Opinion
No. CV 08 500 34 90 S
April 14, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The defendant, Michael Nunan, moves for summary judgment in this negligence case brought by the plaintiff, Marie Sic.
Summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings and documentary proof submitted demonstrate that no genuine dispute as to material facts exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, Practice Book § 17-49.
In her complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant had stopped his car, facing westbound, on Route 66 at its intersection with Buck Road in the town of Hebron, while waiting for the opportunity to turn left onto Buck Road. The plaintiff was driving through the intersection eastbound on Route 66. Suddenly, a third vehicle struck the defendant's car from behind and propelled the defendant's vehicle into the plaintiff's causing her serious injury. These allegations are undisputed.
The plaintiff asserts that the defendant was negligent by stopping his vehicle at an angle in his lane of travel; by failing to brake or turn his vehicle after he was struck to avoid colliding with the plaintiff; by failing to keep a proper lookout "for traffic approaching from behind;" by failing to drive in the established lane, in violation of General Statutes § 14-236; and by turning his front wheels to the left while he was stopped.
In support of this motion, the defendant submitted two affidavits denying that he was in any lane but his own and stating that the interval of time between the two collisions was one second or less. The plaintiff supplied no counteraffidavits as to these factual circumstances.
The court holds that, based on the proof submitted, there is no genuine factual controversy that the defendant never violated § 14-236 nor that an ordinarily prudent driver in the defendant's situation lacked sufficient time to brake or turn after being rear-ended to escape colliding with the plaintiff's vehicle. The remaining specifications of negligence contend that the defendant breached a duty of care owed to the plaintiff, as an occupant of an oncoming vehicle, to have anticipated the possibility that a third vehicle would slam into the rear of his vehicle while he was stopped in preparation to make a left turn.
The plaintiff submitted the transcript of the deposition of James MacPherson, a master driving instructor and motor vehicle expert. MacPherson opined that turning the front wheels to the left while stopped and awaiting the opportunity to turn left is an unwise and inherently dangerous maneuver. In his classes, he stresses the importance of eschewing this action.
MacPherson acknowledged that Connecticut has no law or regulation governing this circumstance. Nor does any other state or jurisdiction to his knowledge. Also, the Connecticut driver's manual issued by the Motor Vehicle Department omits discussion on this point.
The plaintiff argues that this expert opinion is sufficient to present a factual dispute as to whether the defendant acted negligently by turning his front wheels to the left while stopped. The court sees the dispositive issue as whether a driver, who is stopped while preparing to make a left turn, owes a duty of care to oncoming drivers to foresee and defend against the general possibility that a third driver will violate the law, or otherwise operate unsafely, and smash into the rear of his or her stopped vehicle and thrust it into the path of oncoming traffic. The court holds that no such generic duty exists.
Under our common law, every driver is "entitled to assume that [others] would act as ordinarily prudent men should and to regulate his conduct accordingly." Strosnick v. Connecticut Company, 92 Conn. 594, 598 (1918). "[A] driver is entitled to assume that other users of the highway will obey the law, including lawful traffic regulations, and observe reasonable care until he knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known that the assumption has become unwarranted." Gross v. Boston, Worcester and New York Street Railway Company, 117 Conn. 589, 596 (1933).
Under this principle, a pedestrian can assume that a driver will obey intersection rules when turning left into a driveway. Turbert v. Mather Motors, Inc., 165 Conn. 422, 429-30 (1973). Also, one driver can lawfully assume that another driver will yield the right of way when the rules of the road require the other driver to do so. Ramonas v. Zucker, 163 Conn. 142, 147-48 (1972).
Thus, mere general knowledge that others will, on occasion, violate the law and operate dangerously is insufficient, as a matter of law, to impose a duty to act in anticipation of this ever present possibility. Otherwise, the right to assume safe operation by others, in the absence of specific and particular evidence to the contrary, would be a nullity and the "entitlement" to such an assumption vitiated.
No evidence was proffered in the present case that the defendant possessed any specific information that would have caused an ordinarily vigilant driver to know that another vehicle was about to collide violently into the rear of his properly stopped car. He was, therefore, under no duty to defend the plaintiff against such an eventuality by having his wheels positioned in a particular direction.
Our legislature has refrained from imposing any such obligation, and the court discerns no compelling reason to depart from the common-law presumption of safe operation described above. Summary judgment enters in favor of the defendant.