Opinion
Case No. 1:12-cv-770
11-25-2013
RONALD D. SHELBY, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
Judge Timothy S. Black
ORDER THAT: (1) THE ALJ'S NON-DISABILITY FINDING IS FOUND
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND AFFIRMED;
AND (2) THIS CASE IS CLOSED
This is a Social Security disability benefits appeal. At issue is whether the administrative law judge ("ALJ") erred in finding the Plaintiff "not disabled" and therefore unentitled to disability insurance benefits ("DIB"). (See Administrative Transcript ("Tr.") (Tr. 22-32) (ALJ's decision)).
I.
On April 14, 2009, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB alleging he became disabled on August 15, 2008. (Tr. 22). The agency denied his claim initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 71-76, 78-80). ALJ Lorenzo Level held a hearing on June 3, 2011, at which Plaintiff and a vocational expert ("VE") testified. (Tr. 36-63). Based upon review and evaluation of the medical evidence in the record, and Plaintiff's testimony at the hearing, the ALJ found Plaintiff's diabetes, coronary artery disease, degenerative disc disease, tinnitus, hearing loss, and obesity were severe impairments. (Tr. 24). However, the ALJ determined these impairments were not severe enough, either singly or in combination, to meet or medically equal one of the impairments in the Listings. (Tr. 25-26).
The ALJ found Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light work with the following limitations: occasionally climb ramps and stairs; never kneel, crawl, or climb ladders ropes or scaffolds; no driving on-the-job (e.g. no commercial driving); no exposure to temperature extremes (hot and cold) and to humidity; no hearing capability; and no hazards such as unprotected heights or dangerous moving machinery. (Tr. 26). The ALJ found Plaintiff could not return to his past relevant work. (Tr. 31). However, relying on VE testimony, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could perform other work in significant numbers in the national economy, such as a mail clerk, a food preparer, and a security guard. (Tr. 31-32; 57-60). Accordingly, in his written decision dated August 24, 2011, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled. (Tr. 19-35). Plaintiff requested Appeals Council review of the ALJ's decision. (Tr. 15-18). The Appeals Council denied review on August 13, 2012, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1-6). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.981. Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of this final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Plaintiff was born in November 1961 and was 49 on the date of the ALJ's denial. (Tr. 131). He graduated from high school and worked as a factory laborer. (Tr. 153).
The ALJ's "Findings," which represent the rationale of his decision, were as follows:
1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2013.(Tr. 24-32).
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 15, 2008, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.)
3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: diabetes, coronary artery disease, degenerative disc disease, hearing loss, and obesity (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).
4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526).
5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) with further limitations. He can occasionally climb ramps and stairs. He can never kneel, crawl, or climb ladders ropes or scaffolds. He cannot be subject to a job that requires him to drive on-the-job (i.e. no commercial driving). He must not be exposed to temperature extremes (hot and cold) and to humidity. He must not be subject to a job that requires fine hearing capability. Finally, he cannot be exposed to hazards such as unprotected heights or dangerous moving machinery.
6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565).
7. The claimant was born on November 11, 1961, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset date (20 CFR 404.1563).
8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English (20 CFR 404.1564).
9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is "not disabled," whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (see SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).
10. Considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569 and 404.1569(a)).
11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from August 15, 2008, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g)).
In sum, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not under a disability as defined by the Social Security Regulations, and was therefore not entitled to DIB. (Tr. 32).
On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ made a number of "factual" and "vocational" errors. (Doc. 8 at 2-10).
II.
The Court's inquiry on appeal is to determine whether the ALJ's non-disability finding is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). In performing this review, the Court considers the record as a whole. Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 1978). If substantial evidence supports the ALJ's denial of benefits, that finding must be affirmed, even if substantial evidence also exists in the record upon which the ALJ could have found plaintiff disabled. As the Sixth Circuit has explained:
"The Commissioner's findings are not subject to reversal merely because substantial evidence exists in the record to support a different conclusion. The substantial evidence standard presupposes that there is a "zone of choice" within which the Commissioner may proceed without interference from the courts. If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court must affirm."Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994).
