Opinion
3:23-CV-1108 (DNH/ML)
09-29-2023
SHANISE SHIDAGIS, Plaintiff, v. MANAGER AT CITGO GAS STATION, Defendant.
SHANISE SHIDAGIS Plaintiff, Pro Se
SHANISE SHIDAGIS
Plaintiff, Pro Se
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
MIROSLAV LOVRIC, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The Clerk has sent a pro se complaint in the above captioned action together with an application to proceed in forma pauperis, filed by Shanise Shidagis (“Plaintiff”) to the Court for review. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 2.) For the reasons discussed below, I grant Plaintiff's in forma pauperis application, and recommend that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed in its entirety without leave to amend. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 2.)
I. BACKGROUND
Construed as liberally as possible, Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that on an unspecified date, the Citgo Gas Station manager (“Defendant”) kicked her, causing a contusion. (See generally Dkt. No. 1.)
The court must interpret pro se complaints to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. Soto v. Walker, 44 F.3d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)).
Based on these factual allegations, Plaintiff asserts one claim of “assault.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) As relief, Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $600.00. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.)
II. PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
“When a civil action is commenced in a federal district court, the statutory filing fee, currently set at $402, must ordinarily be paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A court is authorized, however, to permit a litigant to proceed in forma pauperis status if a party “is unable to pay” the standard fee for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). After reviewing Plaintiff's in forma pauperis application (Dkt. No. 2), the Court finds that Plaintiff meets this standard. Therefore, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
The language of that section is ambiguous because it suggests an intent to limit availability of in forma pauperis status to prison inmates. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (authorizing the commencement of an action without prepayment of fees “by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses”). The courts have construed that section, however, as making in forma pauperis status available to any litigant who can meet the governing financial criteria. Hayes v. United States, 71 Fed.Cl. 366, 367 (Fed. Cl. 2006); Fridman v. City of N.Y., 195 F.Supp.2d 534, 536 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Plaintiff is reminded that, although her application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted, she is still required to pay fees that she may incur in this action, including copying and/or witness fees.
Plaintiff is advised that the ability to litigate an action without prepayment of fees is a privilege that can be denied, revoked, or limited based upon a showing of prior abuses. See In re Anderson, 511 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1994) (denying the pro se petitioner's request for leave to proceed IFP where the Court found that, like the previous twenty-two petitions filed during the three immediately preceding years, the instant petition was “patently frivolous”); see also Cuoco v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 328 F.Supp.2d 463, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“The ability to proceed IFP is a privilege provided for the benefit of indigent persons.”). The authority of a court to deny or limit a request to proceed IFP is implicit in the permissive, rather than compulsory, language of the controlling statute, which provides that “any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (emphasis added); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 183 (1989). For this reason, courts are regarded as possessing discretionary authority to deny IFP status to litigants who have abused the privilege. See Hurt v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 544 F.3d 308, 309-310 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Butler v. Dep't of Justice, 492 F.3d 440, 444-45 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“This Circuit grants IFP status to various plaintiffs, but asserts its discretion to deny or revoke this privilege for abusive litigants, looking to ‘the number, content, frequency, and disposition of their previous filings[.]'”).
Plaintiff's litigation history in this district suggests that she is on the brink of being found to have abused the privilege of proceeding IFP. In addition to the case currently before the Court, Plaintiff has filed seven other lawsuits in this district within the last twelve months. In six of the other actions, Plaintiff requested, and was granted, permission to proceed without prepayment of fees. (Shidagis I, Dkt. No. 4; Shidagis II, Dkt. No. 4; Shidagis III, Dkt. No. 4; Shidagis IV, Dkt. No. 4; Shidagis V, Dkt. No. 5; Shidagis VI, Dkt. No. 4.)
Shidagis v. Broome Cnty. D.S.S., Case No. 3:22-CV-1224 (BKS/ML) (“Shidagis I”); Shidagis v. Broome Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., Case No. 3:22-CV-1299 (GTS/ML) (“Shidagis II”); Shidagis v. Broome Cnty. Sheriff's Office, Case No. 3:22-CV-1300 (DNH/ML) (“Shidagis III”); Shidagis v. Broome Cnty. D.S.S., Case No. 3:23-CV-0031 (BKS/ML) (“Shidagis IV”); Shidagis v. Dominguez, Case No. 3:23-CV-0032 (BKS/ML) (“Shidagis V”); Shidagis v. Citgo Gas Station, Case No. 3:23-CV-0192 (DNH/ML) (“Shidagis VI”); and Shidagis v. Broome Cnty. Sheriff's Office, Case. No. 3:23-CV-1107 (DNH/ML) (“Shidagis VII”).
Common to the other dismissed actions filed by Plaintiff in this district (including, as will be discussed below, the current Complaint under consideration in this report) is her failure to include factual allegations in her complaints that demonstrate that the Court has jurisdiction to consider her claims. Accordingly, Plaintiff is hereby cautioned that (1) proceeding IFP is a privilege that is extended to litigants at the discretion of the court, and (2) any further filing of patently frivolous lawsuits may result in the denial of any request to proceed IFP in an action and/or a recommendation to the Chief District Judge that a filing injunction be issued against Plaintiff, barring her from filing any future lawsuits in this district without prior permission.
The Court also notes that the allegations contained in Plaintiff's Complaint here are almost identical to the facts alleged and claims that were dismissed in Shidagis VI. (Compare Dkt. No. 1, with Shidagis VI, Dkt. No. 1.)
