Opinion
Case Number 99 C 0211
February 17, 1999
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The Board of Education of the City of Chicago ("the Board") honorably discharged a number of its tenured teachers on January 22, 1999. It did so pursuant to a policy it promulgated that provides for the discharge of any teacher whose service is no longer needed in his or her previous teaching position and who after ten months is unable to find a new permanent post within the school system. The policy outlines a set number of circumstances in which a teacher's services could be deemed no longer necessary, including a school closing, a drop in enrollment, a change in educational focus at a particular school, and when action is taken as a result of "remediation, probation, reconstitution or educational crisis." See Amended Board Report 95-0814-P02 Policy Regarding Reassignment and Layoff of Regularly Certified and Appointed Teachers, § 1. In laying off the teachers, the school district followed the Board's procedures in so far as it notified the teachers of their reserve status, allowed them ten months to find a new permanent post, and when they did not, gave them at least 14 days notice of their termination.
Eight of the discharged teachers and the Chicago Teacher's Union (collectively the "Teachers") seek a preliminary injunction — and ultimately a permanent injunction, as well as monetary damages — to prevent the Board from following through on these dismissals. Plaintiffs argue that as tenured teachers in the Chicago school system, they hold permanent positions and that under state law they may be fired only for cause and only after designated procedures for dismissal for cause have been implemented. Because the Board concedes that none of these teachers was fired for cause, Plaintiffs assert that the Board's action violates their constitutional right not to be deprived of their permanent employment positions without due process of law.
Plaintiffs briefly allege in their complaint that certain teachers lost their positions not for one of the reasons listed in the Board's layoff policy, but because they were absent due to sickness, maternity leave, or an approved sabbatical. If those allegations prove true, the plaintiffs may have some success on the merits. However, plaintiffs have not pressed these facts in their briefs, and the bare allegation is not enough to warrant granting an injunction at this time.
I will issue a preliminary injunction if the Teachers can show: (1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, (2) lack of an adequate remedy at law, and (3) irreparable injury without injunctive relief; and if the balance of harms to each party and the public interest weigh in favor of doing so. See Brownsburg Area Patrons Affecting Change v. Baldwin, 137 F.3d 503, 506 (7th Cir. 1998). As plaintiffs have satisfied all three initial conditions, including showing more than a negligible chance of success on the merits, I proceed to balance the harms to each party and to the public interest of issuing or not issuing the injunction. See id. As I indicated earlier when denying plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order, in a case pitting the possibility of the wrongful termination of school teachers against the cost to a public school board and the taxpayers of paying unneeded employees, the harm tally is substantial on both sides of the balance sheet. Given these significant competing harms, my decision whether to issue the injunction turns on the actual strength of the plaintiffs' case on the merits, for the more likely the Teachers' case is to succeed on the merits, the less the balance of harms must weigh in their favor. See Vencor, Inc. v. Webb, 33 F.3d 840, 845 (7th Cir. 1990).
Tenure in the Chicago school system is a creation of the Illinois General Assembly. See 105 ILCS 5/34-84. While teachers who hold tenure have a property right therein, see Pittman v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 64 F.3d 1098, 1104 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-39, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1491-92 (1985)), the scope of that tenure is defined by statute and can be changed — or even eliminated — by the General Assembly at any time without constituting a due process violation. See Pittman, 64 F.3d at 1104 (upholding statutory amendment eliminating tenure held by school principals). In other words, the General Assembly is free to decide that the job protection enjoyed by Chicago's tenured school teachers should not include protection from necessary lays offs and to grant the Board the authority to determine such necessity. Therefore, as the legislature could have done what the Board says it did ( i.e., grant the Board power to lay off tenured teachers), the relevant question is whether it actually did what the Board says it did.
Plaintiffs assert that two provisions in the Illinois School Code, 105 ILCS 5/34-84 and 105 ILCS 5/34-85, unambiguously state that the only way a tenured teacher may be dismissed is for cause. The first provision, which addresses teacher appointments and promotions and which is the one that actually creates tenure, states in relevant part: "[A]fter satisfactory service for a probationary period . . . appointments of teachers shall become permanent, subject to removal for cause in the manner provided in Section 34-85." 105 ILCS 5/34-84. The second provision addresses the procedures involved in removing teachers for cause and states in relevant part: "No teacher employed by the board of education shall [after receiving tenure] be removed except for cause." 105 ILCS 5/34-85.
The Board counters that nothing in the language of these provisions indicates that cause is the only way a teacher may be dismissed and points to a separate provision in the School Code for authority to act as it did: 105 ILCS 5/34-18 (31). This section, which was enacted in 1995 as part of a package of amendments, grants the Board the power to "promulgate rules establishing procedures governing the layoff or reduction in force of employees and the recall of such employees." 105 ILCS 5/34-18 (31). As teachers are employees under the School Code, the Board argues, they may be laid off pursuant to policies it promulgates.
