Opinion
6:19-CV-06406 EAW
2020-04-21
Gemayel SHEPHERD, Plaintiff, v. Preiti NANDALAWAYA, in both her individual capacity and her official capacity, Gerald Cahill, in both his individual capacity and his official capacity, Israel Lucion, in both his individual capacity and his official capacity, Nichole L. Chilton, in both her individual capacity and her official capacity, John Doe, Jane Doe, State of New York, and Franklin Correctional Facility, Defendants.
Van Henri White, Law Office of Van White, Rochester, NY, for Plaintiff.
Van Henri White, Law Office of Van White, Rochester, NY, for Plaintiff.
DECISION AND ORDER
ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, United States District Judge
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Gemayel Shepherd ("Plaintiff"), represented by counsel, brings this action asserting a state law claim and a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in connection with his previous confinement at the Franklin Correctional Facility ("Franklin C.F."). (Dkt. 1). Plaintiff asserts claims against Preiti Nandalawaya ("Nandalawaya"), Gerald Cahill ("Cahill"), Israel Lucion ("Lucion"), Nichole L. Chilton ("Chilton"), the State of New York, Franklin C.F., John Doe, and Jane Doe (collectively, "Defendants"). Plaintiff has also submitted an application to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and an affirmation of poverty in support thereof. (Dkt. 2).
The Court grants Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis . Having reviewed the Complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court finds that Plaintiff's Complaint must be dismissed, but grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. (Dkt. 3). As required at this stage of the proceedings, the Court treats Plaintiff's allegations as true.
Due to a prior accident, Plaintiff is a paraplegic. (Id. at ¶ 11). During 2017, Plaintiff was an inmate at Franklin C.F. (Id. at ¶ 12). "Throughout all of 2017," Nandalawaya, Cahill, Lucion, and Chilton were all employed at Franklin C.F., and Lucion was "under the supervision and control of the other Defendants in this action." (Id. at ¶¶ 13, 14).
On January 11, 2017, during a therapy session, Lucion placed a hot pack on Plaintiff's lower back and instructed "Plaintiff to leave it there." (Id. at ¶ 15). The hot pack on Plaintiff's back caused Plaintiff first and second-degree burns. (Id. at ¶ 16). As a result, "Plaintiff suffered great mental distress and severe emotional pain." (Id. at ¶ 22).
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff's Motion for In Forma Pauperis Status is Granted
Plaintiff's motion for in forma pauperis status and affirmation of poverty in support thereof have been reviewed in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Plaintiff has met the statutory requirements for in forma pauperis status, and, therefore, permission to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
II. Legal Standard
" Section 1915 requires the Court to conduct an initial screening of complaints filed by civil litigants proceeding in forma pauperis , to ensure that the case goes forward only if it meets certain requirements." Guess v. Jahromi , No. 6:17-CV-06121(MAT), 2017 WL 1063474, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2017), reconsideration denied , 2017 WL 1489142 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2017).
In evaluating the Amended Complaint, the Court must accept all factual allegations as true and must draw all inferences in Plaintiff's favor. See Larkin v. Savage , 318 F.3d 138, 139 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam); King v. Simpson , 189 F.3d 284, 287 (2d Cir. 1999). "Specific facts are not necessary," and a plaintiff "need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ " Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Boykin v. KeyCorp , 521 F.3d 202, 213 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing pleading standard in pro se cases after Twombly : "even after Twombly , dismissal of a pro se claim as insufficiently pleaded is appropriate only in the most unsustainable of cases"). Although "a court is obliged to construe [pro se ] pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights violations," McEachin v. McGuinnis , 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004), even pleadings submitted pro se must meet the notice requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Wynder v. McMahon , 360 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2004).
"To state a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the challenged conduct (1) was attributable to a person acting under color of state law, and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Whalen v. County of Fulton , 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Eagleston v. Guido , 41 F.3d 865, 875-76 (2d Cir. 1994) ). " Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere." Sykes v. James , 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle , 471 U.S. 808, 816, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985) ).
To establish liability against an official under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that individual's personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation; it is not enough to assert that the defendant is a link in the chain of command. See McKenna v. Wright , 386 F.3d 432, 437 (2d Cir. 2004) ; Colon v. Coughlin , 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995). Moreover, the theory of respondeat superior is not available in a § 1983 action. See Hernandez v. Keane , 341 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir. 2003). A supervisory official can be found to have been personally involved in an alleged constitutional violation in one of several ways:
(1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation, (2) the defendant, after being informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong, (3) the defendant created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom, (4) the defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of inmates by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring.
Colon , 58 F.3d at 873 (citing Wright v. Smith , 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) ).
