A majority of the appellate court reversed, concluding that the production of oil from wells on other parcels in the Unit constituted production from the subject parcel, so as to preserve defendant's mineral interest. ( 122 Ill. App.3d 1089, 1097.) We granted plaintiffs' leave to appeal (87 Ill.2d R. 315). The sole issue concerns the construction of the 1962 deed from defendant's predecessor in interest to plaintiffs.
Thus, an order dismissing an affirmative defense is not final. City of Chicago v. Piotrowski, 215 Ill.App.3d 829, 159 Ill.Dec. 395, 576 N.E.2d 64 (1st Dist. 1991); Geier v. Hamer Enterprises, Inc., 1991 WL 9328 (1st Dist. 1991); Shelton v. Andres, 122 Ill.App.3d 1089, 78 Ill.Dec. 430, 462 N.E.2d 549 (5th Dist. 1984). To the extent that the January 1989 Order dismissed the Debtors' affirmative defense, dismissal of that defense was not itself final.
Id. In Shelton v. Andres, 122 Ill.App.3d 1089, 1093 (1984), we likewise concluded that the circuit court's order striking the defendant's affirmative defenses was not final because it did not determine the litigation on the merits so that, if affirmed, the only thing remaining would be to proceed with execution of the order
" Id. Similarly, in Shelton v. Andres, 122 Ill. App. 3d 1089 (1984), the court concluded that an order striking a defendant's affirmative defenses "was not final because it did not determine the litigation on its merits so that, if affirmed, the only thing remaining would be to proceed with execution on the order. *** The fact that the trial court made a finding pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) that 'there is no just reason for delaying appeal of this order' does not confer finality upon an order that is otherwise not final.
They would not be appealable until the final judgment was entered in the resumed proceeding, at which time the final judgment would draw into question all prior nonfinal orders and rulings which produced the judgment. Shelton v. Andres (1984), 122 Ill. App.3d 1089; Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp. (1979), 76 Ill.2d 427. Because our jurisdiction is confined to reviewing appeals from final orders or judgments (87 Ill.2d R. 301), unless one of the exceptions for interlocutory appeals is applicable (Supreme Court Rule 304, as amended April 27, 1984, effective July 1, 1984; 87 Ill.2d Rules 307, 308; cf. Novak Food Service Equipment, Inc. v. Moe's Corned Beef Cellar, Inc. (1984), 121 Ill. App.3d 902 (where the court rejected plaintiff's claim the interlocutory appeal should be allowed under Supreme Court Rule 307(a))), we conclude the appeals at bar must be dismissed because the record does not show a final judgment has been entered which finally determines the parties' rights or which, if affirmed, would terminate the litigation.