[¶ 13.] Contrary to Taxpayer's assertions, there is authority stating that "[a] single sale of property . . . does not ordinarily determine true and full value of a property as there may be economic conditions of a temporary nature and other factors which prevent the same from being a true measure of value." Sheraton-Midcontinent Corp. v. County of Pennington, 77 S.D. 554, 560, 95 N.W.2d 892, 896 (1959). See also Willow, Inc., 89 S.D. at 647, 237 N.W.2d at 662 (stating great weight should not always be given to a sale).

SDC 57.0301 defines them as "the usual cash selling price" which was said to be the price it would bring if offered for sale on the open market under conditions in which neither buyer nor seller could take advantage of the exigencies of the other. Sheraton-Midcontinent Corporation v. County of Pennington, 77 S.D. 554, 95 N.W.2d 892. It is akin to eminent domain willing seller — willing buyer guide for which see City of Huron v. Jelgerhuis, 77 S.D. 600, 97 N.W.2d 314.

See Williams, 69 SD at 121, 7 N.W.2d at 150 (concluding that a property owner is entitled to relief when the owner shows that the Director's valuation was excessive). See also Sheraton-Midcontinent Corp. v. Pennington County, 77 S.D. 554, 558, 95 N.W.2d 892, 894 (1959) (concluding that "[t]he burden of proof . . . is on the complaining taxpayer to prove that an assessment is excessive"). [¶ 17.

In fact, we have stated that the determination of true and full value "permits evidence of all relevant factors and does not authorize assessing authorities to fix an assessment within a specific formula." See Sheraton-Midcontinent Corp. v. County of Pennington, 95 N.W.2d 892, 896 (SD 1959). [¶ 40] It is a simple principle that when property is recently purchased through an arm's length transaction with no unique circumstances or surrounding market conditions affecting the sale, the sale price should not be disregarded in considering what that property is worth.

The terms "actual value" and "true and full value" mean the "market value" of property to be assessed and market value has been defined as the price . . . a purchaser willing but not obligated to buy would pay an owner willing but not obligated to sell, taking into consideration all uses to which the property is adapted and might in reason be applied. Rau v. Fritz, 81 S.D. 311, 314, 134 N.W.2d 773, 775 (1965) ( citing Sheraton-Midcontinent Corp. v. County of Pennington, 77 S.D. 554, 95 N.W.2d 892 (1959) and Tidball v. Miller, 72 S.D. 243, 32 N.W.2d 683 (1948)). See Bailey v. Megan, 102 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1939); Mortenson v. Stanley County, 303 N.W.2d 107 (S.D. 1981); Yadco, Inc. v. Yankton County, 89 S.D. 651, 237 N.W.2d 665 (1975); In re Appeals of Jepsen, 76 S.D. 421, 80 N.W.2d 76 (1956); Williams v. Stanley County Bd. of Equalization, 69 S.D. 118, 7 N.W.2d 148 (1942).

This court has recognized a similar measure of damages in different settings. See Ward v. LaCreek Electric Ass'n, 1968, 83 S.D. 584, 163 N.W.2d 344 (destruction of things attached to realty) . . . Sheraton-Midcontinent Corp. v. County of Pennington, 1959, 77 S.D. 554, 95 N.W.2d 892 (value of building for taxation); Lampe Market Co. v. Alliance Ins. Co., 1946, 71 S.D. 120, 22 N.W.2d 427 (value of building in insurance case). . . .

" In an appeal to the circuit court, the court does not merely have power to determine whether an assessment is excessive or arbitrary, but exercises independent judicial judgment to determine valuation. Sheraton-Midcontinent Corp. v. County of Pennington, 1959, 77 S.D. 554, 95 N.W.2d 892; Rau v. Fritz, 1965, 81 S.D. 311, 134 N.W.2d 773. In giving effect to these constitutional and statutory provisions, the court may give the taxpayer relief where property is assessed at more than its actual value even though there is no proof that a reduction is necessary to effect uniformity with other property of the same class; Williams v. Stanley County, 1942, 69 S.D. 118, 7 N.W.2d 148, where property is assessed at more than its true and full value in money; In re Appeals of Jepsen, 1956, 76 S.D. 421, 80 N.W.2d 76, where, without regard to "actual value" or "true and full value in money" the assessment lacks uniformity and is grossly inequitable; In re Robinson, 1951, 73 S.D. 580, 46 N.W.2d 908, or where discrimination exists, reduction of valuation to such an amount as may be necessary to remove the discrimanation.

This court has recognized a similar measure of damages in different settings. See Ward v. LaCreek Electric Ass'n, 1968, 83 S.D. 584, 163 N.W.2d 344 (destruction of things attached to realty) (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Farmers Co-op. Co., 68 S.D. 338, 2 N.W.2d 665); Sheraton-Midcontinent Corp. v. County of Pennington, 1959, 77 S.D. 554, 95 N.W.2d 892 (value of building for taxation); Lampe Market Co. v. Alliance Ins. Co., 1946, 71 S.D. 120, 22 N.W.2d 427 (value of building in insurance case). We find no conflict between this measure of damages and SDCL 21-1-6 or 21-1-7.

SDCL 10-6-1. It has been said by our decisions to be "the amount a willing purchaser will pay a willing seller in an open market." Sheraton-Midcontinent Corp. v. County of Pennington, 1959, 77 S.D. 554, 95 N.W.2d 892. [1-3] Often, however, there is no market for the property to be assessed.

The first controversy in this case, as in Yadco v. Yankton County, 1975, 89 S.D. 651, 237 N.W.2d 665, also decided today, is whether the trial court's determination of true and full value is to be sustained. As noted in Yadco, the determination of true and full value commonly involves consideration of various factors, including "`replacement cost less proper deductions * * * income from the property,' Sheraton-Midcontinent Corp. v. County of Pennington, [1959, 77 S.D. 554, 95 N.W.2d 892]; `"Evidence of actual sales of other lands,"' when such sales are made by willing buyers to willing sellers, Tidball v. Miller, [1948, 72 S.D. 243, 32 N.W.2d 683]; and previous sales of the particular property in question, Plaza Hotel Assoc. v. Wellington Assoc., Inc., 1973, 73 Misc.2d 6, 340 N.Y.S.2d 796." Yadco v. Yankton County, supra.