The claimant bears the ultimate burden to prove by sufficient evidence that he is entitled to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a). That is, he must present sufficient evidence to show that, during the relevant time period, he suffered an impairment, or combination of impairments, expected to last at least twelve months, that left him unable to perform any job in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
A.
The record reflects that:
A. Medical Evidence
Records show that Plaintiff's diabetes caused hypoglycemia due to poor metabolic control in December of 2008. (Tr. 292). As a result, Plaintiff was hospitalized for renal failure. (Tr. 289-91). During this hospitalization, Plaintiff also underwent a cardiology consultation due to complaints of shortness of breath. (Tr. 284-86). Plaintiff had a normal EKG study and echocardiogram, but the cardiologist noted that longstanding diabetes could have an adverse effect on his coronary artery status. (Id.)
Due to Plaintiff's continuing complaints of shortness of breath and fatigue, he underwent a stress test on February 9, 2009. (Tr. 361). This test revealed mild exercise induced myocardial ischemia, suspect on the basis of small vessel coronary disease, and decreased peak coronary flow related to Plaintiff's long history of diabetes. (Id.) Plaintiff also underwent a left heart catheterization that revealed moderate non-obstructive coronary artery disease and normal left ventricular ejection fraction and diastolic function. (Tr. 351-52). Plaintiff underwent another cardiology consultation in May of 2009 where these findings were reconsidered. (Tr. 494). On November 19, 2010 in a re-evaluation, Plaintiff was assessed as having non-obstructive coronary artery disease that was characterized as being non-cardiac in etiology; he continued to have a normal ejection fraction of 55%. (Tr. 1362).
The record shows that another complication of his diabetes was a diagnosis of peripheral neuropathy. Plaintiff underwent an EMG in 2007 that showed chronic sensorimotor peripheral neuropathy with mixed axonal and demyelinating features. (Tr. 465). On May 10, 2010, Plaintiff complained of pain in the legs and feet for at least two years that was now getting worse. (Tr. 1481). He stated that in his feet and legs, he felt a pinprick sensation that was intermittent and that his legs felt heavy after walking short distances. (Id.) He was diagnosed with diabetic neuropathy. (Id.) Another EMG of the lower extremities was performed on July 26, 2010 that showed little change from the 2007 EMG, but there was clear evidence of peripheral neuropathy. (Tr. 1441-43). Plaintiff also saw Dr. Lindy Wyatt, M.D., Ph.D., from the VA hospital. (Tr. 1281). Dr. Wyatt diagnosed Plaintiff with peripheral neuropathy, but found it was mild in all four extremities. (Id.) In addition, she noted that his complaints did not match with the objective medical evidence, calling them "wildly exaggerated and nonsensical." (Id.)
The medical record also shows that Plaintiff has lower back pain caused by degenerative disc disease in the lumbar spine. An x-ray from 2007 revealed mild lumbar kyphosis, but no structural abnormalities in the lumbar spine. (Tr. 1117). Plaintiff underwent physical therapy in 2009, but did not obtain any significant benefit. (Tr. 980). A more recent x-ray of the lumbar spine revealed mild degenerative changes. (Tr. 858). Plaintiff was diagnosed with having multilevel discogenic disease, most severe at L4-L5, based on an MRI. (Tr. 856). He underwent a lumbar spinal epidural injection on April 6, 2010. (Tr. 1502).
The record also indicates that Plaintiff is obese. On one examination, Plaintiff weighed 238 pounds and his height was 75 inches, giving him a BMI of 29.9. (Tr. 1333). Plaintiff did not complain of symptoms nor do the medical records document significant limitations resulting from Plaintiff's obesity.
Finally, Plaintiff was also diagnosed with hearing loss after undergoing an audiology consult on October 17, 2008. (Tr. 519-521). He complained of difficulty hearing and tinnitus, as well as dizziness. (Id.) His audiometric results were consistent with bilateral sensorineural hearing loss, evidenced by air bone gaps, and he was found to be a candidate for hearing aids. (Id.) This diagnosis was continued in notes from 2010, when Plaintiff was diagnosed with bilateral mixed hearing loss, left greater than right. (Tr. 1494).