III. Plaintiff's Claims
A. Eighth Amendment Claim—Inadequate Medical Care
As his first cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that Lucion's placement of the hot pack, "and the other Defendants' collective failure to properly supervise the use of the hot pack amounted to a malicious, wanton, and callous administration of the medical care required under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States." (Dkt. 3 at 5). However, Plaintiff's Complaint does not implicate these Amendments as the allegations only concern the medical treatment he received while confined as an inmate at Franklin C.F. Because Plaintiff is represented by counsel, Plaintiff is not entitled to the special solicitude granted to pro se plaintiffs. Nonetheless, the Court construes Plaintiff's first cause of action, titled "Section 1983 claims" as alleging a claim of inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment. However, as discussed below, Plaintiff's claim must be dismissed as Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege Defendants were deliberately indifferent.
A claim of inadequate medical care rises to the level of a constitutional violation only where the facts alleged show that defendant was deliberately indifferent to a plaintiff's serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 104-05, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). See also Ross v. Kelly , 784 F. Supp. 35, 43-44 (W.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd , 970 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1992). This standard includes both an objective and subjective component. First, the plaintiff's medical needs must be objectively serious. "A serious medical condition exists where ‘the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’ " Harrison v. Barkley , 219 F.3d 132, 136-37 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Chance v. Armstrong , 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Second Circuit has explained:
[medical] conditions ... vary in severity and ... a decision to leave a condition untreated will be constitutional or not depending on the facts of the particular case. Thus, a prisoner with a hang-nail has no constitutional right to treatment, but if prison officials deliberately ignore an infected gash, "the failure to provide appropriate treatment might well violate the Eighth Amendment."
Id . (quoting Chance , 143 F.3d at 702 ). When assessing whether a serious medical need exists, the Court examines a number of factors, "including whether the plaintiff had an injury or condition ‘that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.’ " Lewis v. Zon, 920 F. Supp. 2d 379, 388 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Chance, 143 F.3d at 702 ).
Second, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant had actual knowledge of the plaintiff's serious medical needs but was deliberately indifferent. Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) ; Brock v. Wright , 315 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2003). An isolated failure to provide medical treatment, without more, is generally not actionable unless the surrounding circumstances suggest a degree of deliberateness, rather than inadvertence, in the failure to render meaningful treatment. Gill v. Mooney , 824 F.2d 192, 196 (2d Cir. 1987). "Mere disagreement over the proper treatment does not create a constitutional claim. So long as the treatment given is adequate, the fact that a prisoner might prefer a different treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation." White v. Clement , 116 F. Supp. 3d 183, 186 (W.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Chance , 143 F.3d at 703 ).
Assuming for purposes of initial review that Plaintiff has alleged a serious medical need, Plaintiff's claim must still be dismissed because he fails to adequately allege the subjective component. Plaintiff only alleges that Lucion placed the hot pack on Plaintiff's back. Plaintiff does not allege facts indicating that Lucion knew of and disregarded an excessive risk of substantial harm when he placed the hot pack on Plaintiff's back. Further, Plaintiff does not allege that he was denied adequate treatment or care in connection with his resulting burns. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim as alleged against Lucion must be dismissed. Compare Campbell v. New York City , No. 12-CV-2179 (CBA) (VMS), 2014 WL 4199717, at *5-6 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2014) (adequate allegation of deliberate indifference where plaintiff alleged that he communicated to the defendant regarding a known and serious harmful allergy but the defendant offered no alternative medication), with Magee v. Childs , No. CIV904CV1089GLSRFT, 2006 WL 681223, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2006) (holding that the plaintiff failed to plead facts that would constitute deliberate indifference where the plaintiff did not state "any facts that would prove that Defendant Tousignant knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to [the plaintiff's health]"). However, Plaintiff will be permitted to amend his Complaint to set forth the necessary allegations therein.
Plaintiff's claim as alleged against Nandalawaya, Cahill, and Chilton must also be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to allege the personal involvement of these Defendants in the denial of adequate medical care. Plaintiff alleges that these Defendants were involved because Lucion "was under the supervision and control of [these] Defendants" (Dkt. 3 at ¶ 14), and because of their "collective failure to properly supervise the use of the hot pack" (id. at ¶ 25). Such allegations are insufficient to allege supervisory liability under § 1983 and, thus, Plaintiff's claim against these Defendants must be dismissed. See Pettus v. Morgenthau , 554 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of supervisory official where complaint lacked "any hint that [the official] acted with deliberate indifference to the possibility that his subordinates would violate [plaintiff's] constitutional rights"); Mimms v. Carr , No. 09-CV-5740 (NGG)(LB), 2011 WL 2360059, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. June 9, 2011) (dismissing supervisory liability claims where the plaintiff, in conclusory fashion, alleged that defendants had failed to supervise or train their subordinates). However, Plaintiff will be permitted to amend his Complaint to set forth the necessary allegations therein.
