Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BC159185 John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Judge.
Zee Law Group and Tappan Zee for Defendant and Appellant.
Law Office of James S. Uyeda and James S. Uyeda for Plaintiff and Respondent.
JACKSON, J.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Ryo Sato appeals from an order denying his motion opposing an application by plaintiff Shuwa Investments Corporation for renewal of a judgment against defendant. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff obtained a money judgment in the sum of $100,000 against defendant in 1998. Plaintiff recorded an abstract of judgment in 2000. After plaintiff discovered that defendant and his wife had transferred half of their ownership interest in real property in South Pasadena to their son and daughter, plaintiff filed a second action seeking a decree that the son and daughter’s interests were subordinate to plaintiff’s judgment obtained in 1998. Plaintiff obtained a second judgment against those defendants in 2002. The second judgment acknowledged and reflected an amount due and owing to plaintiff on the first judgment in the sum of $209,182.48. This sum included the principal amount of the first judgment plus interest and legal fees incurred to enforce and collect the first judgment.
The second judgment included in part the following:
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
“1. Now due and owing to Plaintiff, SHUWA, from Defendant, Ryo Sato, are the following sums: (i.) the total principal amount of damages awarded by the Los Angeles County Superior Court to Plaintiff, SHUWA, pursuant to a Judgment (“Judgment”) entered on March 13, 1998, in a prior action (Case No. BC159185) in the amount of $100,000.00 . . . .”
In 2004, plaintiff recorded a second abstract of judgment on the second judgment. Pursuant to the second judgment, the South Pasadena property was to be sold. On the morning of the sale, defendant filed a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. He was subsequently granted a discharge of his debts.
In 2007, plaintiff filed an application for renewal of the first judgment. Defendant filed a motion opposing plaintiff’s application. Defendant argued that the 1998 judgment had merged into the subsequent 2002 judgment, and allowing the renewal of the 1998 judgment would improperly grant plaintiff a windfall. Plaintiff contended that (1) the second judgment did not seek the same relief as the first; (2) California law does not require merger with regard to actions on a judgment, especially where it could be harmful to a creditor; and (3) plaintiff would not be able to recover twice on the same claim because the second judgment and the second abstract of judgment are based upon and relate back to the first judgment and the first abstract of judgment. The trial court denied defendant’s motion, finding plaintiff’s argument to be persuasive.
DISCUSSION
The trial court denied defendant’s motion in reliance on the case of Provisor v. Nelson (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d Supp. 876 (Provisor). Inasmuch as the application of this case to the undisputed facts is a question of law, our review is de novo. (Florio v. Lau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 637, 641.)
In Provisor, the issue presented concerned the effective date of a judgment lien when a new judgment is rendered in an action on a prior judgment. While the court did not decide the case based upon the merger doctrine, the trial court in the instant matter found that the dicta discussion of merger in Provisor was compelling.
In discussing merger in Provisor, the court stated as follows: “Defendant next argues that the first judgment of 1953 was merged into the second judgment of 1963 and has no further validity. Both sides have extensively briefed the question of merger of judgments. There is a conflict of authority on the merger question among the various state courts . . . and no clear holding in California. However, the reasoning of two older cases in this state appears to reject the concept of merger of the first judgment into the second. Morton v. Adams (1899) 124 Cal. 229 . . .; Lilly-Brackett Co. v. Sonneman (1910) 157 Cal. 192 . . . . If the point were squarely raised by the facts we would be constrained to hold on the authority of those cases that California does not follow the merger rule.” (Provisor, supra, 234 Cal.App.2d at p. Supp. 878.)
Provisor also cited judicial concern in preserving judgment liens and their priorities when the result would otherwise be unfair or inequitable to the judgment creditor. (Provisor, supra, 234 Cal.App.2d at p. Supp. 879.) As discussed below, the doctrine of merger would be unfair to plaintiff.
In Morton v. Adams, supra, 124 Cal. at p. 233, the court explained that merger should “not be allowed to have the effect of extinguishing the lien of the first judgment when it is necessary to preserve priorities.”