In sum, a review of the objective medical evidence shows that Plaintiff has a variety of impairments. He has been coping with the hardships of managing each of his conditions. He has undergone therapy, injections, takes a variety of medications for pain and management of his metabolic functions, and has undergone a plethora of diagnostic tests. Particularly, Plaintiff's diabetes is a longstanding condition that has caused him a variety of secondary impairments.
The record contains a mental consultative examination dated August 5, 2009. (Tr. 807-12). The consultative examiner did not diagnose Plaintiff with any mental health condition based on unremarkable findings in the examination. (Id.) A GAF score of 80 was given, indicating transient symptoms and expectable reactions to psychosocial stressors.
The Global Assessment of Functioning ("GAF") is a numeric scale (0 through 100) used by mental health clinicians and physicians to subjectively rate the social, occupational, and psychological functioning of adults, e.g., how well or adaptively one is meeting various problems-in-living. The scale is presented and described in the DSM-IV-TR.
The record also contains medical opinions from the State Agency. In a Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessment, the State Agent opined that Plaintiff was limited to light work, could never climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, could frequently balance, and needed to avoid concentrated exposure to noise. (Tr. 827-34).
B. Plaintiff's Testimony
Plaintiff is a 49 year old male who was 46 years old on the alleged onset date. (Tr. 27). He alleges disability due to a variety of physical impairments. Most notably, he testified about his diabetes mellitus that he has suffered from for 30 years. (Id.) He testified that his blood sugar levels are still higher than usual, despite treatment, and range between 100 and 160 in the mornings. (Id.) He testified that his diabetes has caused extensive peripheral neuropathy in his upper and lower extremities. (Id.) Specifically, he stated that his hands cramp up and feel weak, he drops things, and he has pain and decreased sensation in his legs. (Id.) He also testified that due to this disease, he has poor peripheral and blurry vision. (Id.) In terms of treatment for this condition, he stated that he takes two kinds of insulin daily. (Id.)
Plaintiff also testified that he suffers from coronary artery disease and has several small blockages. (Id.) He testified that symptoms of this condition include shortness of breath and fatigue. (Id.) He stated that the shortness of breath is brought on by simply walking 10 to 20 feet, climbing one flight of stairs, or getting up too fast from sitting. (Id.) He stated he also has difficulty with breathing in very hot and humid weather, as well as cold weather. (Id.) He stated he takes nitroglycerin twice a day for this condition. (Id.)
Finally, Plaintiff testified about his back impairment. (Id.) He stated that he has considerable pain in the lower back that is intermittent, and the pain radiates up and down his leg. (Id.)
In terms of functional limitations from these impairments, Plaintiff stated that he can sit for only 30 minutes at a time because the pain in his lower back is so severe that he must change positions. (Id.) He can only stand for 30 minutes before his legs and lower back start to bother him. (Id.) He can walk 20 yards before he needs to stop. (Id.) He stated he can lift a gallon of milk and can lift it 10-15 times, but then his muscles get weak. (Id.)
He also testified that he has problems with activities of daily living but maintained that he could shop with his wife and do some household chores, like vacuuming and laundry. (Id.) He stated limitations with these activities included bending and lifting. (Id.) He also stated that he could prepare simple meals in the microwave. (Id.) In terms of driving, he stated that he no longer drives because he has been in accidents when he had very low blood sugar due to his diabetes and he passed out. (Id.) Therefore, he stated he is scared to drive. (Id.)
Finally, Plaintiff testified that he had significant problems with memory. (Id.) He stated he had trouble retaining simple things and trouble with new learning. (Id.)
C. Vocational Expert Testimony
Plaintiff has past relevant work as a material handler. (Tr. 31). The VE testified that Plaintiff's residual functional capacity would preclude this type of work. (Id.) The ALJ asked the VE whether jobs exist in the national economy for an individual with Plaintiff's age, education. work experience, and residual functional capacity. The VE testified that given all of these factors the individual would be able to perform the requirements of representative occupations such as a mail clerk (800 jobs regionally and 69,100 jobs nationally), food preparer (900 jobs regionally and 113,500 jobs nationally), and a security guard (600 jobs regionally and 99,100 jobs nationally). (Id.)
