On or about August 8, 1996, Vaccaro filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming, inter alia, that Gagne's claims were barred on public policy grounds. Specifically, relying on Alan E. Silver, P.C. v. Jacobs, 43 Conn. App. 184, 602 A.2d 551, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 938, 684 A.2d 708 (1996), decided well after the events in the present case had transpired, Vaccaro claimed that Gagne's failure to obtain a written fee agreement as required under § 52-251c precluded him from recovering his fee. In opposition to the motion, Gagne advanced four grounds under which he claimed recovery despite his noncompliance with § 52-251c: (1) Alan E. Silver, P.C., had been decided improperly; (2) that case was distinguishable; (3) Aldrich waived the protection of § 52-251c; and (4) Vaccaro's bad faith actions precluded him from relying on Gagne's noncompliance with § 52-251c as a defense.
This failure is fatal to the plaintiff's claims. See Alan E. Silver, P.C. v. Jacobs, 43 Conn. App. 184, 188-89, 682 A.2d 551, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 938, 684 A.2d 708 (1996). Our law is clear.
We agree. After the briefs were filed in this appeal, this court decided Alan E. Silver, P.C. v. Jacobs, 43 Conn. App. 184, 682 A.2d 551, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 938, 684 A.2d 708 (1996). Silver held that an attorney who worked on a personal injury case could not collect his fee from a successor attorney after settlement in the absence of a written fee agreement between the attorney and the client.