Shaw v. Close

24 Citing cases

  1. Gadson v. Among Friends Adult Day Care, Inc.

    39 N.E.3d 168 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015)   Cited 12 times

    Those cases only stand for the proposition that an action must be brought in the name of the insurer-subrogee if that insurer-subrogee has compensated the insured for all the damages it could seek against a defendant, and the insured thus no longer has any claim remaining. In Shaw v. Close, 92 Ill.App.2d 1, 4, 235 N.E.2d 830 (1968), for example, the insured had fully resolved its claims; “the only action which remained was [that] of the insurance company.” Thus, because the insured was the only remaining real party-in-interest, the “action had to be brought either in the name of or for the use of the [insurance] company.

  2. Brooke Inns, Inc. v. S & R Hi-fi & TV

    249 Ill. App. 3d 1064 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 17 times

    Defendant cites to Blatz v. City of Rock Falls (1982), 105 Ill. App.3d 732, 434 N.E.2d 807, for the proposition that when an insured subrogates all his rights and interest to his insurer, he retains no interest in the subrogated claim. Defendant asserts that only the insurer here was entitled to bring the suit for damages. Defendant maintains that by executing the subrogation receipt, plaintiffs relinquished any rights and interest in the lawsuit to Home Insurance Company. Shaw v. Close (1968), 92 Ill. App.2d 1, 235 N.E.2d 830. Plaintiffs counter by arguing that a subrogation action may be brought in the name of the insured if the insured retains a pecuniary interest, even for only a nominal sum over and above the subrogation claim.

  3. Hartford v. Burns Int'l Security Services

    172 Ill. App. 3d 184 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)   Cited 21 times
    Holding that waiver of subrogation provision applied to situation where insurer pays the insured's losses and seeks to recover that amount from the defendant

    • 7 "Where an injured party executes a release to the tortfeasor of any and all claims which he may have because of an accident, there arises a bar to any action against the tortfeasor by either the injured party or his insurer-subrogee." ( Shaw v. Close (1968), 92 Ill. App.2d 1, 3; 6A J. Appleman J. Appleman, Insurance Law Practice § 4092, at 239 (1972).) The scope and extent of a release is determined by the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract.

  4. Blatz v. City of Rock Falls

    434 N.E.2d 807 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)   Cited 5 times

    As the court indicated, such subrogation arises independent of contract, by operation of law. However, to the extent that any damages resulted beyond those paid for by Economy, the Blatzes retained an interest in the claim against the City of Rock Falls. ( Smith v. General Paving Co. (1974), 24 Ill. App.3d 858, 863, 321 N.E.2d 689; Shaw v. Close (1968), 92 Ill. App.2d 1, 4-5, 235 N.E.2d 830.) It is important to note that the record does not indicate that the Blatzes assigned all their rights and interests with respect to their claims to their insurer, Economy. No such assignment, either under the provisions of the insurance contract, or by separate agreement, is found in the record. Therefore, to the extent they can show damages above that paid for by their insurer to them, they retain an interest in the claim against the City of Rock Falls. Their complaint alleges damages significantly in excess of the $7,834.

  5. Hitchcock Air Conditioning Co. v. Hazen

    357 N.E.2d 69 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976)   Cited 2 times

    The interest retained by plaintiff in the instant case is its claim for $363.24 consequential damages. Defendant cites no cases involving a so-called nominally retained interest by assignor as invalidating the bringing of an action by the assignee in the assignor's name. Shaw v. Close, 92 Ill. App.2d 1, 235 N.E.2d 830, supports the proposition that where the right of subrogation exists an action may be brought in the name of the insured if the insured has an interest in the suit and is entitled to recover something, if only a nominal sum, over and above the amount of the subrogation claim. See also Smith v. General Paving Co., 24 Ill. App.3d 858, 321 N.E.2d 689.

  6. Commercial Underwriters v. Aires Environmental Serv

    No. 99 C 2129 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 9, 2002)   Cited 2 times

    Such an interest exists where the insured "has an interest in the suit and is entitled to recover something, if only a nominal sum, over and above the amount of the subrogation claim." Shaw v. Close, 235 N.E.2d 830, 831-32 (Ill.App.Ct. 1968). Here, defendant Aires has an interest that could be as much as $22,500, which is the difference between the deductibles of the insurance policies issued by Steadfast and CUIC. This amount surely qualifies as a de minimis interest, as defined under Illinois law.