B.
Plaintiff's burden was to show that he was not able to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that could have been expected to result in death or had lasted or was expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a).
The agency applies this statutory standard by employing a five-step sequential analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). Plaintiff bears the burden of production at steps one through four. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(iv); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987). At step five, Plaintiff retains the burden of proving disability, but the agency must produce evidence of jobs existing in significant numbers that Plaintiff can perform, given his age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff was not disabled because, despite his impairments, he could perform jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's RFC finding of light work is undermined by several errors the ALJ made in evaluating the evidence. (Doc. 8 at 2-8). The ALJ properly articulated in his decision how he arrived at his RFC finding, however. (Tr. 26-31). The regulations specifically state that the responsibility for assessing a claimant's RFC rests with the ALJ. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546. The Sixth Circuit has noted an RFC "is an assessment of what [a claimant] can and cannot do, not what []he does and does not suffer from." Howard v. Comm'r of Soc Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 239 (6th Cir. 2002). The ALJ must resolve the conflicts in the evidence and incorporate only the credible limitations of record in the RFC finding. See Casey v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1234-35 (6th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). Statements about what a claimant can still do despite his impairments are important evidence that must be considered in assessing a claimant's RFC, but such statements are not determinative. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(b), 404.1527, 404.1545. "Opinions on some issues," such as a claimant's RFC, "are not medical opinions," "but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved for the Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case; i.e., that would direct the determination or decision of disability." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e). Thus, an ALJ's RFC finding does not need to mirror the opinion of a treating, examining, or non-examining physician.
Moreover, an ALJ has the responsibility of deciding the weight to be given opinions in the record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 404.1545, 404.1546(c); Perales, 402 U.S. at 399; Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997). An ALJ is required to consider all the relevant evidence in assessing a claimant's RFC, which is what the ALJ did in Plaintiff's case. The ALJ fulfilled this responsibility in this case when he evaluated all the evidence from Plaintiff's treating, examining, and non-examining sources in determining Plaintiff's RFC. (Tr. 26-31). Here, the ALJ's RFC finding that Plaintiff could perform light work with limitations was supported by the record. (Tr. 26).
The ALJ properly considered Plaintiff's diabetes and coronary disease is assessing his RFC. With respect to Plaintiff's diabetes, the ALJ noted that the medical records do show ongoing treatment for this condition as well as complications that had arisen due to the longstanding nature of this impairment. (Tr. 28). The ALJ mentioned that another complication of Plaintiff's diabetes was a diagnosis of peripheral neuropathy. (Id.) The ALJ also noted medical records from Dr. Lindy Wyatt, M.D., Ph.D., from the VA hospital, revealing Dr. Wyatt diagnosed Plaintiff with peripheral neuropathy, but found it was mild in all four extremities. (Id., Tr. 1281-82). In addition, Dr. Wyatt noted that Plaintiff's complaints did not match with the objective medical evidence, calling them "wildly exaggerated and nonsensical." (Id.) Plaintiff does not claim that the ALJ erred in his recitation of Dr. Wyatt's medical notes, but rather that the ALJ erred because he supposedly referred to Dr. Wyatt as a treating physician, when she was only an examining physician. (Doc. 8 at 7). Regardless of whether Dr. Wyatt was a one-time examiner or a treating physician, the ALJ still must consider evidence from acceptable sources. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (The weight afforded a medical source's opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of a claimant's impairments depends upon the examining and treating relationship the medical source has with the claimant, the evidence the medical source presents to support his or her opinion, how consistent the opinion is with the record as a whole, the specialty of the medical source, and other factors). Therefore, the ALJ did not err by referring to Dr. Wyatt's examination in his decision. Plaintiff also states that despite Dr. Wyatt's findings on examination, the VA still gave him a 70% disability rating. (Doc. 8 at 7). However, Dr. Wyatt did not examine Plaintiff for the purpose of providing a disability rating. (Tr. 1281-82).
