Opinion
Civil Action 4:20-cv-3025-JD-TER
01-26-2024
BRONSON SHELLEY, #1589035, aka Bronson Shelley, # 353229, Plaintiff, v. BRYAN P. STIRLING, JAMES M. BROWN, DENNIS R. PATTERSON, and ANNIE RUMLER, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THOMAS E. ROGERS, III UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, and the South Carolina Religious Freedom Act (SCRFA), SC Code Ann. § 132-10 et seq. Following Defendants' motion to dismiss and first motion for summary judgment, the only claims remaining in this action are Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief as to all Defendants in their official capacities and Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Rumler in her individual capacity under the South Carolina Religious Freedom Act. See Orders (ECF Nos. 39, 85). Presently before the Court is Defendants' second Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 76). Plaintiff filed a Response (ECF No. 87), and Defendants filed a Reply (ECF No. 89). All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), DSC. This report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.
II. FACTS
On May 16, 2013, Plaintiff first requested official recognition of the Hebrew Israelite faith group while he was a prisoner at the Broad River Correctional Institution. Compl. ¶ 1 (ECF No. 1); Request to Staff Member (ECF No. 66-2, p. 2). On May 23, 2013, Plaintiff met with Chaplin James M. Brown, who presented Plaintiff's request to Associate Warden Sutton, who disapproved Plaintiff's requested recognition. Compl. ¶ 2; Request to Staff Member (ECF No. 66-2, p. 2); Sutton Memorandum (ECF No. 66-2, p. 3).
Plaintiff's complaint is verified. A verified complaint is considered a sworn affidavit for summary judgment purposes when it is based on personal knowledge. Goodman v. Diggs, 986 F.3d 493, 498 (4th Cir. 2021).
On May 31, 2013, Plaintiff appealed the decision denying recognition of the Hebrew Israelite faith to Warden Robert Stevenson, III. Compl. ¶ 3. This appeal was also disapproved. Compl. ¶ 3. Plaintiff then appealed to the Chief of Pastoral Care Services Branch and Head Chaplin Lloyd Roberts through Chaplin Brown, who never forwarded the request, and, thus, Plaintiff never received a response. Compl. ¶ 4.
On February 1, 2015, Plaintiff wrote Chaplin Howser while at Kirkland Correctional Institution and requested a response to his last state of appeal for his faith recognition process. Compl. ¶ 5; Request to Staff Member (ECF No. 66-2, p. 17). On February 24, 2015, Plaintiff received a response from Bennie Coldough, the new Head Chaplin and Chief of Pastoral Care Services, who stated that he had no knowledge of Plaintiff's appeal and that Plaintiff should file a new request. Compl. ¶ 6; Request to Staff Member (ECF No. 66-2, p. 17).
In July of 2016, Plaintiff resubmitted his request for faith recognition of the Hebrew Israelite religion. Compl. ¶ 9. Plaintiff requested status updates on his request for faith recognition of the Hebrew Israelite faith group on August 18, 2016, December 21, 2016, and March 31, 2017. Compl. ¶¶ 1-12; Inmate Request (ECF No. 66-2, p. 18). After each request, Plaintiff received a response that no decision had yet been made. Compl. ¶¶ 10-12; Inmate Request (ECF No. 66-2, p. 18). On August 28, 2017, Plaintiff received a memorandum from Sherman L. Anderson, Chief of the Office of General Counsel-Inmate Grievance Branch that SCDC's General Counsel Office was reviewing his request for the Hebrew Israelites to be a recognized faith group, and that he would be notified of the outcome. Compl. ¶ 13; Anderson Memorandum (ECF No. 66-2, pp. 9-10).
