Opinion
No. 10-11-00329-CR
08-30-2012
JEREMIAH DWAINE SHULTS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
From the 82nd District Court
Falls County, Texas
Trial Court No. 8915
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Jeremiah Dwaine Shults was indicted on two counts of tampering with physical evidence. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.09 (d) (1) (West Supp. 2011). The jury acquitted Shults on Count 1 and convicted him on Count 2. The trial court assessed punishment at ten years confinement and a $2,500.00 fine. The trial court suspended imposition of the confinement portion of the sentence and placed Shults on community supervision for ten years. We affirm.
Background Facts
Shults is the former Chief of Police of Rosebud. He was having a sexual relationship with an eighteen year-old girl, Dana White. On August 15, 2009, Dana was at a party with a friend, Ashley, and they both had been drinking beer. They left the party, and Ashley was driving a vehicle belonging to Dana's mother. Ashley lost control of the vehicle, ran off the road, and hit a couple of trees and a fence. The wreck occurred at approximately 1:30 a.m.
After the accident, Dana called Shults, and he told her he would be right there. Dana also called James Allen who arrived at the scene with Chuck Pruitt shortly before Shults arrived. Dana testified that James and Chuck were both intoxicated when they arrived. Dana further testified that Shults told them what they needed to do in order to avoid getting in "trouble." Shults did not call Department of Public Safety troopers to the accident at that time.
Shults said that they needed to find someone sober to claim to be the driver of the vehicle. Dana's brother, Brent, later arrived at the scene. He had not been drinking, and he agreed to say he was driving at the time of the accident. Shults came up with a story for Brent to say that he swerved to miss an animal and went off the road.
Dana and Ashley had a twelve pack of beer in the vehicle. Shults instructed them to get rid of the beer, and Dana testified he helped them get the beer out of the vehicle. The beer was placed in James' car. Shults also told them they needed to move the driver's seat of the vehicle back so that it would be consistent with Brent driving the vehicle at the time of the wreck. Shults then instructed Dana and her friends to leave the scene before DPS troopers arrived.
Trooper David Grote testified that he and Trooper Cashion arrived at the scene at approximately 2:12 a.m. Shults and Brent were at the scene when the troopers arrived, and a wrecker had been called and was also at the scene. Trooper Grote further testified that Shults lied to him about who was driving the vehicle at the time of the wreck. Shults was subsequently indicted for two counts of tampering with physical evidence for moving the driver's seat of the car and concealing alcoholic beverage containers.
Extraneous Offenses and Bad Acts
In his sole issue on appeal, Shults complains that the trial court erred in admitting extraneous offenses and bad acts at trial.
Standard of Review
A trial court's ruling on the admissibility of extraneous offenses is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). As long as the trial court's ruling is within the "zone of reasonable disagreement," there is no abuse of discretion, and the trial court's ruling will be upheld. Id at 343-344.
Background Facts
On a separate occasion unrelated to the accident, Officer C.W. Crutcher, a police officer for the city of Rosebud, met with Texas Ranger Marquis Cantu to discuss Crutcher's concerns about Shults. Officer Crutcher said that Shults was at parties and that he was drinking with underage females and playing beer pong with young people. Officer Crutcher also said that he had concerns about evidence missing from the police department. Ranger Cantu testified that he intended to look into the allegations, but he was investigating a murder and his time was limited. Ranger Cantu later learned that Officer Crutcher had been terminated from the Rosebud Police Department.
Sometime later, Ranger Cantu began looking into the allegations made by Officer Crutcher, and he contacted Dana. While talking to Dana about Crutcher's allegations, Ranger Cantu learned about Shults' involvement in the wreck on August 15, 2009.
Texas Ranger Mark Leger testified at trial that he investigated the allegations against Shults of tampering with physical evidence after being assigned the case by his supervisor. Ranger Leger testified in detail about his interview with Shults. On cross-examination, Shults' trial counsel offered into evidence a letter written by the District Attorney to the Texas Rangers. The letter set out the allegations against Shults and stated that the District Attorney's office would prosecute the charges upon receipt of the complete investigative report.
Shults' trial counsel then questioned Ranger Leger on whether the district attorney had already conducted an investigation herself and whether the district attorney had given immunity to anyone involved in the case. During re-direct examination, Ranger Leger testified that the allegations against Shults originally were received by Ranger Cantu. Ranger Leger explained that the Texas Rangers are required to have a letter from the District Attorney's office before investigating an allegation involving public corruption. Ranger Leger stated that it is standard for the letter to include language that the district attorney will prosecute the charges upon completion of the investigation because the Texas Rangers do not want to pursue an investigation if the charges will not be prosecuted.
Later during the testimony of Ranger Cantu, the State asked about the procedures for investigating allegations against public officials. The State then asked Ranger Cantu how he first learned of problems with Shults. Shults objected that the testimony would involve evidence that is inadmissible under TEX. R. EVID. 404(b). The State argued that Shults opened the door by introducing the letter from the district attorney. The State further argued that Shults introduced testimony to attempt to show that the State was involved in selective prosecution and that witnesses were biased and prejudiced.
The trial court heard testimony outside the presence of the jury from Ranger Cantu on how he first heard about problems with Shults. The trial court allowed Ranger Cantu to testify about the information he received from Officer Crutcher concerning Shults' behavior that led to the investigation for tampering with physical evidence.
Argument
Shults first argues that the State failed to object to the admission of the letter and thus waived any error. Shults contends that the letter from the district attorney was hearsay and that because the State did not object to the admission of the letter, the State waived its argument that Shults opened the door for the testimony.
Hearsay is a statement other than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. TEX. R. EVID. 801 (d). Shults' trial counsel asked Ranger Leger about his assignment to the case. An extrajudicial statement or writing which is offered for the purpose of showing what was said rather than for the truth of the matter stated therein does not constitute hearsay. Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). An extra-judicial statement or writing may be admitted as circumstantial evidence from which an inference may be drawn, and not for the truth of the matter stated, therein, without violating the hearsay rule. Id. Shults offered the letter to explain its theory of why the Texas Rangers began investigating him. See Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d at 347. The letter was not inadmissible hearsay, and the record does not show that the State deliberately waived an objection to later argue that Shults opened the door for the evidence.
Shults next argues that even if the door was opened, the State was allowed to reply in an overly broad manner and that the evidence should have been excluded under TEX. R. EVID. 403. Shults attempted to show that the State was engaging in selective prosecution in his case and that witnesses who testified against him were biased or prejudiced and shown favoritism by the State. The State introduced evidence to rebut the defensive theory. We do not find that the State's evidence to rebut the defensive theory was overly broad. The trial court heard the testimony of Ranger Cantu outside the presence of the jury. The trial court found that Shults "opened this area of inquiry. The Court is going to allow it, because [the jury] needs to weigh it. The Court does not believe it will substantially outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice as the Court will put a limiting instruction in the - - in the charge ..." We do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence of extraneous offenses and bad acts. We overrule the sole issue on appeal.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
AL SCOGGINS
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Scoggins
Affirmed
Do not publish
[CR25]