. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims of malicious prosecution against Defendant Troutman should be dismissed because the criminal proceeding at issue did not end in Plaintiff's favor.
C. PLAINTIFF DID NOT ASSERT ANY PLAUSIBLE CLAIM AGAINST THE DAUPHIN COUNTY OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER OR ERIC ALLEN DELP IN THE SECOND SUPPLEMENT (MDPA SIMONETTI I, DOC. 7)
As discussed above, on August 3, 2020, the Court received a supplement/proposed amended pleading listing the Dauphin County Office of the Public Defender and Eric Allen Delp in its caption. MDPA Simonetti I at Doc. 7. Beyond the caption, there is no reference to either of these Defendants. The supplement/proposed amended pleading does not allege any facts related to these Defendants and does not assert any claim against them.
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explains that, a Complaint must contain, “a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. Dismissal under Rule 8 is when a complaint leaves “the defendants having to guess what of the many things discussed constituted [a cause of action];” Binsack v. Lackawanna County Prison, 438 Fed.Appx. 158 (3d Cir. 2011), or when the complaint is so “rambling and unclear” as to defy response. Tillio v. Spiess, 441 Fed.Appx. 109 (3d Cir. 2011). Similarly, dismissal is appropriate in “‘those cases in which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.'” Tillio, 441 Fed.Appx. at 110 (quoting Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995)); Tillio v. Northland Grp. Inc., 456 Fed.Appx. 78, 79 (3d Cir. 2012).
Absent any facts related to these Defendants or any claims asserted against these Defendants in the supplement/proposed amended pleading, any claim Plaintiff attempts to assert against these two Defendants in the above-captioned case should be dismissed.
D. PLAINTIFF'S REMAINING STATE LAW CLAIMS
On August 3, 2020, supplement/proposed amended pleading Plaintiff also appears to assert several slander and libel claims against Defendant Troutman, as well as Andrew Scott Hodecker and Jacob Nicholas Shindel. MDPA Simonetti I at Doc. 7. Slander and Libel are state law torts. In the supplement/proposed amended pleading Plaintiff asserts that this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question). However, for the reasons set forth in sections IV. A, B, and C of this Report, Plaintiff has not alleged any plausible federal claim. The absence of a federal claim appears to divest this Court of original jurisdiction over this case.
If there is another basis for jurisdiction over these claims, Plaintiff should raise the issue in his objections to this Report.
Where a district court has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction, the Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Whether the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction is within its discretion. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 650 (3d Cir. 2009). That decision should be based on “the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988).
Ordinarily, when all federal law claims have been dismissed and only state law claims remain, the balance of these factors indicates that these remaining claims properly belong in state court. Id. at 350. This case is no exception. In the absence of any plausible federal claim, Plaintiff's state law claims should be dismissed.
V. RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:
(1) Plaintiff's federal claims against all individuals named in the captions of the Complaint and Supplements be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii);
(2) The Court DECLINE to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims against all individuals named in the Complaint and Supplements;
(3) Defendant Robinson's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 15) be DENIED as MOOT; and
(4) The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to CLOSE this CASE.
NOTICE OF LOCAL RULE 72.3
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.