Based on the bulk of the medical evidence, the ALJ properly found that although Plaintiff has peripheral neuropathy in his extremities, his allegations regarding the severity of symptoms and limitations caused by this impairment did not correlate with the objective medical evidence. (Tr. 28). The ALJ noted that the objective medical evidence, including two EMG studies, consistently showed mild neuropathy, that would likely cause symptoms, but not to the degree of complete disability and debilitating functional limitations. (Id.) The ALJ nevertheless accommodated Plaintiff's diagnosis of peripheral neuropathy in the RFC finding by limiting Plaintiff to light work, with limitations in postural adjustments. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges his neuropathy causes more work-related limitations than the ALJ found, but fails to articulate any doctor that described limitations greater than the ALJ found. (Doc. 8 at 3-4).
The ALJ also properly considered Plaintiff's lower back pain caused by degenerative disc disease in the lumbar spine in assessing Plaintiff's RFC. (Tr. 28-29). The ALJ noted that an x-ray from 2007 revealed mild lumbar kyphosis, but no structural abnormalities in the lumbar spine. (Tr. 28-29, 1117). The ALJ pointed out that Plaintiff underwent physical therapy in 2009, but did not obtain any significant benefit. (Tr. 29, 980). A more recent x-ray of the lumbar spine revealed mild degenerative changes (Tr. 29, 858). Plaintiff was diagnosed with having multilevel discogenic disease, most severe at L4-L5, based on an MRI. (Tr. 29, 856). Plaintiff alleges the ALJ erred by not discussing the specific findings of the MRI in his decision. (Doc. 8 at 4). Although Plaintiff may have preferred the ALJ be more thorough in discussing this piece of evidence, "[a]n ALJ can consider all the evidence without directly addressing in his written decision every piece of evidence submitted by a party." Kornecky v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 167 F. App'x, 496, 508 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Loral Defense Systems-Akron v. N.L.R.B., 200 F.3d 436, 453 (6th Cir. 1999)) (citations and internal quotations marks omitted). Plaintiff also mentions that the radiculopathy of his leg alone would cause specific limitations. (Doc. 8 at 4-5). Again, Plaintiff fails to cite to a doctor who articulated this opinion.
The ALJ then pointed out that Plaintiff underwent a lumbar spinal epidural injection in April 2010. (Tr. 29, 1502-03). The ALJ properly incorporated these mild degenerative changes into Plaintiff's RFC finding and, giving Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt, found that Plaintiff would be capable of performing light work and would only be further limited in postural adjustments, particularly in climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. (Tr. 29).
With regard to the opinion evidence, the ALJ properly noted that there were no treating source opinions on Plaintiff's RFC in the medical record. (Tr. 30). There was also no physical consultative examination in the record. (Tr. 30). However, the ALJ noted that the record contained a mental consultative examination dated August 2009, which the ALJ gave great weight as it was consistent with the bulk of the medical evidence showing Plaintiff's mental health problems were very mild. (Tr. 30, 807-12).
The ALJ also noted that the record contained medical opinions from a non-examining state agency consultant. (Tr. 30). In a Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessment, the non-examining state agency consultant opined that Plaintiff was limited to light work, could never climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, could frequently balance, and needed to avoid concentrated exposure to noise. (Tr. 30, 827-34). Plaintiff questions how the ALJ could have given this opinion significant weight. (Doc. 8 at 7). Although an ALJ is not bound by their findings, state agency medical consultants are considered experts in the Social Security disability programs and their opinions may be entitled to great weight if they are supported by the record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(2)(i). The ALJ properly gave this opinion significant weight, but also properly found Plaintiff had additional limitations of no exposure to temperature extremes and humidity, no driving on the job, and no job that requires fine hearing capability. (Tr. 26, 30).