While there is clear tension between these two statutory provisions, there cannot be an actual conflict. It is my job to interpret the statute, and I look to the rules of statutory interpretation outlined by the Illinois Supreme Court to do so. See U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Barker Car Rental, 132 F.3d 1153, 1156 (7th Cir. 1997). The primary rule of interpreting Illinois statutes, to which all other rules are subordinate, is that a court should ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. See Abrahamson v. Illinois Dept. of Prof. Reg., 153 Ill.2d 76, 91 606 N.E.2d 1111, 1118 (1992). The court should seek the legislative intent primarily in the language of the statute, by giving the statutory terms their ordinary meaning. See In Re: Application for Judgment Sale of Delinq. Prop. for the Tax Year 1989, 167 Ill.2d 161, 168, 656 N.E.2d 1049, 1053 (1995). In doing so, the statute should be evaluated as a whole, and the language within each section of a statute must be examined in light of the entire statute. See Sulser v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 147 Ill.2d 548, 554, 591 N.E.2d 427, 429 (1992). In addition, it is also proper to compare statutes on related subjects in ascertaining legislative intent. See People v. Krause, 273 Ill. App.3d 59, 62, 651 N.E.2d 744, 746 (3d Dist. 1995) (citing Illinois-Indiana Cable Television Assoc. v. ICC, 55 Ill.2d 205, 220, 302 N.E.2d 334, 342 (1973)). Finally, when the meaning of the statute is unclear from the statutory language itself, a court may look beyond the language employed and consider the purpose of the law and the evils the law was designed to remedy , see In Re: Application for Judgment, 167 Ill.2d at 168, 656 N.E.2d at 1053, as well as the legislative history. See People v. Lowe, 153 Ill.2d 195, 203, 606 N.E.2d 1167, 1171 (1992).
With these principles in mind, I turn to the specific issue in this case: whether 105 ILCS 5/34-18 (31) grants the Board authority to promulgate guidelines to lay off tenured teachers, notwithstanding the definition of tenure outlined in 105 ILCS 5/34-84. More precisely, I must determine whether the Illinois legislature intended the word "employees" in 5/34-18 (31) to include those teachers who had completed their probationary period and received tenure.
I look first to the plain language of the statute. Giving the word "employees" its plain meaning, I find that it encompasses all persons employed by the Board, including tenured teachers. There are no restrictions whatsoever in the text of the provision, and I decline to read into it what is not there, an exception for a single set of employees. Plaintiffs point to introductory language in 105 ILCS 5/34-18 that grants power to the Board to perform the enumerated functions "except as otherwise provided by this Article" and argue that the subject of dismissal of tenured teachers is otherwise provided for in 105 ILCS 5/34-84 and 5/34-85. However, neither 105 ILCS 5/34-84 nor 5/34-85 makes any specific mention of layoffs, and they simply do not constitute authority sufficiently contrary to the explicit language in 105 ILCS 5/34-18 (31) to warrant restricting the Board's power in the way the Teachers suggest.
This plain reading of the statute finds further support in the text of amendments made to the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (IELRA), see 115 ILCS 5/4.5(a)(3) , at the same time that 105 ILCS 5/34-18 (31) was enacted. Specifically, the General Assembly removed the union's ability to bargain collectively about "[d]ecisions to layoff or reduce employees (including but not limited to reserve teachers . . .)." 115 ILCS 5/4.5(a)(3). This prohibition with respect to bargaining about decisions to lay off reserve teachers would be superfluous if reserve teachers could not actually be laid off. Thus, the only way to read 105 ILCS 5/34-18 (31) in a way that gives meaning to 115 ILCS 5/4.5(a)(3) is that "employees" includes teachers.
While the Illinois Code does not provide a definition of the term "reserve teacher," the parties do not dispute that reserve teachers are the same as supernumerary teachers, who are "teacher[s], not on administrative payroll, who [have] a rating of 'satisfactory' or better and whose service is no longer required because of a decrease in student membership, a change in subject matter requirements within the attendance center organization, or the closing of an attendance center." See 105 ILCS 5/34-1.1. They also do not dispute that reserve teachers can include tenured teachers.
The Teachers argue that construction with other sections of the School Code itself mandates the opposite conclusion. They point to 105 ILCS 5/24-12, which details procedures by which non-Chicago school districts may honorably discharge their teachers. Plaintiffs argue that the absence of any similarly explicit provision for Chicago schools demonstrates legislative intent not to allow honorable discharges of Chicago teachers at all. That argument fails. The legislature is by no means bound to apply exactly the same policies to every school district in the state. Indeed, if that were the case, there would be no reason for the separate provisions governing school districts of relative sizes, as one general law would suffice. As I have said before, the legislature is free to pick a place to try reforms to see how they work before spreading them to other troubled school districts. See Hearne v. Board of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 996 F. Supp. 773, 778 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
The Teachers' strongest argument is simply the plain language of sections 105 ILCS 5/34-84 and 5/34-85, which themselves must be construed together with the power granted the Board to promulgate rules governing layoffs of employees in 105 ILCS 5/34-18 (31). Plaintiffs make a credible argument that a reasonable reading of the plain language is that teachers who have finished their probationary periods and earned tenure may be dismissed only for cause. While I do not believe that a plain reading of the entire code supports this interpretation, there is enough ambiguity to warrant examination of legislative intent beyond the plain language of the statute.
