Summary
noting that the Court may limit discovery if it determines that the burden of the discovery outweighs its likely benefit
Summary of this case from Gregg v. Local 305 IBEWOpinion
Cause No. 1:04-CV-00149.
March 3, 2005
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Compel filed by the Plaintiff. On March 3, 2005, argument was heard on the motion. For the reasons provided, the motion will be GRANTED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case has been brought by the Plaintiff, Rebecca Sills, alleging that she was discriminated and retaliated against for seeking leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. (FMLA). While the details of her allegations are not particularly important for purposes of our discussion here, the Defendant seeks to characterize it as simply one about FMLA eligibility and whether Bendix can be estopped to assert that the Plaintiff was ineligible for FMLA coverage. The Plaintiff maintains that her case is more than that, and, judging from her complaint, we agree.
At present, the Plaintiff seeks documents responsive to her First Request for Production of Documents, and more particularly, Request No. 12:
The complete personnel files, including any independent files kept by supervisors, time cards, attendance records, FMLA requests and responses and disciplinary actions, of all employees who performed the same or similar duties as Plaintiff from January 1, 1998 to the present.
After some discussion between counsel, the Request has been narrowed to a request that the Defendant produce "copies of all FMLA paperwork, including initial application and determinations with reasons as to whether granted or not, all disciplinary actions taken against all such employees since 2000, and all attendance records of such employees since 2000 for current and former employees who had requested FMLA leave at any time from January 1, 2000, to the present." ( See Mot. to Compel at 3.)
The Defendant maintains that even when narrowed, the Request is irrelevant, too broad, and unduly burdensome. In particular, counsel maintains that if forced to comply, the Defendant at some point will need to comb through a warehouse containing time card records for a number of employees and that this process is cumbersome, time-consuming, and unnecessary.
STANDARD ON MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) permits discovery into "any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party." Sanyo Laser Prod., Inc. v. Arista Records, Inc., 214 F.R.D. 496, 498 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (quoting Davenport v. Ind. Masonic Home Found., Inc., 2003 WL 1888986 at *3 (S.D. Ind. March 27, 2004) (quoting Rule 26(b)(1))). This is somewhat of a restriction of what was previously allowed in discovery prior to this rule's revision in 2000, in that discovery was then broadly defined as any information relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action. Id. Nevertheless, even under the revised rule, parties are still able to obtain discovery that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action if good cause is shown. Id. at 499 (citing White v. Kenneth Warren Son, Ltd., 203 F.R.D. 364, 366 (N.D. Ill. 2001) ("For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.")). Under the relevancy standard, "information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Id. (quoting Martin Prop. Inc. v. Florida Indus. Inv. Corp., 2003 WL 1877963 at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 2003) (quoting Rule 26(b)(1))); see also Jones v. Hamilton County Sheriff's Dept., 2003 WL 21383332 at *3 (S.D. Ind. June 12, 2003).
When the discovery sought appears relevant, the party opposing the discovery bears the burden of proof to establish the discovery's lack of relevance by demonstrating that it is of such marginal relevance that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in favor of broad disclosure. Jones at *3 (citing Beach v. City of Olathe, Kansas, 203 F.R.D. 489, 496 (D. Kan. 2001) (citing Scott v. Leavenworth Unified School Dist. No. 453, 190 F.R.D. 583, 585 (D. Kan. 1999))).
DISCUSSION
Applying the principles outlined above to the situation here it is apparent that the motion should be granted. First, the basis for the Plaintiff's claim rests upon the assertion that the Defendant discriminated and retaliated against her because she used, and continued to need, FMLA leaves of absence. ( See Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 8.) One way to establish such a claim, either one of discrimination or retaliation, is to show that the Defendant used the same modus operandi towards others similarly situated to the Plaintiff. Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2002) ("To meet her burden of demonstrating that another employee is `similarly situated,' a plaintiff must show that there is someone who is directly comparable to her in all material respects"). Thus, what the Plaintiff seeks here by way of her Request is clearly relevant to her claims, Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1), and is therefore clearly discoverable.
Nor has Bendix shown that the burden and expense of the discovery sought outweighs its likely benefit. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2)(iii). "Before restricting discovery, the court should consider `the totality of the circumstances, weighing the value of the material sought against the burden of providing it,' and taking into account society's interest in furthering `the truthseeking function' in the particular case before the court." Patterson, 281 F.3d at 681 (quoting Rowlin v. Alabama, 200 F.R.D. 459, 461 (M.D. Ala. 2001)).
Bendix offers no "evidence" concerning the burden that will be imposed by the Request. See Culkin v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 225 F.R.D. 69, 71 (D. Conn. 2004) (party opposing requests for documents must demonstrate that they are burdensome or oppressive by submitting affidavits or evidence revealing the nature of the burden). Although counsel provided some information at the hearing suggesting that a burden will be imposed, we do not know the precise extent of that burden, nor has such information been properly supported by an affidavit or otherwise. In that regard, the "totality of the circumstances," Patterson, 281 F.3d at 681, indicates that on the one hand we have relevant information relating to the Plaintiff's claim, and on the other, unsupported assertions of burden. In weighing those two circumstances, it is clear that the truthseeking function will best be served by granting the motion. Id.