The ALJ also properly took into consideration Plaintiff's daily activities in assessing Plaintiff's credibility and RFC. (Tr. 27, 30). A claimant's statement that she is experiencing pain or other symptoms will not, taken alone, establish that she is disabled; there must be medical signs and laboratory findings which show the existence of a medical impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms alleged. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a); Duncan v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 801 F.2d 847, 853 (6th Cir. 1986). When the medical evidence documents a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms alleged, the Commissioner then evaluates the intensity and persistence of the symptoms to determine how those symptoms limit the claimant's capacity for work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1). In making this evaluation, the Commissioner considers objective medical evidence, as well as other factors such as evidence of daily activities, the treatment the claimant receives, medication taken and any resulting side effects, other measures taken to alleviate the pain, and whether any of the evidence conflicts with the claimant's statements. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2)-(4).
The ALJ appropriately followed the regulations and case law in evaluating Plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain and other symptoms, and his analysis is supported by the record. (Tr. 26-31). The ALJ properly took into consideration Plaintiff's testimony, the objective medical evidence, the medical opinions, and Plaintiff's daily activities. (Tr. 26-31).
Plaintiff's only challenge to the ALJ's credibility analysis is that Plaintiff alleges the ALJ erred by stating his daily activities "were intact." (Doc. 8 at 5-6). However, there was nothing improper in the ALJ taking Plaintiff's daily activities into consideration in evaluating Plaintiff's credibility. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i) (authorizing an ALJ to consider activities when evaluating functional limitations); see also Warner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 392 (6th Cir. 2004) (permitting an ALJ to consider daily activities such as housework and social activities in evaluating complaints of disabling pain). The ALJ noted that Plaintiff testified that he has problems with activities of daily living to include limitations with bending and lifting, but maintained that he could shop with his wife and do some household chores, like vacuuming and laundry. (Tr. 55). Plaintiff also stated that he could prepare simple meals in the microwave. (Tr. 55). In any event, the ALJ did not discount Plaintiff's credibility solely based on his daily activities. The ALJ considered a host of factors in assessing Plaintiff's credibility in accordance with 20 C.F.R § 404.1529(a)-(c) and thus committed no harmful error. (Tr. 26-31).
The ALJ properly considered Plaintiff's testimony, along with the relevant evidence and medical opinions discussed above, and performed his duty as the trier of fact in resolving any conflicts in the evidence. See Perales, 402 U.S. at 399. The ALJ fulfilled his responsibility of assessing Plaintiff's RFC by considering all of the relevant evidence, including the objective medical evidence and any opinions from acceptable medical sources, as explained above. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513, 404.1520, 404.1526(d), 404.1527, 404.1545, 404.1546(c). The ALJ, who is in the best position to observe Plaintiff's demeanor and evaluate the testimony in light of the record, properly determined that Plaintiff's allegations regarding his limitations were not fully credible. See Gooch v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 833 F.2d 589, 592 (6th Cir. 1987). An ALJ's conclusions about credibility should not be discarded lightly and should be accorded great weight and deference. See Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 476 (6th Cir. 2003). Consequently, the ALJ's findings with respect to Plaintiff's RFC and credibility analysis are supported by substantial evidence and were made according to the regulations, rulings, and Sixth Circuit law.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred by failing to discuss a VA disability rating and a Goodwill work evaluation. (Doc. 8 at 8-9). Plaintiff has not produced a decision from the VA that indicated he was considered 70% disabled. Even if this Court were to find that based on Plaintiff's testimony alone, the VA found Plaintiff 70% disabled, the ALJ was not bound by the VA's determination. "[A] decision by another governmental agency as to an individual's disability is not binding upon the Social Security Administration." Turcus v. SSA, 110 F. App'x 630, 632 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504); see also SSR 06-03p, 71 Fed. Reg. 45,593 ("Because the ultimate responsibility for determining whether an individual is disabled under Social Security law rests with the Commissioner, we are not bound by disability determinations by other governmental agencies. In addition, because other agencies may apply different rules and standards than we do for determining whether an individual is disabled, this may limit the relevance of a determination of disability made by another agency").
With respect to Plaintiff's allegation regarding the Goodwill work evaluation, as stated above, "[a]n ALJ can consider all the evidence without directly addressing in his written decision every piece of evidence submitted by a party." Kornecky, 167 F. App'x at 508 (quoting Loral Defense Systems-Akron, 200 F.3d at 453) (citations and internal quotations marks omitted). Considering this transcript is over 1500 pages long, it would be next to impossible for the ALJ to cite to every piece of evidence contained in the transcript. Moreover, the Goodwill work evaluation appeared to be conducted by a case manager and an Assistant Director in Employment and Training Services over a five month period in 2009, not evidence from an acceptable medical source. (Tr. 835-47); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d)(4).
