A mandatory jury instruction is one which purports to set out all of the elements essential to an issue and then directs the jury to find for a particular party. Perry v. Goss (1970), 253 Ind. 603, 255 N.E.2d 923; Cato Enterprises, Inc. v. Fine (1971), 149 Ind. App. 163, 271 N.E.2d 146. An ambiguity, inaccuracy, or incompleteness of a mandatory instruction may not be cured by reference to other instructions. Shelby Nat'l Bank v. Miller (1971), 147 Ind. App. 203, 259 N.E.2d 450; Coffey v. Wininger (1973), 156 Ind. App. 233, 296 N.E.2d 154; Estate of Hunt v. Board of Comm'rs of Henry County (1988), Ind. App., 526 N.E.2d 1230. In the present case, final instruction No. 9 purported to set out all of the essential elements and then directed the jury to find guilt upon satisfactory proof of these elements. It is therefore a mandatory instruction.
Sisler v. Shaffer, (1897) 43 W. Va. 769, 28 S.E. 721. See also Apple v. Board of Commissioners, (1891) 127 Ind. 553, 27 N.E. 166; Glover v. Stevenson, (1891) 126 Ind. 532, 26 N.E. 486; Shelby National Bank v. Miller, (1970) 147 Ind. App. 203, 259 N.E.2d 450; Reserve Life Insurance Co. v. Luedke, (1961) 132 Ind. App. 476, 177 N.E.2d 482; 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 15 at 304-308 (3d ed. 1940); McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 58 at 132 (2d ed. 1972); 4 JONES, EVIDENCE § 25:21 at 167 (6th ed. 1972); 12 I.L.E. Evidence § 54 at 486 (1959). Wigmore actually discerns three competing rules among American and English jurisdictions.
When an instruction is not mandatory in nature, it must be considered with all of the other instructions given to the jury and ambiguity, inaccuracy or incompleteness of one instruction may be cured by another instruction not inconsistent therewith. Shelby National Bank v. Miller (1970), 147 Ind. App. 203, 259 N.E.2d 450, trans. denied; Coffey v. Wininger (1973), 156 Ind. App. 233, 296 N.E.2d 154.
2) evidence of sufficient known quantities in the particular cause to which the scientific, business or occupational formula, theorem, rule, standard, calculation can be applied. An example of this process is found in Shelby National Bank v. Miller, (1970) 147 Ind. App. 203, 259 N.E.2d 450. In Miller in an offer to prove the proffered expert was first asked to describe the scientific methods for determining the speed of a vehicle.
Although the police officer in McClure had investigated some 3,000 automobile accidents, the evidence revealed little indication of any particular expertise in determining the speed of vehicles in automobile accidents. This Court therefore held it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude the officer's testimony since reasonable persons might differ as to whether or not the witness was qualified to testify as an expert accident reconstructionist. Robinson also relies on Shelby National Bank v. Miller, (1970) 147 Ind. App. 203, 259 N.E.2d 450 where this Court upheld the exclusion of testimony by a qualified accident reconstruction expert. However, the exclusion was based upon an objection addressing the propriety of eliciting any expert testimony as an invasion of the jury's province.
It was during this impeachment that the question in issue was asked. School City cites Rieth-Riley Constr. Co. v. McCarrell (1975), 163 Ind. App. 619, 325 N.E.2d 844, and Shelby Nat'l Bk., Adm. v. Miller (1970), 147 Ind. App. 203, 259 N.E.2d 450, as authority for the admission of a prior inconsistent statement of opinion for impeachment purposes. Both cases, however, are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar.
Perry v. Goss (1970), 253 Ind. 603, 255 N.E.2d 923. This court, in citing 2 Wiltrout, Indiana Practice, § 1400, in Shelby Nat'l Bk., Adm. v. Miller (1970), 147 Ind. App. 203, 259 N.E.2d 450, held the following: "Except as to mandatory instructions, ambiguity, inaccuracy, or incompleteness of one instruction may be cured by another instruction which is not [4] inconsistent with the other.
In doing so, the defense, in effect, opened the door to the introduction of the entire statement during redirect examination by the State. Where a portion of a statement or conversation is placed into evidence, the adverse party is entitled to prove the remainder. Brown v. State (1915), 184 Ind. 254, 108 N.E. 861; Elgin, Joliets&sEastern R. Co. v. Collins (1970), 147 Ind.App. 343, 260 N.E.2d 810; Shelby Nat'l. Bk., Adm. v. Miller (1970), 147 Ind.App. 203, 259 N.E.2d 450. The final issue presented is whether the trial court erred in permitting the State to treat its own witness as hostile and thereafter impeach the witness' credibility by utilizing excerpts from a prior extrajudicial statement.
Perry v. Goss (1970), 253 Ind. 603, 255 N.E.2d 923. In Shelby Nat'l. Bk., Adm. v. Miller (1970), 147 Ind. App. 203, 259 N.E.2d 450, the court observed: "Except as to mandatory instructions, ambiguity, inaccuracy, or incompleteness of one instruction may be cured by another instruction which is not inconsistent with the other.
However, where an instruction is not mandatory, ambiguity, inaccuracy or incompleteness of one instruction may be cured by another instruction not inconsistent therewith. Shelby National Bank, Adm. v. Miller (1970), 147 Ind. App. 203, 259 N.E.2d 450, 464, (transfer denied). The point of inquiry in determining if an erroneous instruction is prejudicial is whether the jury was misled.