To the extent that ambiguity exists, I am instructed to look to the purpose and spirit behind the statutory language and look here to the enactment of the 1995 amendments to the School Code. See Pub. Act 89-15, H.B. 206, 89th Gen. Assem. (Ill. 1995). Finding explicitly that "an education crisis exists in the Chicago Public Schools," the legislature amended the Code to create a five-member Chicago School Reform Board "to bring educational and financial stability to the system." 105 ILCS 5/34-3.3. As part of this reform effort, the General Assembly granted the Board the power to increase the quality of educational services in Chicago, to develop a long-term financial plan that best used the available resources, to implement cost-saving measures in an effort to reduce excess spending, and to create an efficient and effective management system in the Chicago public school system. See Hearne, 996 F. Supp. at 778. The legislature also granted the Board broad powers to take those actions it deemed necessary to effect change within the school system. See id. In light of the legislators' change-minded approach, it is incredible to believe that they would have strengthened the job security of teachers whose services are no longer needed by the system.
Plaintiffs assert that it is the purpose behind the original enactment in 1909 of the Teacher Tenure law — not the 1995 amendments — that should guide my interpretation of these statutory provisions. Citing cases from 1953 and 1978, they argue that the provisions should be construed to grant teachers maximum job protection. However, each provision at issue in this case was either enacted or amended as part of the 1995 amendments. Therefore, while I am mindful of the guiding principles behind the creation of tenure for teachers in Illinois, it is the legislative purpose behind the 1995 amendments that is the best guide to interpreting the provisions at issue here.
A closer look at the package of 1995 amendments that relates to this issue reinforces this conclusion. By those amendments, the legislature (1) deleted language outlining a process by which reserve teachers could be honorably discharged from the text of 105 ILCS 5/34-84, (2) added in its entirety the text of 105 ILCS 5/34-18 (31), and (3) added the prohibition on collective bargaining with regard to layoffs of employees, including reserve teachers, in 115 ILCS 5/4.5(a)(3). Plaintiffs argue that the General Assembly's deletion of specific language in the tenure statute regarding honorable discharges for reserve teachers is evidence that it intended to prohibit such discharges altogether. But that language was deleted at the same time that the legislature granted the Board broad discretionary power over layoffs and prohibited the teachers' union from bargaining with the Board on the subject of laying off reserve teachers. Taken together, this package of amendments can support only one reading of legislative intent: to grant the Board power to promulgate rules governing layoffs of all employees, including tenured teachers.
Still, the Teachers cite another contemporaneous amendment — the removal of civil service protection for non-teacher school district employees, see 105 ILCS 5/34-15 — as evidence that the General Assembly did not intend to include tenured teachers in 115 ILCS 5/34-18 (31). The Teachers argue that the reduction in job protection for civil service employees and the Board's new power to lay off employees, read together, produce the logical conclusion that the word "employees" in the latter is restricted to the civil service employees in the former. However, such a limited construction simply does not appear in the plain language of 105 ILCS 5/34-18 (31) and would be inconsistent with the broad sweep of reforms enacted by the General Assembly.
Finally, what little legislative history there is supports my reading of the General Assembly's intent. Comments by the sponsor of the 1995 amendments on the floor of the General Assembly confirm that the legislators were not concerned with strengthening the job security of teachers whom the Board no longer needs: "I think we should take [money being paid to reserve teachers] and give it as a salary increase for the teachers who do have classrooms." 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, 68th Legis. Day, at 66 (statements of Rep. Cowlishaw).
Because the General Assembly granted the Board the power to lay off school district employees, including tenured teachers, when it enacted 105 ILCS 5/34-18 (31), and there is no evidence that the Board exceeded its authority in promulgating its policy on honorable dismissals of reserve teachers, the Board did not violate the constitutional rights of plaintiffs in this case. The due process rights of tenured state employees who are laid off pursuant to statutory authority are not violated by the absence of a hearing, even where a hearing would be required for a termination for cause. See Chestnut v. Lodge, 34 Ill.2d 567, 570-71, 216 N.E.2d 79, 801-02 (1966); Hahn v. City of Harvard, 239 Ill. App.3d 819, 823, 609 N.E.2d . 95, 98 (1992). The process that these plaintiffs received is legislative process, and that is enough to satisfy the Constitution.
Plaintiffs make one last argument that merits discussion. The Teachers argue that even assuming that the Board does have the authority to lay off teachers pursuant to its statutory grant of power in 105 ILCS 5/34-18 (31), it exceeded that power by delegating the notice-giving power to school administrators. That argument does not succeed, however, because the explicit power granted to the Board is one to "promulgate rules establishing procedures governing the layoff or reduction in force of employees and the recall of such employees." See 105 ILCS 5/34-18 (31). While implicit in that grant is the power to lay off employees, the General Assembly, significantly, does not specify that the Board itself must perform the actual laying off.
In sum, in light of the Teachers' small chance of success on the merits of their procedural due process claim and the significant cost to the Board in paying teachers it does not need, the balance of harms cannot justify equitable relief at this time. Accordingly, I deny Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.