After properly assessing Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could not return to his past relevant work. (Tr. 31); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). The ALJ, therefore, had to determine if Plaintiff could perform other work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). The ALJ relied on VE testimony, in conjunction with the Medical Vocational Guidelines, 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, as a framework to determine that Plaintiff could perform other work in significant numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 31-32, 57-60); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(e). The Commissioner can show that Plaintiff possesses the capacity to perform substantial gainful activity existent in the national economy by finding, based on substantial evidence, that Plaintiff has the vocational qualifications to perform specific jobs. See Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 530 (6th Cir. 1997). The Commissioner can meet her burden by using VE testimony in response to a hypothetical question comprehensively portraying Plaintiff's vocational abilities and limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(e).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by giving an incomplete hypothetical question to the VE because it did not include the need to alternate between sitting and standing, vision problems due to diabetes, and problems using his hands due to diabetic neuropathy of his hands, and because it left out the number of days of work he would miss. (Doc. 8 at 9-10). However, significantly, Plaintiff fails to identify any doctor's limitations that the ALJ supposedly did not include in his hypothetical question to the VE. (Id.) To the extent Plaintiff is arguing the ALJ failed to include the above-noted limitations and statements, the ALJ did not find Plaintiff completely credible. (Tr. 27). "It is well established that an ALJ may pose hypothetical questions to a vocational expert and is required to incorporate only those limitations accepted as credible by the finder of fact." Casey, 987 F.2d at 1234-35 (citation omitted); Manor v. Astrue, 2011 WL 2940356, *9 (S.D. Ohio June 9, 2011) (ALJ not obligated to include the claimant's unsubstantiated complaints in hypothetical question to VE) (citing Hardaway v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 823 F.2d 922 (6th Cir. 1987)).
The ALJ provided a hypothetical question to the VE, which included all relevant vocational information that pertained to Plaintiff, including all of the limitations the ALJ found in his assessment of Plaintiff's RFC. (Tr. 26). The ALJ stated he specially accounted for Plaintiff's peripheral neuropathy, back problems, and obesity by limiting Plaintiff to light work with postural limitations. (Tr. 28-29). The ALJ also took into consideration Plaintiff's hearing loss by limiting him to jobs that do not require fine hearing capabilities. (Tr. 29). The VE testified that an individual with Plaintiff's vocational profile could perform other work such as a mail clerk, a food preparer, and a security guard. (Tr. 31-32, 57-60). The ALJ then relied on the VE's testimony in identifying the jobs Plaintiff could perform. (Id.) Since the VE testimony was in response to a hypothetical question accurately portraying Plaintiff's vocational abilities and limitations, the ALJ properly relied on the VE's testimony in his decision. See Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 356-57 (6th Cir. 2001); Varley v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 820 F.2d 777, 779-80 (6th Cir. 1987). The hypothetical questions posed to the VE accurately reflected Plaintiff's abilities and limitations, and the VE's response provides substantial evidence that Plaintiff was not disabled.
The Commissioner, and not the court, is charged with the duty to weigh the evidence, resolve material conflicts in the testimony, and determine the case accordingly. See Perales, 402 U.S. at 399. Even if this Court disagrees with the ALJ's resolution of the factual issues, and would resolve those disputed factual issues differently, his decision must be affirmed where, as here, it is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. See Cornette v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 869 F.2d 260, 263 (6th Cir. 1988). In this case, the record as a whole supports the ALJ's conclusions that Plaintiff could perform other work in significant numbers in the national economy, and was not disabled.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's assignments of error are unavailing. The ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and is affirmed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the decision of the Commissioner, that Matthew C. Hartley was not entitled to disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, is found SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, and AFFIRMED; and, as no further matters remain pending for the Court's review, this case is CLOSED.
________________
Timothy S. Black
United States District Judge