In August of 2018, the Office of General Counsel contacted Dennis Patterson, SCDC's Assistant Deputy Director of Operations, regarding Plaintiff's request and asked him whether official recognition of the Hebrew Israelites could pose a security issue. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 15. Patterson gave his opinion that because of its alleged racist teachings, officially recognizing the Hebrew Israelites as a religious group within SCDC would generate racial animus among the prisoners and pose a security threat to both prisoners and staff. Compl. ¶ 15. Also in August of 2018, Patterson communicated these conclusions to SCDC's Office of General Counsel and Plaintiff alleges that his request for recognition of the Hebrew Israelite faith was disapproved by Defendant Annie Rumler in that office. Compl. ¶ 16. Defendants assert that Brown, who by then had been promoted to Chief of Pastoral Care Services, not Rumler, made the final decision to deny Plaintiff's faith recognition request. Defendants point to an email sent by Brown to “SCDC Pastoral Services, Chaplains Plus Volunteer Coordinators" and copied to other individuals, including Patterson and Rumler, which states “This is to inform you that the request by Bronson Shelley 353229, for the South Carolina Department of Corrections to recognize Hebrew Israelites as a faith group is disapproved. This decision is based on security concerns with some of the identified beliefs of this group." Brown Email (ECF No. 76-2).
See Brown Aff. ¶ 9. It's not clear from the affidavit when Brown was promoted to this position.
Brown's affidavit describes the process for determining whether to approve an inmate's request for faith recognition:
The institutional Chaplain will meet with the inmate(s) who made the request and discuss all the information about the faith and its practice. When deemed necessary by the Chaplain, the inmate(s) will be asked to complete a “Religious Information Fact Sheet" which provides additional information about the potential religious practice of the inmate(s). The institutional Chaplain will confer with the Warden and as appropriate submit a written report to the Chief, Pastoral Care Services Branch, which will include their assessment of the need for recognition of the faith and any institutional problems with the management of the requested practices. The Chief of the Pastoral Services Branch will evaluate the request, do vetting with staff of considered recommendations, and if recommended, the Chief of Pastoral Services will develop an appropriate recommendation that is a policy change which recognizes such a faith with management guidelines.
Brown Aff. ¶ 6.
Brown's affidavit also provides as follows:
Upon my promotion to serve as Chief of Pastoral Services, I was confronted with an additional recognition request for the “Hebrew Israelite" faith from inmate Shelley. In vetting this request, I turned over the request and attendant materials to our SCDC Office of General Counsel. Eventually, I received a response from Ms. Annie Rumler in our Office of General Counsel, in August of 2018, indicating a Disapproval Response was validated. I communicated this determination to our SCDC Chaplains. The institutional Chaplain wherein inmate Shelley was located would notify him directly of this decision.
Brown Aff. ¶ 9 (ECF No. 76-3).
Plaintiff alleges that because of the continuous denial of Plaintiff's requests for faith recognition of the Hebrew Israelite religion and his inability to practice his religion, he suffers from depression and has made numerous attempts at suicide. Compl. ¶¶ 17-27. In Plaintiff's prayer for relief, he seeks “a declaration that the acts and omissions described herein violated Plaintiff's rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States." Compl. p. 41. He also seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, his costs in this action, and “any additional relief this court deems just, proper, and equitable." Compl. ¶ 45. He does not specifically seek injunctive relief within his prayer for relief though he mentions injunctive relief elsewhere in the complaint. See Compl. ¶ 1 (“Plaintiffs claims for injunctive relief are authorized by 28 U.S.C. Section 2283 and 2284 and Rule 65 of the Fed.R.Civ.P. "); Compl. ¶ 40 (“Plaintiff has been irreparably injured by the conduct of the Defendants unless the court grants the monetary, and declaratory and injunctive relief which Plaintiff seeks.").
The same issues raised in this case have already been addressed in a prior case filed by Plaintiff arising out of the same facts and circumstances. In Shelley v. Stirling, et al, 4:18-cv-2229-JD-TER (the previous action), Defendants averred that they denied recognition of the Hebrew Israelite faith as a religious group within SCDC due to its racist teachings, which would cause a security threat among inmates and staff, but failed to point to specific evidence of racist teachings from the religion. See Report and Recommendation pp. 12-14 (ECF No. 128 in the previous action). The court held that even though issues of fact exist “as to the racial teachings of the Hebrew Israelite,” Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. See Order pp. 4-5 (ECF No. 140 in the previous action). However, the only claims before the court in the previous action were claims against Defendants in their individual capacities for monetary damages. In the present case, Plaintiff has asserted claims for injunctive relief, which are not barred by qualified immunity. See Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492, 498 n.9 (4th Cir. 2014).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, the moving party bears the burden of showing that summary judgment is proper. Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment is proper if the non-moving party fails to establish an essential element of any cause of action upon which the non-moving party has the burden of proof. Id. Once the moving party has brought into question whether there is a genuine dispute for trial on a material element of the non-moving party's claims, the non-moving party bears the burden of coming forward with specific facts which show a genuine dispute for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The non-moving party must come forward with enough evidence, beyond a mere scintilla, upon which the fact finder could reasonably find for it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1011 (4thCir. 1991). However, the non-moving party may not rely on beliefs, conjecture, speculation, or conclusory allegations to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Barber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992). The evidence relied on must meet “the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at a trial on the merits." Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1993).
