The “no objection” waiver doctrine has been disregarded by appellate courts where the record fairly indicates that the trial judge was not mislead into believing that the defense was actually waiving or otherwise abandoning the complaint previously made to the introduction of that evidence. Bouyer v. State, 264 S.W.3d 265, 268–69 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2008, no pet.) (trial court held suppression hearing on issue after counsel said “no objection”); Shedden v. State, 268 S.W.3d 717, 730 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2008, pet. ref'd) (trial court “expressly represented to [defendant's counsel] that it considered the suppression issue preserved for appeal”). Accord, See 43A GEORGE E. DIX AND JOHN M. SCHMOLESKY: Criminal Practice and Procedure § 53:150 (3d ed.2011) (stating that application of the principles of waiver or forfeiture are “open to doubt” where defense counsel's “no objection” statement might well have been intended by counsel to mean that the defense had no objections beyond those already presented and rejected and the trial court was not mislead into believing that the defense no longer wished to pursue that objection).

Disclosure under Rule 508(c)(3) is required only when the trial court is not satisfied that the informant was reliable and credible. See TEX. R. EVID. 508(c)(3); Shedden v. State, 268 S.W.3d 717, 734 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2008, pet. ref'd); see also Glenn v. State, Nos. 01-96-00452-CR, 01-96-00453-CR, 1998 WL 224009, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 7, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for publication).

It is well-settled law that when a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence is overruled, the defendant does not need to subsequently object at trial to the same evidence in order to preserve error on appeal. Moraguez v. State, 701 S.W.2d 902, 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Shedden v. State, 268 S.W.3d 717, 730 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2008, pet. ref'd). "However, when the defendant affirmatively asserts during trial he has 'no objection' to the admission of the complained of evidence, he waives an error in the admission of the evidence despite the pre-trial ruling."

However, not every appellant who states "no objection" at trial is denied appeal for want of preserved error. See Shedden v. State, 268 S.W.3d 717, 730 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2008, pet. ref'd); Bouyer v. State, 264 S.W.3d 265, 268-69 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.). In the rare case, error may be preserved if the trial court re-examines the admissibility of the challenged evidence after appellant has stated "no objection" or otherwise failed to earlier object to its admission.

However, when a defendant affirmatively states during trial that he has "no objection" to the admission of the complained-of evidence, he waives any error in the admission of the evidence despite the pretrial ruling. Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 905 (2011); Swain v. State, 181 S.W.3d 359, 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Jones v. State, 833 S.W.2d 118, 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Moraguez, 701 S.W.2d at 904. Relying on Shedden v. State, 268 S.W.3d 717 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2008, pet. ref'd) and Bouyer v. State, 264 S.W.3d 265 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.), Maldonado asserts he did not waive any error in the admission of the dental records by affirmatively stating "no objection" because the trial court did not construe his statement to be a waiver of the motion to suppress. Maldonado argues the hearing on the motion to suppress and comments made by the trial court during that hearing "show that the trial court fully understood that this issue was being preserved for appeal."

As consequence, Sanchez has not shown that the trial court erred in denying his implied Franks motion. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56, Harris, 227 S.W.3d at 86; Shedden v. State, 268 S.W.3d 717, 738 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2008, pet. ref'd) (holding that where the defendant "did not establish that [the officer] intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly made a false statement in his warrant affidavit," the trial court did not err in denying his Franks claim); see also State v. Ozuna, No. 13-16-00364-CR, 2018 WL 2057274, at *10 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg May 3, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that because the defendant failed to prove a Franks violation occurred, "we need not remove [the statement] from the probable cause equation," and the defendant's challenge to the validity of the search warrant affidavit fails). We overrule Sanchez's last issue.

Each of the cases cited by the concurrence involve an instance in which the defendant had previously preserved his claim of error prior to stating that he had "no objection" to the evidence when subsequently offered. See Thomas v. State, 408 S.W.3d 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (error previously preserved by pre-trial motion to suppress); Bouyer v. State, 264 S.W.3d 265, 268-69 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.) (error preserved by pre-trial motion to suppress even though hearing on motion not held until after the evidence was admitted); Shedden v. State, 268 S.W.3d 717, 730 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2008, pet. ref'd) (error preserved by pre-trial motion to suppress and trial court specifically advised by defendant that he did not intend to waive his objections to admission of the evidence); 43A George E. Dix And John M. Schmolesky: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 53:150 (3d ed. 2011) (waiver "open to doubt" where defense counsel's "no objection" statement might have been intended to mean that defendant had no objections beyond those already presented and rejected and the trial court was not misled into believing that the defense no longer wished to pursue that objection). We conclude that these cases hold that a defendant's statement of "no objection" to the State's proffered evidence does not forfeit the defendant's earlier-preserved claim of error in the admission of the evidence.

See Thomas v. State, 408 S.W.3d 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (holding that the "no objection" waiver rule should not be applied mechanically in every case). See also Bouyer v. State, 264 S.W.3d 265, 268-69 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.) (trial court held suppression hearing on issue after counsel said "no objection"); Shedden v. State, 268 S.W.3d 717, 730 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2008, pet. ref'd) (trial court "expressly represented to [defendant's counsel] that it considered the suppression issue preserved for appeal"). Accord 43A GEORGE E. DIX AND JOHN M. SCHMOLESKY: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 53:150 (3rd ed. 2011) (stating that application of the principles of waiver or forfeiture are "open to doubt" where defense counsel's "no objection" statement might well have been intended by counsel to mean that the defense had no objections beyond those already presented and rejected and the trial court was not misled into believing that the defense no longer wished to pursue that objection).

Based on the foregoing, we determine that Detective Dickson's testimony does not demonstrate that he provided a false statement or that the any statements in the affidavit were made intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard for their truth. See Shedden v. State, 268 S.W.3d 717, 737-38 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2008, pet. ref'd). As a result, the trial court did not err in refusing Appellant's requested instruction under Article 38.23.

Id. (quoting Howard, 941 S.W.2d at 117). See Shedden v. State, 268 S.W.3d 717, 735 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2008, pet. ref'd) (objection arguing that trial court's refusal to compel State to disclose identity of confidential informant violated "due process' rights . . . was not specific enough to preserve [appellants'] arguments that the ruling violated their rights to a 'fair trial.'"); see alsoBell v. State, 90 S.W.3d 301, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ("It is not sufficient that appellant raise only a general constitutional doctrine in support of his request for relief."). Tiede relies on the inherent prejudice argument.