Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4904-13T2
06-25-2015
JONATHAN SIERRA, Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
Jonathan Sierra, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Andrew J. Sarrol, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Leone and Gilson. On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections. Jonathan Sierra, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Andrew J. Sarrol, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Appellant Jonathan Sierra is an inmate at the New Jersey State Prison in Trenton. He appeals a final agency decision of the Department of Corrections ("Department") imposing disciplinary sanctions on him for fighting and assaulting another inmate with a weapon. We affirm.
On September 23, 2013, a corrections officer observed appellant fighting with Raheem Jones, another inmate. The officer called for backup and ordered the inmates to stop fighting. The inmates, however, continued to fight, including throwing punches at each other. After the fight was broken up, Jones told an officer that appellant had thrown hot water on him, which resulted in second degree burns to Jones' torso, arms and neck. Later, appellant admitted to one of the officers that he had thrown hot water on Jones.
Appellant was charged with "fighting with another person" (*.004) and "assaulting a person with a weapon" (*.003) in violation of N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a). A disciplinary hearing was conducted on September 25, 2013. Appellant was assigned a counsel substitute. He then elected not to make a statement at the hearing and he also elected not to call any witnesses or confront witnesses at the hearing.
The hearing officer reviewed the officers' reports of the incident and a medical report. The hearing officer then found that appellant had assaulted Jones with a weapon and had fought with Jones. The hearing officer imposed on appellant, consecutively for each charge, the sanctions to fifteen days of detention, 365 days of administrative segregation, 365 days of loss of commutation time, and 365 days loss of telephone, television and radio privileges. In addition, the hearing officer also imposed the sanction of thirty days loss of recreational privileges on the fighting charge.
Appellant administratively appealed the hearing officer's decision and the Department upheld the ruling and sanctions. Appellant now appeals that final agency decision and makes two arguments: (1) his due process rights were violated; and (2) some of the sanctions were excessive. Neither of these arguments warrants reversal of the Department's decision.
Our review of agency action is limited. "An appellate court ordinarily will reverse the decision of an administrative agency only when the agency's decision is 'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or [] is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'" Ramirez v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 382 N.J. Super. 18, 23 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)). Furthermore, "[i]t is settled that '[a]n administrative agency's interpretation of statutes and regulations within its implementing and enforcing responsibility is ordinarily entitled to our deference.'" Wnuck v. N.J. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 337 N.J. Super. 52, 56 (App. Div. 2001) (quoting In re Appeal by Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 307 N.J. Super. 93, 102 (App. Div. 1997)). The Department is given broad discretion in matters regarding the administration of a prison facility, including disciplinary infractions by prisoners. Russo v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 324 N.J. Super. 576, 583 (App. Div. 1999).
Appellant's due process arguments are premised on his allegation that the hearing officer denied his requests to review documents, for a twenty-four-hour postponement, and to confront the officer who witnessed the fight. Appellant contends that when he made these requests, the hearing officer ended the hearing and adjudicated the charges on the papers without appellant's participation. Appellant also contends that the hearing officer failed to note that appellant had pled not guilty.
There are two problems with appellant's due process arguments. First, he did not raise these arguments in his administrative appeal. Second, the arguments are contradicted by the record.
In support of his administrative appeal, appellant filed a three-page statement. Nowhere in that statement did appellant raise any due process arguments. Instead, in his administrative appeal, appellant argued that the hearing officer improperly relied on an officer's report. In particular, appellant contended that one of the officers reported that appellant admitted that he threw boiling water on Jones and had used two "stingers" to boil the water. A stinger is a heated immersion coil used to heat water and inmates are permitted to use stingers by the Department. Appellant then argued that no stingers were ever found and, therefore, the officer's report was not substantiated.
We decline to address appellant's due process arguments because they were not raised in his administrative appeal to the Department and they do not concern jurisdiction or a matter of public interest. See Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (explaining that if an issue is not raised at a hearing or trial level, it should not be addressed on appellate review unless the question goes to jurisdiction or concerns matters of "great public interest").
We point out, however, that the record establishes that appellant was accorded all the modified due-process rights of a prisoner. See Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496 (1975) (outlining those procedural rights). Appellant had received written notice of the charges, the hearing officer was impartial, he had limited rights to call and confront witnesses, and he was provided with a written statement of the evidence relied on and the sanctions imposed. Specifically, the hearing officer's adjudication reports on both charges state that (1) appellant was assigned counsel substitute, (2) appellant entered a "no plea," (3) appellant elected not to make a statement, and (4) appellant elected not to call or confront any witnesses. Those reports were then signed by appellant's counsel substitute. Thus, even if the due process issues were to be reached, there is no legally competent proof that appellant was denied any due process.
Appellant also argues that the sanctions imposed were excessive. Specifically, appellant contends that he was given consecutive sanctions of one-year losses of telephone, radio and television privileges. Appellant also argues that his thirty-day loss of recreational privileges was excessive.
Again, appellant did not clearly raise these arguments in his administrative appeal. While appellant had requested that his sanctions be "reduced" in his administrative appeal, he did not clearly contend that the sanctions exceeded or were unauthorized by the regulations. Consequently, again we decline to reach these issues on this appeal since they do not involve jurisdiction or a matter of public interest.
We note, however, that appellant committed two very serious infractions. He assaulted another inmate with a weapon and he fought with that inmate. The Department regulations authorize a number of sanctions for an inmate found guilty of such prohibited acts. See N.J.A.C. 10A:4-5.1 (detailing sanctions for prohibited acts). Among the authorized sanctions, are sanctions for up to one year loss of telephone, radio and television privileges, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-5.1(g)(6), and up to thirty days loss of recreational privileges, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-5.1(a)(2). The regulations do not limit consecutive sanctions for separate disciplinary violations, except for disciplinary-detention sanctions. See N.J.A.C. 10A:4-5.3 (placing limitations on consecutive disciplinary-detention sanctions). The consecutive sanctions that defendant complains of were not disciplinary-detention sanctions. Moreover, his disciplinary-detention sanction was within the limits permitted by N.J.A.C. 10A:4-5.3.
The decision of the hearing officer and the Department's adoption of the hearing officer's findings were not arbitrary or capricious, and the findings and sanctions were supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Henry, supra, 81 N.J. at 579-80.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION