Shelby Nat'l. Bk., Adm. v. Miller

16 Citing cases

  1. Madison v. State

    534 N.E.2d 702 (Ind. 1989)   Cited 13 times
    Stating an explanation of possible penalties is not an inducement rendering a confession involuntary

    A mandatory jury instruction is one which purports to set out all of the elements essential to an issue and then directs the jury to find for a particular party. Perry v. Goss (1970), 253 Ind. 603, 255 N.E.2d 923; Cato Enterprises, Inc. v. Fine (1971), 149 Ind. App. 163, 271 N.E.2d 146. An ambiguity, inaccuracy, or incompleteness of a mandatory instruction may not be cured by reference to other instructions. Shelby Nat'l Bank v. Miller (1971), 147 Ind. App. 203, 259 N.E.2d 450; Coffey v. Wininger (1973), 156 Ind. App. 233, 296 N.E.2d 154; Estate of Hunt v. Board of Comm'rs of Henry County (1988), Ind. App., 526 N.E.2d 1230. In the present case, final instruction No. 9 purported to set out all of the essential elements and then directed the jury to find guilt upon satisfactory proof of these elements. It is therefore a mandatory instruction.

  2. French v. State

    266 Ind. 276 (Ind. 1977)   Cited 45 times
    Finding that the victim's abduction from one county and later murder in another county were "integrally related" for purposes of venue

    Sisler v. Shaffer, (1897) 43 W. Va. 769, 28 S.E. 721. See also Apple v. Board of Commissioners, (1891) 127 Ind. 553, 27 N.E. 166; Glover v. Stevenson, (1891) 126 Ind. 532, 26 N.E. 486; Shelby National Bank v. Miller, (1970) 147 Ind. App. 203, 259 N.E.2d 450; Reserve Life Insurance Co. v. Luedke, (1961) 132 Ind. App. 476, 177 N.E.2d 482; 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 15 at 304-308 (3d ed. 1940); McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 58 at 132 (2d ed. 1972); 4 JONES, EVIDENCE § 25:21 at 167 (6th ed. 1972); 12 I.L.E. Evidence § 54 at 486 (1959). Wigmore actually discerns three competing rules among American and English jurisdictions.

  3. Estate of Hunt v. Bd. of Comm., Henry Cty

    526 N.E.2d 1230 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 14 times

    When an instruction is not mandatory in nature, it must be considered with all of the other instructions given to the jury and ambiguity, inaccuracy or incompleteness of one instruction may be cured by another instruction not inconsistent therewith. Shelby National Bank v. Miller (1970), 147 Ind. App. 203, 259 N.E.2d 450, trans. denied; Coffey v. Wininger (1973), 156 Ind. App. 233, 296 N.E.2d 154.

  4. Martin v. Roberts

    452 N.E.2d 182 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 2 times

    2) evidence of sufficient known quantities in the particular cause to which the scientific, business or occupational formula, theorem, rule, standard, calculation can be applied. An example of this process is found in Shelby National Bank v. Miller, (1970) 147 Ind. App. 203, 259 N.E.2d 450. In Miller in an offer to prove the proffered expert was first asked to describe the scientific methods for determining the speed of a vehicle.

  5. City of Indianapolis v. Robinson

    427 N.E.2d 902 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 15 times
    In Robinson, the trial court permitted an expert to render an opinion in response to a hypothetical question based on automobile accident reconstruction.

    Although the police officer in McClure had investigated some 3,000 automobile accidents, the evidence revealed little indication of any particular expertise in determining the speed of vehicles in automobile accidents. This Court therefore held it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude the officer's testimony since reasonable persons might differ as to whether or not the witness was qualified to testify as an expert accident reconstructionist. Robinson also relies on Shelby National Bank v. Miller, (1970) 147 Ind. App. 203, 259 N.E.2d 450 where this Court upheld the exclusion of testimony by a qualified accident reconstruction expert. However, the exclusion was based upon an objection addressing the propriety of eliciting any expert testimony as an invasion of the jury's province.

  6. School City of Gary v. Claudio

    413 N.E.2d 628 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 22 times
    In School City of Gary v. Claudio (1980), Ind. App., 413 N.E.2d 628, this Court noted that there exists a "well recognized duty in tort law that persons entrusted with children, or others whose characteristics make it likely that they may do somewhat unreasonable things, have a special responsibility recognized by the common law to supervise their charges."

    It was during this impeachment that the question in issue was asked. School City cites Rieth-Riley Constr. Co. v. McCarrell (1975), 163 Ind. App. 619, 325 N.E.2d 844, and Shelby Nat'l Bk., Adm. v. Miller (1970), 147 Ind. App. 203, 259 N.E.2d 450, as authority for the admission of a prior inconsistent statement of opinion for impeachment purposes. Both cases, however, are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar.

  7. Moore v. Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology

    165 Ind. App. 165 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975)   Cited 4 times

    Perry v. Goss (1970), 253 Ind. 603, 255 N.E.2d 923. This court, in citing 2 Wiltrout, Indiana Practice, § 1400, in Shelby Nat'l Bk., Adm. v. Miller (1970), 147 Ind. App. 203, 259 N.E.2d 450, held the following: "Except as to mandatory instructions, ambiguity, inaccuracy, or incompleteness of one instruction may be cured by another instruction which is not [4] inconsistent with the other.

  8. Patterson v. State

    314 N.E.2d 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974)   Cited 2 times

    In doing so, the defense, in effect, opened the door to the introduction of the entire statement during redirect examination by the State. Where a portion of a statement or conversation is placed into evidence, the adverse party is entitled to prove the remainder. Brown v. State (1915), 184 Ind. 254, 108 N.E. 861; Elgin, Joliets&sEastern R. Co. v. Collins (1970), 147 Ind.App. 343, 260 N.E.2d 810; Shelby Nat'l. Bk., Adm. v. Miller (1970), 147 Ind.App. 203, 259 N.E.2d 450.        The final issue presented is whether the trial court erred in permitting the State to treat its own witness as hostile and thereafter impeach the witness' credibility by utilizing excerpts from a prior extrajudicial statement.

  9. Lanoux v. Hagar

    159 Ind. App. 646 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974)   Cited 14 times
    In LaNoux v. Hagar (1974), 159 Ind. App. 646, 308 N.E.2d 873, a case wherein an 11 year old boy was struck by a car while riding a bicycle, the court determined at the outset that it must determine whether the instructions given were mandatory in character or otherwise.

    Perry v. Goss (1970), 253 Ind. 603, 255 N.E.2d 923. In Shelby Nat'l. Bk., Adm. v. Miller (1970), 147 Ind. App. 203, 259 N.E.2d 450, the court observed: "Except as to mandatory instructions, ambiguity, inaccuracy, or incompleteness of one instruction may be cured by another instruction which is not inconsistent with the other.

  10. Coffey v. Wininger

    156 Ind. App. 233 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973)   Cited 41 times
    Holding that there was no evidence or inferences to be drawn from the evidence to support the damage award

    However, where an instruction is not mandatory, ambiguity, inaccuracy or incompleteness of one instruction may be cured by another instruction not inconsistent therewith. Shelby National Bank, Adm. v. Miller (1970), 147 Ind. App. 203, 259 N.E.2d 450, 464, (transfer denied). The point of inquiry in determining if an erroneous instruction is prejudicial is whether the jury was misled.