B. Medical Malpractice
Plaintiff alleges medical malpractice as a second cause of action. (Dkt. 3 at 5). Having concluded Plaintiff's federal claim is not viable at this stage of the proceedings, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law medical malpractice claim unless Plaintiff is able to amend his allegations to assert a viable federal claim.
A district court has discretion to hear state law claims where the relationship between a plaintiff's federal and state claims present "but one constitutional case" and "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs , 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). When a federal court dismisses federal claims, the court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) ; see also Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc. , 556 U.S. 635, 639, 129 S.Ct. 1862, 173 L.Ed.2d 843 (2009) ("A district court's decision whether to exercise that jurisdiction after dismissing every claim over which it had original jurisdiction is purely discretionary.").
"Courts ‘consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in order to decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.’ " Lundy v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long Island, Inc. , 711 F.3d 106, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill , 484 U.S. 343, 349-50, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988) ). "Once all federal claims have been dismissed, the balance of factors will ‘usual[ly]’ point toward a declination." Id. (citation omitted); see also Brzak v. United Nations , 597 F.3d 107, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2010) ("[I]f a plaintiff's federal claims are dismissed before trial, the state claims should be dismissed as well.").
In consideration of the relevant factors, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claim unless he is able to amend his allegations to assert a viable federal cause of action.
C. Sovereign Immunity
Plaintiff asserts claims against the State of New York and the named Defendants in both their personal and official capacities. The Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over claims against states absent their consent to such suit or an express statutory waiver of immunity. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman , 465 U.S. 89, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). It is well-settled that states are not "persons" under § 1983, and thus Eleventh Amendment immunity is not abrogated by that statute. Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police , 491 U.S. 58, 65-66, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). The Eleventh Amendment bar extends to agencies and officials sued in their official capacities. Kentucky v. Graham , 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) ; see also Hafer v. Melo , 502 U.S. 21, 27, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991) (just as states and state agencies are not "persons" under § 1983, state officers acting in their official capacities are not "persons" since they assume the identity of the government that employs them).
Plaintiff may therefore sue the State of New York and the named Defendants in their official capacities only if such Defendants consent to be sued. Pennhurst , 465 U.S. at 99-101, 104 S.Ct. 900. Since none have consented, the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff's suit against the State of New York and the named Defendants in their official capacities. To the extent that such claims have been made, they are dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff's claim against Franklin C.F. must also be dismissed. "An official arm of the state," such as DOCCS, "enjoys the same Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court as is enjoyed by the state itself." Posr v. Court Officer Shield No. 207 , 180 F.3d 409, 414 (2d Cir. 1999). "A state correctional facility, which has no separate legal existence, is generally referred to as a ‘branch’ of DOCCS and, as such, is immune from § 1983 liability." Wilcox v. Auburn Corr. Facility , No. 9:19-CV-0715 (LEK/DJS), 2019 WL 5968102, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2019) ; see also Simmons v. Gowanda Corr. Facility , No. 13-CV-0647Sc, 2013 WL 3340646, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013) (holding that DOCCS and Gowanda Correctional Facility enjoy the "same Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court as is enjoyed by the state itself"). To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to assert a claim against Franklin C.F., such claim is dismissed with prejudice.
D. John and Jane Doe
Plaintiff lists John and Jane Doe as defendants. However, the Complaint contains no allegations regarding these parties. Consequently, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to assert claims against John and Jane Doe, such claims are dismissed. However, Plaintiff will be permitted to amend his Complaint to set forth the necessary allegations therein. Plaintiff is advised that should he file an amended complaint, Plaintiff must include allegations detailing John and Jane Doe's personal involvement in connection with Plaintiff's claims.
IV. Leave to Amend Complaint
As discussed above, Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim, as presently alleged, cannot go forward against Defendants. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint by May 22, 2020 . Plaintiff is not required to file an amended complaint—but if he fails to do so, his federal claims will be dismissed with prejudice and his state law claim will be dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff is further advised that should he file an amended complaint, he must include specific allegations as to each Defendant's personal involvement in connection with his claims.
Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint is intended to completely replace the prior complaint in the action, and thus it "renders [the original complaint] of no legal effect." Int'l Controls Corp. v. Vesco , 556 F.2d 665, 668 (2d Cir. 1977). Therefore, Plaintiff's amended complaint must include all of the allegations against Defendants, such that the amended complaint may stand alone as the sole complaint in the action.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The Court dismisses Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care and state law malpractice claims without prejudice and with leave to replead. Plaintiff's claims against the State of New York, named Defendants in their official capacities, and Franklin C.F. are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint, as directed above, by May 22, 2020 , in which he must include the necessary allegations regarding his claims. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint by this date, his Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care claim will be dismissed with prejudice, while his state law malpractice claim will be dismissed without prejudice for lack of supplemental jurisdiction, and the Clerk of Court is directed to close the case without further order of the Court.
SO ORDERED.