To show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Rather, the party must present evidence supporting his or her position by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A); see also Cray Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Systems, Inc., 33 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 1994); Orsi v. Kickwood, 999 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1993); Local Rules 7.04, 7.05, D.S.C.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Claims for Injunctive Relief
As stated above, Plaintiff does not make any specific requests for injunctive relief in his complaint, but the reasonable inference is that he is seeking an injunction requiring SCDC to recognize Hebrew Israelites as a religious group. Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to show that he is entitled to a permanent injunction. The Fourth Circuit has recognized that “federal injunctive relief is an extreme remedy." Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1382 (4th Cir. 1995). A An injunction is a matter of equitable discretion; it does not follow from success on the merits as a matter of course." Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 32 (2008). “[A] plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; 3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction." Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 156B57, 130 S.Ct. 2743, 2756, 177 L.Ed.2d 461 (2010) (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L. C., 547 U.S. 388, 391, 126 S.Ct. 1837, 164 L.Ed.2d 641 (2006)). All four factors must be satisfied in order for the injunction to issue, and the plaintiff seeking the injunction bears the burden to show that each factor is met. Steves ¶ Sons, Inc. v. JELD-WEN, Inc., 988 F.3d 690, 719 (4th Cir. 2021). Upon a finding that all four factors are met, the Court nonetheless retains the equitable discretion to deny issuance of the injunction. Bethesda Softworks, L.L.C. v. Interplay Entm't Corp., 452 Fed.Appx. 351, 353 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Christopher Phelps ¶ Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 543 (4th Cir. 2007) (explaining that a court may decline to grant injunctive relief “even when a plaintiff has made the requisite showing”); Safeway Inc. v. CESC Plaza Ltd. P'ship, 261 F.Supp.2d 439, 467 (E.D. Va. 2003). Under the PLRA, “[p]rospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs” and a court may not grant or approve any prospective relief unless it “finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
Although Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the present motion, he did not address any of the arguments raised by Defendants. Rather, he continues to argue claims that have already been dismissed, such as equal protection, or issues not raised in this action. Plaintiff fails to address any of the factors necessary to show that a permanent injunction is proper in this case.
The majority of Plaintiff's response addresses laws applicable to Native American Indians.
As to irreparable injury, the movant must show the harm to be “neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent. " Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Medical Group, 952 F.2d 802, 812 (4th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). “The Supreme Court has explained that >loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”' Newsom ex rel. Newsom v. Albemarle Cnty. Sch. Bd., 354 F.3d 249, 261 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976)). Further, with respect to the second factor, remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for the loss of a First Amendment freedom. Legend Night Club v. Miller, 637 F.3d 291, 302 (4th Cir. 2011).
With respect to the balance of hardships, the Fourth Circuit has long held that Aabsent the most extraordinary circumstances, federal courts are not to immerse themselves in the management of state prisons." Taylor v. Freeman, 34 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 1994). The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that A>[t]he difficulties of operating a detention center must not be underestimated by the courts," and that “correctional officials ... must have substantial discretion to devise reasonable solutions to the problems they face.'" Prieto, 780 F.3d at 255 (quoting Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 326, 132 S.Ct. 1510, 1515B16 (2012)). Courts typically give deference to prison officials' decision making as long as the officials are pursuing a rational penological objective. Washington v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. CV 5:16-3913-BHH, 2020 WL 553855, at *13 (D.S.C. Feb. 3, 2020) (citing Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 288 (4th Cir. 1980)). As noted in the previous action, although “'internal [prison] security [is] perhaps the most legitimate of penological goals,' Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 133 (2003), . . . based on the evidence presented, an issue of fact exists as to whether the Hebrew Israelite religion contains racially prejudicial and inflammatory views and teachings, which is the reason for the security concerns.” See Report and Recommendation p. 13 (ECF No. 128 in the previous action). Those same issues of fact are still present in this case. Thus, for the same reasons, an issue of fact exists as to whether, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, injunctive relief is appropriate.
