That is, a single district judge may dismiss a complaint otherwise subject to § 2284(a) if the judge determines that the constitutional claims are insubstantial in that they are "obviously without merit or clearly determined by previous case law." Armour v. State of Ohio, 925 F.2d 987, 989 (6th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (citing, inter alia, Simkins v. Gressette, 631 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1980)). Cf. Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 518 (1973) (stating that the convening of a three-judge district court is not required when the plaintiffs' "constitutional attack" on state government action is "insubstantial").

See, e.g., Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196 (E.D.Ark. 1989), and Smith v. Clinton, 687 F. Supp. 1310 (E.D.Ark. 1988) (naming Arkansas Board of Apportionment); Ketchum v. City Council of City of Chicago, 630 F. Supp. 551 (N.D.Ill. 1985) (naming Chicago City Council); Mac Govern v. Connolly, 637 F. Supp. 111 (D.Mass. 1986) (naming Senate and House chairmen of the Joint Special Committee on Redistricting, as well as the Joint Committee); Simkins v. Gressette, 631 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1980) (naming South Carolina House and Senate); Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479 (S.D.Ind. 1984), rev'd, 478 U.S. 109, 106 S.Ct. 2797, 92 L.Ed.2d 85 (1986) (naming Speaker of the House, President Pro Tem of Senate, and House and Senate chairman of Standing Committees on Elections and Apportionment).

Providing only thirty days for briefing, argument, and decision of a novel constitutional question before the courts is troublesome. In Simkins v. Gressette,631 F.2d 287 (4th Cir.1980), we dismissed a challenge alleging South Carolina's reapportionment plan unconstitutionally diluted the plaintiffs' votes. The Simkins plaintiffs brought their claim just two days before the beginning of the filing period and six-teen days before the filing deadline.

Having concluded that Duckworth's complaint stated no claim, the court reasoned that the questions presented by the pleadings were insubstantial. As a result, the court did not forward Duckworth's complaint to a three-judge court, as provided for by 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (providing that a district court of three judges be convened to hear cases challenging congressional districting as unconstitutional), and instead dismissed the case itself on the authority of this court's precedent in Simkins v. Gressette, 631 F.2d 287, 295 (4th Cir. 1980) (noting that convening a three-judge court is not required to address insubstantial claims). Duckworth now appeals from that dismissal.

In Simkins v. Gressette, 631 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1980), this court found injunctive relief foreclosed to plaintiffs who waited to bring suit until two days before the opening of the filing period for candidates seeking nomination for South Carolina state senator, and sixteen days before the final deadline for filing. Finding the case controlled by Maryland Citizens, we explained not only that the delayed suit "would clearly cause a major disruption in the election," but also that the year of the election was "the year of a national census which will likely require reapportionment in South Carolina."

This court finds that no “unusual” equitable considerations exist in this case because: 1) Plaintiffs have not unduly delayed bringing suit and 2) this case does not involve the arduous task of reapportionment and redrawing district lines. This court also finds the circumstances in this case to be distinguishable from those in Maryland Citizens for a Representative Gen. Assembly v. Governor of Maryland, 429 F.2d 606 (4th Cir.1970) and Simkins v. Gressette, 631 F.2d 287 (4th Cir.1980), both of which affirmed a district court's refusal to convene a three-judge panel because it found injunctive relief to be unavailable. In Maryland Citizens, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court's finding that injunctive relief was unavailable when the plaintiffs delayed challenging a reapportionment plan for approximately five years after it had been adopted, filing their complaint “only thirteen weeks prior to the filing deadline,” when finding the statute ineffective would have required the “time-consuming process” of developing a new reapportionment plan (that “could not have been expected [to be completed] until close upon the eve of the [filing] deadline”), and when a census that same year would require yet another reapportionment. Maryland Citizens, 429 F.2d at 608–610 (expressing concerns about potential instability from “reapportioning with undue frequency”).

The first prerequisite has not been met; as for the second, Plaintiffs' constitutional challenges are wholly insubstantial. See Simkins v. Gressette, 631 F.2d 287, 295 (4th Cir. 1980) (noting that convening a three-judge court is not required to address insubstantial claims). Plaintiffs argued that 42 U.S.C. § 1973c is an Act of Congress that requires the Court to convene a three-judge panel.

The first prerequisite has not been met; as for the second, Plaintiffs' constitutional challenges are wholly insubstantial. See Simkins v. Gressette, 631 F.2d 287, 295 (4th Cir. 1980) (noting that convening a three-judge court is not required to address insubstantial claims). Plaintiffs argued that 42 U.S.C. § 1973c is an Act of Congress that requires the Court to convene a three-judge panel.

Nonetheless, a single district judge is authorized to grant a preliminary motion to dismiss in an apportionment challenge if the judge determines that the constitutional claims are insubstantial. Armour v. State of Ohio, 925 F.2d 987, 989 (6th Cir. 1991) (en banc) ( citing, inter alia, Simkins v. Gressette, 631 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1980)). As the Fourth Circuit has explained:

Id. at 610-11. Similarly, the court in Simkins v. Gressette, 631 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1980), upheld the district court's dismissal of an apportionment challenge that was filed two days before the opening of the filing period for the 1980 election. Id. at 289.