  7. Sovereign Chemical & Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Ameropan Oil Corp.

    148 F.R.D. 208 (N.D. Ill. 1992)   Cited 5 times

    It also appears that such an insured has a substantive right to bring a claim for the entire amount. See id.;Nitrin, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 35 Ill.App.3d 577, 342 N.E.2d 65, 76 (1st Dist.1976); Shaw v. Close, 92 Ill.App.2d 1, 235 N.E.2d 830, 831-32 (1st Dist.1968); Brosam v. Employer's Mutual Casualty Co., 61 Ill.App.2d 183, 209 N.E.2d 350, 352 (4th Dist.1965). Therefore, Sovereign's partial interest in the claimed damages is a substantive basis under Illinois law for bringing the present lawsuit.

  8. Hughes v. Hughes

    35 Ohio St. 3d 165 (Ohio 1988)   Cited 78 times
    Holding federal law on exemption does not divest state court of jurisdiction to award exemption as part of division of marital property

    In fact, Ohio has codified this rule in R.C. 1.42. See, also, Fleming v. Warshawsky Co. (C.A. 7, 1941), 123 F.2d 622, 626 (construing "release" with "waive"); Shaw v. Close (1968), 92 Ill. App.2d 1, 3, 235 N.E.2d 830, 831 ("release" is the giving up or abandoning of a claim or right); Atlantic Natl. Ins. Co. v. Armstrong (1966), 65 Cal.2d 100, 112, 52 Cal.Rptr. 569, 577, 416 P.2d 801, 809 (equates "waiver" and "release" in an analysis of an agreement to forgo collection of payments); Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark v. Copeland (1967), 248 Cal.App.2d 561, 565, 56 Cal Rptr. 794, 797 ("release" is the relinquishment, concession, or giving up of a right, claim, or privilege); Gronquist v. Olson (1954), 242 Minn. 119, 125, 64 N.W.2d 159, 163 (a "release" is a relinquishment, concession, or giving up of a right, claim, or privilege); Woodrough v. Douglas Cty. (1904), 71 Neb. 354, 361, 98 N.W. 1092, 1095 (holding a release is a "voluntary relinquishment"); Coopey v. Keady (1914), 73 Ore. 66, 76, 144 P. 99, 101 (a "release" is a relinquishment, concession or giving up of a right, claim, or privilege). I would find release to be synonymous with waiver.

  9. Home Insurance Co. v. Hertz Corp.

    71 Ill. 2d 210 (Ill. 1978)   Cited 42 times
    Holding that "an unlimited release executed by an insured-subrogor for consideration not specifically including an amount designated as covering the insurer's subrogation interest does not bar a subsequent subrogation action by an insurer-subrogee against the tortfeasor, if the tortfeasor or his insurance carrier had knowledge of the insurer-subrogee's interest prior to the release"

    The appellate court here relied on Inter Insurance Exchange of Chicago Motor Club v. Andersen (1947), 331 Ill. App. 250, and two subsequent appellate decisions which cite Andersen with approval. ( St. Louis Fire Marine Insurance Co. v. Garnier (1960), 24 Ill. App.2d 408; Shaw v. Close (1968), 92 Ill. App.2d 1.) In Andersen, the insurer, after paying its insured under a collision policy, brought a subrogation action against the tortfeasor for property damage to the insured's automobile; it also joined the insured as a defendant, alleging that, by executing the release, he failed to protect the insurer's subrogation rights as required by the insurance contract.

  10. Developers Sur. & Indem. Co. v. Lipinski

    87 N.E.3d 331 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017)   Cited 1 times

    ¶ 28 Section 2-403(c) of the Code ( 735 ILCS 5/2-403(c) (West 2012)) provides, "Any action hereafter brought by virtue of the subrogation provision of any contract or by virtue of subrogation by operation of law shall be brought either in the name or for the use of the subrogee."¶ 29 In Shaw v. Close, 92 Ill. App. 2d 1, 4, 235 N.E.2d 830 (1968), the court explained:"This statute simply means that the interest of a subrogee cannot be concealed in any proceeding brought for its benefit. It must be either named as the plaintiff or disclosed as the real party in interest.