The undersigned notes that other corrections facilities outside of South Carolina include Hebrew Israelites as a recognized religion. See, e.g., Siddha v. Dovey, No. CV GLR-20-185, 2020 WL 6204317, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 22, 2020) (listing Hebrew Israelites as one of the recognized religions by Maryland corrections facilities); Covington v. Perry, No. 5:15-CT-3177-FL, 2018 WL 4964360, at *2 (E.D. N.C. Oct. 15, 2018) (including Hebrew Israelites as a recognized religion in North Carolina corrections facilities); Coward v. Robinson, 276 F.Supp.3d 544, 562 (E.D. Va. 2017) (acknowledging Hebrew Israelites as a religion approved by the Virginia Department of Corrections).
Finally, the question of whether the injunction is in the public interest “certainly presents conflicting considerations. On one hand, the general public has an interest in ensuring that the constitutional protections afforded to the public, including those imprisoned, are vindicated; on the other hand, the public most certainly has an interest in the effective management of the prison system, both for the safety of the general public and those in the prison system, whether they be inmates or administrators.” Holloway v. Coakley, No. 2:17 CV 74, 2018 WL 1287417, at *7 (N.D. W.Va. Mar. 13, 2018). Though prison safety is a matter of public concern, as discussed above, an issue of fact exists as to whether recognizing the Hebrew Israelite faith would create a security risk within SCDC.
For these reasons, summary judgment is not appropriate on Plaintiff's requested injunctive relief.
B. SCRFA
Plaintiff also asserts a state law claim against Rumler for violation of the SCRFA. Defendant argues that summary judgment is appropriate on Plaintiff's SCRFA claim because there is no evidence in the record that Defendant Rumler made the decision to deny Plaintiff's request for recognition of the Hebrew Israelite faith, the decision was made in furtherance of a compelling state interest, and because she is entitled to immunity from suit under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act.
The purpose of the SCRFA is to restore and guarantee “that a test of compelling state interest will be imposed on all state and local laws and ordinances in all cases in which the free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and provide a claim or defense to persons whose exercise of religion is substantially burdened by the State” and provides a right of action for persons whose exercise of religion has been burdened in violation of the Act. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-32-30; S.C. Code Ann. § 1-32-50. The Act provides that “the State may not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the State demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is (1) in furtherance of a compelling state interest; and (2) the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling state interest.” S.C. Code Ann. § 1-32-40. It further provides that “[t]his chapter does not affect the application of and must be applied in conjunction with Chapter 27 of Title 24, concerning inmate litigation.” S.C. Code Ann. § 1-32-45. Chapter 27 of Title 24 is entitled “Application of Religious Freedom Act to prison regulations” and states
“State” is defined within the Act as “the State of South Carolina and any political subdivision of the State and includes a branch, department, agency, board, commission, instrumentality, entity, or officer, employee, official of the State or a political subdivision of the State, or any other person acting under color of law.” S.C. Code Ann. § 1-32-20(4).
A) A state or local correctional facility's regulation must be considered “in furtherance of a compelling state interest” if the facility demonstrates that the religious activity:
(1) sought to be engaged by a prisoner is presumptively dangerous to the health or safety of that prisoner; or
(2) poses a direct threat to the health, safety, or security of other prisoners, correctional staff, or the public.
(B) A state or local correctional facility regulation may not be considered the “least restrictive means” of furthering a compelling state interest if a reasonable accommodation can be made to protect the safety or security of prisoners, correctional staff, or the public.