In the other California case cited in Provisor, Lilly-Brackett Co. v. Sonneman (1912) 163 Cal. 632, 633-634, the court noted: “‘According to the weight of authority, where an existing judgment is sued on as a cause of action, and a new judgment recovered on it, there is no merger of the first judgment, nor is it extinguished without satisfaction of the second.’”
The court further noted: “‘But a second judgment obtained upon the first is of no higher security than the first. Both should stand until the debt which is evidenced by them is fully paid off and satisfied. The first judgment is neither satisfied, merged nor extinguished by a second judgment on the same cause of action, or by an affirmance thereof by a superior court. “Satisfaction” is a technical term, and in its application to a judgment it means the payment of the money due on the judgment, which must be entered of record, and nothing but this is a legal satisfaction of the judgment.’” (Lilly-Brackett Co. v. Sonneman, supra, 163 Cal. at pp. 634-635.)
Here, after plaintiff obtained the first judgment in 1998 and sought to foreclose upon it in 2005 pursuant to the second judgment, defendant filed bankruptcy proceedings and received a discharge in 2006. The discharge nullified any prebankruptcy claims and judgments against the debtor and prevented proceeding against the debtor personally; however, it did not affect creditors’ rights against prebankruptcy liens on the debtor’s property. (Songer v. Cooney (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 387, 392-393.) Since both of plaintiff’s judgments arose before bankruptcy, the judgments are now void and plaintiff is limited to recovery upon the prebankruptcy liens it obtained upon those judgments.
During the bankruptcy proceedings, defendant filed a motion to void the judgment lien on the second judgment. Defendant claimed the abstract of judgment was fatally defective because plaintiff had failed to provide defendant’s social security number as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 674, subdivision (f). (Keele v. Reich (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 1129, 1132; In re Conceicao (Bankr. 9th Cir. 2005) 331 B.R. 885.)
The motion was never heard or decided by the bankruptcy court. If defendant was able to vacate the renewal of the first judgment and then prevail upon a motion to void the judgment lien on the second judgment, plaintiff would lose all ability to collect upon its judgment due to defendant’s discharge in bankruptcy. Not only would this be unfair to plaintiff, but defendant has not shown that he is being harmed by renewal of the judgment. Double recovery for plaintiff is not possible. The second judgment specifically refers and relates back to the first judgment. Satisfaction of one judgment would be a satisfaction of both.
Plaintiff’s counsel, during oral argument on the motion, assured the court that plaintiff was not going to attempt to collect $100,000 on the first judgment and $209,000 on the second judgment.
The existence of the judgment lien on the first judgment does not adversely affect defendant. The abstract of judgment in the second action attaches a copy of the entire second judgment. The second judgment specifies that the amounts of the second judgment are liens pursuant to the abstract of judgment in the first judgment. There was no harm to defendant by renewing the first judgment.
Defendant also contends that allowing plaintiff to possess the two judgments on a single cause of action violates the doctrines of res judicata and fairness. We disagree.
The plaintiff does not have two separately executable judgments. Under the doctrine of res judicata, “[a] valid final judgment in favor of the plaintiff merges the claim in the judgment. The cause of action is extinguished and the only remaining right of action is on the judgment.” (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Judgment, § 342, p. 899.) Once a judgment is obtained, however, a subsequent action on the judgment is not an action on the same claim and is not barred by res judicata.
If defendant were to attack a judgment on the grounds of res judicata, it should have been the second judgment and not the first judgment on renewal. For the sake of argument, if any judgment would have been subject to res judicata, it would have been the second judgment.
The trial court relied on plaintiff’s supplemental brief in reaching its decision. The brief presented two points: (1) the facts describing defendant’s attempt in the bankruptcy proceedings to void the second judgment lien and (2) the fact that the pages attached to the second abstract of judgment set forth that the money judgment reflected in the abstract derived from and related back to the original money judgment. The trial court stated in its ruling that the supplemental brief was persuasive and correct. We concur.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
We concur: WOODS, Acting P. J., ZELON, J.