III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR INITIAL REVIEW OF THE COMPLAINT
“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
In addition, the Court shall dismiss any action where the Complaint fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 88-89 (1988) (holding that subject matter jurisdiction is a “threshold question that must be resolved . . . before proceeding to the merits.”); Humphrey v. Syracuse Police Dep't, 758 Fed.Appx. 205, 205-06 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Bond, 762 F.3d 255, 263 (2d Cir. 2014)) (“[b]efore deciding any case on the merits, a district court must determine that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the matter.”); Koziel v. City of Yonkers, 352 Fed.Appx. 470, 471 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint on initial review for lack of subject matter); Talley v. LoanCare Serv., Div. of FNF, 15-CV-5017, 2018 WL 4185705, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2018) (dismissing on initial review, action challenging state court mortgage foreclosure judgment because the court lacked jurisdiction); Eckert v. Schroeder, Joseph & Assoc., 364 F.Supp.2d 326, 327 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Hughes v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n of the City of N.Y., Inc., 850 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 967 (1988)) (“[a] court shall, sua sponte, dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as soon as it is apparent that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.”).
“In reviewing a complaint . . . the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Courts are “obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally.” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (reading the plaintiff's pro se complaint “broadly, as we must” and holding that the complaint sufficiently raised a cognizable claim). “[E]xtreme caution should be exercised in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and [the] parties . . . have had an opportunity to respond.” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983).
IV. ANALYSIS
In addressing the sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint, the court must construe her pleadings liberally. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Having reviewed Plaintiff's Complaint with this principle in mind, I recommend that all causes of action be dismissed.
The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and must independently verify the existence of subject matter jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005); Doe v. United States, 833 F.3d 192, 196 (2d Cir. 2016). “Congress has granted district courts original jurisdiction over cases in which there is a federal question, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and certain cases between citizens of different states, so long as the requirements of complete diversity and amount in controversy are met, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332.” Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Kentucky, 704 F.3d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 2013). “[F]ailure of subject matter jurisdiction is not waivable and may be raised at any time by a party or by the court sua sponte. If subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, the action must be dismissed.” Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 700-01 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see also Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000).
Here, there is no “federal question” jurisdiction because the claim of “assault” is a state law claim. Harris v. Lewis, 22-CV-6953, 2022 WL 10642676, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2022) (“The only way that Plaintiff's allegations of assault would rise to the level of a federal claim is if the assault was perpetrated by a state actor....Instead, Plaintiff is suing a private individual for assault, and he has not pleaded facts showing that his claim arises under federal law. There is, therefore, no basis for federal question jurisdiction.”); Phillips v. Town of Hebron, 16-CV-1726, 2017 WL 3387133, at *6 (D. Conn. Aug. 7, 2017) (“Plaintiff's claims for assault are plainly state law claims that do not present any federal question.”); see also Wilson v. Neighborhood Restore Dev., 18-CV-1172, 2018 WL 2390143, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 2018) (citing Loreley Fin. (Jersey) No. 3 Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Sec., LLC, 797 F.3d 160, 182 (2d Cir. 2015)) (holding that “personal injury . . . [is a] state law claim[]” that does not raise any federal question for purposes of jurisdiction).
In addition, because the complaint alleges that Plaintiff and Defendant are citizens of New York (Dkt. No. 1 at 3), there is no diversity jurisdiction. Lever v. Lyons, 16-CV-5130, 2021, WL 302648, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2021) (no diversity jurisdiction where parties were all citizens of New York). Moreover, the amount at stake does not appear to be more than $75,000. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.)
As a result, I recommend that Plaintiff's claims be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
V. OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND
Generally, a court should not dismiss claims contained in a complaint filed by a pro se litigant without granting leave to amend at least once “when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”). An opportunity to amend is not required, however, where “the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Cortec Indus. Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Of course, where a plaintiff is unable to allege any fact sufficient to support its claim, a complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.”). Stated differently, “[w]here it appears that granting leave to amend is unlikely to be productive, . . . it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.” Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993); accord, Brown v. Peters, 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997) (Pooler, J.).
See also Carris v. First Student, Inc., 132 F.Supp.3d 321, 340-41 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) (Suddaby, C.J.) (explaining that the standard set forth in Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999)-that the Court should grant leave to amend “unless the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would be successful in stating a claim”-is likely not an accurate recitation of the governing law after Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)), rev'd on other grounds, 682 Fed.Appx. 30.
Here, leave to amend would be futile. As a result, I recommend that Plaintiff's claims be dismissed without leave to amend. See Vazquez v. New York, 22-CV-0196, 2022 WL 2390248, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. June 30, 2022) (Hummel, M.J.) (recommending dismissal without leave to amend the plaintiff's defamation claim because, inter alia, “plaintiff has not established jurisdiction.”), report and recommendation adopted by, 2022 WL 3100553 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2022) (Suddaby, C.J.).
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 2) is GRANTED; and it is further respectfully
RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE BUT
WITHOUT LEAVE TO REPLEAD Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider the claim stated therein; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall file a copy of this order, report, and recommendation on the docket of this case and serve a copy upon the parties in accordance with the local rules.
The Clerk shall also provide Plaintiff with copies of all unreported decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW . 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(d), 72; Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)).
If you are proceeding pro se and served with this report, recommendation, and order by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date that the report, recommendation, and order was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(1)(C).
Plaintiff is reminded that she must immediately notify the Court of any change of address consistent with N.D.N.Y. L.R. 10.1(c)(2), and that her failure to notify the Court of a change of address could result in the involuntary dismissal of her cases for failure to prosecute pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) and N.D.N.Y. L.R. 41.2(b).