As stated above, Defendants first argues that Defendant Rumler did not burden Plaintiff's exercise of his religion because she did not make the decision to deny recognition of the Hebrew Israelite faith. Defendants argue that Brown, Chief of Pastoral Care Services, made the decision and there is no evidence in the record that Rumler made the decision. However, Plaintiff asserts in his verified complaint that his request for the recognition of the Hebrew Israelites as a religious group “was disapproved by Defendant Annie Rumler or validated by her.” Compl. ¶ 16. In addition, Brown's affidavit specifically states that “in vetting [Plaintiff's] request, I turned over the request and attendant materials to our SCDC Office of General Counsel. Eventually, I received a response from Ms. Annie Rumler in our Office of General Counsel, in August of 2018, indicating a Disapproval Response was validated. I communicated this determination to our SCDC Chaplains.” Brown Aff. ¶ 9. Contrary to Defendants arguments, the record is far from clear that Brown was solely responsible for making the decision to deny Plaintiff's request for recognition of the Hebrew Israelite faith. At the least, an issue of fact exists as to who was responsible for denying Plaintiff's request.
Defendants next argue that the decision was made in furtherance of a compelling state interest. As stated above, the SCRFA specifically states that it is to be applied in conjunction with S. C. Code Ann. § 24-27-500(A), which provides that a correctional facility's “regulation must be considered ‘in furtherance of a compelling state interest' if the facility demonstrates that the religious activity: (1) sought to be engaged by a prisoner is presumptively dangerous to the health or safety of that prisoner; or (2) poses a direct threat to the health, safety, or security of other prisoners, correctional staff, or the public.” Defendants argue that, after conducting research and gathering input from others, Defendant Brown made the decision that the religious activity for which Plaintiff seeks official recognition and group practice would pose a direct threat to the health, safety, or security of other prisoners and correctional staff because of its racist teachings and literature. Brown Aff. ¶¶ 8-9; Patterson Aff. ¶¶ 7-8. However, similar arguments were raised and rejected in the previous action with respect to Plaintiff's claim under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. The reason given in both the previous action and the present action for denying Plaintiff's request that SCDC recognize the Hebrew Israelite faith is because of the faith's racist teachings and literature. The court has already found that issues of fact exist as to whether “the Hebrew Israelite religion contains racially prejudicial and inflammatory views and teachings.” Report and Recommendation p. 13 (ECF No. 128 in previous action); see also Order p. 4 (ECF No. 140 in previous action) (agreeing with the Report and Recommendation that “issues of fact exist as to the racial teachings of the Hebrew Israelite” but finding that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from money damages). Defendants have presented no more evidence in this action that would eliminate those issues of fact. Thus, based on the facts presented, the court cannot conclude as a matter of law that the religious activity sought by Plaintiff “is presumptively dangerous to the health or safety of that prisoner” or that it “poses a direct threat to the health, safety, or security of other prisoners, correctional staff, or the public.”
Defendants also argue that Rumler is entitled to qualified immunity under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (SCTCA), S.C.Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10 et seq. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claim for violation of the SCRFA against Rumler is barred because she was acting within the scope of her official duties and did not act with actual fraud, actual malice, or intent harm, nor do her actions involve a crime of moral turpitude. The SCTCA specifically provides that “[a]n employee of a governmental entity who commits a tort while acting within the scope of his official duty is not liable therefor except as expressly provided for in subsection (b).” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-70(a). Subsection (b) states that “[n]othing in this chapter may be construed to give an employee of a governmental entity immunity from suit and liability if it is proved that the employee's conduct was not within the scope of his official duties or that it constituted actual fraud, actual malice, intent to harm, or a crime involving moral turpitude.” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-70(b).
The facts in the record regarding Defendant Rumler are only of acts within the scope of her official duties and there is no evidence that she acted with actual fraud, actual malice, intent to harm or that her actions were a crime involving moral turpitude. See Flateau v. Harrelson, 355 S.C. 197, 584 S.E.2d 413, 417-18 (S.C.Ct.App.2003) (“The statutory dialectic [of the SCTCA] reveals that a governmental employee acting within the scope of official duty is exempt from personal liability....”). Thus, Defendant Rumler is immune from suit under the SCTCA and summary judgment is appropriate as to the SCRFA claim against her.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is recommended that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 76) be denied as to Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief and granted as to Plaintiff's SCRFA claim against Rumler.