The board shall have the power and authority of establishment, improvement, maintenance and abandonment of public roads of the county and of enforcement of the laws in relation thereto as provided by the provisions of Chapter 39, articles 14 to 20, except sections 39-1520.01 and 39-1908. In SID No. 1 v. County of Adams, 209 Neb. 108, 306 N.W.2d 584 (1981), we addressed this statute and whether under its provisions a county could be compelled to maintain roads created and owned by a sanitary and improvement district. We determined that § 39-1402 was a statute of general application.
. . . In State ex rel. Scherer v. Madison Cty. Comrs., 247 Neb. 384, 527 N.W.2d 615 (1995), and in SID No. 1 v. County of Adams, 209 Neb. 108, 306 N.W.2d 584 (1981), we addressed the issue of whether a county was responsible for maintaining roads within a sanitary and improvement district. We concluded that article 7 of chapter 31 was a special, independent legislative act which created an exception to the general statute dealing with the responsibility of counties to provide for construction, improvement, and maintenance of roads within a district organized for those purposes.
Moreover, where the special statute is later, it will be regarded as an exception to, or qualification of, the prior general one. SID No. 1 v. County of Adams, 209 Neb. 108, 306 N.W.2d 584 (1981). The statutes contained in the probate code address the exact situation presented here and are controlling to the extent they conflict with 24-517.
Even if the Wage Payment and Collection Act was applicable to the claim at bar, there is no merit to the employees' contention that the Wage Payment and Collection Act is a special provision in regard to wage claims and takes precedence over the claims statutes. Generally, "`"[w]here the general statute, if standing alone, would include the same matter as the special act, and thus conflict with it, the special act will be considered as an exception to the general statute . . . ."'" SID No. 1 v. County of Adams, 209 Neb. 108, 113, 306 N.W.2d 584, 586 (1981). The act is not a special provision governing the same subject matter as the claims statutes.
We did not, however, indicate the extent, if any, of the conflict between the two provisions. In SID No. 1 v. County of Adams, 209 Neb. 108, 306 N.W.2d 584 (1981), this court indicated that where a general statute standing alone would include the same matter as the special act, and thus conflict with it, the special act is considered an exception to the general statute. In the present case, the provisions in question relate to different matters: cancellation or termination, on the one hand, and rescission, on the other.
The defendant's first assignment of error relates to the absence of an allegation in the information that the particular loans were made without approval of the board of directors as set out in 8-409.01. As a matter of fact, the defendant had received such approval for one loan in an unspecified amount on May 10, 1982, recorded as a mortgage on his residence on May 11. Thus, argues the defendant, the information failed to allege an essential element of the crime, i.e., lack of board approval. However, the defendant overlooks the $60,000 limitation on any type of loan, whether approved or not, as specified in 8-409.02. That section and 8-409.01 are in pari materia and must be construed together in order to give meaning to the provisions of both. SID No. 1 v. County of Adams, 209 Neb. 108, 306 N.W.2d 584 (1981). Also, the court will avoid constructions which lead to absurd or unjust results.
09 were open to statutory construction, we could look at statutes in pari materia and at the legislative history of the act to find the intent of the Legislature. See, SID No. 1 v. County of Adams , 209 Neb. 108 (1981) and Pettigrew v. Home Insurance Co ., 191 Neb. 312 (1974). For example, the statutes regulating physician's assistants which, like the statutes regulating dental hygienists, are part of the Uniform Licensing Law, do define `supervision' of physician's assistants in Neb.Rev.Stat. § 71-1,107.